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Session 1 — Qualitative and quantitative benefits in the use of Model Laws 
 
 
The impact of UNCITRAL on Foreign Direct Investment※ 
 
Andrew Myburgh, World Bank 
Jordi Paniagua, University of Valencia, Spain 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 This paper discusses the impact that a number of initiatives by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) have had on foreign direct investment (FDI). It focuses on initiatives 
that have strengthened domestic and international legal regimes governing international commercial 
arbitration (arbitration). Arbitration is relied on by many companies to enforce contracts that cross 
international borders. For this reason, strengthening the enforcement of these contracts can be expected to 
lower transaction costs and so promote trade, and foreign direct investment. UNCITRAL’s initiatives 
reviewed in this paper are: 
 
- The Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (NY 
Convention). The NY Convention requires signatories to recognize and enforce awards made in 
international arbitration proceedings unless certain, relatively restrictive, conditions are met. By 
facilitating the enforcement of arbitration awards the NY Convention underpins the use of international 
commercial arbitration. Indeed, large scale use of arbitration is largely traced to the establishment of 
the NY Convention in the late 1950s (Casella, 1996). 
 
- The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (Model Law on Arbitration). 
According to UNCITRAL the Model Law on Arbitration is designed to help states to strengthen their 
arbitration laws. The Model Law on Arbitration covers arbitral process all the way from the agreement 
to enforcement of the award. It includes the composition and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and 
court interventions in the arbitral process (UNCITRAL, 2016a). By adopting the Model Law on 
Arbitration countries should improve the reliability and predictability of using arbitration to resolve 
contractual disputes.  
 
- The Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of 2002 (Model Law on Conciliation) 
provides uniform rules with respect to the conciliation process with the aim of ensuring greater 
predictability and certainty in its use. “The Model Law addresses the procedural aspects of 
conciliation, including appointment of conciliators, commencement and termination of conciliation, 
conduct of the conciliation, communication between the conciliator and other parties, confidentiality 
and admissibility of evidence in other proceedings as well as post-conciliation issues, such as the 
conciliator acting as arbitrator and enforceability of settlement agreements” (UNCITRAL, 2016b). An 
important benefit of the Model Law on Conciliation is that it should reduce the expected cost of using 
arbitration by decreasing the need for arbitration proceedings.  
 
 This paper evaluates these initiatives in three parts. Section 2 describes the impact that UNCITRAL’s 
initiatives can be expected to have; section 3 discusses the results of preliminary empirical analysis on the 
role that UNCITRAL’s initiatives have had. 4 concludes with some implications for policy. 
 
__________________ 
※  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do  
not represent the views of the World Bank and its affiliated organizations or those of the executive directors of 
the World Bank or the governments they represent. Jordi Paniagua gratefully acknowledges the financial support 
from Spain’s Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2015-68057-R). 
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2. Expected Economic Impact of UNCITRAL’s initiatives  
 
 The importance of arbitration arises from the difficulties firms face when they use foreign domestic 
courts to enforce cross border contracts. Firms can be unfamiliar with foreign laws and legal processes. 
Furthermore, surveys suggest that firms often have concerns about the impartiality, length of proceedings, 
expertise and levels of corruption in foreign courts (PwC, 2013). All these factors lead firms to be wary of 
relying on foreign jurisdictions to enforce contracts.  
 
 Many of the concerns that firms have with relying on foreign domestic are mitigated by arbitration. 
Surveys (PWC, 2013) find that firms are attracted to arbitration due to the expertise and neutrality of the 
decision maker, confidentiality of the proceedings a lack of familiarity with the courts and laws in foreign 
countries, and enforceability. When firms use arbitration they are able to decide the process used for 
selecting the arbitrators, the procedures under which the arbitration will be conducted, and the law under 
which any disputes will be adjudicated. The majority of contracts reference English or New York State law. 
These jurisdictions have large bodies of precedent that provide guidance on the likely results of arbitration 
proceedings in the wide range of circumstances that can lead to a dispute (Landes and Posner, 1976). Finally, 
due to the widespread adoption of the NY Convention it is often easier to enforce international commercial 
arbitral awards than awards made by foreign domestic courts. 
 
 The benefits of arbitration will be greatest for relationship specific investments. These are defined as 
investments that have far less value outside of the initial relationship. A concrete example is an investment 
in a coal mine that will be located next to its only customer, a power station. A firm would typically only 
invest in the coal mine if it had entered into a contract with the power plant outlining the amount and price 
of coal that the power plant will purchase. If the mine is then built, but the power station breaches the 
contract by stopping payments the value of the investment in the coal mine would be greatly reduced. For 
this reason, a mining company would be wary of making an investment in the coal mine unless they were 
confident that they could enforce the contract with the power plant. As this example suggests relationship 
specific investments often arise in infrastructure. Other examples include large construction projects where 
a failure to pay for the project would lead to losses for the construction firm, the provision of finance where 
a failure by a borrower (say) to pay back the loan leads to losses, imports where the importer cannot be sure 
of the quality of the product being purchased, and projects that have an intellectual property component 
where the client can use the intellectual property but refuse to pay for it. 
 
 Difficulties enforcing contracts can be expected to lead to less relation specific investments. Consistent 
with this, Nunn (2007) finds that a country’s ability to enforce written contracts is an important determinant 
of its comparative advantage. This result is based on the insight that improved contract enforcement leads 
to higher relationship-specific investments which leads to the expansion of sectors in which these 
investments are particularly important Nunn (2007). Another example is (Berkowitz et al, 1996) who finds 
that adopting the NY Convention is associated with greater export of goods whose quality is difficult to 
evaluate at point of delivery. 
 
 While there are often benefits from using arbitration rather than the domestic courts, arbitration comes at 
a cost. It is estimated that in many countries the cost of an arbitration case is ten times, or more, expensive than 
the cost of a comparable case in a domestic court (Myburgh & Paniagua, 2016). One contributor to these higher 
costs is that unlike in a domestic court whose services are typically provided at low or no cost, the parties to 
an arbitration need to pay for the arbitrators as well as various administrative expenses. This can be a 
substantial proportion of the damages sought, especially for smaller claims. The Paris based International 
Chamber of Commerce reports that its costs make up a substantial proportion of small claims. It estimates that 
litigants will be charged 35% of a 100,000 Euro claim or 35,000 Euro, 13% of a million Euro claim or 130,000 
Euro, and 4% of a 10 million Euro claim or 400,000 Euro. Due to the high cost of arbitration commentators 
suggest that parties use the domestic courts for disputes over smaller amounts (Casella, 1996).1 
__________________ 
1 This discussion is focused on arbitration around investments. For disputes over the delivery of goods the cost of 
arbitration can be relatively low at a few thousand dollars.  
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 An important way to lower the cost of using arbitration is to promote the use of mediation and 
conciliation. Increasing the use of mediation and conciliation can reduce the number of disputes that enter 
into arbitration proceedings. Due to the high costs of arbitration proceedings this can significantly reduce 
the cost and time of disputes (Love, 2011). For example, a study found that in Argentina a mediation costs 
one sixth of an arbitration (Jorquiera and Alvarez, 2005). This suggests that even a small increase in disputes 
resolved through mediation and conciliation can substantially reduce the expected cost of using arbitration 
to resolve disputes arising from a contract. 
 
2.1. A simple model of the impact of UNCITRAL’s initiatives 
 
 To understand the effect of the improvements in arbitration that UNCITRAL brings it is useful to 
consider a simple model based on Meltiz (2003). This model is illustrated in Figure 1. The model assumes 
that there is a range of prospective investment projects with different levels of productivity P(θ). Each MNE 
receives a signal on how productive its investment it will be, and then it decides whether to invest, and how 
much to invest if it does. The profitability of investing at different levels of productivity is shown by the 
upward sloping “profitability line”. The point at which this line crosses the x-axis is the productivity 
threshold above which there is a positive return and so firms invest. All projects to the right of that threshold 
are undertaken. The distance from the right hand side of the graph to this crossing point determines how 
many projects will be undertaken. The amount invested in each project is determined by how profitable it 
is. More is invested in projects that are more profitable (i.e. further above the x-axis). Total investment is a 
function of the area below the profitability line but above the x-axis (as shown by the shaded area in Figure 
1). The greater this area the greater the total volume of FDI.  
 
Figure 1: Description of the model 
 
 
 
 The model described by Figure 1 allows us to review firms’ decisions to use different forms of dispute 
resolution, and also the impact that this has on the volume of investments, and the number of investments 
made. When firms to use a particular form of dispute resolution, such as the domestic courts, this has 
implications for their profitability and fixed costs (Myburgh and Paniagua, 2016). By comparing the 
profitability under three different scenarios we can investigate what our priors suggest should be the impact 
of UNCITRAL’s initiatives on investment. In particular we review three scenarios: 
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1. Scenario 1: Domestic courts. Here firms can only use foreign domestic courts to enforce 
contracts. The profitability (π (D)) of the resulting investments at different levels of productivity 
(P(θ)) is shown by the dotted line. The result is relatively poor contract enforcement and so few 
investment projects as the profitability line cross the x-axis far to the right, and relatively low 
levels of investment as poor contract enforcement depresses profitability (the profitability line is 
not far above the x-axis).  
 
2. Scenario 2: Arbitration with poor legal protections. Under this scenario the profitability of 
using arbitration is shown by the dotted line with longer dashes (π (A)). This line falls below 
(π(D)) across projects with different levels of productivity. This assumes that relying on 
arbitration is less profitable than using the domestic courts because the benefits of using 
arbitration do not outweigh the higher costs. This is consistent with the view that absent the 
protections provided by the NY Convention, the Model Law on Arbitration and similar domestic 
laws, arbitration would be seldom used. This is in line with the historical experience that there 
was little use of arbitration prior to the NY Convention (Casella, 1996). 
 
3. Scenario 3: Arbitration with strong legal protections including those provided by 
UNCITRAL. UNCITRAL’s initiatives have two effects. The first is to make arbitration a more 
effective form of contract enforcement. As a result, the line that shows the profitability line from 
investing using arbitration (π(A(UNCITRAL))) is steeper than the profitability line when 
domestic courts are used (π(D)). It is steeper because investments are more profitable at every 
level of productivity. A steeper line can be expected to increase the size of investments, and 
volume of investments. The second effect is to lower the expected cost of using arbitration 
through the Model Law on Conciliation. This increases the number of projects for which it is 
profitable to use arbitration which in turn can be expected to increase the number of investment 
projects.  
 
Figure 2: Firms profitability from arbitration and domestic courts 
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2.1. Implications of the analysis 
 
 Overall the analysis in this section predicts that UNCITRAL’s initiatives should promote FDI in 
sectors where investments are relationship specific, and that in particular:  
 
1. The NY Convention, the Model Law on Arbitration and to a lesser extent the Model Law on 
Conciliation should increase the volume of investment. 
 
2. The Model Law on Conciliation and to a lesser extent the Model Law on Arbitration and the NY 
Convention should increase the number of investment projects. 
 
 The next section reviews the results of a number of preliminary empirical exercises that evaluate these 
predictions.  
 
3. Empirical analysis of UNCITRAL’s initiatives  
 
 This section conducts a preliminary analysis of the impact of UNCITRAL’s initiatives on different 
sectors and types of activity. Although the results of this analysis are inherently tentative, we do find some 
indications that UNCITRAL’s initiatives are associated with an increase in FDI. The research discusses 
previous research on the NY Convention by Myburgh and Paniagua (2016), it then extends this analysis to 
discuss the impact of UNCITRAL’s initiatives on different types of investments, and investments in 
different sectors.  
 
 Myburgh and Paniagua (2016) find that the NY Convention is associated with large increases in FDI. 
The paper finds that that there is a far larger increase in the volume of investments, than in the number of 
investment projects. This result is consistent with the discussion in Section 2 which found that the high cost 
of arbitration should limit its usefulness to smaller projects, and so the NY Convention would largely affect 
the volume of investment rather than the number of investment projects. We extend this result in the 
Appendix and find that as expected adoption of the Model Law on Conciliation is associated with an 
increase in the number of projects.  
 
 As discussed in Section 2 one would expect UNCITRAL’s initiatives to be more important for 
investment activities that are more likely to relationship specific. To test this hypothesis we analyse the 
association between UNCITRAL’s initiatives, and aggregate FDI on a cross-section of 87 countries across 
a number of investment activities. After controlling for GDP the regression explains around 70% of 
variation in aggregate FDI. As shown in Figure 3 the results suggest that the NY Convention and 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Arbitration are associated with higher volumes of FDI in a number of 
activities. Notably this includes construction, business services, design and ICT. The activities where 
UNCITRAL’s initiatives are positively associated with higher volumes of FDI are arguably the activities 
that are more likely to be relationship specific than those activities such as customer care where 
UNCITRAL’s initiatives are not positively associated with higher volumes of FDI. These results are 
consistent with the proposition that UNCITRAL’s initiatives have promoted FDI (for more detail on some 
of the limitations of the analysis see footnote 2 and the Appendix).2  
 
  
__________________ 
2 As discussed in more detail in the Appendix there are limitations to an analysis of this kind. In particular, factors 
other than UNCITRAL’s initiatives are likely to be promoting FDI and so one cannot definitively conclude from 
this analysis alone that UNCITRAL’s initiatives have caused the increase in FDI. The limitations in data mean 
that one cannot conclude that UNCITRAL’s initiatives are not having an impact in the sectors because there is 
no positive statistical relationship shown. For example, it may be that the Model Law on Conciliation does 
promote FDI in more sectors. However, too few countries have adopted it, and we have relatively little data by 
activity. This suggests that even though a positive relationship may exists our analysis may not have found a 
statistically significant relationship.  
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Figure 3: Association between FDI and UNCITRAL’s initiatives, a (+) shows a significant  
statistical relationship 
 
Activity 
type Activity  
Adopted NY 
Convention 
Adopted UNCITRAL 
Model Law on 
Arbitration 
Adopted UNCITRAL 
Model Law on 
Conciliation 
 
Customer 
Business services + + + 
Sales & Marketing +   
Customer care 
 
  
Tech support 
 
  
Shared services    
Complex 
Headquarters    
Design + 
 
 
ICT + +  
RD 
 
  
Education 
 
  
High Fixed 
costs 
Maintenance    
Extraction    
Manufacturing    
Logistics  +  
Construction + +  
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
 
 This paper has found that UNCITRAL’s initiatives to strengthen the domestic and international legal 
regimes for arbitration have promoted foreign direct investment (FDI). The paper suggests that 
UNCITRAL’s initiatives have promoted relationship specific investments. Countries that adopt the NY 
Convention and UNCITRAL’s Model Laws on Arbitration and Conciliation tend to experience higher 
levels of investments in sectors such as construction and activities such as ICT.  
 
Appendix I 
 
 We conduct a series of statistical exercises to evaluate the importance of UNCITRAL’s initiatives for 
FDI. These exercises aim to show were UNCITRAL’s initiatives are associated with more FDI and the 
nature of this association. They also provide a tentative indication of the impact that these initiatives may 
be having of FDI. Our analysis has a number of limitations which suggest that results should only be 
considered tentative. An important limitation is that we have not been able to model the factors that lead 
countries to adopt the Model Laws, or the NY Convention. This is a particular limitation in the case of the 
Model Law on Arbitration. It appears that jurisdictions such as England or Hong Kong with established 
arbitration regimes have not adopted the Model Law on Arbitration. This phenomenon suggests that 
adoption of the Model Law will not be monotonically associated with a stronger arbitration regime. This 
will tend to attenuate any relationship between adoption of the Model Law and FDI and so could lead to 
fewer statistically significant results. Consistent with this we find fewer statistically significant results for 
the adoption of the Model Law on Arbitration than we expected. A number of important variables used in 
the analysis are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Variables dictionary  
 
Variable Description Source 
LFDI Log of aggregate incoming greenfield FDI in 2012 FDI Markets 
LGDP Log of GDP World Bank data 
NYC  Is the country a member of the NY Convention? NY Convention 
UNCITRAL Had the country adopted the Model Law on Arbitration by 2010? UNCITRAL 
CONCIL Had the country adopted the Model Law on Conciliation by 2010? UNCITRAL 
 
 We conduct a sector analysis to examine in depth effects that might be hidden on an aggregate level. 
Rather than focusing on sectors, we study the individual’s investment project activity. Firms’ activity reveal 
more information than aggregate sectoral data. For example, a highly complex chemical project might be 
masked in the agricultural sector. We have identified three groups of activities on which we expect a 
different impact of arbitration: high fixed costs, complex and customer activities.  
 
 The estimations related to activities with high fixed costs are reported in Table 2. These activities are 
maintenance, extraction, manufacturing, logistics and construction. Contrarily as expected, arbitration has 
no significant association with most activities with high fixed costs. Arbitration, both UNCITRAL and NY 
Convention, has a positive and significant association with FDI only in construction.  
 
Table 2: High Fixed Cost Activities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Maintenance Extraction Recycling Manufacturing Logistics Construction 
LGDP 0.865*** 0.514*** 0.908*** 0.901*** 1.078*** 1.082*** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
       
NYC 0.122 0.403 -0.424 0.610 1.093 2.482*** 
 (0.64) (1.39) (0.75) (0.69) (0.77) (0.92) 
       
UNCITRAL 0.144 0.263 0.104 0.020 0.734* 1.101** 
 (0.34) (0.74) (0.40) (0.37) (0.41) (0.50) 
       
CONCIL -0.032 -0.128 -0.125 -0.326 0.104 -0.094 
 (0.56) (1.21) (0.65) (0.60) (0.67) (0.81) 
       
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 
R2 0.601 0.110 0.531 0.589 0.654 0.620 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Complex activities (Headquarters, Design, ICT, RD and Education) are reported in Table 3. The picture 
is different from high fixed cost activities. Arbitration has a positive association in most of them (except for 
HQ, which might not involve complex activities). NY Convention is positive and significant for Design and 
ICT and UNCITRAL membership as well for ICT.  
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Table 3: Complex Activities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Headquarters Design ICT RD Education 
LGDP 1.136*** 1.201*** 0.707*** 1.161*** 0.857*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) 
      
NYC 0.136 1.230* 2.557*** 0.916 -0.574 
 (0.77) (0.70) (0.95) (0.77) (0.58) 
      
UNCITRAL 0.261 0.369 1.133** -0.180 0.260 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.51) (0.41) (0.31) 
      
CONCIL -0.133 -0.291 0.408 0.343 -0.066 
 (0.67) (0.61) (0.83) (0.67) (0.50) 
      
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 
R2 0.642 0.724 0.472 0.656 0.633 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Business Services, Sales and Marketing, Customer care, Tech support and Shared Services are the 
customer related actives. The estimation results are reported in Table 4. Again, although we observe certain 
heterogeneity, most of customer related activities are found to have a positive impact from arbitration. 
Particularly Business Services is positively associated with both NY Convention, and adoption of the Model 
Laws on Arbitration and Conciliation.  
 
Table 4 Customer Activities 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Business 
Services 
Sales 
Marketing 
Customer 
Care 
Tech 
Support 
Shared 
Services 
LGDP 0.688*** 0.787*** 0.835*** 0.732*** 0.660*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
      
NYC 0.932** 1.407*** -0.069 -0.369 0.500 
 (0.42) (0.44) (0.63) (0.76) (0.84) 
      
UNCITRAL 0.616*** 0.305 0.439 0.335 0.326 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.34) (0.41) (0.45) 
      
CONCIL 0.748** -0.170 0.541 0.310 0.167 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.55) (0.66) (0.73) 
      
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 
R2 0.729 0.764 0.604 0.434 0.360 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Model Laws as Instruments for Harmonization and Modernization 
 
Reinmar Wolff, University of Marburg, Germany 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 UNCITRAL’s mission is to promote the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of 
international trade.1 It has been entrusted with this task because divergences in national trade laws have 
been recognized as impediments to the development of world trade.2 World trade, in turn, has been 
considered an important factor in the promotion of friendly relations between States and, consequently, the 
maintenance of peace and security.3 Harmonization has traditionally gone hand in hand with modernization 
as anachronistic trade law will never facilitate international trade. Modernization also sets the stage for 
innovation4 and sustainable development. 
 
 In its 50 years of existence, UNCITRAL has significantly contributed to the harmonization and 
modernization of various areas of international trade law. Over five decades UNCITRAL has created texts 
in areas as diverse as international commercial arbitration, procurement, insolvency, online dispute 
resolution, the international sale of goods and security interests. 
 
 Among UNCITRAL’s texts are several whose dissemination is truly global. Examples of 
groundbreaking pieces that harmonized and modernized international trade law include the New York 
Convention (NYC, with 157 Contracting States5 at the time of writing) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (ICA-ML, adopted in 76 States and a total of 107 jurisdictions6).7 
These texts have been so successful that they have indeed become cornerstones in their field, even having 
an impact on jurisdictions that did not adopt them. 
 
 Other texts created by UNCITRAL have been blessed with less success. The UN Convention on 
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, for example, has only managed to 
attract five Parties in almost 30 years, despite requiring ten in order to actually enter into force.8 The UN 
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade is likewise still 
waiting to enter into force with the receipt of the fifth action it requires since it has not been able to amass 
more than four instruments of ratification, accession, approval, acceptance or succession since 1991.9 
 
 Why do some harmonizing texts virtually reshape the landscape of international trade law while others 
turn out to have no effect on harmonization and modernization at all? This question is vital for a law-making 
institution like UNCITRAL, even more so since its resources (and the resources of its Member States) are 
limited10 and texts that ultimately remain little more than drafts do not advance UNCITRAL’s mission to 
promote harmonization of international trade law. 
 
 Success has many faces and the search for success factors does not yield simple answers. The need for 
reform and the substantive quality of proposed rules are obvious factors for success. Other factors for the 
__________________ 
1 General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI), sub I. 
2 General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI), fifth recital. 
3 General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI), third recital. 
4 For an example, see Cohen, Unif. L. Rev. 325, 327 (2010); more generally Basedow, RabelsZ 81 (2017), 1, 9.  
5 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Oct.  6, 
2017). 
6 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited  
Oct. 6, 2017). 
7 Cf. Kronke, JZ 2001, 1149, 1150: two of six “true success stories of global private law harmonization.” 
8 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/payments/1988Convention_bills_status.html (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2017). 
9 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/1991Convention_status.html (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2017). 
10 For that aspect, see Knieper, in: Liber amicorum Knežević, 2016, pp. 654, 668 et seq. 
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success of a legal text are less obvious but no less decisive. A notable inclusion in these less obvious factors 
is the proper choice of instrument, i.e. the technique employed to harmonize and modernize the law. 
 
 This paper attempts to shed light on one of these instruments that has been neglected almost completely 
thus far, namely the model law. Before going on to discuss the success factors for model laws (below IV), 
this paper will elaborate on where model laws are located in the system of available instruments for 
harmonization (below II) and on how they operate (below III). 
 
 
II. The Model Law Within the System of Instruments 
 
 Traditionally, harmonization and modernization was achieved through conventions. While 
conventions are still an important instrument for harmonizing and modernizing international trade law, 
alternative harmonization instruments have entered the stage over the last few decades and have been 
receiving more and more attention. Before turning to one of these instruments (the model law) in detail, it 
is worthwhile to provide a quick overview of the available instruments. These instruments can be divided 
into three classes: legislative, contractual and explanatory instruments.11 
 
1. Legislative Instruments 
 
 Legislative instruments either have force of law (conventions) or are addressed to legislatures to enact 
national laws accordingly (model laws, legislative guides). 
 
(a) Conventions 
 
 Conventions are concluded between States, usually at a diplomatic conference or in the United Nations 
General Assembly,12 and require States to express their consent to be bound by the convention (Art. 11 et 
seq. of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). If it is self-executing, a convention creates 
uniform law that directly governs the transactions that fall within its scope of application.13 Technically, 
this method of unification results in the highest degree of harmonization that can be achieved.14 
 
(b) Model Laws 
 
 The model law is an alternative legislative instrument. It is a “best practice law” which is suggested 
for adoption, i.e. for incorporation into the national laws of the States.15 Upon adoption, the model law 
provisions become part of the State’s domestic law. 
 
 While a convention can generally only be ratified in its entirety or not at all,16 the States are free to 
adopt a model law in parts or with modifications.17 A model law can, however, only achieve its harmonizing 
effect to the extent that its provisions are adopted by the States. It therefore does not come as a surprise that 
UNCITRAL regularly encourages States to adopt its model laws in full.18 
 
__________________ 
11 A Guide to UNCITRAL, 2013, paras 32 et seq. (available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-
57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf, last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
12 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 39; UNCITRAL Secretariat, A/CN.9/204, para. 11. 
13 UNCITRAL Secretary-General, A/CN.9/203, para. 117. 
14 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 35. 
15 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 37; Boele-Woelki, Recueil des Cours 271 (2009), 2010, pp. 271, 327 para. 
54; Cohen, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 567, 582 (2011). 
16 Boele-Woelki (fn. 15), p. 338 para. 68 (“all boils down to the motto: ‘Take it or leave it!’”). 
17 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 38; Herrmann, Unif. L. Rev. 483, 484 et seq. (1998); Herrmann, Bus. L. 
Int’l 249, 252 (2001). 
18 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 38; UNCITRAL Secretary-General, A/CN.9/207, para. 26; Herrmann, 
Unif. L. Rev. 483, 493 (1998); see also Boele-Woelki (fn. 15), p. 328 para. 54. 
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(c) Legislative Guides 
 
 The softest of the legislative instruments is the legislative guide. These guides restrict themselves to 
setting out policy considerations for the benefit of national legislatures.19 This allows for utmost flexibility 
when it comes to the transformation into national law. 
 
2. Contractual Instruments 
 
 While legislative instruments address legislatures, the addressees of contractual instruments are the 
parties to a contract, i.e. businesses. Examples of contractual instruments include the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. Since contractual instruments address 
businesses, it is hardly surprising that such instruments have also been developed by private organizations 
which do not have the standing to create legislative instruments.20 Prominent examples include the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which provides model contracts and model clauses like the 
Incoterms, as well as the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) with its standard 
contracts. 
 
 Since contractual instruments have different addressees than legislative instruments, they function in 
a fundamentally different way. On the one hand, contractual instruments are limited in their potential scope 
of application. Contracts can only operate within the framework of the legal systems to which they are 
subordinated. Standard contracts will inevitably fail where the governing law’s mandatory provisions do 
not leave room for party-autonomous stipulations. Contractual instruments can also never entail mandatory 
provisions that limit the parties’ contractual freedom.21 As a result, only legislative instruments are available 
where the legal area that is in need of harmonization entails issues that are not to be left up to the parties. 
 
 On the other hand, being located on the contractual level allows contractual instruments to operate 
largely independently of the applicable legislative framework.22 Since mandatory statutory rules only limit 
the parties’ contractual freedom in exceptional situations, standard contracts may establish a de facto 
uniform legal framework that works even in legal environments that are neither harmonized nor 
modernized. Contractual instruments moreover have the advantage of greater adaptability: standard 
contracts can be adapted to changed circumstances more easily than laws that need to undergo an elaborate 
revision process. 
 
3. Explanatory Instruments 
 
 The last class of instruments for the harmonization and modernization of law are explanatory 
instruments.23 Contrary to the other two classes of instruments, explanatory instruments operate as 
guidelines or general advice but do not result in standardized legal texts. 
 
 In light of their limited effect on harmonization, explanatory instruments will usually only be 
considered where stronger instruments fail for specific reasons. The UNCITRAL Recommendation on the 
Interpretation of Art. II(2) and VII(1) of the New York Convention24 (which undertook the modernization 
of the 1958 New York Convention’s in-writing requirement) provides for a characteristic example: in terms 
of the number of its Contracting Parties, the New York Convention has been considered too successful to 
be amended or supplemented by another convention. Amending the Convention was considered likely to 
__________________ 
19 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), paras 43 et seq. 
20 Boele-Woelki (fn. 15), p. 341 para. 72. 
21 Cf. UNCITRAL Secretary-General, A/CN.9/203, para. 115; Herrmann, Unif. L. Rev. 483, 484 (1998).  
22 On harmonization through standard contracts, see, e.g., the contributions of Collins, Ackermann and Möslein, in: 
Eidenmüller, Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution, 2013.  
23 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), paras 19 et seq. 
24 Recommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, 10  June 1958, 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 7 July 2006 at its thirty-ninth session, 
Issued in Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/61/17), annex II. 
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exacerbate the existing lack of harmony since adoption of a binding instrument would have taken several 
years. In light of these circumstances, an interpretative declaration has been identified as the proper 
instrument for modernizing the New York Convention.25 
 
 
III. Implementation and Application Issues for Model Laws 
 
 Before the success factors for model laws can be discussed (below IV), it is worthwhile to take a closer 
look at how this instrument functions. 
 
1. Methods of Model Law Adoption 
 
 Model laws, unlike conventions, can neither be acceded to nor can they assume force of law. Indeed, 
model laws are ultimately nothing more than templates for domestic legislation to be enacted in their image. 
In most cases, model laws are translated into the enacting jurisdiction’s official language (if need be) and 
their text goes through the usual legislative procedure in the same way as any other bill. 
 
 UNCITRAL’s model laws are designed to be fully incorporated into bodies of statutory law. They are 
drafted as fully-fledged statutes while consistently using placeholders like “this State” (e.g. Art. 1 ICA-ML) 
or gaps as in Art. 6 ICA-ML (“The functions referred to in articles 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3) and 34(2) 
shall be performed by … [Each State enacting this model law specifies the court, courts or, where referred 
to therein, other authority competent to perform these functions.]”). If the model law is not enacted as a 
standalone law but as part of a code, some issues may be better treated in another part of the code.26 
 
 Model laws can, however, also be incorporated by reference. Art. 16(1) of the Australian International 
Arbitration Act, for example, provides that “[s]ubject to this Part, the Model Law has the force of law in 
Australia.” If this approach is selected, placeholders need to be defined (“The following courts are taken to 
have been specified in Article 6 of the Model Law …”, Art. 18(3) of the Australian International Arbitration 
Act) and gaps filled in the referencing law: “‘this State’ means Australia (including the external Territories)” 
(Art. 16(1) of the Australian International Arbitration Act). Legally, both methods of adoption are 
equivalent. 
 
2. Unified Interpretation and Application 
 
 Model laws, unlike conventions, do not remain self-contained bodies of autonomous law but become 
fully integrated parts of the national legal system upon adoption. This specific feature gives rise to both 
legal and factual difficulties in achieving harmonization and modernization. 
 
(a) Legal Difficulties 
 
 The legal difficulties that can arise in relation to the unified interpretation and application of model-
law-based provisions can be explained best in comparison to conventions. Conventions can create 
autonomous law, the interpretation and application of which should not depend on which court interprets 
and applies it.27 Autonomous law is not subjected to domestic rules of interpretation. The criteria for 
interpretation are rather to be derived only from the law itself. In practice there is always the possibility that 
__________________ 
25 For a summary of this discussion, see Wolff, in: Wolff, New York Convention, Commentary, 2012, Art. II paras 
18 et seq. 
26 Estrella Faria, Legal Harmonization through Model Laws: The Experience of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), paper delivered at the ALRAESA Conference, March 15-17, 2005, 
South Africa, p. 20 (available at http://www.justice.gov.za/alraesa/conferences/2005sa/papers/s5_faria2.pdf, last 
visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
27 Kropholler, Internationales Einheitsrecht, 1975, pp. 235 et seq., 240 et seq. 
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different courts will not reach the same results when applying the same rules to the same facts,28 but in 
theory they should. 
 
 Model law provisions, conversely, become part of national law once they are adopted.29 Although they 
can all be traced back to the same model, similar provisions under several different national laws cannot be 
interpreted uniformly due to a lack of an autonomous legal text.30 The standard for interpretation for model-
law-based national provisions is therefore to be determined under the national law of the State that has 
adopted the model law. This finding is crucial from a harmonization perspective since only the way in which 
the law is applied is relevant for harmonization at the end of the day; merely having uniformity of wording 
is useless.31 
 
 Applying a domestic standard of interpretation when interpreting model-law-based provisions does 
not, however, necessarily result in the application of exactly the same methods of interpretation that apply 
to any other domestic law of that State. Whether or not the international origin of model-law-based 
provisions is to be taken into account depends solely on the rules of interpretation of the respective State. 
 
 In fact, all of the traditional means of interpretation allow for the consideration of the model-law-based 
provisions’ origin:32 when exploring the meaning of a term, specifically its legal meaning, the literal 
interpretation may treat the model-law-based provisions as a self-contained body of law, the terminology 
of which is uncoupled from the remaining legal order. The historical interpretation may include the model 
law’s drafting history. The systematic interpretation may again treat the model-law-based provisions as a 
self-contained body of law and construe it from within itself. The teleological interpretation may take the 
purpose of implementing harmonized law into account and therefore reference the purpose attached to the 
respective provision of the model law. A comparative interpretation (in the manner in which it is recognized 
as a means for interpretation of uniform law) may call for consideration of foreign case law and legal writing 
on model-law-based provisions (or on the model law itself) and a comparative examination of model-law-
based provisions with non-unified national law that can contribute to identifying a suitable understanding 
of the model-law-based provisions. 
 
 Taking into account the origin of model-law-based provisions can promote unified interpretation — 
provided that the rules of interpretation in the State adopting the model law so permit. To facilitate such 
permission, it is advisable to include provisions like Art. 2 A(1) ICA-ML (“In the interpretation of this Law, 
regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith.”) in model laws.33 Even in jurisdictions in which such provision was not 
needed, its presence serves to remind judges and other users of the special traits of rules that only appear to 
be an indistinguishable part of the national body of law at first glance. 
 
 The States are, however, free to screen out such provisions when adopting a model law and to decouple 
their national law from its model law background. This approach may be taken by States that intend to 
implement a modern and well-drafted law while keeping full control over its interpretation. However, 
cutting the model-law-based provisions off from their international origin comes at the price of cropping 
their harmonizing and trade-promoting effect. As this outcome will usually not be in the State’s best interest, 
this step should not be taken without careful consideration. 
 
__________________ 
28 Boele-Woelki (fn. 15), p. 299 para. 16. 
29 Linhart, Internationales Einheitsrecht und einheitliche Auslegung, 2005, p.  253. 
30 Wolff, AYIA 2014, 51, 56 et seq.; dissenting Bachand, in: Bachand/Gélinas, The UNCITRAL Model Law after 
25 Years: Global Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration, 2013, pp.  242 et seq. 
31 Bachand (fn. 30), pp. 231 et seq.; Gebauer, Unif. L. Rev. 683, 691 (2000); see also Schmitthoff, 17 Int’l & Comp. 
L.Q. 551, 566 et seq. (1968). 
32 For details, see Wolff, AYIA 2014, 51, 63 et seq. 
33 For details, see Wolff, AYIA 2014, 51, 69 et seq. 
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(b) Factual Difficulties 
 
 Even if the legal tools which allow for unified interpretation are available, applying them properly 
remains a challenge. The consideration of foreign decisions and legal literature in particular — which is 
essential for unified interpretation — may require intensive research and extensive efforts that a state court 
judge may not be able to make,34 at least not in courts of lower instance.35 This holds particularly true in 
States that can only provide their courts with very limited resources. 
 
 To facilitate this task, UNCITRAL supplies multiple tools, including case law digests36 and the case 
law on UNCITRAL texts (CLOUT) database.37 The (ongoing) legal education of judges likewise remains 
essential. Although these steps are valuable, they cannot guarantee unified interpretation and application. 
Apparently, however, not much can be done beyond the aforementioned to facilitate unified interpretation 
of model-law-based provisions. The only exception would be the establishment of an international court 
that holds exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of harmonized law.38 Being required to delegate 
sovereignty in this manner would, however, most likely diminish the States’ willingness to adopt 
harmonized law. 
 
3. Interaction with Other Areas of Law 
 
 An area closely related to unified interpretation is the interaction of model-law-based provisions with 
other domestic provisions of the State which has enacted the model law. 
 
(a) Interaction with Non-harmonized National Law 
 
 The interaction of model-law-based provisions with non-harmonized provisions merits discussion in 
two respects. 
 
 First, it is irreconcilable with an interpretation of model-law-based provisions as a self-contained body 
of law (above 2) to assign legal terms in such provisions the same meanings they hold in other areas of law 
of that State. National legislatures should therefore avoid using legal terms that have a pre-defined meaning 
in their legal order (including when translating the model law into the State’s official language).39 
 
 Second and more importantly, model-law-based provisions may be inconsistent with other national 
law. For example, national non-harmonized law may allow judges to be challenged on grounds that do not 
justify challenging an arbitrator under Art. 12 ICA-ML. This result is inconsistent since impartiality and 
independence cannot be less essential for arbitrators (if for no other reason than that they are solely 
appointed by the parties) than it is for judges. Given that the ICA-ML relies on an international consensus, 
judgments that diverge therefrom can likely be traced back to idiosyncratic domestic rules on challenging 
judges that can only be revised by the national legislature. 
 
(b) Interaction with Otherwise Harmonized Law 
 
 While the interpretation of model-law-based provisions should not take inspiration from national law, 
it may well take inspiration from other harmonized provisions, be it conventions or other model-law-based 
provisions. One example is taking recourse to Option I Art. 7 ICA-ML for interpreting the in-writing 
__________________ 
34 Cf. Magnus, in: Janssen/Meyer, CISG Methodology, 2009, pp. 33, 57 and the delegate of the United Kingdom’s 
remark in A/CONF.89/C.1/SR.7: “If that second clause was addressed to judges required to hear cases concerned 
with carriage by sea, they might become confused as to the what extent they should refer to decisions taken by 
the courts of 100 or so other countries before rendering their own judgement.” 
35 Cf. Gruber, Methoden des internationalen Einheitsrechts, 2004, p. 200. 
36 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 59. 
37 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), paras 56 et seq. 
38 See Basedow, RabelsZ 81 (2017), 1, 26. 
39 For an example, see Wolff, AYIA 2014, 51, 63. 
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requirement in Art. II NYC.40 In such cases several harmonized provisions may jointly form a self-contained 
body of law. Again, however, the adopting State has the final say on the applicable rules of interpretation. 
 
(c) Interaction with National Modifications to the Model Law 
 
 Model laws can be enacted with modifications. Such modifications do not raise specific interpretative 
issues as long as they remain separable — these modifications are to be interpreted under domestic law 
only. 
 
 Modifications are less easy to handle if they are inseparably intertwined with national law, for example 
if they extend the scope of application of a model law. While the ICA-ML is restricted to international 
commercial arbitration, some States have adopted it as their only arbitration law that also regulates domestic 
and consumer arbitration. However, rules that are suitable for international commerce (which is 
UNCITRAL’s mandate) are not necessarily viable for domestic consumer disputes to the same extent. 
 
 Where there is a dispute involving such inseparably intertwined modifications, it must be determined 
whether the national legislature intended for the modified provisions to be governed by the same rules in 
harmonized interpretation in both international commercial and purely domestic cases. This will often be 
the case since a split interpretation of one and the same set of rules depending on whether the case lies 
within the originally intended scope of application of the model law is not sensible. Even harmonized 
interpretation would not, however, disallow taking into account the individual circumstances of each case, 
even where they are rooted in an extended scope of application. Conversely, caution is advisable if case law 
from beyond the original scope of the model law is used for comparative interpretation of model-law-based 
provisions. 
 
 
IV. Success Factors for Model Laws 
 
 Having discussed the place they occupy within the system of available instruments for harmonization 
(above II) and how they function (above III), this paper can now turn to a more detailed analysis of the 
success factors for model laws. 
 
 Success always relies on multiple factors whose identity and interaction cannot be determined with 
mathematical precision.41 Success factors can, however, be distinguished by the level on which they take 
effect: some are of a general nature and apply regardless of which instrument has been chosen for 
harmonization (below 1), while others are specific to the choice of a suitable instrument, i.e. a model law, 
as opposed to another instrument (below 2). The third group consists of factors that may contribute to the 
success of a model law on the level of its implementation (below 3). 
 
1. Instrument-unrelated Factors 
 
 Since the model law is a specific instrument for the harmonization and modernization of law, it shares 
some success factors that all instruments have in common. Although these general criteria are of 
considerable weight, they can only be summarized in a cursory manner as this paper’s focus is not on law-
making in general. 
 
(a) Need for Reform 
 
 Since UNCITRAL lacks the power to impose its texts on the States, any harmonizing and modernizing 
text — regardless of the instrument chosen for it — requires the States’ consent. The starting point of any 
national law reform is therefore the State’s perception that the current legislation is in need of reform.42 
__________________ 
40 For details, see Wolff, in: Wolff (fn. 25), Art. II para. 114. 
41 For an empirical approach, see Efrat, 60 International Studies Quarterly 624 (2016).  
42 Boele-Woelki (fn. 15), p. 336 para. 65; on the importance of timing Estrella Faria (fn. 26), p. 22. 
  
17 
(b) Persuasiveness of the Harmonized Regulation 
 
 States will adopt the harmonizing instrument only if doing so promises to yield greater benefits than 
its alternatives, i.e. enacting non-harmonized law or abstaining from reform altogether. 
 
(aa) General Criteria for “Good Law” 
 
 A harmonized law will be perceived as good law if its rules honour the legitimate interests of the 
parties, work in practice and are consistent. A clear and transparent structure contributes to better law to the 
same extent as simple and clear-cut provisions.43 For this reason the complexity and length of the provisions 
on interim measures and preliminary orders in Art. 17 et seq. ICA-ML 2006 are not amongst the selling 
points of this model law. 
 
(bb) Non-national Character of the Regulation 
 
 While the creation of harmonized law naturally entails a comparative element, the most practical of 
pre-existing solutions should not simply be identified and adopted. The more easily the harmonized law 
can be attributed to one specific legal order or tradition, the lower its acceptance by other States is likely to 
be. This factor contributed to the limited success of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS), the CISG’s predecessor, which was perceived as a predominantly Western European instrument.44 
 
(c) Competitive Effects of Harmonized Law Adoption 
 
 In line with the assumptions on which the establishment of UNCITRAL is based (above I), the 
enactment of harmonized law by a State will usually be accompanied by the expectation that harmonized 
law will promote international trade and that international trade will contribute to the State’s wealth. Two 
examples of where the adoption of harmonized law is perceived as providing a competitive advantage are 
the adoption of the ICA-ML by Germany and Austria in the hopes of becoming more attractive as venues 
for international arbitral proceedings.45 
 
 For some States, conversely, competitive advantage is the reason for not adopting harmonized law. 
Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom, for example, which are frequently chosen as venues for 
international arbitration, did not adopt the ICA-ML and do not plan to do so. Notably, the strength of these 
venues is owed more to traditional connotations as a neutral (Switzerland) or business-friendly (United 
Kingdom) seat than to the content of their national arbitration laws. 
 
2. Choice of Instrument Factors 
 
 Apart from the general factors for harmonizing texts, the success of a model law also hinges on a 
number of instrument-specific factors. A model law is likely to be more successful if this instrument in 
particular is the best choice for a given harmonizing endeavour. 
 
(a) Need for Flexibility 
 
 The need for flexibility is the single most frequently cited reason for choosing the form of a model 
law: “The form of a model law was chosen as the vehicle for harmonization and modernization in view of 
the flexibility it gives to States in preparing new arbitration laws.”46 This likewise applies to model laws in 
other areas of law. 
 
__________________ 
43 Estrella Faria (fn. 26), p. 9. 
44 Knieper (fn. 10), p. 665. 
45 Germany: Government bill, BT-Drucks. 13/5274, p. 1; Austria: Nationalrat, XXII. Gesetzgebungsperiode, 
Regierungsvorlage No. 1158, p. 2; similarly for Singapore Lim, 7(1) Asian Int’l Arb. J. 1, 6 (2011). 
46 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
amended in 2006, para. 3; similar UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Guide to Enactment, para. 27.  
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(aa) Actual Need for Flexibility 
 
 An actual need for flexibility exists where States are likely to want to make various modifications to 
the uniform text in order to make it fit into their respective legal orders and where States may not be willing 
to accept uniform binding solutions.47 Such modifications are typical where the model law provisions relate 
to other critical areas of law like the national court system.48 One example that illustrates this is Art. 8(1) 
ICA-ML; according to this provision, a court before which an action covered by an arbitration agreement 
is brought shall “refer the parties to arbitration.” This legal consequence was transformed into “reject the 
action as inadmissible” in sect. 1032(1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure since German law does not 
provide for referral to arbitration. 
 
 While States can make reservations when acceding to conventions, such reservations are only 
permitted under certain restrictive circumstances (Art. 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties). Permitted reservations are often already specified in the convention, which requires a high degree 
of foresight at the time the convention is drafted. Since such foresight is not always at hand, model laws 
have an advantage where the uniform text later needs adjusting in order for it to fit into national law. 
 
(bb) Perceived Need for Flexibility 
 
 Another more psychological factor may be the opportunity to amend the model law text before or after 
adoption regardless of whether such amendments are needed and of whether they are indeed implemented. 
Simply having full ownership over the enacted law may in and of itself enhance willingness to adopt 
harmonized and modernized law and may make it more attractive to implement model laws rather than to 
accede to conventions. Indeed, amendments to model laws are said to often be made for their own sake.49 
 
(b) Need for Formulated Rules and Standards 
 
 If flexibility were the key advantage of model laws, legislative guides — which are even more flexible 
— would seem to be the better choice in most cases. However, the desire for flexibility is in fact 
counterbalanced by the need for formulated rules and standards. While model laws are preferable to 
conventions where flexibility is needed, they are also preferable to legislative guides where formulated 
rules and standards are essential. 
 
(aa) Harmonizing Effect of Rules 
 
 In sharp contrast to the emphasis on flexibility, UNCITRAL and other law-making organizations 
should strive to replace legislative guides with model laws or conventions wherever possible — provided, 
of course, that the conditions for model laws are met. The downside to full flexibility in transformation is 
the often lesser degree of harmonization that such an instrument can actually effect. Given that legislative 
guides do not provide precisely worded rules to be enacted, their unifying effect is necessarily limited to 
the underlying policy decisions. This is only of limited assistance for international trade: certainly 
businesses’ costs for adjusting their transactions to the requirements of several jurisdictions will decrease 
if these jurisdictions follow the same policies, but transaction costs would be significantly lower still if 
harmonized law were in effect in these jurisdictions.50 
 
 Precisely worded provisions should only be abstained from for good reasons. Such reasons include if 
States use disparate legislative techniques and approaches for solving a given issue.51 Model law provisions 
in such cases would often be subject to complete revision before their adoption by a State, which would 
render the creation of fully-worded provisions as a one-size-fits-all uniform solution useless. 
__________________ 
47 Gopalan, L. & Com. 117, 152 (2003-2004); see also A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 35. 
48 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Guide to Enactment, para. 27; Estrella Faria (fn. 26), p. 22 
(on Art. 27 ICA-ML). 
49 Herrmann, Bus. L. Int’l 249, 252 (2001). 
50 See Knieper (fn. 10), p. 666. 
51 A Guide to UNCITRAL (fn. 11), para. 43. 
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(bb) Efforts of Formulating Rules 
 
 Fully-worded provisions are also preferable for another reason, namely that they save the States the 
efforts of formulating their own bespoke provisions.52 An example of this is the sanctions regime for 
businesses that fail to comply with the business register regulations: while it is true that “(t)he Regulation 
should establish and ensure wide publication of sanctions (including fines, deregistration and loss of access 
to services) that may be imposed on a business for a breach of its obligations under the Regulation,”53 the 
effort to identify the best practice for such sanctions and to draft appropriate regulations remains with the 
individual State. 
 
 If States have to transform several interdependent policy considerations into national legislation, they 
moreover run the risk of unintended or incoherent results.54 Being aware of such risk may also prevent 
States from adopting harmonized law. 
 
 These effects are even more pronounced where the State lacks the experience or resources to create 
and implement proper provisions that meet the requirements of international trade.55 
 
(cc) Need for Standardization or Otherwise Uniform Solutions 
 
 The general preference for fully-formulated provisions in conventions and model laws becomes a must 
where the issues at stake require standardization or otherwise uniform solutions. The current discussion on 
the structure of a unique business identification number may serve as an example: upon request by Working 
Group I, the Secretariat has prepared “an instrument along the lines of a concise legislative guide on 
business registration.”56 While this draft instrument refrains from proposing an internationally standardized 
unique business identifier, UNCTAD submits that “(i)t would simplify registration and cross border trade 
and investment if all governments were to agree on a common alphanumeric system for registering 
businesses that would facilitate identification of a company’s ultimate beneficiary ownership by country.”57 
While this is certainly true, international trade (and the community of States) would be much better served 
if such system was directly set up in a model law (or convention). 
 
(c) Self-contained Area of Law 
 
 Model laws require a confined and self-contained area of law with a limited number of interfaces with 
other legal areas. This largely follows from the reflections on flexibility (above a) and fully-worded rules 
(above b): if an area of law is embedded in a larger legal context or closely interwoven with several other 
areas of law, adopting States would regularly need to make numerous adjustments to the model law 
provisions. A set of fully-worded provisions is of little use in such a setting. If an area of law of that kind is 
suitable for harmonization at all, a legislative guide is the preferable instrument. 
 
(d) Irrelevance of a State’s Legal Obligation 
 
 States can autonomously adopt model laws and reverse their adoption at any time. The model law is 
therefore not the proper instrument if other States need legal certainty that a given State will adopt and 
__________________ 
52 Cf. Estrella Faria (fn. 26), p. 30 (“convenient first drafts of modern statutes”). 
53 UNCITRAL Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.96, Recommendation 41. 
54 Cohen, Unif. L. Rev. 325, 330 (2010). 
55 See Cohen, Unif. L. Rev. 325, 329 (2010). 
56 UNCITRAL Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.96 para. 1. 
57 UNCTAD, A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.98, p. 5. 
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remain true to a specific set of harmonized rules. One example of this is where regulations are adopted on 
the basis of reciprocity. 
 
(e) Efforts for Setting up the Instrument 
 
 A final argument for favouring model laws over conventions is the effort required to develop the 
instrument. Conventions are usually concluded at a diplomatic conference or in the United Nations General 
Assembly,58 which has proven to be time-consuming and costly.59 Model laws, on the other hand, do not 
require such an involved conclusion procedure. 
 
(f) Final Remark: the Political Factor 
 
 It is one thing to have a clear understanding of the factors for a proper choice of instrument and another 
to make a choice according to these insights. 
 
 The choice of instrument is not imposed by the UNCITRAL Secretariat or any other administrative 
body. It is rather the result of what the States represented in UNCITRAL and its Working Groups could 
agree on. Since decisions are usually taken by consensus,60 the process inherently runs the risk of ending 
up with the smallest common denominator in terms of the instrument’s harmonizing effect. 
 
 This risk is increased by the fact that the choice of instrument is often only discussed at a relatively 
late stage. States that do not feel comfortable with the substance of the proposed harmonizing rules can still 
easily opt for an instrument with a lesser harmonizing effect at this stage. 
 
3. Model Law Implementation Factors 
 
 The final group of success factors for model laws relates to their technical implementation. 
 
(a) Interfaces with Other Areas of Law 
 
 Since model laws require a confined and self-contained area of law with a limited number of interfaces 
with other legal areas (above 2. c), care should be taken when tailoring a model law’s scope of regulation. 
Interfaces with other areas of law should be small in number and clear in demarcation. For this reason, it 
was a wise decision not to go into the details of court proceedings in the ICA-ML but to restrict the rules to 
the absolute minimum in this respect. The same would hold true for a model company law and its interfaces 
with regulations on business registers. Indeed, as long as the aforementioned interfaces are kept to a 
minimum, the ability to make minor modifications to model laws is one of their best features (above 2. a) 
aa). 
 
(b) Use of Neutral Legal Terminology 
 
 Legal terms in model-law-based provisions should not be assigned the meaning they have in other 
areas of law of that State. Not only States enacting model laws (above III. 3. a) but also the makers of model 
laws must be aware of this risk. The makers can minimize it by avoiding terms that are likely to have a 
specific legal meaning (e.g. “due process”) and instead making use of non-technical terms (e.g. “full 
opportunity to present one’s case”).61 
 
__________________ 
58 See fn. 12. 
59 UNCITRAL Secretary-General, A/CN.9/203, para. 119; UNCITRAL Secretary-General, A/CN.9/207, para. 26; 
Cohen, 36 Brook. J. Int’l L. 567, 582 (2011); Gopalan, L. & Com. 117, 152 (2003-2004). 
60 Knieper (fn. 10), pp. 662 et seq. 
61 Herrmann, Unif. L. Rev. 483, 489 (1998); similarly Estrella Faria (fn. 26), p. 9. 
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(c) Reconcilement with Otherwise Harmonized Law 
 
 New model laws should, to the extent possible, be reconciled with pre-existing harmonized texts to 
allow for harmonic interaction (above III. 3. b). 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The model law is a relatively new legislative instrument. Its characteristic features are that States are 
free to adopt it fully or in part and that it becomes part of the State’s domestic law once it is adopted. A 
convention, conversely, cannot be modified by the States (apart from reservations under strict conditions) 
and remains autonomous law. Since model laws do not create autonomous law, it is difficult to ensure 
uniform interpretation and application of model-law-based provisions. This difficulty can, however, be 
overcome by the States in large part since the available means of interpretation can be adjusted accordingly. 
Provisions like Art. 2 A ICA-ML can assist in this task. 
 
 Success factors for model laws include instrument-unrelated factors, factors that make model laws a 
superior choice to other types of instrument for a given regulation and factors relating to the implementation 
of the model law. Among the most important factors for choosing the proper instrument is the weighing of 
a real or perceived need for flexibility against the need of States and businesses for uniform rules. The area 
of law dealt with in a model law should be self-contained with a limited number of clearly defined interfaces 
with other legal areas. 
 
 Model laws have not been subject to extensive research to date. A better understanding of this 
instrument is, however, vital for the successful creation of further model laws and for the effective use of 
UNCITRAL’s resources. This paper has attempted to undertake a first step to further such understanding. 
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Harmonization of National Legislation through Model Laws: From the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law to the League of Arab States and the Gulf  
Cooperation Council 
 
Mohamed Y. Mattar, Qatar University College of Law, Qatar 
 
Introduction 
 
 In its productive efforts to remove barriers in international trade and reconcile differences in legal 
systems, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] adopts model laws that 
provide guidance for national legislation in enacting new laws or amending and changing existing ones. 
 
 In the Arab region, the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, for instance, is a testimony to this success story. 
 
 In the meantime, the Arab countries have their own regional model laws that are intended to achieve 
their goal in establishing a “close cooperation of the member states… in… economic and financial matters 
including trade, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry”, as stipulated in the charter of the league of 
the Arab states.  
 
 This process started in 1981 with the famous Sanna Strategy, a great number of model laws were 
drafted by the League of Arab States [LAS] that covered proof of civil and commercial transactions through 
technology, civil law, combating cyber-crimes, human trafficking and corruption, electronic commerce, 
legal aid, Arabic judiciary, among others.  
 
 The Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] similarly states that it aims to “formulate similar 
regulations in various fields including… economic and financial affairs, commerce, customs and 
communications”. 1 
 
 More recently, the GCC adopted model laws on trademarks, regulations of the financial markets, 
issuance of investment funds, combating dumping through remedies and preventive measure and several 
others. 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to present the first comprehensive, although brief, analysis of these model 
laws. I will examine the origin of the Arab model laws and whether they rely on international standards 
including those embodied in the works of the UNCITRAL. I will debate their impact on national legislation 
in Arab laws and whether they provide guidance in drafting domestic laws irrespective of their non-binding 
nature. I will argue that reforming and modernizing commercial and trade laws in Arab legal systems are 
contingent upon learning from comparative models and best global practices.  
  
__________________ 
1  Article (4). The Article adds that the GCC aims at fostering scientific and technical progress in industry, mining, 
agriculture, water and animal resources as well as establishing scientific research centers and setting up joint 
ventures. For an analysis of the integration policies of the GCC, see, Nasser Al-Mawali, Intra-Gulf Cooperation 
Council: Saudi Arabia Effect, 30 Journal of Economic Integration 532 (2015).  
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The Impact of the UNICTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration on Arab Legislation 
 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted in 1985 and 
amended in 2006. It had a great influence on arbitration laws in the Arab region.2 
 
 For instance, in 2012 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia adopted a new arbitration law which is based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration although requiring the arbitration 
process not to “violate Sharia”, and the arbitration award not to contradict the public order of the Kingdom, 
which is based on Islamic law. Nonetheless, except for this limited public policy exception, “arbitration 
awards issued in accordance with this law are not to be challenged in any way except through the filing of 
a lawsuit to nullify an arbitration award according to the provisions of this law”3. Thus, the law limits the 
interference of courts in the arbitration process.  
 
 In 2015, Bahrain in its new arbitration law stated explicitly that “The provisions of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration Act attached to this law shall apply to all arbitration 
whatever the nature of the legal relationship of the dispute therewith, if this arbitration takes place in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain or abroad and that the two parties agreed to comply with the provisions of the attached 
law”.4 
 
 In Egypt, the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration, in one of its awards 
explicitly referred to article 21 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and article 22 of the Egyptian 
Arbitration Law.5 The Cairo Arbitration Center was the second institution, after the Kuala Lumpur Regional 
Center for Arbitration in Malaysia, to adopt new rules of arbitration based upon the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
 
 This trend in the Arab region, whether in the law or in settlement of disputes is consistent with the 
General Assembly’s resolution that recommended that “All states give due consideration to the Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral 
procedures and the specific needs of international commercial arbitration practice”. 6  
__________________ 
2  See Nayla Comair — Obeid, Salient Issues in Arbitration from an Arab Middle Eastern Perspective. 4 The 
Arbitration Brief 52 (2014) concluding that “what we are witnessing in the Arab Middle Eastern region is a new 
trend: a newfound appreciation for Arbitration as a viable means of dispute resolution”. [Id at 74]. The author 
observes that while Oman and Bahrain have strictly followed the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Tunisia have mainly relied on the Model Law in drafting their national arbitration laws. [Id at 54].  
3  Article 49. See generally Arthur, Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East, 5 Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law 2006 concluding that “the day will inevitably come when mutual commercial interests will intertwine and 
become so interdependent that international private law and Islamic law will stand where neither dominates the 
other; this day will be predicated on a mutual respect and understanding for each body of law, including its 
historical foundations and modern application” (Id at 193). See also, Faisal Kutty, The Sharia Factor in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 28 Lay. L.A. Int’I & Comp, L. Rev 565 (2006) concluding that “There is 
a need to reform Islamic Law from within to deal with contemporary norms, transactions, and institutions, but 
there is an equal need to better accommodate and address the issues of concern from an Islamic Perspective. [Id 
at 623] see also, Radwa S. Elsaman, Factors to be considered before Arbitrating in the Arab Middle East: 
Examples of Religious and Legislative Constraint, 1 Arbitration Brief 8(2011). 
4  Article 1 (1) of the law of Arbitration of Bahrain. But see Jose Angelo Esteralla Faria, Legal Harmonization 
Through Model Laws: The Experience of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), arguing that “a certain level of variation — for instance to ensure conformity with the local 
drafting style or to better reflect local economic conditions or legal tradition — may be appropriate, or even 
necessary, where the primary purpose of adopting an international model is to modernize the law. Changing the 
text of a model law to conform to the local style of drafting or to fit squarely the legal status quo may be neither 
counter-productive…” [Id at 31].  
5  Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration, case No 67/1995.  Decided August 11, 1996. 
The Center proposes the following model arbitration clause “Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or 
relating to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in 
accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration. ” 
6  The General Assembly: Resolution 40/72, of December 11, 1985. In 2006, an important article was added stating 
that “In the interpretation of this law regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith”. [Article 2(1)] This observance is consistent with 
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The influence of the UNCITRAL Model Laws on Electronic Commerce and Electronic Signature in the Arab 
Region 
 
 Similarly, most Arab laws on electronic commerce are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce of 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures of 2001. For 
instance, the law of Qatar No. 16 of 2010 regarding Electronic Transactions and Commerce provides that 
information in a contract of a transaction shall not be denied effect, validity, or enforcement on the grounds 
that it is in the form of a data message. 7 
 
An Arab strategy for the Unification of Arab legislation 
 
 The Yemen strategy of 1981 or the “Sana’a strategy for the unification of Arab Legislation” called for 
the unification of the laws in the Arab region in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.8 In 1982, a 
number of committees were established to adopt model laws as a guide for national legislators. In 1988, the 
first model law was adopted by the LAS in the area of personal status.  
 
An Agreement or a Convention and a Model Law: Two Instruments of Unification of Arab Law 
 
 There are several means of unification of Law in the Arab world. For instance, there have been a great 
number of agreements or conventions that have been drafted and that are binding on Arab states once they 
are ratified. These binding agreements have been simultaneously accompanied by a number of “soft” law 
instruments such as a model law.  
 
 For instance, in the important area of combating human trafficking, especially for the purpose of forced 
labour, the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2014 prohibits “All forms of slavery and trafficking in human 
beings” as well as “forced labour”. 9 
__________________ 
the mandate of the UNCITRAL in “promoting ways and means of ensuring a uniform interpretation and 
application of international conventions and uniform law in the field of the law of international trade ”. The 
UNCITRAL has adopted several model laws that followed the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985. These included the Model Law on International Credit Transfers (1992), the Model Law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (1994), the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996), the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), the Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001), the Model Law 
on International Commercial Conciliation (2002) and the Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016) which 
applies to security rights, a term which is defined as “ a property right in a movable asset that is created by an 
agreement to secure payment of an obligation, regardless of whether the parties have denominated it as a security 
right, and regardless of the type of asset, the status of the grantor or secured creditor, or the nature of the secured 
obligation, and the right of the transferee under an outright transfer of a receivable by agreement” (Article 2). 
See also, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (2010).  
7  Article 4 of the law of Qatar No. 16 of 2010 regarding Electronic Transactions and Commerce, equivalent to 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce of 1996. Article 28 of the Qatari law recognizes 
an electronic signature in accordance with the requirements specified in article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures of 2001. See also, the Law of Tunisia No. 83 of 2000, the Law of Jordan No. 58 of 
2001, the Law of the United Arab Emirates No. 2 of 2002, See e.g., Stephen E. Blythe, Fine Tuning the E - 
Commerce Law of the United Arab Emirates: Achieving the Most Secure Cyber Transactions in the Middle East, 
1 International Journal of Business and Social Sciences 1 (2010). See also, the law of Bahrain No. 28 of 2002 
regarding electronic transactions and commerce.  
8  The Sana’a strategy adopted the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Prophet as the basis for application of 
Islamic law, without relying on any particular jurisprudential doctrine. It considered “principles of justice: that 
do not contradict Islamic law, as a source of codification of the laws. It also made it clear that such process 
should be “gradual” and should take into consideration the special circumstances of every state. This influence 
of Islamic law is seen in the Arab model Civil Law of 1996 that contained an introductory part covering rules of 
Islamic jurisprudence that should be utilized in the interpretation of the different articles of the model Civil Law. 
Other model laws did not pay too much attention to Islamic law in the process of drafting.  
9  Article 10 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights provides that “[1] All forms of slavery and trafficking in human 
beings are prohibited and are punishable by law. No one shall be held in slavery and servitude under any 
circumstances. [2] Forced labour, trafficking in human beings for the purposes of prostitution or sexual 
exploitation, the exploitation of the prostitution of others, any other form of exploitation or the exploitation of 
children in armed conflicts are prohibited”. For a discussion of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, see Mohamed 
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 The Arab Convention against Transactional Organized Crime of 2012 calls upon Arab states to take 
the necessary measures in their domestic laws to criminalize any act committed by an organized criminal 
group including the act of human trafficking. 10 
 
 The Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences of 2010 includes “Traffic in 
persons” as well as “Traffic in human organs” as “offences related to organized crime committed by means 
of information technology”. 11 
 
 These are binding regional instruments. In the meantime, the League of Arab States adopted two “soft” 
instruments, an Arab strategy to combat human trafficking12, and a Model Law which had a significant 
impact on anti-trafficking legislation13 that were adopted in Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia subsequent to the 
issuance of the Model Law.14 
 
 Similarly, in the area of combating corruption, the League followed the same dual methodology relying 
on both instruments, thus adopting the Arab Convention against Corruption in 201015, and the Arab Model 
Law against Corruption in 2012. 16 
 
__________________ 
Y. Mattar, Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights: Reconciling National, Regional, and International 
Standards, 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 91 (2013). I argued that “the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
provides a comprehensive and adequate platform for human rights promotion and protection in the region, 
provided that its provisions are properly interpreted in light of international standards embodied in international 
conventions” Id at 147. 
10  Article 11 of the Arab Convention on Combating Transnational Organized Crime of 2012. See generally, 
Mohamed Y Mattar, Corporate Criminal Liability: Article 10 of the Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 66 Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs 107 
(2012).  
11  Article 16 of the Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses. The purpose of this 
Convention “is to enhance and strengthen cooperation between the Arab States in the area of combating 
information technology offenses to ward off the threats of such crimes in order to protect the security and interests 
of the Arabs states and the safety of their communities and individuals.” [Article 1]. The Convention defines 
“Information technology” as “any material or virtual means or group of interconnected means used to store, sort, 
arrange, retrieve, process, develop, and exchange information according to commands and instructions stated 
therein. This includes all associated inputs and outputs by means of wires or wirelessly in a system or network.” 
[Article 2]. 
12  See “The Comprehensive Arab Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings” adopted by the Council of 
Arab Ministers of Justice Resolution No. 879 — 27 of February 15, 2012. The Arab Strategy is based on 8 focus 
areas, including criminalizing all types and forms of trafficking in human beings, ensuring effective 
investigation, indictment and trial in human trafficking crimes, strengthening prevention measures and 
procedures, victims protection, strengthening regional and international cooperation in combating trafficking in 
human beings, strengthening national institutional capacities for combating the crime, updating the Arab Model 
Law on Combating Human Trafficking and ensuring coordination of efforts to combat human trafficking in the 
Arab region.  
13  For a discussion of the status of anti-trafficking laws in the Arab world, see Mohamed Y. Mattar, Human Rights 
legislation in the Arab World: The Case of Human Trafficking, 33 Michigan Journal of International Law’ (2011). 
Except for Libya, Yemen and Palestine, every Arab country has passed a law on combating human trafficking. 
Several laws have provided for the principle of non-punishment of a victim of trafficking in accordance with the 
international standards on the rights of a victim of a crime. On drafting anti- trafficking legislation, see generally, 
Mohamed Y. Mattar, Incorporating the Five Basic Elements of a Model Anti -trafficking in Persons Legislation 
in Domestic Laws: From the United Nations Protocol to the European Convention, 14 Tulane J. Int’L and Comp. 
L. 357 ( 2006). 
14  The Model Law follows the definition of trafficking in persons as stipulated in the United Nations Protocol to 
prevent, suppress, and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children of 2000, which defines 
exploitation to include “at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal or  organs” 
[Article 3]. It is noted that the law of Sudan unlike the laws of Morocco and Tunisia, does not enumerate a list 
of exploitation, as does the protocol. Instead, the law focuses on any act that degrades human dignity or achieve 
unlawful aims. [Article 7]. 
15  Arab Anti-Corruption Convention (League of Arab States 2010) which aims at “fostering integrity, transparency, 
accountability, and the rule of law (Article 2).  
16  Arab Model Law Against Corruption (League of Arab States 2012).  
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Incorporating Arab Model Laws in Domestic Legislation 
 
 To what extent are these model laws effective? Do they have an impact on domestic legislation? Can 
a judge refer to them in interpreting the national law? 
 
 A model law, by definition, is not binding. It only serves a guide for the national legislator in enacting 
a law or amending an existing one.  
 
 In some instances, a national legislator may rely upon a model law. For example, the law of customs 
No. 40 of 2002 of Qatar makes an explicit reference to the Model Law on Customs that was adopted by the 
GCC. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates customs law No. 85 of 2007 applies the GCC Model Law on 
Customs.  
 
 This incorporation of the model law into the national law is the only way a judge may give effect to 
the model law. One would like to see judicial decisions that use a model law or an international principle 
or a guideline, at least in the interpretation of a national law regardless of its non-binding nature. Judicial 
discretion in such circumstance may find authority in the concept of “justice” which a judge may apply to 
achieve equity in a particular case. This reinterpretation of the notion of “ judicial interpretation” would 
also give effect to the rise of model laws and their preference over conventions, as means of unifying and 
harmonizing national laws especially in the area of investment, commerce and trade. 
 
The Development of Arab Civil Law away from the methodology of the Model Law 
 
 Some of the Arab model laws did not impact national legislation. For instance, the Arab Civil Law of 
1996 was drafted by the Arab league based upon the Jordanian Civil Code of 1976 and the United Arab 
Emirates Code of Civil Transactions of 1985, both of which were influenced by Islamic Law. Consequently, 
the Arab Civil Code contained 85 introductory articles drawn from Islamic jurisprudence. Nonetheless, both 
the Qatari Civil Code of 2004 and the more recent Civil Code of Oman of 2013 did not follow this 
methodology. Instead, they were influenced by the Egyptian Civil Code of 1949, which followed the French 
model of codification. 17 
 
Model Laws as a Vehicle for Introducing Legal Development 
 
 Model laws may also serve as a vehicle to introduce current legal developments. For instance, the 
GCC Model Law on Combating Information Technology Crimes of 2013 criminalizes establishing a 
website or spreading information on the internet to facilitate or publicize programs or ideas that may violate 
the public order and good morals18. The law also penalizes the use of the internet to commit an act of 
prostitution19, or place information or pictures or recording that may infringe upon private life20, or with the 
__________________ 
17  See generally, Nabil Saleh, Civil Codes of Arab Counties: The Sanhouri Codes, 8 Arab L.Q 161 (1993). See also 
K. Zurgert & H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 110 (1997) stating that “although Abu Sanhouri and the 
Egyptian legislator emphasized that Islamic law was considered throughout in the preparation of the Code, the 
Code appears, on closer investigation, to be principally oriented towards French law, and it contains only a few 
rules of Islamic origin, such as those relating to the gift and preemption”. It is also noted that Islamic law was 
only considered as a subsidiary source of law. Article 1 of the Egyptian Civil Code clearly provides that “In the 
absence of any applicable legislation, the judge shall decide according to the custom and failing  the custom, 
according to the principles of Islamic law. In the absence of these principles, the judge shall have recourse to 
natural law and the rules of equality”. It is to be observed that the Qatari Civil Code of 2004 and the Omani Civil 
Code of 2013 make Islamic law, not customs, the first subsidiary source of law. Nonetheless, the impact of 
Islamic Law on commercial transactions is minimal except for the prohibition of interest. For a discussion of the 
compatibility of Islamic Law and the CISG regarding the issue of interest, see generally, T.S. Twibell, 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) 
Under Shari’a (Islamic Law) : Will Article 78 of the CISG be Enforced When the Forum is in an Is lamic State?, 
9 INT’L Legal PERSP.25 (1997). 
18  Article 28.  
19  Article 21.  
20  Article 23.  
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intent to commit an act of trafficking in persons or in human organs21, or any act that degrades the Islamic 
religion or any other religions22.  
 
 There is a need to introduce more model laws that reflect recent developments in the law. One may 
suggest a model law in the area of franchising based upon the UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law 
of 2013, especially since Arab national laws still rely on the traditional rules of commercial agency and lack 
a comprehensive law that covers all aspects of a franchise licensing arrangement. One may also suggest an 
Arab model law on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that builds upon and learns from the provisions of 
the Federation International Des Ingenieurs Conseils (FEDIC). One may also suggest an Arab model law 
in the area of environmental protection reconciling investment legislation with the new challenges posed 
by climate change. One may also suggest an Arab model law on insolvency that draws on and borrows from 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of 1997 and its Guide to Enactment and 
Interpretation of 2013. One may also suggest an Arab model law on secured transactions based upon the 
UNCITRAL newly adopted Model Law on Secured Transactions of 2016. Perhaps the LAS or the GCC 
would consider endorsing the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions as the Arab model law on 
this important and innovative subject. One may also propose an Arab model law in the area of international 
sales reflecting the international standards embodied in the UNCITRAL Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sales of Goods (CISG). Perhaps building consensus around a model law would encourage 
more Arab states to ratify the convention which provides a very clear and widely acceptable statement of 
the law of international sales. 
 
Compliance of Model Laws with International Standards 
 
 An example of compliance with international standards, is the GCC Model Law on Commercial 
Trademarks of 1996 as amended in 2006 and 2012, which follows the TRIPS Agreement. The Model Law 
provides for a one year protection period23 that may be renewable for similar periods. The Model Law 
provides that the holder of a trademark which is confusing to the public or contains false statements 
regarding its source of the products or services, may not be registered24. Both documents define a trademark, 
which is protectable to include “any sign or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the foods 
or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings”. It is noted that U.A.E, Qatar, and Bahrain 
have adopted the Trademark Model Law as the applicable law25, thus replacing the local trademark laws of 
the GCC countries26. This is a significant trend in accepting model laws in national legal systems in the 
Arab world. This trend should be encouraged if we are serious about unifying and harmonizing the Arab 
laws, especially in the area of investment, trade and commerce. 
 
__________________ 
21  Article 25.  
22  Article 22. See also the Law of Sudan on Combating Human Trafficking of 2014 which explicitly provides that 
“ there shall be deemed to have committed an offence, whoever uses the internet, or establishes a website, with 
the intent to commit any of the offenses stipulated in this Act, and shall be punished with imprisonment, for a 
term not to exceed five years or with a fine, or with both.” (Article 14). See also the Law of Iraq on Combating 
Human Trafficking of 2012 (Article 7). 
23  Article 21. According to article 18 of the TRIPS agreement, a trademark shall be protected for a period of no less 
than 7 years. 
24  Article 3. See article 15 of the TRIPS agreement. See generally, Amir H. Khoury, “ Measuring the Immeasurable 
“ The Effects of Trademark Regimes : A Case Study of Arab Countries, 26 Journal of Law and Commerce 
11(2006-07). 
25  Article 15 of the TRIPS Agreement, equivalent to article 2 of the Arab Model Law on Trademarks. Article 15 
continues, “Such signs, in particular words including personal names, letters numerals, figurative elements and 
combination of colours as well as any combinations of signs, shall be eligible for registration as a  trademark.  
26  See e.g. the law of Bahrain No. 6 of 2014 approving the Trademark law of the Gulf Cooperation Council States, 
implemented by Decision No. 65 of 2016 issuing the Implementation Regulation for the Trademark law of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council States, approved by law No. 6 of 2014. See also the Qatari Decree No. 18/2007 and 
the United Arab Emirates Federal Decree No. 52/2007. Although the GCC Trademark Model Law does not 
provide for a unified filing system, applications for trademark protection are to be filed separately in each 
country.  
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A Need for Revision of Model Laws 
 
 Some of the Model Laws adopted by the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
must be amended in light of newly developed international standards. For instance the right to legal aid is 
organized by different provisions in the Model Law on Criminal Procedures issued by the GCC27 of 2010, 
the GCC Model Law on the Practice of the Legal Profession of 200228 and the Arab League Model Law on 
Judicial Aid of 200829. These Model Laws restrict the right to provide legal aid to lawyers and are mainly 
intended to provide legal aid to an accused who is unable to afford a lawyer. These rules should be 
reconsidered in light of the United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal 
Justice Systems30 and the United Nations Model Law on Legal Aid. Both adopt a broad concept of legal aid 
and expand on those who may provide legal aid and those who are entitled to receive it.31 
 
 Model laws may then become a vehicle for enhancing human rights and an instrument for legal reform. 
One may think about a model law on the establishment and operations of non-governmental organizations 
addressing the important role civil society plays in monitoring the application and enforcement of the law, 
whether it relates to combating corruption, corporate social responsibility, tax, privatization, corporate 
governance or foreign direct investment in the Arab world. One may also think about a model law on human 
rights in business holding companies doing business in the Arab world to international standards especially 
in the area of labour rights. It is encouraging that the GCC issued in 2013 guiding principles for corporate 
governance applicable to financial markets companies to ensure transparency and disclosure by the board 
of directors towards shareholders, creditors, interested parties and the public. It is also encouraging the in 
2015 the GCC adopted its own human rights declaration, “pursuant to the GCC Charter which provides for 
the common destiny and the unity of aim which link their peoples, and which calls for coordination, 
integration and interconnection between them in all fields, as well as deepening and strengthening of bonds, 
ties and cooperation between their peoples in various fields...” (Preamble). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 I hope that my paper will “contribute to the body of knowledge on the law of international trade and 
further the work of the UNCITRAL” by discussing these “regional activities of (the Arab Countries) in 
commercial legal reforms (s)” and “modernizing (their) commercial legal systems” through model laws.32 
__________________ 
27  See Article 5 and 245.  
28  See Article 5 and 39.  
29  The Model Law is applicable to natural persons and legal persons who are engaged in public interest work that 
benefits the society. While this expansion in legal aid beneficiaries is to be applauded, the law fell short of 
providing for all aspects of legal aid. There is a need for a more comprehensive legal aid law that addresses the 
needs of the vulnerable populations in the Arab world. For a definition of the vulnerable, see, The United Nations 
Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems (2013).  
30  The First Principle of the United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice 
Systems of 2013 provides that “Recognizing that legal aid is essential element of a functioning criminal Justice 
System that is based on the rule of law, a foundation for the enjoyment of other rights, including the right to a 
fair trial, and an important safeguard that ensures fundamental fairness and public trust in the criminal justice 
process, States should guarantee the right to legal aid in their national legal systems at the highest possible level, 
including where applicable in the constitution”. [Principle 1 — Right to Legal Aid]. 
31  The model law, which I was privileged to co-draft, is based on these guiding principles; non-discrimination 
[Article 5], right to information [Article 6], protection of vulnerable persons [Article 7], right to early access to 
legal aid [Article 8], equal right to defence or legal aid beneficiaries [Article 9] and the principle that “Nothing 
in the present law shall be interpreted as proving a lesser degree of protection than that provided under 
international human rights conventions applicable to the administration of and access to justice…” [Article 10]. 
32  More efforts are needed to engage the Arab countries in the working of the UNCITRAL. For instance, only six 
Arab countries have ratified the United Nations Convention on Contracts for  the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG); these are Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Mauritania, Lebanon, and Bahrain. See, Amin Dawwas and Yousef Shandi, 
the Applicability of the CISG to the Arab world. Uniform Law Review 813 (2011). This slow acceptance of 
international rules is also seen in the approach of Arab States to the conventions adopted by The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law. For instance, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction of 1980 was ratified only by Morocco and Iraq, although international abduction 
of children is very common in the Arab world, See generally, Erika Ressse, International Child Abduction to 
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Let us start a constructive and productive dialogue between the UNCITRAL and the League of Arab States 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the area of regional and international model laws. 
 
 I have argued that Arab model laws should be utilized not only as a means for the harmonization and 
unification of Arab national laws but also to introduce recent legal developments especially in the area of 
commerce, trade and investment. I also argued that Arab model laws should be used to enhance human 
rights in conducting business and trade and to promote the rule of law and legal reform, 
 
 The UNCITRAL model laws should serve as a guide for drafting and enacting a model law in the Arab 
region. I have suggested drafting an Arab model law on international sales to encourage more ratifications 
of the UNCITRAL Convention on International Sales of Goods. I have also suggested endorsing the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions of 2016 as the Arab model law. A close cooperation with 
the UNCITRAL when drafting a regional model law is imperative33 to ensure compliance with international 
standards and comparative models. 
 
 While the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council adopted several model laws in 
different areas of the law, the impact of these model laws is still insignificant. Unlike the great influence of 
a UNCITRAL model law, whether in international commercial arbitration, electronic commerce or 
electronic signature, on Arab national laws, regional model laws generally lack such impact. Learning from 
the UNCITRAL model laws experience, and perhaps endorsing the UNCITRAL model laws, would 
contribute to a better understanding of the role of model laws in unification and harmonization of the law 
in the Arab region and beyond. 
 
  
__________________ 
non- Hague Convention: The need for an International Family Court, 2 NW.J.Int’L.Hum. RTS, 1(2004). HCCH 
members from the Arab countries include only Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. Similarly, 
only Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia are members of the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private International Law “ UNIDROIT”. In the meantime, the impact of the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts on Arab commercial transactions has not yet been felt, unlike other legal 
systems. See generally, Michael Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commerc ial Contracts: 
Achievements in Practice and Prospects for the Future, 17 Australian International Law Journal 177 (2010). 
33  In September 2012, as the executive director of the Protection Project, I held a regional conference in Beirut on 
the “Harmonization of the law: the Hague Conference, the UNIDROIT and the UNCITRAL”, In March 2014, I 
launched the Arabic version of the UNIDROIT and in December 2014, we were privileged to hear from the 
UNCITRAL in an Arab regional conference which I organized in Siracusa, Italy. Qatar University College of 
Law will organize the 2018 International Association of Law Schools annual meeting. I in tend to chair a panel 
on incorporating international standards in commence, instruments and trade in educational curriculum in Law 
Schools. In my judgment, Arab model laws do not receive attention in any of the academic courses taught in law 
schools in Arab universities. Reform of Arab legal education is needed to integrate new developments including 
the rise of model laws as a means for the unification and harmonization of the law.  
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Session 2 — Opportunities and challenges in the use of UNCITRAL models 
 
 
International Insolvency Law’s Cross-Roads and the New Modularity 
 
John Pottow, University of Michigan Law School, United States of America 
 
 UNCITRAL has been modernizing international trade law for a half-century. Its Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency has been heralded as a success in integrating various legal traditions to take incremental 
steps towards the establishment of harmonized bankruptcy procedures. 
 
 But this project now stands at a cross-roads. Some have complained that far from being a success, the 
Model Law is a failure due to its purportedly disappointing adoption rate. Calls have consequently been 
raised to jettison the soft law approach altogether and switch gears to treaty negotiations. Others have noted 
that the Model Law will never realize its full potential until it tackles the questions of corporate groups for 
multinational debtors, which its tentative forays in the Legislative Guide have been insufficient to achieve. 
And still others have complained that the first wave of fixes to the Model Law is already required, noting 
the European Union’s “recast” of its cognate Insolvency Regulation. Thus, the cross-roads: should 
UNCITRAL amend the Model Law, supersede it with a convention, or try something else? 
 
 The cross-roads reflect the confluence of three challenges: first, an unexpected interpretation of the 
Model Law by an important enacting state; second, critique from academics, bemoaning perceived 
imperfections in the Model Law; and third, agitation from a particular NGO important in the international 
insolvency reform process. And as always, the ever-shifting political dynamics of the “transnational legal 
order” of international insolvency exert their own pressure. This brief article addresses each in turn before 
noting UNCITRAL’s apparently novel solution of modularity. 
 
 First, the U.K. Rubin decision. Part of the genius of the Model Law was its intentional vagueness, 
leaving contentious provisions up for ex post interpretation, rather than ex ante pre-specification, enabling 
“recursive” content revision. But this open-endedness comes with a cost. In Rubin, the U.K. Supreme Court 
propounded an unexpectedly restrictive reading of the Model Law, holding that it forecloses recognition of 
a U.S. foreign main proceeding judgment when the U.S. court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction did 
not comport with British law. The U.K. court pointedly held that the Model Law’s vague references to 
“cooperation” and intent to foster greater international “assistance” to foreign bankruptcy proceedings were 
insufficient to provide a statutory foundation. Rubin has led calls to amend the Model Law to confirm its 
cooperative intent. 
 
 Next, the academics. An intellectual whipping boy of the Model Law has been COMI, a concept also 
anchoring the kindred-spirit EU Insolvency Regulation. Numerous commentators complain its undefined 
standard causes untoward uncertainty. They, too, have called for amendments. 
 
 Finally, and likely relatedly, the groundswell of opposition from the International Bar Association, an 
important NGO whose initial Concordat provided the theoretical foundation for the Model Law. The IBA 
has spearheaded a glass-half-empty effort to suggest that the Model Law’s uptake rate has been a disaster. 
The IBA even trumpeted a questionnaire, couched as a pseudo-empirical study, showing support for a 
convention as an alternative to the faltering Model Law. It also arranged informal discussions at two 
meetings of Working Group V, going so far as to suggest that consideration of the viability of a convention 
is on the formal agenda per a charge from the Commission. Suffice it to say, this has called the model law 
“technology” into question. 
 
 How has UNCITRAL responded to this methodological cross-roads? With what I call modularity. The 
Rubin decision prompted the design of a new model law on cross-border recognition of judgments. It is 
intended to be either a standalone vehicle or an addition to the pre-existing Model Law. Thus, UNCITRAL 
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has doubled down on the model law framework, deploying its flexibility to establish modularity, namely, 
the ability to build upon, but also function independently from, pre-existing instruments. 
 
 This brings us to politics. The simplest solution to a Rubin decision getting the Model Law “wrong,” 
would be to amend the Model Law (or promulgate interpretative guidance), to get it “right.” The standalone 
recognitions model law does something different. It corrects Rubin, but it also makes adoption possible by 
states still sceptical of the underlying Model Law. This modularity has enabled a State to adopt the new 
recognitions model law, but not the underlying Model Law. This provides political cover to expand 
cooperative insolvency norms through the side door—achieving some of the same benefit as adopting the 
Model Law itself. 
 
 As for the academics, UNCITRAL has largely ignored them, by which I mean insisting that the perfect 
not become enemy of the good. But the response to the “threat” of the IBA has been most interesting. Much 
like when confronted with the infamous French “Observation” that called into question the legitimacy of 
much of UNCITRAL’s working group practice, the Secretariat responded as it does best: inclusive, fulsome 
procedure that sets the stage for an issue to die its own death after natural catharsis. While not opposing a 
convention, it clarified the need for States to demonstrate willingness to get behind a convention, especially 
so from States not already behind the Model Law. There was no stampede. 
 
 Thus, the path forward from the cross-roads seems to be more model laws. Far from path-dependence, 
this is adroit incrementalism. IBA grumbling notwithstanding, a model law is a nimble and cost-effective 
technology that allows states to adopt and adapt as need be. It also permits modularity, an important new 
technological feature with political payoff. This is an important innovation for UNCITRAL, and may well 
show a new path forward. 
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Investment Law and Climate Disputes: 
The Role of the UNCITRAL in Powering Sustainable Development 
 
Fernando Dias Simões, Faculty of Law of the University of Macau, Macau SAR, People’s Republic of 
China  
 
 
I. Investment law and the quest for greener sources of energy  
 
 The use of renewable sources of energy, along with the implementation of eco-friendly technologies, 
plays a pivotal role in addressing the quandaries caused by climate change. The global demand for greener 
alternatives led to the emergence of an international market for renewable energy technologies and 
equipment.1 Over the last decade this market attracted colossal flows of capital.2 Foreign direct investment 
is particularly welcome as it can provide fresh funds and induce the transfer of technology.3 From a broader 
perspective, foreign investment is a key component of any agenda for sustainable development.4 
 
 The financial viability of investments in renewable energies is frequently dependent upon public 
support.5 All over the world governments have designed and implemented renewable energy support 
mechanisms so as to encourage private investment, often in the form of subsidies and incentive tariffs.6 
Investments in the energy field are also highly capital intensive and require a lengthy payback period.7 
Regulatory risks loom large — the possibility that the rules in force at the moment the investment was made 
are altered, threatening the ability of investors to recover and earn a profit on their investments.8 
Governments may decide to change the regulatory framework once investments take place and costs are 
“sunk.”9 Changes to economic mechanisms are a critical risk factor surrounding such investments, since 
the level of public support is the most important element influencing expected profits.10 Therefore, investors 
seek to ensure the stability of the regulatory framework that underpins their investments and secure 
protection from unwarranted policy changes. 
__________________ 
1  See, generally, RENEWABLE ENERGY: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGIES, POLICIES AND 
MARKETS (Dirk Assmann et al. eds, 2006). 
2  See, e.g., Omar Ellabban et al, Renewable Energy Resources: Current Status, Future Prospects and their Enabling 
Technology, 39 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 748, 758 (2014).  
3 Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 
27(3) JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 333, 334 (2009).  
4  Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8(3) JOURNAL OF WORLD 
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357 (2007).  
5  World Bank, INCLUSIVE GREEN GROWTH: THE PATHWAY TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 22 
(2012). 
6  See, e.g., Richard Ottinger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 331, 359 ff (2002); Bradford Gentry & Jennifer Ronk, International Investment 
Agreements and Investments in Renewable Energy, in FROM BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITIES: RENEWABLE 
ENERGY ISSUES IN LAW IN POLICY 25, 59 ff (pre-publication draft), available at 
http://environment.yale.edu/publication-series/documents/downloads/0-9/11-03-Gentry_Ronk.pdf (last visited 
October 26, 2016); Richard Ottinger et al., Renewable Energy in National Legislation: Challenges and 
Opportunities, in BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: ENERGY LAW IN TRANSITION 183, 186 ff (Donald 
Zillman et al. eds., 2008). 
7  Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and the International Energy Governance , in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 307, 315 (Christoph Herrmann & Jorg Terhechte eds., 2012).  
8  Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law 337; Nigel Bankes, Decarbonising 
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CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 18, 19 (1998); Ralf Dickel, Impact of Liberalisation on Investment 
Performance in the Power Sector, in ELECTRICITY TRADE IN EUROPE: REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC 
AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 69, 76 (Janusz Bielecki & Melaku Desta eds., 2004).  
10  Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law 342; Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Managing the Risk in Renewable Energy 10-11, available at http://digitalresearch.eiu.com/risksandrenewables/report 
(last visited October 26, 2016). 
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International investment agreements have become especially important over the past few decades. These 
legal instruments aim to create a “level playing field” for investments in the energy sector, and minimize 
non-commercial risks associated with such investments.11 These international legal instruments can help 
lower regulatory and political risks, thus boosting investor confidence and increasing international 
investments into renewable sources of energy.12 
 
 Investment agreements are a form of international law that creates a series of obligations owed by the 
host state towards foreign investors.13 The numbers of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral 
agreements entering into force have increased throughout the past few decades. The Energy Charter Treaty 
(“ECT”), a multilateral treaty entered into force in 1998, is the only energy-specific multilateral investment 
protection mechanism currently in force.14 While there are differences between the scope and content of the 
different investment treaties, there is a shared core content: they normally include the obligation to treat 
foreign investors fairly and equitably; provide foreign investors full protection and security; and not to 
expropriate foreign investment except under certain conditions, including the payment of compensation.15 
Furthermore, international investment agreements normally contain procedural protections, typically 
including dispute resolution clauses that enable foreign investors to initiate arbitration proceedings against 
the host state, known as ‘investor-state arbitrations’.16 
 
 
II. The wave of disputes over changes to renewable energy incentives  
 
 With a view to increasing the production of clean energy, many countries introduced incentives to 
encourage investment in the renewable energy sector. As originally intended, the introduction of these 
mechanisms led a substantial number of companies and individuals making investments in this field.17 
While economic incentives attracted significant amounts of investment, several countries — namely, Spain, 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria — have decided to reduce or eliminate them.18 These 
legislative measures have triggered a wave of arbitral proceedings where investors claim that such measures 
breach the protection afforded by international investment agreements, namely the ECT. As of 15 June 
2016, 43 cases had been initiated relating to changes in economic support programs in the renewable energy 
market.19 
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 The anatomy of these cases is substantially different from the prototype of energy-related disputes 
submitted to arbitration in the past. For years, states have enacted regulations to protect the environment by 
limiting environmentally detrimental investments. Commentators have expressed concern that investors 
could initiate arbitral proceedings, claiming that climate-related regulatory measures breached relevant 
investment treaty provisions. Such cases posed a risk that international investment agreements could have 
a constraining effect (“regulatory chill”) on climate change mitigation measures and restrain the host-state’s 
policy space significantly.20 
 
 Differently, the new wave of disputes refers to cases were states are reducing or eliminating the 
economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to lure investments into the renewable energy 
market. Investors are complaining that such regulatory changes diminish or exhaust the commercial 
viability of their investments.21 Host states argue that support mechanisms have proven too popular (and 
therefore, more expensive than anticipated); that they became too generous because the production costs 
for the new technology have decreased significantly; or that they simply cannot afford these initiatives due 
to the ongoing financial crisis.22 The crux of the question is whether investors can seek compensation under 
__________________ 
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investment treaties when governments encourage investment via economic support schemes, but decide to 
reduce or eliminate them after the investment has been made. Again, we may have a clash between energy-
related policies and investment law.23\ 
 
 These disputes raise a classic problem in investment arbitration: how to strike a balance between 
foreign investors’ reliance on the regulations that underpin their long-term investments and the host state’s 
right to adapt regulations to new needs.24 The introduction of changes to economic support mechanisms 
typically involves governmental measures adopted for public purposes, whether for financial or other 
reasons. The host state intervenes as the regulation of energy production, distribution and consumption is a 
key element of national economic law, and policy.25 The novelty in this new wave of disputes is that 
challenged measures work against the protection of the environment, while in the past they were eco-
friendly.26 
 
 
III. Renewable energy policymaking at a crossroads?  
 
 Changes to regulatory frameworks might have a significant impact on what until recently seemed like 
an unstoppable move towards a low-carbon model of development, jeopardizing the credibility of 
renewable energy policies and generating high investment uncertainty.27 These measures may affect the 
support for renewable energy in both the present and future. Governments may cut agreed subsidies for 
projects built or under construction but also decide not to grant any support for new projects.28 If investors 
have the perception that governments might act opportunistically and change the ‘rules of the game’ after 
the investment has been made, they will most likely factor in a risk premium in future projects, increasing 
the costs of eco-friendly policies.29 
 
 While some years ago investors were claiming that states had enacted environment-friendly 
regulations in a way that was detrimental to their investments, the new wave of disputes refers to cases were 
states are reducing or eliminating the economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to 
encourage investments in the renewable energy market. This new category of disputes basically results from 
the move from the old to the new production matrix.30 
 
 To date, only one award has been rendered in disputes relating to alterations to economic support 
programs in the renewable energy market. On 21 January 2016, the tribunal in Charanne and Construction 
Investments v. Spain ruled in favour of the validity of the host state’s regulatory changes.31 While this 
decision offers important insights into how standards of investment protection might be interpreted and 
applied in similar disputes, it does not establish any binding precedent. Other arbitral tribunals will have to 
__________________ 
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balance the expectations of investors against the right of states to intervene in the public interest and adjust 
regulatory structures according to the specific circumstances that surround those cases. As divergent 
interpretations persist about when the investors’ expectations deserve protection under the standards of 
investor protection, any evaluation will be deeply dependent upon the specific circumstances and facts of 
each particular case.32 The approach of different international investment arbitrators to similar issues can 
vary considerably, creating a degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of international investment 
disputes.33 This lack of certainty raises the question of the necessity to create a specific investment regime 
for low-carbon investments. 
 
 
IV. The possible role of the UNCITRAL in developing international energy investment law  
 
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), established in 1966, 
serves as the core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of International Trade Law.34 It is a 
‘specialized quasi-legislative commission’35, a ‘transnational quasi-legislature of the world’36 with a 
mandate to ‘further the progressive harmonization and modernization of the law of international trade by 
preparing and promoting the use and adoption of legislative and non-legislative instruments in a number of 
key areas of commercial law.’37 Over the past half a decade, UNCITRAL has international legal instruments 
on many areas of procedural and substantive law including dispute resolution, international contract 
practices, transport, insolvency, electronic commerce, international payments, secured transactions, 
procurement and sale of goods.38 
 
 The breadth of topics that UNCITRAL addresses has grown enormously since its creation.39 While the 
incursion of the UNCITRAL into the realm of investment law is recent, its first products in this area — the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014)40 and the United 
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014)41 are noteworthy 
contributions that signal an increasing engagement with the tensions and quandaries surrounding this field 
of international economic law. 
 
 The current wave of disputes in the field of renewable energy investments signals a failure by 
governments in adjusting their regulatory structures without destabilizing the market for renewable 
energies. Regardless of the final outcome of these disputes, they indicate a significant level of conflict 
between host states and investors. Well-designed economic support schemes are in the best interest of both 
governments and investors, because the alternative is an explosion of disputes where everyone loses except 
the arbitration industry.42 Governments should factor in some flexibility into the regulatory structure so as 
__________________ 
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Commission on International Trade Law, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12 -
57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf 1 (last visited October 26, 2016); David Stewart, What Does International 
Law have to do with International Development?, 42 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
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35  Katherine Lynch, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 209 (2003).  
36  Terence Halliday, Josh Pacewicz & Susan Block-Lieb, Who Governs? Delegations and Delegates in Global Trade 
Lawmaking, 7 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 279, 280 (2013).  
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to eliminate the risk of legitimate policy decisions giving rise to legal disputes, while at the same time 
providing adequate assurances to investors.43 Policymakers need to design economic support schemes that 
are flexible enough to accommodate changes in the market without disrupting the stability of the regime 
itself. 
 
 Countries need to adopt a holistic approach to renewable energy policymaking so as to avoid possible 
clashes between different legal frameworks. Legal instruments, international investment law in particular, 
can help to mobilize the huge investments required to transform the energy sector to cleaner forms of 
generation. The challenge is to shape national policies in ways that do not breach the rights of foreign 
investors under international investment agreements. This can only be achieved if host states are truly aware 
of the scope of their obligations to foreign investors when they design and implement their renewable 
energy policies.44 This requires a clear understanding of the disciplines of international investment law and 
how they may limit or impact upon national regulation. 
 
 UNCITRAL is in a privileged position to assist States in reforming and improving the legal 
frameworks applicable to investments in the renewable energy field. The Commission has been 
characterized as an ‘epistemic community’ or ‘group of knowledge-based experts’.45 Like other specialized 
agencies of the United Nations, the Commission exhibits an increased ‘professionalization’ and 
‘bureaucratization’ with an emphasis on technical concerns and responsibilities.46 In designing new policies 
or adjusting existing ones, governments need to take into account that the legal framework that supports 
renewable energy investment is not confined to national regulations. The legal obligations borne by states 
towards investors encompass obligations in domestic law (contract and administrative law) but also in 
international law, namely international investment law. The challenge for governments is to strike a balance 
between regulation that discourages foreign investment and foreign investment protection that discourages 
regulation.47 The wealth of knowledge acquired by the UNCITRAL over the years might be particularly 
useful in raising to this challenging task. 
 
 Regardless of the final outcome of the pending disputes, it is important to ensure that bridges between 
states and investors are not burned. The transition to a low-carbon model of development requires long-
term cooperation between parties. Countries will continue to strive to design and implement energy policies 
that allow them to face climate change. Investors are essential partners in this process, and governments 
need to be able to encourage them to make their contribution in future ventures. The work model followed 
by the UNCITRAL is particularly apt to stimulate this inclusive type of debate. The UNCITRAL has been 
labelled by some scholars as an ‘inclusive body’48 or a ‘site’ for ‘normative modelling’ through which legal 
norms, principles, and standards for the global political economy are articulated. 49 In addition to its sixty 
Member States,50 UNCITRAL also invites as observers other Member States of the United Nations, as well 
as international and regional organizations (both intergovernmental and non-governmental) involved in 
shaping the legal frameworks of national and global commerce and investment.51 Observers may participate 
__________________ 
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in discussions to the same extent as members. By tradition, decisions taken by UNCITRAL and its working 
groups reconcile the different positions represented by its members and other participants by consensus 
rather than by vote.52 Honnold refers to UNCITRAL as a ‘mix of academic specialists in commercial and 
comparative law, practicing lawyers, and members of government ministries with years of experience in 
international lawmaking’ with an acknowledged pragmatic approach.53 The inclusion of a broad array of 
actors including states, corporate and industry representatives, legal experts and professionals, and other 
public and private international organizations allows the UNCITRAL to, despite its budgetary constraints, 
mobilize substantial know how and expertise. In the words of Halliday, Block-Lieb and Carruthers, ‘[t]here 
is little point in developing a global standard if the interest groups most affected by it will reject it on arrival, 
or if the experts who practice around the standard find it technically deficient’.54 Such situations can lead 
to ‘actor mismatch’, a situation where national or industry actors are missing from the international text-
making enterprise, and when local actors are missing from national lawmaking.55 
 
 This collaborative model also has the advantage of allowing for the coordination of the activities of 
organizations active in the field of international trade law. This helps to avoid duplication of efforts and to 
promote efficiency, consistency, and coherence in the unification and harmonization of international law.56 
The Energy Charter Secretariat has been discussing the benefits of a non-binding declaration and/or an 
interpretative note on the promotion of low-carbon investments. It is argued that such a statement would 
improve legal certainty in the application of the ECT, reducing the normative and political risks and 
investment related disputes.57 Moreover, a clear political statement on low-carbon investments by the 
Energy Charter Conference would send an important signal to the international community and to investors 
on its commitment to sustainable development and climate change mitigation. The overall objective being 
the protection and balance the interests of ECT members and of international investors.58Greater policy 
coordination between the European Union and its member states is also needed.59 The European 
Commission is currently working to devise a European policy on renewable energy promotion. In this 
regard, the design of support schemes is of paramount importance. While economic support mechanisms 
have demonstrated important successes, they have also evidenced a number of policy failures.60 
 
 The UNCITRAL is a ‘quasi governmental norm-creating forum’,61 but is not alone in crafting global 
governance norms. It should therefore cooperate and collaborate with other leading organizations such as 
the Energy Charter Secretariat, the European Union, or the World Trade Organization in furthering a modern 
legal framework for foreign investments in renewable energies. These and other ‘formulating agencies’ 
should take part in this debate so as to prevent inconsistencies and contradictions between different rules 
and standards regulating global investment flows. This ‘inclusive process’,62 involving a variety of 
participants, including member States of UNCITRAL, non-member States, and invited intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations, is part of the UNCITRAL’s ADN and is vital for distilling the best 
international practices, promoting consensus-building, and crafting a coherent, efficient legal framework. 
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It is the combination of the process of participation and consensus-building that leads to the wide 
acceptability of UNCITRAL texts.63 
 
 The UNCITRAL should also coordinate its activities with other United Nations agencies, namely the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)64 and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP).65 The former performs an important role in gathering and dissemination information 
in the field of international investment and international investment law.66 Each year UNCTAD publishes 
the ‘World Investment Reports’ outlining trends in global foreign direct investment and providing in-depth 
analysis into trends in investment treaty practice.67 The 2015 ‘Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development’,68 provides guidance for policymakers in the evolution towards a new generation of 
investment policies, offering operational guidelines or action menus for national investment policies, 
guidance for the design and use of international investment agreements, and an action menu for the 
promotion of investment in sectors related to the sustainable development goals. This document serves as 
an important reference for policymakers in formulating national and international investment policies that 
are more suited to the particularities of renewable energy markets. It contains important suggestions on how 
to design investment incentive schemes for sustainable development,69 for example, that ‘[i]nvestment 
incentives should (…) not become permanent; the supported project must have the potential to become self-
sustainable over time — something that may be difficult to achieve in some sectors. This underlines the 
importance of monitoring the actual effects of investment incentives on sustainable development, including 
the possibility of their withdrawal if the impact proves unsatisfactory.’70 
 
 The UNEP, on the other hand, coordinates the environmental activities of the United Nations. It aims 
at serving as the ‘leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, 
promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within 
the United Nations system and serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.’71 
 
 The numerous claims over changes in economic support mechanisms that have surfaced in the past 
few years provide evidence that states need to rethink and reshape their renewable energy policies. The 
determination of what is reasonable for the investor to expect is important for any reform of legal 
frameworks. Shifts in both policy and the development of countries make this determination different from 
country to country.72 The creation of efficient and sustainable markets for renewable sources of energy is a 
tremendous financial and legal challenge. This endeavour can only be achieved through a thorough 
knowledge of the functioning and possible implications of the economic mechanisms and legal frameworks 
that underpin foreign investments in the renewable energy market. While it is not the only global 
formulating agency, the work of the UNCITRAL gains added credibility and legitimacy from its perceived 
representatives and its institutional aura as a United Nations organ.73 In crafting modern legal instruments 
__________________ 
63  Caroline Nicholas, Negotiations and the Development of International Standards in Public Procurement: Let the 
Best Team Win? 7(1) TRADE LAW & DEVEVELOPMENT 64, 80 (2015); Julia Salasky & Corinne Montineri, 
UN Commission on International Trade Law and Multilateral Rule-making: Consensus, Sovereignty and the Role 
of International Organizations in the Preparation of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency , in RESHAPING 
THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM. JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 584, 
587 ff (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015). 
64  See http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx. 
65  See http://www.unep.org/. 
66  See Investment Policy Hub (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/) a comprehensive and free online database 
of all International Investment Agreements and many investor-state dispute settlement cases. 
67  See http://www.worldinvestmentreport.org. 
68  See 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/INVESTMENT%20POLICY%20FRAMEWORK%2
02015%20WEB_VERSION.pdf. 
69  Ibid., 124 ff. 
70  Ibid., 127. 
71  See http://www.unep.org/about. 
72  Åsa Romson, International Investment Law and the Environment , in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 37, 40 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds, 2011). 
73  Gerard McCormack, Secured Transactions Law Reform, UNCITRAL and the Export of Foreign Legal Models , in 
AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 33, 34 (N. Orkun 
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to address these issues, the Commission need to adopt democratic and legitimate rule-making processes 
that ensure fair representation and participation of all the interests at stake in the development process.74 
The Commission should invite other international formulating agencies and international organizations to 
co-operate closely on these issues so as to avoid duplication of efforts and inconsistency between policies 
and rules. 
 
 The work of the UNCITRAL typically takes the form of conventions, model laws, legislative guides, 
or model provisions.75 The use of varied strategies allows UNCITRAL the flexibility to approach particular 
areas of law taking into account its specificities and reflect the different degrees of consensus that can be 
reached among all intervening parties. Conventions are, naturally, difficult to negotiate. It seems more 
realistic, therefore, to adopt alternative tools such as the elaboration of a legislative guide that could provide 
valuable technical information to promote and revise bilateral or multilateral bilateral investment treaties 
and national investment laws. Legislative guides allow for greater flexibility by accommodating dissent 
and national particularities and including more detailed background material for the guidance of national 
legislators.76 A legislative guide on international investments in the renewable energy market should focus 
on reducing inconsistent or overly broad interpretations of investment disciplines by offering model 
provisions that incorporate more precise language and are adjusted to the technical intricacies of this type 
of investments. The guide should circulate among key actors so as to, hopefully, shape legal reform efforts 
in more indirect but effective ways than formal conventions.77  
 
 It should also be recognized that UNCITRAL, like other elements of the United Nations, faces budget 
pressures, so it is important that it focuses its UNCITRAL focuses its efforts and resources in priority 
projects.78 In considering what topics should be added to its work program, the Commission takes into 
account factors such as global significance, special interest to developing countries, developments in 
technology, and changing trends in commercial practice.79 For the reasons discussed in the second and third 
sections of this paper, UNCITRAL could, and should, devote its attention to the creation of a modern 
international legal framework that supports and promotes investments in the renewable energy field, 
protecting the legitimate interests of investors while retaining the regulatory space of host states. The 
UNCITRAL has been recognized as one of the most practical and productive organs in the United Nations 
constellation.80 Its legislative products are highly influential in shaping the law of global commerce.81  
 
 UNCITRAL has developed sophisticated means of integrating widely diverse interests, of obtaining 
broadly inclusive representation, of establishing expert authority.82 This paper has argued that the 
UNCITRAL is in a privileged position to lead an effort — along with other international organizations, 
public and private stakeholders — to conduct a thorough analysis of the challenges raised by the growing 
interaction between international investment treaties and national legal frameworks that regulate economic 
incentives in the renewable energy field and devise a legislative text offering effective solutions.
__________________ 
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The Reduction of the Legal Obstacles Faced by MSMEs in the 
Footsteps of the Previous Attempts at Harmonizing Company Law: 
Will UNCITRAL Reinvent the Role of Harmonization in Company Law? 
 
Corrado Malberti, University of Trento, Italy 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Since 2014, the UNCITRAL Working Group I has been elaborating a proposal aiming at harmonizing 
the legal framework for MSMEs (micro, small and medium enterprises). This initiative, which is the first 
attempt at harmonizing company law at the global level, displays some distinctive features that apparently 
restrain its scope. More precisely, Working Group I aims only at creating tools to facilitate business 
registration and allow small businesses to grow and succeed in developing nations. In addition, in the 
ongoing discussions, emphasis has been placed on the possibility of creating a “delinked” legislation, so 
that the impact on the national company law currently in force in any legal system would be minimal. Yet 
current efforts are focused on elements that are essential to any company law, such as limited liability, legal 
personality, party autonomy, object clauses and capital requirements. Moreover, the proposal under 
discussion addresses the different aspects of any national company law, including business registration, 
internal organization, directors, contributions, distributions, transfers of rights, conversions, restructuring, 
dissolution and winding-up. 
 
 This paper argues that, if this initiative is to succeed, it will be impossible to consider the proposed 
rules as legislation that is independent from the national company laws in which they will be implemented. 
This process will inevitably lead to broader harmonization of company law. Since the initiative under 
discussion at Working Group I has the potential to influence company law more broadly, special attention 
should be given to the existing regional attempts at harmonizing legislation in this field. The experiences 
of the European Union, OHADA, the Caribbean countries and, more recently, OAS may provide useful 
guidance to Working Group I on the strategies that succeeded at creating a viable harmonized company law 
framework — and those that failed. 
 
 This paper is organized as follows: Part II provides a short outline on the UNCITRAL initiative on 
MSMEs currently under discussion at Working Group I and explains the general implications of this project 
for national company law. Part III discusses the regional strategies to harmonize company law. This part 
also briefly discusses the different harmonization techniques that have been adopted to achieve this goal. 
Part IV discusses the implications of the project under discussion at Working Group I and recommends 
relying on previous experiences to move forward in the harmonization of company law. Part V concludes 
this paper. 
 
 
II. The UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs and its Implications for National Company Law  
 
A. The UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs 
 
1. The Goals of the UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs 
 
 In these few pages, it is not necessary to investigate the details of the initiative of UNCITRAL on 
MSMEs. We would simply note that work in this area began recently and that Working Group I started 
discussing this topic in early 2014, after having received a mandate by UNCITRAL in 2013. 
 
 The idea of taking action in this field may be traced back to a colloquium on microfinance, which 
was held in Vienna in January 2013 and addressed various topics. A review of the materials presented there1 
__________________ 
1 For additional details on this colloquium on microfinance, see http://www.uncitral.o rg/uncitral/en/commission/ 
colloquia/microfinance-2013-papers.html, last visited on December 20, 2016. 
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gives interesting indications for the roots of this initiative: several presentations covered the creation of an 
enabling environment for micro-businesses, while others dealt with the facilitation of incorporation and 
registration of potential micro-borrowers. The colloquium saw several interventions from Colombian 
speakers, in particular from the Superintendencia de Sociedades; special attention was given to the 
Colombian SAS (Simplified Stock Corporation), a hybrid legal entity inspired by both the US Limited 
Liability Company and the French Société par actions simplifiée.2 
 
 This digression on the 2013 colloquium is useful to understand the drivers of the UNCITRAL initiative 
on MSMEs that influenced the early discussions at Working Group I. In fact, the project revolved around a 
few very different ideas: (a) providing a tool for micro-businesses to better carry out their activities, (b) 
facilitating the incorporation and registration of micro-businesses to make them bankable vis-à-vis potential 
lenders, and (c) introducing a simplified legal form to carry out business.3 
 
 With regard to the first idea, this is a goal that could have been achieved following various strategies: 
one approach would be to introduce new legal entities designed for micro-businesses, a solution that would 
have mimicked the Colombian experience. Other potential strategies were not directly related to company 
law, but were inspired by other tools existing in some jurisdictions to facilitate business activities. More 
precisely, Working Group I examined the French EIRL (Entreprise individuelle à responsabilité limitée) 
and the Italian Contractual Network (Contratto di rete). 
 
 With regard to the idea of facilitating the incorporation and registration of micro-businesses, the 
principal goal was the creation of a legal framework to facilitate micro-borrowing. In that perspective, the 
UNCITRAL initiative is also a logical evolution of the debate on secured transactions: in order to finance 
a business, even the most advanced framework on secured transactions works only if the pool of assets on 
which interests are created is well defined and easy to monitor. However, the confusion between personal 
and business assets increases lenders’ monitoring costs, which in turn makes borrowers more difficult to 
finance. To address this problem, one solution is that of facilitating the creation of micro-entities to decrease 
lenders’ monitoring costs. Certainly, the creation of separate pools of assets makes it easier for lenders to 
finance micro-businesses. However, to encourage borrowers to create legal entities, the separation of pool of 
assets should also entail the limited liability of borrowers, so as to give them an incentive to incorporate.4 
Therefore, to facilitate lending, it is important to ensure the separation between personal and business assets, 
something that may be achieved by incorporating legal persons with limited liability. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Colombian approach prevailed over the French and the Italian ones in the initial meetings 
of Working Group I, since, to the advantage of both lenders and borrowers, it allowed a more intuitive and 
manageable separation of personal and business assets. 
 
 With regard to the last idea that influenced the early development of the initiative on MSMEs, i.e. the 
introduction of a simplified legal entity to carry out business activities, in its first sessions, Working Group 
I discussed at length the possibility of adopting a model law to enable the creation of these entities. It is 
important to stress that the idea of introducing new legal forms is not exclusively related to the creation of 
a friendly environment for micro-businesses. In fact, the simplification of national company law has been 
considered not only for micro-businesses, but also for small and medium-sized enterprises. Hence it is 
important to highlight that simplification is a goal of the UNCITRAL initiative that is partially different 
from that of favouring the growth of micro-businesses. Interestingly, also to achieve that goal, inspiration 
was taken from the Colombian experience with the SAS, since it appeared to be a successful model for that 
purpose as well. 
__________________ 
2 Therefore, it is not surprising that the discussions on the Colombian experience with simplified legal entities 
marked the initial discussions on the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs. 
3 In addition to these three ideas, the initiative has also been influenced by the research of the World Bank, see in 
particular, Rahman et al., Reforming Business Registration: A Toolkit for Practitioners  (2013), available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/577211468155378578/Reforming-business-registration-a-toolkit-
for-the-practitioners, last visited on December 20, 2016.  
4 For an economic analysis of limited liability, see Bainbridge-Henderson, Limited Liability. A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, Elgar, Cheltenham — Northampton, 2016, 44 ff. 
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2. The Mandate of the Commission 
 
 Notwithstanding the drivers that gave the initial impulse to the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs, 
it is also important to highlight the terms of the mandate the Commission gave to Working Group I. On that 
point, it is interesting to note that, as indicated in the provisional agenda of the meetings of Working Group 
I, the focus was on the life cycle of businesses, particularly in relation to micro- and small-sized enterprises. 
In addition, it was clearly suggested that: 
 
 “the Working Group could begin with the facilitation of simplified business incorporation and 
registration, following which it could continue with other matters, such as those discussed at the 2013 
colloquium, in order to create an enabling legal environment for this type of business activity”.5 
 
 Furthermore, the emphasis on business registration was strengthened in the UNCITRAL session held 
in 2014, which:  
 
 “reaffirmed the mandate of the Working Group, relative to reducing the legal obstacles faced by 
MSMEs throughout their life cycle, in particular those in developing economies beginning with a focus 
on the legal questions surrounding the simplification of incorporation”.6 
 
 In conclusion, the mandate given by UNCITRAL is in line with the ideas that initially inspired the 
initiative on MSMEs. It is nevertheless worth noting that the problem of business registration received 
special attention. On the one hand, this seems more consistent with the goal of creating a tool that micro-
businesses could use to carry out their activities, and with that of making these entities bankable vis-à-vis 
potential lenders. On the other hand, the mandate does not emphasize the goal of simplifying company law. 
 
3. The UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs: Current Status 
 
 So far, Working Group I has discussed the initiative on MSMEs in six sessions. Over the course of 
these meetings, it became evident that the registration of legal entities was a distinct issue from that of the 
creation of a harmonized framework for MSMEs. 
 
 Another important issue discussed in the first sessions of Working Group I was the nature of the 
instrument to be prepared: more precisely, while for the registration of businesses, the texts discussed by 
Working Group I always took the form of a legislative guide, the proposed introduction of a harmonized 
legal framework for simplified business entities was, until recently, discussed in the form of a draft model 
law. 
 
 In light of these early discussions, it was finally decided to separate the initiative concerning business 
registration from that regarding the creation of simplified legal entities. Although both topics will continue 
to be on the agenda of Working Group I, the initiative on MSMEs will take two different paths, and two 
different documents will be prepared in view of achieving the goals pursued by Working Group I. 
 
 Importantly, a tentative solution was also found for the problem of what kind of instrument should be 
prepared. At present, for both the initiative on business registration and that on the creation of simplified 
legal entities, the decision of adopting a legislative guide prevailed over that of introducing a model law. 
This approach of Working Group I also received the support of UNCITRAL: 
 
 “The Commission also noted the decision of the Working Group to prepare a legislative guide on each 
of those topics, which would support an overarching introductory framework generally explaining the 
MSME work and possibly accommodating future instruments on MSMEs that might be adopted by 
__________________ 
5 See A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.97 — Annotated provisional, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
commission/working_groups/1MSME.html, last visited on December 20, 2016, para. 11 . 
6 Ibid., para. 14. 
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the Commission. After discussion, the Commission commended the Working Group on the progress 
that was being made on the two topics”.7 
 
 At present, Working Group I has started examining the draft legislative guide on the provisionally 
called “UNCITRAL Limited Liability Organization” (or UNLLO) and is planning, in the next sessions, to 
continue its efforts to prepare a legislative guide on business registration. 
 
B. Implications of the UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs for National Company Law 
 
 The initiative on MSMEs currently being discussed by Working Group I may have repercussions that 
extend beyond its intended goals. Although the proposals on business registration and simplified legal 
entities are addressed only to MSMEs, their adoption by UN Member States could have important 
implications for national company law. 
 
1. The Role of Business Registers in Business Registration 
 
 Starting with the initiative on business registration, one of the most relevant issues that remains 
unsolved is that of the value that may be attached to the information available in business registers. In 
general, Working Group I has discussed two different approaches: the notification approach, which is 
frequent in common law jurisdictions, and the verification approach, which is prevalent in civil law 
countries. Under the notification approach, the information made available by business registers is not 
subject to prior verifications; therefore, the data collected may be unreliable, and the persons that made the 
filings usually cannot invoke such data in their dealings with third parties. The advantage of this system 
lies in the speed of notifications and the fact that no infrastructure is needed to check the accuracy of 
information. 
 
 The verification system requires that information filed with business registers be verified by business 
registers, courts or legal professionals before it is entered in the register and made available to the public. 
The advantage of this system lies in the high degree of certainty that may be attached to information made 
available to third parties. This high degree of certainty may result in attaching special value to the 
information included in business registers, such that even the persons that made the filings may invoke 
information in the register in their dealings with third parties. 
 
 Both these approaches are reflected in the discussions of Working Group I on the registration of 
business entities. The principal issue on this point concerns the creation of a separate legal entity resulting 
from the registration of a business. If the registration of a legal entity triggers the creation of a legal person, 
it seems incongruous to grant this privilege as a result of a potentially erroneous notification made by any 
individual operating in a notification system. To counter this criticism, it may be responded that the ex-ante 
controls surrounding the incorporation of legal entities in verification systems appear outdated and represent 
a relic of the antiquated approach that required governmental authorization for the creation of legal entities. 
This last argument, however, is not particularly convincing, since the controls that are performed in the 
majority of the countries that adopt a verification system do not represent a serious barrier per se to the 
incorporation of legal entities, and the positive externalities that derive from the existence of a reliable 
public register may easily outweigh the cost associated with ex-ante controls.8 
 
 This contentious issue is a key aspect of the attempt at creating a harmonized framework for the 
registration of business entities, especially if a law provides that legal entities come into existence only 
when registered in business registers. Regardless of the solution that will be adopted, the potential 
implications for national company law of the choice between a notification or a verification system are 
evident, since, arguably, it will be impractical for a legislature to attach a different value to the information 
concerning different types of limited liability entities enrolled in the same business register. 
__________________ 
7 Ibid., para. 20. 
8 On these issues, cf. Arruñada, Institutional Foundations of Impersonal Exchange, Chicago University Press, 
Chicago, 2012, 161 ff. 
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 In fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that, in the end, no solution will be taken to solve this 
problem, relying on the idea that all business registers provide — at least — some information, and that 
what really distinguishes them is the level of reliability of that information. A solution of this type will result 
only in a black letter law harmonization that will paper over the actual difficulties of achieving a 
compromise by allowing UN Member States to adopt whichever approach they prefer. 
 
 In conclusion, the problem of the prior verification and legal value of the information made available 
in business registers has implications that extend beyond the limited scope of an initiative addressed to 
MSMEs in developing countries. In fact, this issue could even influence a jurisdiction’s general approach 
to the value of the information filed in business registers. 
 
2. The Implications for National Company Law of the Adoption of a Simplified Framework for Legal 
Entities 
 
 The part of the initiative on MSMEs devoted to the creation of a legal framework on simplified legal 
entities may raise problems that are as contentious as those on business registration. For example, the 
discussions on the recognition of limited liability and legal personality already gave Working Group I an 
opportunity to evaluate under what conditions veil-piercing doctrines may be applied. In addition, Working 
Group I considered other delicate issues, such as the possibility of recommending the introduction of 
unrestricted object clauses and the abolition of minimum capital requirements. More broadly, the draft 
legislative guide currently under discussion provides a detailed framework for all the essential elements of 
a company law statute, including the rules on formation, internal organization, directors, contributions, 
distributions, transfer of rights, conversion, restructuring, dissolution and winding-up. 
 
 Importantly, the draft legislative guide recommends delinking the statute that governs the UNLLO 
from the national company law of the country that adopts this instrument. Arguably delinking may facilitate 
negotiations within Working Group I and limit the repercussions on national company law of the 
introduction of a statute on simplified legal entities: a UNLLO statute could be enacted as standalone 
legislation that remains separate from national company law. 
 
 The idea of adding a new legal entity to those already available in a jurisdiction is not new: for 
example, the European Union in the past introduced legal entities as additional supranational legal forms. 
To some extent, the Regulation on the Societas Europaea (European Company), finally adopted in 2001,9 
may be understood as a tool that introduced a new company in addition to those already available in EU 
Member States. 
 
 However, other more recent initiatives that tried to follow a similar strategy, such as the Societas 
Privata Europaea and the Societas Unius Personae, have not been enacted even after long discussions. The 
experience of the European Union with these regional attempts at harmonizing company law is not 
particularly promising for the UNLLO: for example, examining the last of these initiatives, i.e. the Societas 
Unius Personae, when the European Union tried to adopt legislation on that legal entity, the reactions of the 
Member States were polarized and, in some comments, this initiative was labelled as a “wolf in sheep’s 
clothing”,10 or even a “Trojan horse”11 that could have breached the walls of national company law. 
 
 Furthermore, even the initiatives of the European Union that were ultimately enacted, such as the 
Societas Europaea, only achieved partial harmonization, since they left unsettled many issues that, even 
today, remain governed by national law, so that the rules applicable to a European Company in a Member 
State are completely different from those applicable to the same legal entity in another Member State. In 
addition, even when the Regulation on the European Company addressed a specific topic, in some cases it 
__________________ 
9 The reference is to Reg. (EC) 2157/2001. 
10 Beurskens, „Societas Unius Personae” — der Wolf im Schafspelz?’ — Der Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie über 
Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung mit einem einzigen Gesellschafter , GmbHR (2014), 738. 
11 See, for example, Siems, The Societas Unius Personae (SUP): a Trojan Horse? , available at 
http://www.siemslegal.blogspot.it/2014/04/the-societas-unius-personaesup-trojan.html, last visited on October 20, 
2016. 
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still failed to adopt a clear solution and just gave a set of options.12 In other cases, just a compromise solution 
was adopted without solving the underlying issue.13 
 
 In conclusion, the idea of delinking the UNLLO legislative guide from national company law will not 
make it easier to reach a compromise on the key elements of this initiative. Certainly, from a drafting 
perspective, this approach makes it easier to create a single and coherent statute for simplified legal entities. 
However, the substantial nature of the problems that will be addressed by the legislative guide will and 
should be understood in view of the possible repercussions the solutions adopted will have on national 
company law. Therefore, it will be unwise to underestimate the potential implications of the UNLLO project 
for national law, which, as the first global attempt at harmonizing company law, will necessarily mark the 
path for any future global harmonization initiative in this field. From this perspective, a policy-based 
approach that states clear and well-defined policy goals and provides several legislative options to achieve 
them would be preferable to reaching an only apparent compromise on the wording of a legislative guide.14 
 
 
III. The Harmonization of Company Law at the Regional Level 
 
 The significance of the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs for company law is clearly visible in the 
fact that this project is the first attempt at harmonizing this field at the global level. However, Working 
Group I is not writing on a blank slate: previous harmonization projects resulted in the adoption of important 
pieces of legislation. A first historical example may be traced back to the efforts that led the countries that, 
at that time, formed the Deutscher Bund toward the adoption of the ADHGB (Allgemeines Deutsches 
Handelsgesetzbuch) in 1861. Similarly, the enactment in 1968 of the First Company Law Directive (Dir. 
68/151/EEC) remains an important step in the harmonization of the company law of the Member States of 
the European Union. In the following pages, I provide an outline of some of the most relevant harmonization 
initiatives undertaken at the regional level in the domain of company law. More precisely, I discuss in 
particular the initiatives undertaken in the European Union, OHADA, the Caribbean countries and OAS. 
 
A. European Union 
 
 The European Union is currently following three different approaches to harmonize company law, and 
a fourth strategy is under discussion among academics.15 The first approach is the harmonization by 
approximation of company law. In short, this strategy aims at levelling the playing field with regard to the 
protections granted to shareholders and third parties, in view of facilitating the free movement of legal 
entities within the internal market. 
 
 The second strategy pursued by European authorities aims at the unification of company law. This 
approach resulted in the creation of some supranational legal forms, including the previously mentioned 
Regulation on the Societas Europaea. In its purest form, this strategy endeavours to create European legal 
entities that are independent from national company law, a goal that has not been completely achieved even 
with the Societas Europaea.16 
 
 The third strategy pursued by the European Union is that of encouraging the creation of regulatory 
competition between Member States. This approach is more recent, and it may be traced back to the Centros 
__________________ 
12 One example of this optional approach may be found in the freedom companies enjoy to choose between a one -
tier or a two-tier board structure. 
13 For example, this was the approach of the compromise to the problem of the choice between the real seat and the 
incorporation theory. 
14 See, for example, Wool, Rethinking the Role of Uniformity in the Drafting of International Commercial Law: A 
Preliminary Proposal for the Development of a Policy-Based Unification Model, 2 Unif. L. Rev. (1997), 46. 
15 For an overview of the different harmonization strategies of European company law see Grundmann — Glasow, 
European Company Law, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2012, 2nd ed., 53 ff. 
16 The statute of the European Company is not self-sufficient, and frequently, in order to fill the gaps, reference 
should be made to the national law. 
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decision of the ECJ of 1999.17 While this strategy had some repercussions on the legislation of the Member 
States in certain domains, such as the minimum capital requirements of limited liability entities, it did not 
contribute to a more harmonized company law framework.18 
 
 Finally, the fourth approach currently under discussion by European academics is that of working on 
a model law, the so-called European Model Company Act (EMCA), whose first version was recently 
presented publicly. It is difficult to believe that the EMCA may be adopted in its entirety by any EU Member 
State, but this project is important because it has given rise to an active forum of discussion on several 
company law topics, and it may inspire some targeted reforms of national company law.19 
 
 The initiatives undertaken by the European Union in the domain of company law probably constitute 
the most elaborate and comprehensive harmonization project undertaken in this field, and this experience 
should be carefully evaluated by Working Group I to assess its virtues and limits. With specific regard to 
the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs, it is worth noting that the harmonization of incorporation procedures 
and the creation of a general framework for business registers were among the first topics addressed by the 
First Company Law Directive in 1968. 
 
B. OHADA 
 
 A second important experience in company law harmonization comes from OHADA. This experience 
is less multifaceted than the European endeavour, but more in-depth and more remarkable for its results. In 
1997, OHADA adopted the “Acte uniforme relatif au droit des sociétés commerciales”, a comprehensive 
company law statute that pre-empted the national company law of all OHADA Member States. This 
initiative achieved the extraordinary result of introducing a uniform and directly applicable company law 
framework, with a unification that left little room for the intricacies that, for example, may be found in the 
European Union in the relationship between national and European law. This project considers all aspects 
of company law in detail, including that of the registration of legal entities.20 
 
 Remarkably, the project was also recently updated in 2014, and, among other things, this reform 
introduced a new simplified legal entity, the Société par actions simplifiée, inspired by the French 
experience. However, with the 2014 reform, the complete unification of company law was partially lost: 
currently, the amended “Acte uniforme” leaves OHADA Member States the freedom to opt out from the 
provisions of the Act on two points: the formalities surrounding the incorporation and the minimum capital 
requirements of limited liability companies.21 
 
C. Caribbean Countries 
 
 Another interesting experience in company law harmonization at the regional level may be found in 
the Caribbean countries. The harmonization process in this region started in 1971 within CARIFTA; 
afterwards, these efforts were taken over by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). This project resulted 
in the publication of a Report and a model legislation. Afterwards, these efforts were followed by those of 
the Caribbean Law Institute. All these different initiatives deeply influenced the legislations of many 
Caribbean countries.22More recently, it is also worth mentioning an initiative of OHADAC, which, in 2014, 
__________________ 
17 ECJ, 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1484. 
18 For example, the competition between Member States led to the lowering of capital requirements for European 
limited liability companies. However, Member States adopted different approaches to achieve that goal, so this 
process did not result in a harmonized framework on this issue.  
19 For a recent overview on this project, see the articles published in the second issue of 13 ECFR (2016).  
20 See Fénéon, Droit des sociétés en Afrique [OHADA], LGDJ, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 2015, 4 ff. 
21 Ibid., 9 ff. 
22 Including Barbados, Anguilla, Bahamas, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. On the harmonization initiatives in the Caribbean see, for example, Burgess, 
Commonwealth Caribbean Company Law, Routledge, Abingdon, 2013, 11 ff.; Mangal, An introduction to 
company law in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Canoe Press, Barbados, 1995, 5 ff. 
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published a draft model law on commercial companies. This project adopts a different approach from 
previous Caribbean initiatives, which relied mainly on the common law legal tradition. 
 
 The attempts at harmonizing company law in the Caribbean region are interesting since they have 
taken a different path from that undertaken by the European Union or OHADA. Even without imposing the 
adoption of a specific legislation, these projects were able to influence the company law of many countries 
in the region. However, it has been argued that the results of this harmonization process did not bring “a 
high degree of uniformity … even among [the countries] implementing reforms”.23 
 
D. OAS 
 
 Another regional experience worth mentioning is that of OAS. At first, the efforts of this organization 
were aimed at the harmonization of private international law and resulted in the signing of two conventions: 
the Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws Concerning Commercial Companies of 1979, and the 
Inter-American Convention on Personality and Capacity of Juridical Persons in Private International Law 
of 1984. 
 
 However, more recently, OAS started exploring new strategies, and, in 2012, a model law for the 
creation of a statute on a simplified stock corporation was presented to the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee. This initiative is deeply influenced by the Colombian experience with the SAS, and, to some 
extent, it has traits in common with the early works of Working Group I that, in its earlier sessions, 
considered a similar model law. However, this project has not yet been adopted by OAS, which last 
discussed it at the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, where, after a lively discussion, it was 
recommended “further study and analysis of the matter”.24 
 
E. Other Harmonization Experiences 
 
 After this cursory analysis of the initiatives for company law harmonization that are relevant to the 
UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs, it is also useful to mention some other experiences in this field. These 
attempts took place in single jurisdictions or at the regional level at different moments in the history of 
company law. 
 
 Examining the experiences that took place in a single country, it is worth mentioning the harmonization 
of cantonal law in Switzerland that, at the beginning of the 20th century, resulted in the adoption of the 
national codification of company law. Other interesting initiatives may be found in Canada with the Canada 
Business Corporations Act, and in the process that led to the enactment of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001. With regard to the United States, an important example of soft law harmonization may be found in 
the process that led from the Uniform Business Corporation Act to the Revised Model Corporation Act in 
the twentieth century. 
 
 Finally, examining regional harmonization experiences, prominent examples of harmonization of 
company law may be found in the inter-Nordic legislative cooperation after World War II, in the important 
efforts pursued within the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in some initiatives recently 
undertaken by APEC.25 
 
 
__________________ 
23 See, Goddard, Convergence in Corporations Law-Towards a Facilitative Model, 26 Victoria U. Wellington L. 
Rev. (1996), 191, 196. 
24 See CP/CAJP-3318/15, available at scm.oas.org/doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_15/CP34561E08.doc, last visited 
on December 20, 2016, 3. 
25 This last experience has been mentioned in relation with the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs; see, for example, 
Dennis — Pliego Ramos, Creating an Enabling Legal Environment for Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises: Simplified Incorporation and Registration , 33 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp L. (2016), 71, 77 ff. 
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IV. Future Prospects for the UNCITRAL Initiative on MSMEs 
 
 The previous pages illustrate the various forms that company law harmonization efforts have taken in 
the past. Certainly, the UNCITRAL has its own working method and the results of the discussions of 
Working Group I will follow that approach. In the case of the initiative on MSMEs, it appears that Working 
Group I’s efforts could take the form of a legislative guide while, for the moment, the adoption of a model 
law seems less likely. 
 
 Given the work done so far, what is striking is that Working Group I was not particularly interested in 
the successful harmonization efforts carried out by regional organizations such as the European Union or 
OHADA, which together count for 45 UN Member States. Apparently, the strategy implemented by 
Working Group I displayed more characteristics in common with tentative initiatives such as the OAS 
Simplified Stock Corporation or the efforts of the APEC that achieved less meaningful results. This is 
obviously not to say that the first attempt at harmonizing company law at the global level should take the 
form of the legislations in force in the European Union or in OHADA. However, at the very least, more 
attention should be devoted to these experiences, since the different elements that are currently under 
consideration at UNCITRAL were considered at length in these previous harmonization initiatives. 
 
 While the initiative under discussion at UNCITRAL is focused on MSMEs, it would be limiting to 
consider it only within the framework of economic development. The initiative has the potential to influence 
the future of national company law. This is also proved by the fact that the discussions of Working Group I 
frequently refer to topics such as legal entities owning UNLLOs, interconnection of business registers, 
boards of directors, scaling up and cross-border transactions: all these matters are hardly of any interest for 
one person or family micro-businesses in developing countries, and they reveal what could be the potential 
implications of the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs for company law in general.26 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 This paper examined UNCITRAL’s recent initiative addressed to MSMEs. After having provided a 
short outline of the evolution of the initiative elaborated by Working Group I, I have analysed previous 
attempts at harmonizing company law at the regional level. I have examined in particular the experiences 
of the European Union, OHADA, the Caribbean countries and OAS, also evaluating how these experiences 
may contribute to the debate currently taking place within UNCITRAL. Finally, I have investigated the 
broader implications of the UNCITRAL project, and recommended that careful consideration be paid to the 
regional harmonization experiences that have successfully created a meaningful harmonized company law. 
 
  
__________________ 
26 On the possible future directions of the UNCITRAL initiative on MSMEs, see Callison — Fenwick — McCahery 
—Vermeulen, Corporate Disruption: The Law and Design of Organizations in the 21st Century , available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818383, last visited on December 20, 2016.  
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Problems on harmonization and unification of international commercial law  
 
Ana Teresa de Abreu Coutinho Boscolo, University of São Paulo, Brazil1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Considering the large amount of instruments created artificially or spontaneously aiming to harmonize 
and unify international commercial law, it is important to analyse which are the main problems arising from 
the present reality in order to deal with such issues and try to surpass their difficulties. 
 
 This paper highlights the main problems applicators in general (judges, arbitrators, etc), States, and 
International Organizations, including UNCITRAL, face when dealing with harmonization and unification 
of international commercial law. Consequently, the intention is that such problems are taken into account 
in order to improve the effectiveness of harmonizing/unifying instruments and mechanisms.2 
 
 Therefore, the subject issue of this paper concerns which problems emerge when harmonization and 
unification of international commercial law are sought; i.e. which difficulties should be considered when 
looking for efficient results on granting better-shaped-to-reality international commercial instruments,3 
since their creation until their application.  
 
 In this sense, problems can be divided into two categories: (i) one including problems accruing from 
the relationship between instruments and States; and (ii) other including problems accruing from the relation 
among instruments themselves. In the first category are included problems related to the drafting (and 
creation) of harmonizing/unifying instruments; their use (choice); their application by different applicators 
(judges, arbitrators); and situations that jeopardize their complete application, such as public policy issues 
and mandatory rules. In the second category are placed problems related to creation and drafting of 
instruments and their application.  
 
 However, before entering the subject itself, it is important to clarify some aspects concerning the 
terminology used, especially the terms unification and harmonization.4 Unification takes place when  
(i) there is only one instrument to be applied; and (ii) the result of such application worldwide is similar 
enough that it leads to the avoidance of practical differences that may result in a specific choice of the 
applicator.5-6 
__________________ 
1  This paper consists in a short version of our Master thesis. Issues were identified and more deeply analysed in 
our text presented and defended in Portuguese at the University of São Paulo Faculty of Law in May 2016 under 
the title: Desafios da Harmonização do Direito do Comércio Internacional. Available at: 
http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2135/tde-25102016-162941/pt-br.php accessed on 08 January 2017.  
2  The word Mechanism is used for the purpose of this paper as the way all available instruments can be used in 
order to harmonize or unify international commercial law.  
3  The word Instrument is used for the purpose of this paper as rules containing any kind of command or guideline 
that can be used in order to harmonize or unify international commercial law. It means that the instrument may 
be used for a purpose different to the one it was created for.  
4  It is possible to notice some terminological differences concerning texts written in different languages. Especially 
in French and in Portuguese three words are used: harmonização/harmonization, unificação/unification and 
uniformização/uniformization. In English, the large majority of authors, including International Organiza tions, 
use two words: harmonization and unification. In this sense, unificação/unification and 
uniformização/uniformization are treated as unification in this paper, as criteria used to treat them separately do 
not prevent their union. Also, such choice avoids misunderstandings regarding texts written in English.  
5  Such definition was based on the following texts: ANDERSEN, 2007; BOELE-WOELKI, 2010; KAMDEM, 
2009; DOLINGER, 2008; OLIVEIRA, 2008; UNCITRAL, 1970, p. 13; MATTEUCCI, 1957; DAVID, 1968; 
BONELL, 1990; BOGGIANO, 2000; FARIA, 2009; DE LY, 1997; ANDERSEN, 2007, UNCITRAL Website 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html#harmonization> (accessed on 08 January 2017); 
Unidroit Institute Website <http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/overview> (accessed on 08 January 2017). 
Hague Conference Website <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26> (accessed on 08 
January 2017). 
6  Although some authors use the expression forum shopping, it is not used here because, considering such concept 
and some divergences on its definition, some situations in which harmonizing/unifying instruments could be 
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 Harmonization, in turn, has two meanings. The first one is used when an instrument works as model 
or source of inspiration to the creation or the application of another instrument in order to bring them closer 
and facilitate commercial relations. The second concerns harmonization seen as the harmonic coexistence 
of instruments.7  
 
 Therefore, any instrument can be used as a means of harmonization or unification, regardless the aim 
it was created for. Generally speaking, any source of international commercial law can be seen as a kind of 
harmonizing/unifying instrument. 8  
 
 Considering the definition brought above, problems on harmonization/unification of international 
commercial law are any factors jeopardizing the fulfilment of at least one of the requirements of 
harmonization/unification as defined above.  
 
 Once unification requires (i) the existence of only one instrument (ii) applied similarly enough that the 
result of such application avoids practical differences, one may conclude that unification is not achieved if, 
regarding requirement (i), there is no harmonizing/unifying instrument to be applied or available 
instruments are not applied, or, regarding requirement (ii), the same instrument is applied differently, being 
this a reason for choosing one applicator or another. 
 
 Further, once harmonization requires the use of an instrument as model or source of inspiration in 
order to get them closer and facilitate commercial relations, problems arise when no instrument is used as 
model or source of inspiration or if such use does not result in the facilitation of commercial relations. The 
same is true when instruments do not coexist harmonically. 
 
 In the following topics, every problem mentioned above will be dealt with individually.9 However, 
before moving on to such analysis, it is important to highlight that the existence of harmonizing/unifying 
instruments does not mean diversity itself is a problem. The existence of multiple instruments available 
means applicators can choose the one that best fits their relation. In addition, propagation of such 
multiplicity of instruments will, at last instance, show which are better suited for each relation and which 
should not be kept. In other words, practice will show which critics to which instruments are correct and 
which are not. The most important is that the content of one instrument does not harm the existence of a 
multiplicity of possibilities and their application. The application of each instrument must be made 
consistently worldwide no matter the applicator chosen.10 Further, it is important to bear in mind that 
harmonization and unification should be sought as a means for a further objective.11 
 
__________________ 
used would be left out.  
7  Such definition was based on the following texts: KAMDEM, 2009; BOELE-WOELKI, 2010; OLIVEIRA, 2008; 
LEBOULANGER, 2009; DAVID, 1968; UNCITRAL Website <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_  
faq.html#harmonization> (accessed on 08 January 2017); Unidroit Institute Website 
<http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/overview> (accessed on 08 January 2017); Hague Conference Website 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26> (accessed on 08 January 2017).  
8
  Based on: BASSO, 2011, p. 24-114; GALGANO & MARRELLA, 2011, p. 193-304; and BORTOLLOTTI, 2009, 
pp. 9-122.  
9  Critics to the creation and to the application of harmonizing/unifying instruments may also be considered a 
challenge as they could result in the non-application of instruments. Most common critics can be found on 
STEPHAN, 1999; GOPALAN, 2003; GOODE, 2003, item I; GOODE, 2005, p. 556; ROSETT, 1992, p. 688; DE 
LY, 1997, p. 529; SACCO, 2001, pp. 174-175. If on the one hand the above mentioned authors present critics, 
on the other, they also present suggestions to reduce them.  
10  SACCO, 1990, p. 2 e 15; SACCO, 2001, p. 175-180; LOSANO, 2007, p. 18; MISTELIS, 2000, p. 1068; 
ANDERSEN, 2007, p. 48-49; KRONKE, 2009, p. 708; BOISSÉSON, 1999, p. 598.  
11  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, pp. 336-337. 
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2. Problems accruing from the relation between instruments and States 
 
i. Drafting, creation (regarding only the relation with States) and incorporation of instruments  
 
 The first problem has its origins in the existence of different juridical systems.12 Such differences 
usually lead to long discussions during the drafting of harmonizing/unifying instruments. Therefore, the 
careful choice of their characteristics can help facilitating their drafting process and the fulfilment of goals.13 
During such process, every state-representative tend to defend their States´ own interests, which may result 
in incompatibilities. When it comes to the drafting of soft law instruments, conversely, text incompatibilities 
are not that relevant because their binding force is given by the parties or States that can adapt the content 
if they want. Another difference regards drafters, who usually are not state representatives, but experts on 
the subject matter.14 
 
 The second problem relates to the decision of a state to become bound by an instrument or not. When 
it comes to bringing international and transnational instruments to state legal order, it is the state itself the 
one to take decisions, such as: to become part to treaties, to use model law texts when drafting domestic 
legislation, to allow arbitration procedures, etc.15 Such decisions take into account multiple aspects that 
may impair the effectiveness of harmonizing/unifying instruments.  
 
 Some of them are: the existence of other priorities;16 the reduced number of State-parties;17 the reduced 
personnel available to represent the country in conferences or meetings where the drafting is made18; 
apprehension on the results of the application of instruments;19 avoidance of costs (which arise from the 
training to apply a new instrument);20 lack of foreseeability regarding results of application;21 preference 
for domestic law;22 and incompatibilities with domestic law (mandatory rules and public policy issues).23 
 
 Reservations24 and differences resulting from some states being bound to a treaty and others not also 
lead to discrepancies in their application as the content made bound on each state changes.25 However, if 
reservations were not allowed, it is likely treaty acceptance would be reduced.  
 
 Also, the way each State faces international and transnational instruments can be considered a 
problem, especially regarding the hierarchical level international law instruments are placed in each legal 
order.26 When domestic law prevails over international instruments, international commercial relations may 
be given a legal treatment that is not consistent with best practices. 
 
__________________ 
12  MATTEUCCI, 1957, p. 415. 
13  MATTEUCCI, 1957, p. 420 
14  Soft Law is understood here as any kind of instrument that were not given binding force by the state. They depend 
on party autonomy to become binding. ABBUD, 2014, p. 13-14; For further issues on the subject: BONELL, 
2005, p. 229; KAUFMANN-KOHLER, 2010, p. 2; DI ROBILANT, 2006, p. 500; ANDERSEN, 2007, p. 16; 
GABRIEL, 2009, p. 655; BOYLE, 1999, p. 901-902; GERSEN & POSNER, 2008, p. 6; KAUFMANN-KOHLER, 
2010, p. 2; FLÜCKIGER, Alexandre. Why Do We Obey Soft Law?. in NAHRATH, Stéphane; VARONE, Frédéric 
(eds), Rediscovering Public Law and Public Administration in Comparative Policy Analysis: A Tribute to Peter 
Knoepfel, Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 2009, p. 45-62 apud KAUFMANN-
KOHLER, 2010, p. 2- 3; BASSO, 2011, p. 94-96; ABI-SAAB, 1993, p. 59-60.  
15  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, p. 364. 
16  SONO, 2007, p. 2. 
17  SONO, 2007, p. 2; FARIA, 2009, p. 26. 
18  BASSO, 2011, p. 49. 
19  SONO, 2007, p. 2. 
20  SONO, 2007, p. 2; FARIA, 2005, pp. 9-10. 
21  SONO, 2007, p. 2. 
22  FARIA, 2005, p. 9  
23  KLEINHEISTERKAMP in VOGERNAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, 2009, p. 129-130; JAYME, 1995, p. 
228; BODEN, 2002, p. 88; BASSO, 2011, p. 297-298; MCCLEAN, 2000; PIERRE MAYER, 1998; BENNETT, 
2002. 
24  BONELL, 1990, p. 866-867. 
25  FERRARI, 2002, pp. 703 e 704. 
26  BASSO, 2011, p. 50, footnote 77; CASSESE, 2013, p. 299-306. 
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 In order to encourage states to become bound to a certain instrument, a provision containing an 
authorization to opt-out the entire text or to modulate its content may be considered a good idea. An example 
of such kind of provision is article 6 CISG.27 The counterpart of such flexibility however is the existence 
of multiple possibilities of variation, harming the achievement of wider unification.28 
 
 Applicators may also avail themselves of provisions such as article 6 CISG when taking into account 
the limited scope of application of harmonizing/unifying instruments. In order to avoid dépeçage, national 
law may be preferred for it reaching a wider scope of application, so the same legal order is applied to all 
subjects dealt within the contract, which reduces the use of harmonizing/unifying instruments. 29  
 
 It leads to the conclusion that harmonizing/unifying instruments, although having a limited scope of 
application, should be harmonized with the content of other harmonizing/unifying instruments, in order to 
encourage their choice. In this sense, the wider the scope of application of harmonizing/unifying 
instruments, the more parties feel encouraged to allow their application to their commercial relations.  
Further, when bringing harmonizing/unifying instruments to the domestic legal order, their translation is an 
issue to care. The use of different translation methods may lead to text distortions and, consequently, to 
misunderstandings on their application.30 Even if drafting techniques are different, efforts should be applied 
by domestic law drafters so harmonization is kept. 31  
 
 Another delicate issue regards changes made to the original text due to update reasons.32 The consent 
of all States may be required once more and, usually, enormous difficulty is faced to reach consensus again. 
Therefore, problems arising from outdated provisions should be resolved through interpretation techniques, 
either considering the current practice of international commercial law, or making use of most recent 
instruments containing provisions on the specific subject. Provisions on filling gaps may be used for this 
purpose too.33 In this sense, the more harmonizing/unifying instruments are known around the world, the 
easier it will be to find a solution to update their text without having to change the original text. Formulating 
agencies play a very important role in disseminating such knowledge.34  
 
 In addition, undue influence of domestic law on the application of international instruments must be 
avoided because such influence may harm the attainment of the aim pursued.35  
 
ii. Application of harmonizing/unifying instruments 
 
 The application of harmonizing/unifying instruments is a fundamental step to reach harmonization and 
unification. Therefore, every aspect in their reaching will be analysed separately. 
 
 As it was explained before, unification is reached when there is one instrument being applied and its 
application is similar enough that it avoids practical differences harming such application. Reaching 
harmonization, instead, means one instrument is used as a model or source of inspiration to others either 
through interpretation or drafting in order to facilitate commercial relations, or their harmonic coexistence. 
 
 Bearing these definitions in mind, one concludes it is the way the instrument is applied that determines 
whether it was used to harmonize or unify international commercial law.  
 
__________________ 
27  FERRARI, 2002, p. 700  
28  CISG-AC Opinion No. 16.  
29  KOEHLER & GUO, 2008, pp. 55-56. 
30  BONELL, 1990, p. 867. 
31  FARIA, 2005, p. 30-31. 
32  FARIA, 2005, p. 13. 
33  SCHWENZER & HACHEM In SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, 2010, p. 134; FARIA, 2005, p. 13; 
BEAUMONT, 2010, p. 32. 
34  FARIA, 2009, p. 27; Reaching the same conclusion: DAWWAS & SHANDI, 2011; p. 841; BOSCOLO, 2016, 
passim; SCHLECHTRIEM, 2005, p. 29.; SONO, 2007, p. 6. 
35  MATTEUCCI, 1957, p. 423. 
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 Therefore, when analysing the application of harmonizing/unifying instruments, the following aspects 
will be taken into consideration: (1) who is applying the instrument; (2) which instruments the parties are 
allowed to choose and which instruments the applicator is allowed to apply; (3) the relation of such 
instruments with others (especially the ones of domestic legal order, mandatory rules and public policy 
issues); (4) stricto sensu application of instruments.  
 
 As aspect (1) influences aspects (2), (3) and (4), our analysis will focus on aspects (2), (3) and (4), 
considering the applicator being a judge or an arbitrator when necessary. 
 
(a) Which instruments the parties are allowed to choose and which instruments the applicator is allowed 
to apply 
 
 Generally speaking, conflict of laws rules are strictly related to which instruments the parties are 
allowed to choose and to which instruments the applicator is allowed to apply. 
 
 In this sense, harmonizing/unifying instruments may be related to conflict of laws rules in three 
different forms: being the subject matter of such instruments, being the rule determining the application of 
harmonizing/unifying instruments on material rules, and filling gaps left by harmonizing/unifying 
instruments.36 
 
 As said above, some harmonizing/unifying instruments have as subject matter conflict of law rules. 
However, when it comes to international commercial law, material rules instruments are usually given 
preference, but it does not mean conflict of law instruments are not welcome.37 In fact, the purpose conflict 
of law rules are built for has changed a little. 38  
 
 Further, conflict of laws rules can be used to regulate the application of harmonizing/unifying 
instruments. Such rules can be seen from two different perspectives: (1) rules contained in the instrument 
that deals with its own application and (2) national conflict of law rules allowing or not the application of 
harmonizing/unifying instruments.  
 
 From the first perspective, conflict of law rules could fit for self-applicable instruments when states 
are bound to them,39 but should not be used as the first option rule determining their own application because 
it could lead to distortions on the application of the instrument. Anyway, such instruments are ready to be 
applied and will be applied if application criteria are met.40  
 
 Instruments that are not self-applicable or although self-applicable are not being used as such (in case 
the state is not bound to them) depend on party autonomy to become applicable. Non-binding instruments, 
in turn, usually contain parameters that indicate situations to which they could apply, but still depend on 
party autonomy to be applied.  
 
 When it comes to the application of non-binding instruments, also said non-self-applicable, conflict of 
law rules play an important role41 and dispute settlement provisions too. The large majority of states allow 
only the application of laws (and not rules of law) through conflict of law rules.42 Therefore, the main 
problem impairing unification/harmonization concerns the recognition of legislative competence of other 
authorities by states.43 
__________________ 
36  JAYME, 1995, p. 57. 
37  JAYME, 1995, p. 252. 
38  DE LY, 1997, p. 534-535; BADÁN, 2012, p. 80 For example, recently the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts were created.  
39  BADÁN, 2012, 43-44.  
40  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, P. 396. 
41  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, p. 396. 
42  On the definition of law, see: MICHAELS, 2009, pp. 14-16; GRIGERA-NAÓN, 2001, p. 25-26.  
43  JAYME, 1995, p. 262-263; BERGER, 1999, p. 30-31. See also the official commentary to article 3 of the 
Principles on Choice of Law in Commercial Contracts (HPCL). Such instrument allows the parties to choose 
  
55 
 The dispute settlement method chosen plays also an important role. When parties choose arbitration, 
their scope of choice regarding the applicable law is wider. The application of soft law instruments can be 
authorized as it depends on party autonomy and, therefore, parties’ choices.44 If the controversy is submitted 
to domestic courts instead, state rules will set forth what is allowed or not.45-46 In sum, the main concerns 
are (i) whether parties should be authorized to widely and freely choose (regardless the dispute settlement 
method chosen) and (ii) whether domestic judges should be authorized to widely and freely apply 
harmonizing/unifying instruments which the state is not bound to. 
 
 When it comes to filling gaps resulting from the incompleteness of harmonizing/unifying instruments, 
three perspectives are considered. One is wider and the other two are stricter. The wider regards the subject-
matter of instruments. Differently from domestic law, harmonizing/unifying instruments concern a specific 
subject matter.47 Therefore, commercial relations involving various subjects must be given coherent 
treatment considering every aspect concerned. Harmonizing/unifying instruments individually may not be 
considered sufficient. In this case, a possible solution is using multiple harmonizing/unifying instruments 
(when possible) or conflict of laws instruments.48  
 
 The two stricter perspectives are: (1) issues explicitly left out of the scope of the instrument and (2) 
issues in the scope of the instrument but not explicitly dealt within its text. Therefore, if some subjects 
cannot be dealt with within a unifying/harmonizing instrument, although related to it, they may be subject 
to rules that present at least some coherence to it. A text containing conflict of law rules that indicate the 
best solution is an option. Issues contained in the subject matter of the instrument, but not receiving specific 
treatment, should be subject to a provision on filling gaps regarding this kind of situation. 
 
 Therefore, the main problem concerning the filling of gaps is granting coherence to the treatment of 
all issues concerned. Harmonic solutions are the aim to be sought and can be reached if 
harmonizing/unifying instruments present coherent contents and their use is allowed by the state. 
 
(b) The relation of harmonizing/unifying instruments with mandatory rules and public policy issues  
 
 The relation between harmonizing/unifying instruments and mandatory rules and public policy issues 
is considered a problem because the last two limit party autonomy and act preventing the complete 
application of instruments in order to grant protection to national legal orders.49 
 
 Theoretically, when it comes to self-applicable instruments given binding force by the state, mandatory 
rules and public policy issues do not show if the instrument is applied for such a reason. This is so, because 
such issues should have been raised when the instrument was incorporated to the domestic legal order. 
Further, party autonomy is not used but to exclude their application. Therefore, conflicts with mandatory 
rules and public policy issues arise when a non-self-applicable instrument is applied.50 
 
 Thus, excluding cases related to the paragraph above, four issues concerning the conflict between 
mandatory rules and/or public policy issues and harmonizing/unifying instruments are the most relevant 
ones and will be considered here: (1) harmonizing/unifying instruments (soft law) applied as applicable 
law; (2) foreign law applied in a state whose national law is based on the same instrument as the foreign 
__________________ 
rules of law as long as they are “generally accepted” and are considered a “neutral and balanced set of the rules”. 
This is so to try to keep parties’ power balanced, otherwise one party could use its bargain power and impose its 
set of rules to the other. Available at <https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/fulltext/?cid=135#text> 
accessed on 08 January 2017  
44  DE LY, 1997, pp. 538-539; BLACKABY, 2009, p. 226; BORN, 2009, p. 2154; BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, p. 396-
430. 
45  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, p. 400. 
46  Brazilian law is a very clear example of such difference.  
47  FERRARI, 2002, p. 698-699. 
48  MATTEUCCI, 1957, pp. 403-405; DE LY, 1997, p. 534. 
49  BERAUDO, 2005, p. 104-105; BOGGIANO, 2000, p. XI. 
50  Issues arise regarding the underlying subject matter to which the instrument is applied, not the instrument itself. 
The compatibility of the instrument with the domestic legal order was analysed when the state became bound to it.   
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law; (3) provisions on mandatory rules and public policy issues contained in harmonizing/unifying 
instruments; and (4) public policy issues faced during proceedings for recognition and enforcement of 
sentences and awards. 
 
(1) In case of conflict between soft law instruments and national mandatory rules or public policy 
issues, the latter ones prevail.51 If the dispute settlement mechanism is arbitration, as arbitrators 
should deliver an enforceable award, mandatory rules and public policy issues are to be taken into 
account on a case by case basis in order to avoid problems of enforcement.52  
 
(2) In case of application of foreign law, conflicts with mandatory rules and public policy issues may 
occur.53 Therefore, the more the domestic law and the foreign law are harmonized, the less 
mandatory rules and public policy issues will show up. 
 
(3) Provisions regarding mandatory rules and public policy issues and their conflict with applicable 
instruments are usually drafted to restrict the most the application of exceptions. As restrictive as 
their application may be, such kind of provision is always present, so exceptions are allowed and 
states feel encouraged to accept the application of harmonizing/unifying instruments.54 In sum, 
states can avail themselves of an escape valve in order to protect their fundamental values and rules; 
but such protection should only be used in extreme cases. 
 
(4) Countries with different levels of development may have different levels of protection and, 
consequently, more or less tight enforcement standards.55 Treaties on recognition and enforcement 
of judicial sentences are rare.56 Conversely, when it comes to arbitration, the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards plays a very 
important role, facilitating the global circulation of awards. Although its success, public policy 
issues are still responsible for discrepancies on its application.57 Further, the rising idea of 
transnational public policy is also relevant.58 On the one hand, difficulties arise regarding the 
definition of its content and the possibility of its application before state courts (as the concept was 
created in relation to arbitration). On the other, transnational public policy allows applicants to take 
into consideration largely protected interests, fostering harmonization.59 Regional public policy is 
also an issue to care, as organizations might prefer considering regional standards instead of 
national ones.60  
 
__________________ 
51  DE LY, 1997, p. 537. 
52  PIERRE MAYER, 1998, p. 6. Some authors consider arbitrators must always take into account mandatory rules 
existing in every state where the parties might seek recognition and enforcement of the award because arbitrators 
have a duty to deliver enforceable awards. On the one hand: KLEINHEISTERKAMP in VOGERNAUER & 
KLEINHEISTERKAMP, 2009, pp. 133-134; BONELL, 2005, p. 248-249. On the other: MAYER, Pierre, La règle 
morale dans l’arbitrage international, in Études offertes à Pierre Bellet 379, ¶¶ 26-27 (1991), apud FOUCHARD 
& GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, 1999, pp. 881-882. 
53 MATTEUCCI, 1957, p. 420. 
54  Comments to HPCL (Art.11) https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/fulltext/?cid=135#text  accessed 
on 08 January 2017; PERMANENT BUREAU HCCH, 2009, p. 6-8. MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE, 2003, p. 82. 
It is important to keep in mind the exceptional character of such provisions, otherwise applicators may look for 
alternative ways to overcome them, leading to forum shopping and avoiding a proper solution to the core of the 
problem. See MUIR WATT & RADICATI DI BROZOLO, 2004.  
55  BASSO, 2011, p. 292. In the same sense: KLEINHEISTERKAMP in VOGERNAUER & KLEINHEISTERKAMP, 
2009, pp. 133-134. 
56  BASSO, 2011, pp. 303-304. 
57  MAYER & SHEPPARD, 2003, Recommendations 1.b and 1.c; MUIR WATT & RADICATI DI BROZOLO, 2004, 
p. 92; BOISSÉSON, 1999, pp. 597-598. 
58  GALGANO & MARRELLA, 2011, p. 914-934. 
59  PIERRE MAYER, 1998, p. 5; For example: UN Global Compact. Disponível em 
<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-isgc/mission/principles> accessed on 08 January 2017. 
60  MAYER & SHEPPARD, 2003, Recommendation 1.c. 
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(c) Stricto sensu application of instruments  
 
 In this topic remaining issues on the application of harmonizing/unifying instruments will be 
considered, once all other impediments have already been dealt with on previous topics. 
 
 First, the focus is on unification, precisely on its requirement of application being done similarly 
enough by applicators so the choice of the applicator is not relevant to the result obtained.61 
 
 The main problems in this section are related to diverging interpretation of instruments due to language 
discrepancies62 and the influence of domestic legal orders to the application of harmonizing/unifying 
instruments.63  
 
 Regarding language discrepancies, applying interpretation rules is the best approach. Such rules are 
usually found in the instrument text or in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In relation 
to the influence domestic legal orders play, interpretation rules are also relevant, mostly the ones 
determining harmonizing/unifying instruments must be interpreted autonomously and considering their 
international character.64 Further, the more information on such instruments is spread on the domestic level, 
the more correct their application will be. It is especially true when information is available on the judge´s 
mother-tongue.65  
 
 Initiatives on spreading knowledge on unifying/harmonizing instruments are very welcome and 
considered the best way to increase their adequate application. Databases containing doctrine, case law, and 
information on harmonizing/unifying instruments are very important too.66 Courses are a great king of 
initiative too and should be directed not only to university students, but to graduated applicators that are 
unfamiliar to the field and anyone else interested in the subject.67 However, efforts should be applied to 
increase the number of arbitral awards made available to applicators.68 Considering the more specialized 
character of arbitration decisions, the publication of arbitral awards content could help spreading the most 
adequate fashion of applying harmonizing/unifying instruments.69 Obviously, the confidentiality must be 
preserved. 
 
 Further, the creation of an international court to improve harmonization/unification of international 
commercial law is not recommended. This is so for two main reasons: there is no guarantee the existence 
of such a court leads to an adequate application of harmonizing/unifying instruments (as it is possible to 
verify from domestic courts);70 and arbitration is a very used dispute settlement mechanism that would have 
to be banned if such court were to be effective; i.e. the creation of an international court would only fulfil 
its aims if arbitration was no longer used, what is not possible nor recommended. 
 
__________________ 
61  Parallel proceedings (including arbitration) are included in the applicator’s selection issues.  
62  BONELL, 1990, p. 867; ULRICH MAYER, 1998, pp. 588-589. 
63  MATTEUCCI, 1957, p. 423-424. 
64  ULRICH MAYER, 1998, p. 599; BONELL, 1990, p. 867  
65 BOSCOLO, 2016, section 2.B.iv. 
66 Some of them are available at: http://www.unilex.info/; https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG-digest-
2012-e.pdf; <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/>; http://www.cisgac.com/; <http://www.cisg-brasil.net/> all of them 
accessed on 08 January 2017; BERGER, 1999, p. 233. (CENTRAL http://www.central-koeln.de/en_ID122 
accessed on 08 January 2017) Regarding the CISG Advisory Council, see also: KARTON & DE GERMINY 
2009. 
67 FARIA, 2009, pp. 33-34.  
68 DE LY, 1997, p. 545. 
69 DE LY, 1997, p. 545. 
70 ANDERSEN, 2007, p. 6-7; JAYME, 1995, p. 259. 
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 Some initiatives on regional level were taken, such as in the European Union71 and in the OHADA.72 
However, obstacles are faced when trying to grant cohesion and efficiency to the system, what shows a 
global initiative would be subject to difficulties too.73 
 
 Second, there is the possibility some instruments are used to aid the interpretation of others. We could 
call it “harmonizing interpretation”. Any instrument may be used for this purpose.74_75 The aim is bringing 
the content of such instruments into domestic law in order to encourage their use in the national level and 
bring new ideas to national law, fostering harmonization too.76 In this sense, knowledge sharing is 
mandatory, so applicators can identify cases to which these new instruments may be used and, therefore, 
use harmonizing interpretation more frequently. 
 
3. Problems accruing from the relation among Harmonization and Unification instruments themselves 
 
 The relation among harmonizing/unifying instruments takes place in mainly two ways: during their 
creation and during their application/interpretation. Every instrument may work as source of inspiration or 
model for others. In this sense, it is very important to bear in mind pre-existent instruments and their content 
in order to avoid collisions and contradictions and, consequently, grant cohesion to the system. Generally, 
during application, the level of compatibility of instruments varies according to their binding force and 
scope of application. 
 
 Considering the large quantity of instruments already created and, therefore, made available to 
applicators, new instruments should be based on deficiencies of the existing system.77 Besides, the 
feasibility of the proposed solution should be analysed.78 Balance between diversity and 
harmonization/unification is important, as well as between rigidity and flexibility of rules.79  
 
 In this sense, formulating agencies should work together to optimize their activities and avoid the 
drafting of conflicting or overlapping instruments. They should take into account both formal and material 
characteristics of the instruments.80  
 
 Regarding global and regional instruments, it is important to define their scope of application very 
well, so initiatives created by one formulating agency are not lost due to others created in the opposite sense 
by another one.81  
 
 The “dialog of sources” 82 is the best approach to grant harmonic solutions when it comes to the 
application of more than one harmonizing/unifying instrument simultaneously. Hard law and soft law 
instruments should be used together in order to improve harmonic coexistence of instruments and the 
achievement of better practical results. The same is true considering the relation between 
harmonizing/unifying instruments and domestic law.83 
 
__________________ 
71 BIAVATI, 2009, p. 411-426; RIECHENBERG, 2004, p. 321. 
72 LEBOULANGER, 2009, pp. 548-549. 
73 ANDERSEN, 2007, p. 6-7; JAYME, 1995, p. 259. 
74 As seen on KULESZA, 2015, pp. 319-321. 
75 BIN, 1993, p. 475.  
76 BIN, 1993, p. 475-479. 
77  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, pp. 336-337. 
78  GOODE, 2003, item I. 
79  BERGER, 1999, p. 206-212; DE LY, 1997, pp. 523-536. 
80  FARIA, 2009, p. 22; BONELL, 1996, p. 245; DE LY, 1997, p. 536.  
81  KRONKE, 2004, p. 476-477; FARIA, 2009, p. 25; GARRO, 2015, pp. 2-5; MAYER, 2008, p. 400-401; BONELL, 
1996, p. 233. 
82  JAYME, 1995, p. 259.  
83  BOELE-WOELKI, 2010, p. 344; BASSO, 2011, p. 98; KRONKE, 2004, p. 475; BOSCOLO, 2015.; 
VISCASILLAS, 1998, item VI.B. In the same sense KRÖLL & MISTELIS & VISCASILLAS 2011, p. 289 -290; 
CISG-AC Opinion n.13, p. 21-22; AGRÒ, 2011, p. 733; BONELL, 2002, p. 348-349; ULRICH MAYER, 1998, 
p. 599; BADÁN, 2012, p. 50; KRONKE, 2014, p. 38.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
 Highlighting problems on harmonization and unification of international commercial law is the first 
step in order to optimize efforts to facilitate international commercial relations. Next step is taking such 
issues strongly into account when drafting, interpreting and applying harmonizing/unifying instruments. 
Formulating agencies play a very important role in this mission, such as States, all other applicators, and 
academics. Of course this is not an easy task as there are many interests and difficulties involved.  
 
 In this sense, the word that should guide works in this field for the next years is balance: balance 
between divergence and equality; balance between existing instruments and societies’ new needs; balance 
between rigidity and flexibility; and last but not least, balance between party autonomy and State power. 
Bearing this in mind, activities should be focused on initiatives aiming at solving deficiencies of the existing 
system. 
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Towards a ‘digital fitness check’ for existing legal instruments 
 
Christiane C. Wendehorst, University of Vienna and European Law Institute, Vienna, Austria 
 
 UNCITRAL has been a leading force in assisting legislatures worldwide with the challenges posed by 
the transformation of commerce from the analogous to the digital world. The legal notions of non-
discrimination, technological neutrality and functional equivalence formulated by UNCITRAL have 
remained, until the present day, the cornerstones of effective and sustainable legislation in the field. And 
yet, the question arises whether UNCITAL texts can remain as they are or whether they, too, are in need of 
a ‘digital fitness check’. 
 
1. UNCITRAL work in the digital field 
 
 UNCITRAL has produced a range of very influential work in the digital field itself. The 1996 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC) purports to enable and facilitate commerce 
conducted using electronic means. In particular, it is intended to overcome obstacles arising from mandatory 
statutory provisions by providing equal treatment to paper-based and electronic information. Similarly, the 
2005 UN Electronic Communications Convention aims at facilitating the use of electronic communications 
in international trade by assuring that contracts concluded and other communications exchanged 
electronically are as valid and enforceable as their traditional paper-based equivalents. The 2001 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (MLES) aims to enable and facilitate the use of electronic 
signatures by establishing criteria of technical reliability for the equivalence between electronic and hand-
written signatures. And only very recently, the Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records (MLETR) 
has been adopted, which legally enables the use of electronic transferable records that are functionally 
equivalent to transferable documents and instruments including bills of lading, bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and warehouse receipts. 
 
2. A new stage in digitalisation 
 
 However the world has changed and digitalisation has recently entered a new stage that does not find 
itself reflected in the existing UNCITRAL texts so far, in particular not in those that have not originally 
been drafted with digitalisation in mind. 
 
(a) Sale of ‘smart’ goods under the CISG 
 
 One example is the impact which the Internet of Things has on contract law. Sales law used to be about 
the relationship between a seller and a buyer, which is reflected in the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). In the digital age, however, goods are not just tangible 
movable items. Rather, they are embedded with electronics, software, sensors, and network connectivity 
that enable them to collect and exchange data and to be sensed and controlled remotely across existing 
network infrastructure. This is a reality with the majority of new-bought cars, TV sets and ICT equipment, 
but the phenomenon is spreading to almost any kind of movable item or its packaging, including textiles 
and food. The emergence of connected goods (‘smart goods’) and connected packaging (‘smart packaging’) 
means a revolutionary change for sales law because the buyer, and even more so the buyer who is an end 
user, will enter into direct contractual or quasi-contractual relationships with the manufacturer or other third 
parties, such as licensors of embedded software or the providers of digital services. When smart goods or 
smart packaging connect to the Internet, buyers are often forced to conclude a series of post-sale agreements 
by clicking a button or performing a similar act. This means that the sales contract is just one of various 
transactions which the buyer has to make in order to be able to transport, resell, or use the goods in 
accordance with the sales contract, and that the seller is just one of several parties with whom the buyer and 
end user has a direct relationship with regard to the goods. 
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 Even though CISG is, generally speaking, probably better in a position to deal with smart goods than 
many national legal systems it fails to capture the essence of the sale of smart goods and to address a number 
of salient issues, such as (i) that the goods need not only be free from claims of third parties (Article 41 
CISG) but that they must come with claims against third parties, e.g. for online services and updates, and 
that the seller’s position in that regard needs to be defined; (ii) that the goods need not be free from IP rights 
(Article 42 CISG), but that they must come with appropriate licenses for embedded and ancillary software; 
and (iii) that the scope of rights the buyer will have vis-à-vis third parties (e.g. rental allowed? number of 
users?) needs to be as carefully defined as the quality. 
 
(b) Data as collateral under the MLST 
 
 Another example is the use of data as collateral for a security interest. With the rising significance of 
data as an asset and tradeable item it is hardly satisfactory to see that it cannot serve as collateral in order 
to improve the availability of credit in the industry 4.0. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured 
Transactions (MLST), however, remains entirely silent in this regard. As there would need to be asset-
specific rules for security interests in data if data were admissible as collateral silence arguably amounts to 
a negative answer, i.e. it is arguably not well possible under the MLST to grant a security interest in data. 
 
 In practice, parties can achieve satisfactory results by storing the data exclusively on the secured 
party’s servers, but the debtor may need to store the data on its own servers for technical and operational 
reasons. As far as the secured party still has a copy of the data it can nevertheless sell the data on the market 
where the debtor is in default and where this is provided by the security agreement or applicable law, but 
the secured party will then compete on the data market with the trustee in bankruptcy, which will normally 
mean that proceeds of any sale will be lower. Also, a crucial point may be the relationship between a 
‘security interest’ in the data and ownership or any security interest in the servers on which data are stored 
(or in the right against a storage provider, e.g. a cloud provider). The perfection of a security interest would 
prevent third parties from disposing of the data in their own right, either exclusively or as competing 
suppliers on the data market.  
 
 There should be a debate whether perfection can occur by putting the secured party in ‘possession’ of 
the data, i.e. the secured party must have exclusive control of the data and the debtor must be able to access 
and process the data only through the secured party. This can be achieved, e.g., by creating a protected 
space on the debtor’s servers that can be accessed only with the help of a digital key controlled by the 
secured party. Where the data are stored in Cloud space provided by a third party, the same effect could be 
achieved by way of a control agreement or of the secured party becoming the holder of the Cloud space. 
Alternatively, the applicable law may allow for perfection by filing in a registry. 
 
(c) The MLST and self-executing ‘smart contracts’ 
 
 A third example would be the relationship between the MLST and self-executing contracts. When 
speaking of ‘self-execution’, at least three different levels can be identified. The lowest level would be 
simple electronic seizure or repossession, e.g. the creditor switches off essential components of a device, 
of a production line etc. in order to put the debtor and any other person who intends to use the device under 
pressure. The next level would be advanced electronic seizure or repossession, e.g. assets are redirected by 
way of remote control, such as a self-driving car to the creditor’s premises or goods to his warehouse. Such 
advanced electronic seizure may involve the use of blockchain technology but may equally be triggered by 
other means. Both levels of electronic seizure or repossession pose a challenge for the MLST insofar as it 
may mean ‘factual perfection’ without the creditor being in possession of the encumbered asset and without 
filing in a registry. The highest level is fully automated self-execution, i.e. in a situation of default value 
that is represented by a virtual currency or similar digital assets is automatically transferred from the 
debtor’s to the creditor’s account. For the time being, such fully automated self-execution normally involves 
blockchain technology.  
 
 As yet, the MLST fails to reflect the expectation that secured transactions will, in the future, normally 
involve electronic enforcement, e.g. that (i) technical solutions may be as important as written security 
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agreements, that (ii) what is coded in the blockchain may be as important as what is recorded in the registry, 
and that (iii) rules on restitution for unjustified enforcement may be as important as rules on how to achieve 
enforcement. Admittedly, some types of electronic enforcement may simply be held to be incompatible with 
the MLST, i.e. the law of a jurisdiction that has adopted the MLST may consider electronic enforcement as 
plainly unlawful because it serves to circumvent the traditional law of secured transactions and gives the 
creditor an unfair advantage over the other creditors. On the other hand, declaring self-execution to be 
plainly unlawful would mean a quite far-reaching restriction of freedom of contract, as self-execution is 
achieved by a combination of contractual agreement and technical solution and not by way of property law.  
 
3. Conclusions 
 
 The three examples serve to illustrate that we might be well advised to reconsider existing legal 
instruments — in particular UNCITRAL model laws or conventions — in the light of new stages in 
digitalisation and make them undergo a ‘digital fitness check’. In addition to revising existing legal 
instruments, it could make sense to take a broader perspective and to develop a set of principles that would 
guide legislators worldwide in the difficult task of updating their existent legislation in a variety of fields. 
In order to provide for flexibility, the work should initially be conducted by an expert group. This expert 
group could develop results that might then be submitted to one or several UNCITRAL Working Group(s) 
for further consideration.  
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Ownership of data and the numerus clausus of legal objects 
 
Sjef van Erp, Maastricht University, The Netherlands; European Law Institute, Vienna, Austria 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In 1974 Grant Gilmore wrote that contract was dead.1 We now know that it was not. Recently, authors 
have written about the end of ownership and the beginning of the end of classical contract law.2 Again it is 
argued that traditional private law concepts, such as ownership and contract, are in crisis. Gilmore argued 
that contract was drowning in a sea of tort and pleaded for a new law school course on contorts.3 Law 
curricula did not change. Perzanowski and Schultz argue that due to the rise of the Internet of things, the 
sharing economy with its on-line platforms and digital rights management, we can see a paradigm shift 
from ownership to access: assets are no longer controlled (“owned”) by one particular subject, but accessed 
whenever needed.4 Savelyev confronts the traditional role of the state in the development and enforcement 
of private law with the rapidly evolving block chain technology and, closely connected with this, smart (i.e. 
algorithm governed) contracts. Will the state lose control and will algorithms govern us? In other words: 
algorithms as law instead of the rule of law over algorithms?5 Before we embark on another theory of 
“crisis”, let us first see if there really is a crisis or that we are, as we always have been, in a process of 
ongoing development of the law, only different from the past because of the speed of change and the 
growing complexity of legal sources given globalisation with its de-nationalisation, now, so it seems, more 
and more counter-balanced by growing re-nationalisation and localisation, which latter development makes 
the picture even more complex than it already was.  
 
 In the following paragraphs I will first make some introductory remarks on what is meant when 
reference is made to the “classical” model of private law. I will then discuss “data” as a new object of 
property law, whether these data can be included in, what I have called, the “numerus clausus of legal 
objects”, what the consequences are of accepting data as a new legal object for our understanding of 
ownership (more particularly ownership as the foundation of trade in a market economy).6 Finally, I will 
draw some tentative conclusions. 
 
2. “Classical” private law 
 
 It is interesting to note that Savelyev refers to “classic” contract law. What is meant? Generally 
speaking, authors who refer to classical contract law mean contract law (or more generally: private law) as 
it was developed during the 19th century.7 When analysing this classical model of private law two layers 
__________________ 
1  G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (2nd. ed.; Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1995).  
2  A. Perzanowski and J. Schultz, The End of Ownership. Personal property in the digital economy (Cambridge, 
Mass./London: MIT Press, 2016), with accompanying website: www.theendofownership.com; A. Savelyev, 
Contract law 2.0: “Smart” contracts as the beginning of the end of classic contract law, Basic research program 
working papers, series: law, WP BRP 71/Law/2016 (National Research University Higher School of Economics, 
Moscow), available at the Social Science Research Network (SSRN): https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885241.  
3  Gilmore, The Death of Contract, p. 98. 
4  Perzanowski and Schultz, The End of Ownership, p. 1 ff.  
5  See L. Lessig, Law regulating code regulating law, Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 2003, p. 1 ff.  
6  Cf. for a more traditional analysis of objects of property law (such as the human body, pecuniary claims, social 
security benefits, public law licenses), not discussing the question of new objects resulting from the impact of 
digitalisation on property law, A. Praduroux, Objects of property rights: old and new, in: M. Graziadei and L. 
Smith, Comparative property law. Global perspectives (Cheltenham/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2017), p. 
51 ff. 
7  As I already discussed the classical model of private law in earlier writings, for further references I would like 
to refer to J.H.M. van Erp, Contract als Rechtsbetrekking. Een rechtsvergelijkende studie (“Contract as a form 
of Legal Relationship. A comparative study”) (Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1990), p. 1 ff., S. van Erp, 
Teaching law in Europe: From an intra-systemic, via a trans-systemic to a supra-systemic approach, in: A.W. 
Heringa and B. Akkermans (eds.), Educating European lawyers (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: intersentia, 
2011), p. 79 ff., p. 81 ff. and S. van Erp, Lex rei sitae: The territorial side of classical property law, in: Chr. Godt 
(ed.), Regulatory property rights. The Transforming notion of property in transnational business regulation 
(Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), p. 61 ff.  
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can be distinguished. A first (formal) layer, consisting of values, policies, leading principles, ground rules 
and technical rules: the “type” of law that applies. A second (substantive) layer, focussing on subjects, 
objects and relations: the “living” law. I will refer to these layers when discussing the model. “Classical” 
private law was developed in 19th century Europe after the French Revolution, but before the rise of 
Marxism and before the Industrial Revolution. Consequently, it focussed on land as the most important 
source of wealth and the “citoyen”, the well-to-do citizen. The ideological framework underlying the model 
was based on the ideals of the French Revolution, particularly “égalité” (equality, no differences should be 
made based upon status such as being of nobility) and “liberté” (freedom, stressing the autonomy of the 
individual and a person’s free will), resulting in a liberal (and thus market based) approach to economic 
relations. The third ideal of the French Revolution “fraternité” was, so it seems, more of a moral than a 
legal nature. The model was also based on a clear division of power between the legislature and the 
judiciary. The primary law maker was the legislator, the judge was to follow and apply the law with only 
limited power to create (secondary) case law. Although in England the judge still was the person seen as 
the ultimate arbiter regarding what the law was, parliament was sovereign and consequently had the power 
to change the law, so also in England the legislator was stronger than the judge. During the period in which 
the classical model of private law was developed also the rise of the nation-state can be seen, a nation-state 
which not only had a territory in Europe, but also outside Europe. The nation-states were colonial powers. 
Law on the continent of Europe became based on national codes and thus petrified; in England the doctrine 
of “stare decisis” essentially had the same effect. It is remarkable to note that the inward looking approach 
never resulted in a complete closing of the mind towards “foreign” influence. Countries which took over 
the Napoleonic Civil Code, to give but one example, kept looking at the development of private law in 
France. While colonising other countries, the European nation-states tried to influence the law in the 
colonies by introducing (and imposing) their own law. This can be seen as a form of globalisation of the 
law in a period during which, remarkably enough, in Europe the law became more and more national. Today 
we see a resurgence of this inward looking trend when it is argued that a country (nation) should first look 
after its own interests and that international economic and legal cooperation is only a second best 
alternative. Lessons learnt in the 19th and 20th centuries — and organizations such as UNIDROIT and 
UNCITRAL are the direct outcome of that experience — show that a tendency to (re)nationalise the law 
will always encounter barriers of economic interdependence and international trade. 
 
 Based upon this ideological framework the classical model of private law took as its starting point that 
we should, first of all, separate liability questions (rights “in personam”) from questions of wealth (rights 
“in rem”). Liability (the law of obligations) was inter-personal; wealth (the law of property) was about a 
person and his assets or, to formulate it more precisely, legal relations between a subject vis-à-vis a 
substantial number of other subjects regarding an object. The law of property functioned against the 
background of contract law. Because property law gave citizens strong rights against “the world”, these 
rights were seen as in need of strict mandatory regulation and also in need of strict justification, given that 
everyone was bound by these rights without personal agreement. In other words: contract law was the 
default regime, resulting in personal liability, property law was the regime of exception, resulting in creating 
rights about wealth “erga omnes”. When it was attempted to create a property right and this attempt failed, 
the law of contract, being the default system, might still impose, albeit personal, liability. If parties wanted 
to create a servitude, but for some reason were unsuccessful, they still were bound among themselves by 
their agreement. Also personal liability was strictly separated into two categories, depending upon whether 
it resulted from a person’s free will to enter into a legal relationship with another person of free will 
(“meeting of the minds”, contract) or whether the liability was imposed by the law (especially tort and 
unjustified payment). Liability imposed by the law could only happen under very strict conditions. Broken 
down contract negotiations could, therefore, not result in liability: No contract had been concluded yet, 
good faith only had a limited impact and also tort law did not intervene with duties governing behaviour 
during negotiations. Of course, liability could have an impact on a person’s wealth (positively, as creditor, 
or negatively, as debtor), but questions of wealth were still seen as separate from liability, given the in rem 
character of rights regarding wealth. Questions of wealth were governed by property law, which dealt with 
a person’s shadow in the material world: the “patrimoine” or “Vermögen”. A patrimony consisted of all of 
a person’s assets: physical things (particularly land), but also immaterial assets such as monetary claims 
arising from inter-personal liability. Whereas these claims were qualified negatively from the perspective 
of liability law (in other words: they were qualified from the debtor’s side) as “obligation”, they were 
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qualified positively (in other words: from the creditor’s side) in the world of wealth. In some legal systems 
the separation was complete, as can be seen in German law with the two leading dogmas: 
“Trennungsprinzip” (principle of separation of the law of obligations and the law of property) and 
“Abstraktionsprinzip” (principle under which legal acts affecting property relations are independent from 
the impact of the law of obligations). In French law, however, this separation has never been this strict, 
given the rule that a contract of sale transfers ownership, at least between the parties and against third parties 
in good faith. 
 
 With regard to contract law this “classical model” can be found back in the theory that contracts come 
into existence after a “meeting of the minds”, based on the ground rule that a contract results from the 
mechanism of offer and acceptance. Given the autonomy of the individual (“freedom of contract” becoming 
the leading principle in this area of the law), a policy choice had been made to only introduce a few filters 
to check whether the will had been really free. A contract could be avoided if, e.g., the will had been 
influenced by fraud. Justified by the autonomy of the parties the content of their agreement was in their 
hands, again with only a limited filter to check this: contracts violating public policy or good morals were 
invalid. However, the number of mandatory laws was limited, and so was the possible impact of public 
policy. Good faith was a concept that continental legal systems did accept, but only with regard to 
performance and enforcement of contracts. A contract, once concluded without any defect regarding the 
parties’ free will and without violating the limited reasons for invoking public policy or good morals, was 
binding, irrespective of changing circumstances afterwards. 
 
 It will be obvious that, although this classical approach still can be traced in today’s contract law, many 
of the assumptions underlying the model are no longer accepted. Individual autonomy is frequently absent 
when looking at a party’s free will not from a formal, but from a substantive viewpoint. This explains the 
rise of heteronomous rules to protect those renting a dwelling house, employees and consumers. Individual 
autonomy is almost completely absent when accepting general terms and conditions: these are “take it, or 
leave it” contracts, often regarding goods or services one cannot really do without. Good faith is more and 
more seen as an overall norm of behaviour, which may also govern contract negotiations. This, however, 
does not mean that contract law is “dead”. It still does make a difference whether liability is contract based 
or tort based, because it does matter if the parties involved, albeit perhaps to a very limited degree, accepted 
liability or not. What about property law? 
 
 The “classical” model of private law also deeply affected property law. The main object of wealth in 
the 19th century was land. Before the French Revolution land was still governed by a legal structure which 
emanated from the feudal system with its “duplex dominium” (dual ownership) of “dominium directum” 
(ownership in the hands of those who were nominal owners) and “dominium utile” (ownership of those who 
actually lived on and benefitted from the land). Part of the feudal system were positive feudal duties, such 
as the duty resting on the holder of the dominium utile to pay part of the harvest to the holder of the 
dominium directum. No developed system of land registration existed and secret — even general — 
mortgages could be established.8 As a consequence of the French Revolution on the Continent of Europe 
this feudal system of land holding was abolished and dual ownership was replaced by a unitary concept of 
ownership, albeit in France less strict than in Germany.9 Ownership was seen as the ultimate expression of 
freedom, which had both a positive and negative effect. An owner was entitled to the use and benefits of 
assets, could do which the asset as he pleased and was free to transfer it. He could also stop anyone from 
interfering with his asset. English property law did not know this abolition of the feudal system and 
remained, at least in theory, based upon feudal notions. It also preserved its own approach to fragmentation 
of ownership as a result of the interplay between Common Law and Equity culminating in the concept of 
the trust with its “legal” and “equitable” entitlement. With the abolition of the feudal system, the acceptance 
of positive burdens, which could bind a successive owner by force of law, disappeared. Classical property 
__________________ 
8  Cf. V.J.M. van Hoof, Generale zekerheidsrechten in rechtshistorisch perspectief (Deventer: Wolters Kluwer, 
2015). 
9  See W. Swadling and B. Akkermans, Types of property rights: Immovables and movables in: S. van Erp and  
B. Akkermans (eds.), Ius Commune casebooks for the common law of Europe, Cases, materials and text on 
national, supranational and international property law (Oxford/Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 211  ff.  
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law distinguished different degrees of property rights: primary rights (ownership in the Civil Law, freehold 
and title in the Common Law) and secondary rights (property rights of a lesser nature). To a rather limited 
extent, as this violated separating liability from wealth questions, tertiary rights were recognized: rights 
which are in between contract law and property law. Tertiary rights have effect against third parties, but not 
against everyone, such as the lessee who is protected against the consequences of sale of the leased premises 
by the owner/lessor. 
 
 In the development of “classical” property law France — understandably, in light of its revolutionary 
history — made the choice to first of all protect ownership. This explains the choice for a causal system of 
transfer, returning ownership to the seller in case of, e.g., avoidance of the sales agreement. Almost a century 
later, in the heyday of the Industrial Revolution (so under different economic circumstances than the 
drafting of the French Civil Code), the German legislator made a choice for protecting commerce by strictly 
maintaining the difference between the law of obligations and the law of property. It is interesting to note 
that English law seems to have made another policy choice, by not abolishing the feudal system and 
maintaining its duplex ordo of Common Law and Equity. By means of equitable doctrines English property 
law is able to give legal protection to economic interests. The beneficiary under a trust is, although not 
entitled to the trust property under Common Law, still “owner” under the law of Equity, because of his 
apparent need to see his economic interest protected by the law.  
 
 To buttress post-revolutionary property law and prevent any reintroduction of the feudal system, 
classical property law introduced three leading principles. First of all, the principle of “numerus clausus” 
of property rights, to protect the newly introduced concept of unitary ownership against a return of quasi-
ownership rights under the cloak of creating new secondary property rights. This numerus clausus of 
property rights has both a substantive and a procedural side, because this principle not only limits the 
number and content of such rights, but also how these rights are created, transferred and extinguished. 
Following the numerus clausus principle, next to full ownership only property rights less than ownership 
(secondary or so-called “limited” property rights) could be created. These limited property rights are of 
three types: use rights (such as servitude), security rights (e.g. mortgage) and management rights (trust and 
trust-like devices). The numerus clausus of property rights was accompanied by the principle that property 
rights follow a hierarchy (to be found in such ground rules as that older rights have priority over younger 
rights) and the principle that property rights must be transparent (e.g. by registration in case of immovable 
property). It could be said that the feudal period under which secret mortgages were allowed, which from a 
present day perspective could be seen as the ultimate protection of a mortgagor’s privacy, was replaced by 
a period more focussed on providing information to third parties, under which full disclosure was 
demanded.10 
 
 It is against this background that for a considerable period of time property law became a rather static 
area of the law, relatively unaffected by the tumultuous developments of contract and tort law. Of course, 
under the influence of modern financing German law accepted the transfer of ownership for security 
purposes, but changes like this remained within the outer limits of the existing classical system. This can 
be seen when looking at what I called the second layer of that system. Earlier I defined property law as the 
law which governs legal relations between a subject and a considerable group of other subjects regarding 
an object. Who, generally speaking, can be a subject of property law did not change fundamentally: natural 
and legal persons (under both private and public law). The objects which property law recognizes (“legal 
objects”) generally are physical (tangible) assets, such as land and movables and, although in some legal 
systems more explicit than in other legal systems, intangibles, such as monetary claims, to which can be 
added intellectual property. Classical property law does not recognize new legal objects quickly. This can 
be seen with regard to the acceptance of public licenses as tradable objects and concerning the acceptance 
of different types of market quota, such as emission rights and milk quota. In my view this approach can be 
__________________ 
10  Regarding access to land registration data, as we see it today, a clear conflict of interest exists between those 
who are registered as being entitled to a property right and who claim privacy protection, third parties who have 
the right to be informed about the existence of rights which can be invoked against them and the general interest, 
which may demand as much public access as possible to prevent falsification and corruption regarding entries in 
the land registry. 
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qualified as a different type of numerus clausus doctrine, as the number and nature of legal objects is 
limited. This numerus clausus of legal objects buttresses the numerus clausus of property rights, as it limits 
the objects as to which a property right can be claimed. The definition of a property right might even contain 
the object as to which such a property rights is possible. Although the two types of numerus clausus are, 
therefore, linked to one another, each type fulfils a different function. The numerus clausus of property 
rights limits the number and content of these rights, without limiting the objects which can be protected by 
rights erga omnes. The numerus clausus of legal objects provides the limitation concerning the objects and 
by doing so separates the more restricted category of what can be an object of property law from a broader 
category of what can be an object of contract law.  
 
 From the perspective of traditional — or should I, from today’s perspective, say: “analog”? — property 
law, as briefly sketched above, the prime questions with regard to the proprietary nature of data are whether 
(1) they can be accepted as legal objects of property law, (2) whether this has an impact on the nature and 
content of any property rights regarding such content and (3) if we are really talking about the “end” of 
ownership, or perhaps even classical property law. These questions will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
3. Data as a new legal object  
 
 The term “data” covers an incredibly vast area of information. All information needs a carrier. This 
can be the human mind (a person’s memory), the human body (think of genetic information), but also a 
non-human physical carrier, such as a hard disk, usb stick or chip, either connected to your local computer 
or a (cloud) server.11 It seems that courts are in agreement that if data cannot somehow be specified, data 
are seen as pure information which as such cannot be, at least without any further justification, an object of 
property law. Examples are the English Court of Appeal in Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media 
Ltd and the New Zealand Supreme Court in Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen.12 Another question is whether 
information can be seen as an object separate from the carrier, in other words whether information is of a 
tangible or an intangible nature and can be the object of ownership independently from (ownership of) the 
carrier. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v Barthelemy, a tax case, 
that software was tangible personal property.13 The New Zealand Supreme Court took a different, less 
principled and more pragmatic, approach in Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen. The court ruled (Arnold, J.): 
__________________ 
11  Cf. on genetic information already L.B. Andrews, Legal aspects of genetic information, The Yale Journal of 
Biology and Medicine, 1991, p. 29 ff. 
12  Cf. Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Business Media Ltd. , Court of Appeal of England and Wales [2014] EWCA 
Civ 281; Jonathan Dixon v. The Queen [2014] NZCA 329 (CA516/2013) and [2015] NZSC 147 (SC 82/2014). 
See the opinion by Floyd, L.J., in Your Response v. Datateam: “42. I would add only one observation in 
connection with the wider implications of Mr. Cogley’s (the lawyer arguing for Your Response, JvE) submission 
that the electronic database was a type of intangible property which, unlike choses in action, was capable of 
possession and thus of being subject to a lien. An electronic database consists of structured information. Although 
information may give rise to intellectual property rights, such as database right and copyright, the law has been 
reluctant to treat information itself as property. When information is created and recorded there are sharp 
distinctions between the information itself, the physical medium on which the information is recorded and the 
rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical medium and the rights are treated as property, the 
information itself has never been. As to this, see most recently per Lord Walker in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] 
UKHL 21, [2008] 1 A.C. 1 at [275], where he is dealing with the appeal in Douglas v Hello, and the discussion 
of this topic in Green & Randall, The Tort of Conversion at pages 141-144. If Mr. Cogley were right that the 
database could be possessed and could be the subject of a lien and that its possession could be withheld until 
payment and released or transferred upon payment, one would be coming close to treating information as 
property. That observation further underlines the significance of the step we were invited to take.” 
13  South Central Bell Telephone Co. v Barthelemy, 643 S2d 1240 (La 1994). The court ruled (Hall, J.), 643 S2d p. 
1250: “In sum, once the “information” or “knowledge” is transformed into physical existence and recorded in 
physical form, it is corporeal property. The physical recordation of this software is not an incorporeal right to be 
comprehended.” See S. Bagert, South Central Bell v Barthelemy: The Louisiana Supreme Court determines that 
computer software is tangible personal property, Tulane Law Review 1995, p. 1367 ff. and R. Dankner Goldman, 
From Gaius to Gates: Can civilian concepts survive the age of technology?, Loyola Law Review 1996, p. 149 ff. 
Cf. for a more general comparison K. Moon, The nature of computer programs: tangible? goods? personal 
property? intellectual property?, European Intellectual Property Review 2009, p. 396 ff.  
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 “[49] (…) In Your Response Ltd v Datateam Business Media Ltd the Court of Appeal held that it was 
not possible to exercise a common law possessory lien over an electronic database. While the Court 
did not rule out the possibility that such a database might be property, it said that it was at best 
intangible property and so, on the authorities (OBG Ltd v Allan in particular), did not represent 
“tangible property of a kind that is capable of forming the subject matter of the torts that are concerned 
with an interference with possession”. 
 
 [50] The key question for us is whether the digital files are “property” for the purposes of s 249(1)(a) 
(Crimes Act 1961, SvE) rather than whether they are tangible or intangible property, given that the 
definition of “property” in s 2 includes both tangible and intangible property. What emerges from our 
brief discussion of the United States authorities is that although they differ as to whether software is 
tangible or intangible, they are in general agreement that software is “property”. There seems no reason 
to treat data files differently from software in this respect. Even though the English Court of Appeal 
considered that an electronic database was not tangible property capable of being converted, it 
acknowledged that it might be property.  
 
 [51] (…) We consider that interpreting the word “property” as we have is not only required by the 
statutory purpose and context but is also consistent with the common conception of “property”.” 
 
 What does become clear is that, if information is not somehow specified, it cannot be an object of 
property law. This is in conformity with one of the leading principles of property law: transparency. The 
principle of transparency in a classical sense only had two aspects: the object as to which a property right 
was claimed had to be clearly described and delineated (requirement of specificity) and it had to be made 
public (possession could imply information, but also registration). This transparency principle, given the 
pre-Internet age in which it was developed, assumed (physical) barriers, for example that a person asking 
for information on immovable property had to present himself in person at a land registration office or that 
only those who had a legitimate interest would ask and be given the requested information. These barriers 
protected the holder of a property right against information requests from third parties with no legal interest 
and in fact gave the right holder a privacy-like protection. However, as a consequence of present day 
information technology developments, traditional barriers to acquiring information are disappearing and 
the risk increases that information is becoming too easily accessible to persons who cannot show any legal 
interest whatsoever. The two requirements which constitute the transparency principle (specificity and 
publicity) are, therefore, now more and more seen as requirements which have to be balanced against the 
requirement of privacy. The person holding a property right is seen as entitled to be shielded from publicity 
in situations where third persons do not have a legitimate interest in the information.14  
 
 Particularly the specificity requirement could guide us towards criteria to establish which (types of) 
information can be recognized as legal objects (i.e. objects of property law). Once information (data) is 
specific enough to be considered an object of property law, it can be qualified as a virtual asset and questions 
regarding the publicity requirement, balanced by the privacy requirement, will have to be answered. In this 
contribution I will focus on the requirement of specificity, as I consider this to be a preliminary question 
that has to be asked before the publicity requirement needs to be considered. 
 
 When analysing types of information to see if information could be qualified as a legal object, I will 
focus on information stored on a non-human carrier, although this limitation might be questionable, because 
a chip might be implanted in a human body.15 Already chips are implanted in animals, such as pets or cattle. 
 Ownership of the carrier will be governed by classical property law, particularly because it is a 
physical, movable thing. This means that the traditional approach to property law can be followed: Property 
law begins where a subject enters into legal relations with a considerable group of other subjects regarding 
__________________ 
14  It is interesting to note that even before the Internet Technology Revolution the German land registrati on system 
already knew the requirement of legal interest if someone requested information on a registered immovable. See 
M. Hinteregger and L. van Vliet, Transfer systems, in: S. van Erp and B. Akkermans (eds.), Cases, materials and 
text on national, supranational and international property law, p. 844 ff.  
15  Cf. P.M. Schwartz, Property, privacy, and personal data, Harvard Law Review 2004, p. 2055 ff., p. 2060 ff.  
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an object, which implies that property law requires the existence of objects outside the human body.16 In 
case of an implanted chip (for example as part of a pacemaker) this would mean that the distinction between 
subject and object is gone, as after implantation the chip has become part of the human body, not unlike an 
organ transplant. It could then be argued that the data in the chip are to be considered as data comparable 
to genetic information and should be treated as such, with the consequence that any data in the chip would 
no longer be governed by (intellectual) property law. 
 
 Generally speaking, questions regarding ownership of the physical carrier are seen as different from 
questions concerning ownership of the data on the carrier, even though data cannot exist without a carrier. 
With respect to such data we encounter, first of all, the impact of intellectual property law, for example the 
intellectual property rights regarding software. With software, however, users can create new things: Do 
these new things fall under the umbrella of the holder of the intellectual property right or did the user of the 
software create an asset independent from intellectual property law? An example is a car computer, which 
stores data about the technical functioning of the car (engine, brakes etc.) and might also store data about a 
driver’s behaviour in traffic (your driving style); of course, your navigation system stores your destinations. 
Who owns the data about your car’s engine, your driving style and your destinations? Could you argue that, 
because you “own” your car according to classical property law, you own the data, as they are information 
which you created yourself by driving in your own car? Or can your car manufacturer or the manufacturer 
of your navigation system claim ownership under its intellectual property rights? The answer to these 
questions is of incredible importance when looking at the marketability of data. From a classical property 
law viewpoint it is the owner who can transfer. In my view, given the personalised nature of the information, 
it is the car owner who is entitled to the information, not the holder of the intellectual property right 
concerning the software in the car. This means that, if the copyright holder of the software wants to have 
access to the personalised information it will have to be transferred and the car owner will be protected by 
privacy law.17 
 
 Looking at the example I gave above, three elements surface to decide if the information is specific 
enough to qualify as a legal object: (1) nature of the content, (2) the person creating the content and (3) 
purpose and use of the content.  
 
3.1. Nature of the content 
 
 As to content various types can be distinguished: (a) content directly related to the human body, (b) 
user generated content for personal use, (c) user generated content targeting a specific group or person, (d) 
mass distributed user generated content (for commercial purposes or non-commercial purposes), (e) open 
content and (f) agreed upon (commercial) content.  
 
3.2. Person creating the content 
 
 Next to this categorisation focussing on the type of content I would like to suggest that we also take 
into account if data have been created by (a) a specific natural person (private owner of a car or sender of a 
WhatsApp message), (b) private enterprises (Facebook or Google) or (c) a government body (footage 
resulting from CCTV surveillance by the police, land registration data administered by a government 
agency).18  
 
__________________ 
16  A question which has recently been raised by H. Eidenmüller is whether ‘robots’ could be given legal personality. 
That seems, at least for now, unlikely to happen, but the fact that the question has been asked is a sign of how 
rapidly the technological landscape is changing and how difficult it is for lawyers to evaluate these developments. 
See H. Eidenmüller, Robot’s legal personality, Oxford Business Law Blog 8 March 2017, 
www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog. 
17  Cf. C. Prins, Property and Privacy: European perspectives and the commodification of our identity, in: L. 
Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), The future of the public domain. Identifying the commons in information 
law (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006), p. 223 ff. 
18  See for a comparable approach, but focussing on consumers’ information G. Malgieri, Property and (intellectual) 
ownership of consumer information: A new taxonomy for personal data, Privacy in Germany — PinG, n. 4, 2016, 
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3.3. Purpose and use of the content 
 
 If a person creates data to be used only for personal purposes, this would be an argument in favour of 
accepting a property entitlement in the hands of that person. However, if the data concerns open content 
(Wikipedia), the nature of the content is a clear counter-argument. When user generated content targets a 
specific group or person (WhatsApp), this creates a closer link between the person creating the content and 
the data then if the user generated data is mass distributed (Facebook). If the content is meant to be exploited 
for commercial purposes, the person creating the content creates a personal link between him and the 
content to avoid that others can make use of it freely. This also is an argument in favour of accepting a 
property entitlement, which will frequently be accepted in any case because of the impact of intellectual 
property law. However, commercially used digital content in a public private partnership setting might again 
be differently treated. If a national land registry, government owned and operated, with the assistance of a 
privately owned Internet technology company is converted from a more traditional (partly paper based, 
partly digital) registration system to a system completely based on block chain technology and smart 
contracts, ownership of the data by that company will be of a mixed public/private nature. The result may 
be that upon termination of its contract with the government this company could be obliged to also hand 
over its source code, to allow the government access to and control over the stored land data. 
 
 These three elements (nature of the content, person creating the content, purpose and use of the 
content) can be seen as policy weighing factors to decide if the information (the data) is specific enough to 
be considered an object of property law. Questions regarding publicity and privacy remain. Particularly if 
the specificity requirement has been fulfilled because of a close nexus between person and content, given 
the purpose and use of the content, privacy protection will frequently prevail and make the publicity 
requirement moot. 
 
4. Legal objects as qualifier of ownership 
 
 The numerus clausus of property rights is one of the (not to say: the most important) constituent 
principle underlying a property law system.19 What has often not been observed so far on a more general 
level of abstraction is that property rights are defined from the perspective of the object concerned. 
Particularly a comparative approach might be revealing. Ownership in the civil law and freehold in the 
common law are, at least historically, concepts which focus on land. Whether intangible property could be 
owned was (and still is) a debatable question, the answer to which is based upon age-old discussions about 
the nature of intangible property. Could it be “owned” as land or was, for example, the contractual source 
of a monetary claim so directly connected with the in personam right between creditor and debtor that the 
economic value of such a right was fundamentally different from the economic value of physical objects, 
particularly land?20 Let me give an example from the Dutch Civil Code, given its relatively recent 
enactment. The Netherlands Civil Code (article 5:1) defines ownership as follows:21 
 
 1. Ownership is the most comprehensive property right that a person, the ‘owner’, can have to (in) 
a thing.  
 
__________________ 
p. 133 ff., available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2916058.  
19  See for an analysis from a comparative and European viewpoint: B. Akkermans, The principle of numerus clausus 
in European property law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2008).  
20  Cf. for a comparative study about monetary claims: C. Lebon, Het goederenrechtelijk statuut van 
schuldvorderingen (Antwerpen/Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) and C. Lebon, Property rights in respect of claims, in: 
S. van Erp and B. Akkermans (eds.), Cases, materials and text on national, supranational and international 
property law, p. 365 ff. See also J.L. Bergel, Les nouveaux biens, Rapport Général, in: La Propriété, Travaux de 
l’Association Henri Capitant, Tome LIII (Paris: Société de Législation Comparée, 2003), p. 203 ff.  ; V. Sagaert, 
Nieuwe perspectieven op het eigendomsrecht na tweehonderd jaar Burgerlijk Wetboek, in: B. Tilleman and P. 
Lecocq, Zakenrecht/Droit des biens (Brugge: Die Keure, 2005), p. 43 ff.; P. Berlioz, La notion de bien (Paris: 
LGDJ, 2007), p. 71 ff. ; Chr. von Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Sachenrecht, Band I (München: C.H. Beck, 2015), 
p. 318 ff. and B. Mallet-Bricout, Bien et immatériel en France, in: L’Immatériel, Travaux de l’Association Henri 
Capitant, Tome LXIV (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2015), p. 149 ff.  
21  Translation to be found on: www.dutchcivillaw.com/.  
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 2. The owner is free to use the thing to the exclusion of everyone else, provided that he respects the 
rights and entitlements of others to the thing and observes the restrictions based on rules of written 
and unwritten law.  
 
 3. The owner of the thing becomes the owner of its separated fruits and benefits, except when 
another person is entitled to them. 
 
 Article 5:2 adds that the “owner of a thing is entitled to (re)claim it from everyone who keeps it without 
a right or title.” At the heart of this definition is not only the content of the right, but also its qualifier: the 
object, the “thing”. This is defined in article 3:2: “‘Things’ are tangible objects that can be controlled by 
humans.” In other words monetary claims and property rights themselves are not “things” and cannot be 
owned, although the person having the claim or the property right is entitled to it and can, to give but one 
example, transfer it.22 What we see is that the definition of the right is directly connected with the object. 
In Dutch law, following the model of German law, the object must be of a physical, i.e. tangible, nature. 
Monetary claims cannot be “owned”, one can only be “entitled” to these claims. In other words — taking 
not so much a dogmatic, but a more functional approach — “ownership” of intangibles is different from 
“ownership” of tangibles, because the object is different. French law takes a more flexible approach here, 
but also cannot deny that intangibles are different in nature from tangibles. Mallet-Bricout, therefore, argues 
that property law concerning physical things is seen as a model for all other types of property entitlements: 
“Plus généralement, les biens corporels semblent être encore souvent vécus comme des corps étrangers 
qu’il faut assimiler aux institutions et categories de notre vieux droit des biens.”23 Under English law it is 
even clearer than under Dutch, French and German law, that the object fills the content of the right. The 
primary right regarding land (“ownership” in the Civil Law) is the “estate in fee simple absolute” or the 
“freehold”; with regard to receivables and personal property the primary right is “title”. This realisation 
brings with it that if we are willing to accept new types of legal objects such as data, and then ask the 
question: “who owns this property?”, we are already in the process of formulating a different type of 
ownership.24 This is why, also from a comparative viewpoint, it should be realised that, depending upon the 
legal object concerned and in light a legal system’s historical development, a more pragmatic approach 
must be chosen to avoid unnecessary and non-productive academic debate based on sterile dogmatic 
analysis and preconceived 19th century paradigms. We must realise that ownership of physical things is not 
the same as ownership of a monetary claim or ownership of data. In each case the legal object is different 
and hence the qualifier of the primary right. Using the same term (“ownership”) is as such of course 
possible, as long as it is realised that by doing so that particular legal system accepts different types and 
degrees of ownership. Traditionally, common lawyers, given the duplex ordo of common law and equity, 
are more open to this approach than civil lawyers, who, after the French Revolution, were educated in a 
legal environment in which duplex dominium had been abolished and a unitary concept of ownership — 
focussing particularly on land — had been introduced. Of course civil lawyers accept that monetary claims 
can be transferred and pledged, very much like tangible property can be transferred and pledged, but 
monetary claims cannot be revindicated, neighbour law does not apply, so claims cannot be owned. The 
protection of monetary claims is a matter for contract and tort law, in other words: the law of obligations, 
not property law.  
 
 The recent changes in the Luxemburg Commercial Code might prove to be a good example of this use 
of the term “ownership” in a setting where it does not mean ownership in the traditional sense. In 2013 a 
new version of article 567, paragraph 2, of the Luxemburg Commercial Code was enacted.25 It now reads: 
 
__________________ 
22  Cf. W. Loof, Of Trustees and Beneficial Owners. An inquiry into the proprietary aspects of trusts  and trust-like 
devices from a European Private Law perspective (Maastricht: Datawyse/Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2016), 
p. 8 ff. 
23  Mallet-Bricout, Bien et immatériel en France, p. 161. 
24  Cf. J.H.M. van Erp and W. Loof, Eigendom in het algemeen: eigendom van digitale inhoud (titel 1), in: L.C.A. 
Verstappen (red.), Boek 5 BW van de toekomst. Over vernieuwingen in het zakenrecht (Den Haag: SDU, 2016), 
p. 23 ff. 
25  The parliamentary history can be found on: www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action= 
doDocpaDetails&id=6485.  
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 “Les biens meubles incorporels non fongibles en possession du failli ou détenus par lui peuvent être 
revendiqués par celui qui les a confiés au failli ou par leur propriétaire, à condition qu’ils soient 
séparables de tous autres biens meubles incorporels non fongibles au moment de l’ouverture de la 
procédure, les frais afférents étant à charge du revendiquant.” 
 
 The Official Comment explains that this provision was desirable in light of the need to allow 
reclaiming data from a cloud server in insolvency situations.26 The aim of the provision is certainly clear, 
but can the same be said about the property terminology used? Let me start by saying that this attempt by a 
legislature to offer a practical legal solution in situations which are more and more frequent and where 
classical property law does not offer workable answers is certainly to be applauded. At the same time it 
does show how incredibly difficult it is to do this, using the classical framework of property law. The text 
mentions that the property (defined as: “les biens meubles incorporels non fongibles”) must be separable 
(“séparable”), they must either be in the possession of or be held by the bankrupt (“en possession du failli 
ou détenus par lui”) and the property can be revindicated by the person who entrusted it to the bankrupt or 
who is its owner (“revendiqués par celui qui les a confiés au failli ou par leur propriétaire”). This clearly 
is civil law terminology, more particularly civil law terminology in the French legal tradition. Given that 
the property may also include specific data (how else to understand movable, non-fungible, incorporeal 
goods?), the various aspects of specificity discussed above should be taken into account when deciding if 
data can be qualified as a legal object, an object of property law, which can be revindicated from a cloud 
server. Taking the approach, advocated above, we should look at the specificity requirement from three 
angles: nature of the content, person creating the content and purpose and use of the content. I fully agree 
with the approach taken regarding the requirement that the data must be separable: Only well-defined data 
can be legal objects. But is it sufficient if the data are stored on a particular drive or in a particular folder, 
or is it enough to create separate files by using programmes as Word, Excel or Adobe pdf? This is what the 
specificity requirement is all about. I would argue, following the analysis discussed above, that in the case 
of e.g. a company’s books, stored on a cloud server, we look at the nature of the content (a company’s books 
are probably a mixture of user generated content for personal use and user generated content targeting a 
specific group or person and agreed upon (commercial) content), the person creating the content (probably 
only a company’s employees or employees of a firm providing the company with bookkeeping services, 
which also offers cloud storage) and purpose and use of the content (is the purpose only storage or are the 
cloud services part of an overall book keeping package?). If the specificity requirement has been fulfilled, 
most likely also the publicity requirement has been put into effect as well, because in the world of 
intangibles physical signs (for example file names) are necessary to make separated data visible to the 
outside world. In the case that we are discussing here (a commercial setting and insolvency) the privacy 
requirement plays a lesser role, as it is the person owning or entrusting the data to the cloud server who 
revindicates those data. If any privacy protection should be upheld because this person is controlling data 
about other persons, the already existing privacy provisions will continue to apply. Article 567 Luxemburg 
Commercial Code also uses the terms “possession” and “hold”. In the French legal tradition possession 
__________________ 
26  The Exposé des Motifs states (No. 6485, Chambre des Députés, Session Ordinaire 2011-2012, Projet de Loi 
portant modification de l’article 567 du Code de Commerce), p. 2/3: “Le nouvel alinéa 2 de l’article 567 proposé 
traite du cas des biens meubles incorporels non fongibles. Il a été jugé utile de traiter ce cas à part, dans une 
nouvelle disposition, étant donné que la revendication en matière incorporelle ne saurait être limitée aux cas du 
dépôt et de vente pour compte du propriétaire, comme elle l’est en matière corporelle. Il existe en effet 
aujourd’hui des hypothèses auxquelles le législateur n’a pas pensé il y a 10 ans et qui sont plus que de simples 
cas d’école. Ceci est le cas notamment dans le cadre des prestations offertes de façon de plus en plus large, à la 
fois au public en général et aux professionnels en particulier, en matière d’outsourcing ou d’informatique 
dématérialisée, appelée communément informatique dans le nuage (Cloud-computing). Pour continuer avec 
l’exemple du Cloud, l’une des applications du Cloud computing consiste par exemple pour une entreprise, une 
association ou une personne privée à ne plus conserver ses données et fichiers voire logiciels sur son propre 
système informatique, mais de les faire stocker sur des infrastructures informatiques externes accessibles via 
Internet. Or, il faut faire en sorte que celui qui a recours à de tels services puisse en cas de faillite du prestataire 
récupérer les données et fichiers afférents, en ce inclus les traitements qui auront été effectués par le failli ainsi 
que les résultats de ces mêmes traitements. Quant à la recevabilité d’une action en revendication, le texte ouvre 
le droit à la revendication tant à celui qui a confié les données au failli qu’au propriétaire des données lui-même. 
Dans certains cas, il s’agira de la même personne; dans d’autres cas il peut s’agir de deux personnes différentes, 
chacune d’entre-elles disposant dans ce cas d’une action en revendication.” 
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refers to controlling an object for yourself, holding means controlling an object for someone else (e.g. a 
lessee holds for a lessor). By using the phrase “en possession du failli ou détenus par lui” Luxemburg law 
in fact introduces a concept of controlling, thus replacing the old traditional distinction between possessing 
and holding. This does not mean that the German concept of possession has now been introduced, 
distinguishing two types of possession (“Eigenbesitz” and “Fremdbesitz”, respectively possessing for 
yourself or for another person). It means that next to the concepts of possession and holding a new concept 
is being introduced, taking into account the nature of the legal object: data. With regard to data it is not the 
traditional concept of possession that is applied, but the concept of control as used in modern Internet 
technology. Finally, the text introduces “revindication” of data owned or entrusted by the person claiming 
the data from the cloud server. First of all: the English word “entrusted” is used here purely as a translation 
of the new term “confié”. It is not the word trust as used in English trust law, although it does have a 
connotation that seems to imply that a person who cannot be seen as owner, but still has a legitimate interest, 
should also have the right to reclaim the data. I would argue that by introducing a combination of terms, 
mixing traditional with new terminology (“revendiqués par celui qui les a confiés au failli ou par leur 
propriétaire”) Luxemburg accepts the reality of Internet technology that what would have been 
revindication in classical property law, now has become what is called “access”. Article 567, par. 2, 
Luxemburg Commercial Code could therefore be reformulated as follows, and hence also be made 
applicable in other legal settings: 
 
 “Specific data can be accessed and taken under control if the person claiming access and control can 
show a sufficient link with such data, and if the data can be separated from other data at the moment 
of opening the insolvency procedure.” 
 
 I would submit that discussing property law problems along the lines discussed above might very well 
offer practical solutions, acceptable also from a trans-systemic and supra-systemic approach. It will, 
however, require extensive comparative research and rethinking of traditional, classical private law by an 
interdisciplinary group of experts, consisting of lawyers and Internet technology specialists. UNCITRAL, 
given its broad experience in the field of international commercial law, would be an excellent platform for 
such an expert working group. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 The classical approach to property law can still be applied to legal objects which have historically been 
accepted as such: physical things, particularly land and also movable property, monetary claims and 
intellectual property. Next to the numerus clausus of property rights, limiting their number and content, in 
the civil law strengthened by the unitary concept of ownership, the number and type of legal objects can 
also be characterised as a numerus clausus. The type of object is decisive for the type of applicable property 
right. I gave the example of Dutch law in which ownership is defined as the most complete right concerning 
a physical thing. Consequently, if the thing is not physical, that particular object cannot be “owned”. This 
does not mean that no primary right (in the sense of the maximum of powers, rights, privileges and 
immunities) exists, but it is not ownership, but entitlement. The legal object is therefore the qualifier for the 
property right to be applied. In classical property law, if an asset could be qualified as a legal object, still 
no property right could exist if not a second leading principle had been fulfilled: transparency, demanding 
a specific description of the object concerned and publicity (balanced by the demands of privacy). When 
looking at the cases discussed above and particularly analysing the new article 567, par. 2, of the Luxemburg 
Commercial Code, it seems that — perhaps more implicitly than explicitly and more hesitatingly than 
boldly — data have been accepted as a new legal object. The difficulties seem more to arise from the 
requirement of specificity than, among other problems, from the classification of data as tangible or non-
tangible.  
 
 The approach advocated is of a highly pragmatic nature. Data as falling within the numerus clausus of 
legal objects can only be understood from the perspective of Internet technology. New fitting legal concepts 
will have to be developed: ownership and revindication must be replaced by control and access; perhaps — 
so it might be added — the concept of “transfer” should be replaced by “distribution”. Does this mean that 
classical property law is dead? Or even worse: Is ownership, in the words of the legal realist Felix S. Cohen, 
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“transcendental nonsense”?27 Certainly not when we look at the traditionally accepted categories of legal 
objects. What we see is that classical property law is functioning as a model upon which a new property 
law can be built. The development of different conceptions of legal objects, with as a result a different 
approach to property rights and the protection they offer, is nothing new. In the past decades we saw the 
rise of so-called “constitutional property law”: property law as developed in human rights cases, particularly 
flowing from the interpretation of provisions in international treaties and constitutions protecting citizens 
against unacceptable expropriation measures. The nature of the legal field (not private law, but 
constitutional law) resulted in accepting assets as legal objects, which would not have been qualified 
immediately as legal objects under classical property law (e.g. rights to payment of a pension by a pension 
fund).28 Another new field is European property law, developed by the institutions of the European Union 
(flowing from the European treaties, legislative measures and case law). Also here new legal objects have 
been accepted as part of the development towards European-autonomous property rights (e.g. emission 
rights).29 The acceptance of data as a new legal object is therefore not revolutionary, but the outcome of the 
gradual development of property law during the last century in light of changing technological conditions.30 
It can therefore hardly be argued that we see the end of ownership. We only see a changing conception of 
ownership, which arises from the acceptance of data as a new legal object and results in a new field of 
property law: digital property rights. 
 
  
__________________ 
27  F.S. Cohen, Transcendental nonsense and the functional approach, Columbia Law Review, 1935, p. 809 ff.  
28  For a leading study in the field of constitutional property law see A.J. van der Walt, Constitutional property law 
(3rd. ed.), (Cape Town: Jutta, 2011).  
29  Cf. for an overview of European property law E. Ramaekers, European Union property. From fragments to a 
system (Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia, 2013.  
30  Cf. S. van Erp, Fluidity of ownership and the tragedy of hierarchy. A sign of a revolutionary evolution?, European 
Property Law Journal 2015, p. 56 ff. 
  
81 
Implications of the Blockchain Technology for the UNCITRAL Works 
 
Koji Takahashi, Doshisha University Law School, Japan ※ 
 
1. Overview 
 
 The blockchain technology is an algorithm which was invented to create the Bitcoin cryptocurrency 
around 2009. Its significance lies in the fact that it has made it possible for a consensus to be reached (at a 
practical level) about the evolution of data on an open online network. It thus enables the synchronisation 
of distributed ledgers without the involvement of a trusted intermediary. For this reason, the blockchain 
technology is often called “the distributed ledger technology” and helps enhance the security and integrity 
of data. But the blockchain technology is not just about creating ledgers. It also makes it possible to trade 
tokens online on a P2P (peer-to-peer) basis and hold them without the involvement of intermediaries. The 
tokens are either cryptocurrency units of self-anchored value or asset-backed tokens, i.e. tokens for which 
there exists the underlying asset they represent. While the blockchain technology is capable of a myriad of 
applications, its potential is greatest in the areas where disintermediated P2P transactions can be made 
possible. 
 
 While the Bitcoin’s blockchain is public in the sense that it is a platform open to all who wishes to use 
it, there have also been many initiatives to create private blockchain platforms: either consortium type or 
fully private type. In common with public blockchains, they generate append-only distributed ledgers via a 
chain of blocks. However, unlike public blockchains, they are not open. Thus, consortium blockchains are 
a member-only platform where there exists an administrator who grants permissions to one group of 
members to make transactions and another (which may overlap with the former) to do the block validation. 
In common with public blockchains, however, they dispense with a central registry and operate instead with 
synchronised distributed ledgers. Accordingly, both public and consortium blockchains fall within the legal 
analysis of the present article, though which particular legal issues arise will depend on the precise 
configuration of the particular blockchain such as whether or not it is powered by tokens.1 Fully private 
blockchains, on the other hand, merely represent the replacement by the adopting organization of its central 
database with distributed ledgers. Since it is a purely internal matter of the single organization which adopts 
it, fully private blockchains do not fall within the present analysis except for the issue to be discussed at 
Ch. 0 below.  
 
 In the first half of this article, we will examine the existing UNCITRAL works to see what legal issues 
arising from the use of the blockchain technology may be resolved under such works. In the second half, 
we will turn to examine a practically significant problem raised by the technology which calls for a globally 
unified solution but is untouched by the existing works of UNCITRAL or any other international 
organization.  
 
2. Under the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) (EC Model Law), the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures (2001) (ES Model Law) and the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts (2005) (EC Convention) 
 
 One of the principles guiding UNCITRAL in its works in electronic commerce is the principle of 
technology neutrality or technological neutrality, which means that the law should neither require nor 
assume the use of a particular technology for communicating or storing information electronically.2 The 
__________________ 
※  I wish to record my gratitude to the UNCITRAL Secretariat for hosting me as a visiting scholar while I was 
undertaking research on the present topic. It greatly facilitated my understanding of the working of UNCITRAL.  
1  Depending on the consensus algorithm adopted, a private blockchain does not require tokens of self -anchored 
value for incentivising the block validation. Even on such a blockchain, it is possible to issue and circulate asset -
based tokens, i.e. tokens for which there exists the underlying asset they represent.  
2  See the Guide to Enactment of the Electronic Signatures Model Law (2001) para. 5; the preamble of the 
Electronic Communications Convention. In the context of the EC Model law, the expression “media-neutral” is 
used to convey the same idea (See the Guide to Enactment of the Electronic Commerce Model Law (1996) para. 
24). Only later, has that expression come to be understood as referring more narrowly to non-discrimination 
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principle helps ensure that the law is able to accommodate future technological developments. Thus, the 
blockchain technology, though not yet invented when those three instruments were created, is not excluded 
from their scope of application. 
 
 It follows that under the EC Model law, admissibility in evidence or other legal effect may not be 
denied to information solely on the ground that it is in the form of a data message stored in a blockchain3 
(See Articles 5 and 9). In the context of contracts, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be expressed 
by means of data messages stored on a blockchain (See Article 11, as affirmed by Article 8 of the EC 
Convention). The performance of contractual obligations are also subject to the EC Model Law and the EC 
Convention.4 Article 12 of the EC Convention only mentions the formation of contract but States may, 
where appropriate under their legal systems, extend the principle by providing that the performance of a 
contract by an automated system may not be denied effect on the sole ground that no natural person 
intervened in each of the individual actions carried out by the automated system. This would improve clarity 
with respect to a so-called “smart contract.”5 
 
 The principle of technological neutrality does not mean that any technology can create a data message 
which satisfies the paper-based requirements such as those of writing and a signature. Only the technology 
capable of fulfilling the purposes and functions of the paper-based requirements can create a data message 
which is deemed to meet those requirements. This is called the principle of functional equivalence, another 
principle underlying the UNCITRAL works in electronic commerce. Thus, the EC Model law sets out the 
conditions which a data message must meet to fulfil the purposes and functions of the paper-based 
requirements of writing and a signature (Articles 6 and 7). The ES Model Law elaborates on the conditions 
for the signature requirement. A data message stored in a blockchain will be deemed to meet the 
requirements of writing and a signature if it satisfies the respective conditions. The EC Model law also 
provides that there must exist a reliable assurance as to the integrity of information contained in a data 
message before the information is deemed to satisfy the paper-based requirement that it be presented in its 
original form (Article 8). The blockchain technology is particularly apt to provide a reliable assurance as to 
the integrity of information since it is tamper resistant. 
 
3. Under the Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records (2017) (ETR Model Law) and the 
Rotterdam Rules (2008) 
 
 Whereas the three instruments examined above deal with data messages, the ETR Model Law deals 
with electronic transferable records (Article 1(1)). It sets out the conditions which must be met for an 
electronic record to be treated as a transferable document (Article 10). The latter is a document that entitles 
the holder to claim the performance of the obligation indicated in the document and to transfer the right to 
performance by means of the transfer of that document (Article 2). Bills of lading and warehouse receipts, 
for example, are covered. Electronic bills of lading are also covered by the Rotterdam Rules (United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea), which calls 
them “negotiable electronic transport records” (See Article 1(15)).  
 
 It should, however, be noted that the ETR Model Law is not applicable to cryptocurrencies such as the 
Bitcoin because a cryptocurrency holder has no right to claim any performance from anybody. 
Cryptocurrencies have self-anchored value because the participants in the underlying blockchain system 
are willing to accept them as a means of payment.  
__________________ 
between paper and electronic media (See the Guide to Enactment of the Electronic Signatures Model Law (2001) 
para. 5).  
3  It is possible to embed metadata in, for example, the Bitcoin’s blockchain, which allows the extra information to 
be added to the Bitcoin transactions. 
4  Para. 81 of the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law; Article 1(1) of the Convention.  
5  The expression “smart contract” is a misnomer. It is in fact a computer code stored on a blockchain, triggered by 
transactions on it and reads and writes data in it: Gideon Greenspan, “Beware the impossible smart contract” 
(2016) (http://www.multichain.com/blog/2016/04/beware-impossible-smart-contract/). The “smart contract” will 
give rise to a host of new legal issues but its relevance to a contract only lies in the fact that it can automate the 
online execution of the part of a contract which says “if A happens, then do B.” 
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 It should further be noted that an electronic equivalent of securities (such as shares and bonds) is 
outside the scope of the ETR Model Law (Article 1(3)). It follows that blockchain-based tokens representing 
securities (cryptosecurities) cannot be deemed to be securities under the ETR Model Law. A separate 
legislation would be needed to set out conditions for treating them as legally equivalents. 
Both the ETR Model Law and the Rotterdam Rules adhere to the principle of technology neutrality. Thus, 
the draft explanatory notes for the ETR Model Law explain that reference in the Model Law to electronic 
transferable record management systems does not imply the existence of a system administrator or other 
form of centralized control.6  
 
 Both the ETR Model Law and the Rotterdam Rules also adhere to the principle of functional 
equivalence. They set out the conditions which electronic records must satisfy to fulfil the purposes and 
functions of the requirements relevant to transferable documents. Among such requirements, most 
important is the guarantee of singularity. Since a transferable document embodies the right to claim the 
performance of an obligation from another, it is essential to prevent multiple claims from being made on 
one and the same obligation. To this end, the law generally requires that there be only one original copy (or 
one set of original copies)7 of a transferable document in circulation. In an electronic environment, 
providing an absolute guarantee of non-replicability may not be technically feasible since systems may 
retain copies of data. The ETR Model Law seeks to prevent multiple claims by requiring the use of a reliable 
method to identify an electronic record as the electronic transferable record and establish an exclusive 
control of it (Articles 10(1)(b)(i)(ii) and 11(1)(a)).8 The Rotterdam Rules, too, treat the exclusive control of 
an electronic transport record as functionally equivalent to the possession of a transport document (Article 
8(b)). Traditionally, the administrator of an electronic registry has been entrusted to ensure that the relevant 
electronic records are subject to the exclusive control of their holders. The blockchain technology is now 
capable of replacing such an administrator with an algorithm which guarantees that there is a single true 
version of distributed ledgers and ensures that the tokens recorded therein are subject to the exclusive 
control of their holders, i.e. the holders of the private keys.9 There certainly are possibilities that a private 
key is disclosed intentionally or accidentally to two or more persons. More than one person would then 
have control over the cryptocurrency units held in the corresponding address. That would not, however, 
prevent the control from being characterised as exclusive since those persons have control to the exclusion 
of all others.10 
 
 The reliability of the above-mentioned methods will be assessed by adjudicators on an ex post (i.e. 
after the occurrence of a dispute) basis. It would, however, be unfortunate if there were no foreseeability as 
to which methods would pass the reliability test since the use of such methods would then be deterred. A 
thought should, therefore, be given to the possibility of compiling a list of reliable methods on an ex ante 
basis. Such a list would need to be reviewed from time to time because neither the configuration of a central 
registry nor the algorithm of a blockchain is permanently fixed. 
 
 The ETR Model Law also provides that the requirement of a signature may be met by an electronic 
transferable record only if a reliable method is used to identify that person (Article 9 on signature). The 
draft explanatory notes acknowledge that certain electronic transferable records management systems, such 
as those based on distributed ledgers, may identify a signatory by referring to a pseudonym rather than a 
real name.11 The notes suggest that an identification by a pseudonym and the possibility of linking it to a 
real name, if need be, would satisfy the requirement to identify a signatory.12 A remaining question is when 
__________________ 
6  Para. 167 of A/CN.9/920 (2017).  
7  It is an age-old practice to issue and circulate multiple copies of an original bill of lading.  
8  Para. 65 of the draft Explanatory Notes (A/CN.9/920 (2017)).  
9  For details, see Koji Takahashi, “Blockchain Technology and Electronic Bills of Lading” (2016) 22 Journal of 
International Maritime Law 202. 
10  The draft Explanatory Notes, supra note 8, also states at para. 95 that the reference to the person in control does 
not exclude the possibility of having more than one person exercising control.  
11  Para. 60 of A/CN.9/920 (2017). This interpretation is compatible with the understanding expressed in the Guide 
to Enactment for the Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001) which states that the concept of identification 
may rely on other characteristics than a name (para. 117). 
12  Para. 60 of A/CN.9/920 (2017). The same interpretation may be given to the notion of “identification” of the 
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it is sufficient to rely solely on a pseudonym and when it is necessary to have the possibility of linking a 
pseudonym to a real name. Signatures have a range of purposes.13 To take signatures for endorsements as 
an example, where it is sufficient for signatures to establish that endorsements are back to back as under 
bills of lading, pseudonyms would be just as good as real names. Where, on the other hand, it is possible to 
make a recourse against endorsees as under bills of exchange or promissory notes,14 it will be necessary to 
have the possibility of linking pseudonyms to real names. The explanatory notes further suggest that linking 
of a pseudonym to a real name may be based on factual elements to be found outside distributed ledger 
systems.15 This stands to reason since sensitive information is not supposed to be stored on open ledgers. 
 
4. Under the Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016) (ST Model Law) 
 
 Another existing work of the UNCITRAL which has relevance to the blockchain technology is the ST 
Model Law. Any asset having market value will generate demand for use as a collateral. In the light of the 
categorization of assets adopted by the ST Model Law, it will be convenient to classify blockchain-related 
assets into four groups: receivables denominated in a cryptocurrency, the units of cryptocurrencies, 
blockchain-based tokens representing negotiable documents, and blockchain-based tokens representing 
securities. After examining the creation and effects of security rights in those assets under the ST Model 
Law, we will turn our attention to the question whether a blockchain-based distributed-ledger platform may 
serve as a Registry within the meaning of the ST Model Law. The latter question can arise irrespective of 
whether the asset itself in which security rights are created is related to the blockchain. 
 
(a) Receivables denominated in a cryptocurrency16 
 
 The ST Model Law is applicable to security rights in “movable assets” (Article 1(1)). The words 
“movable asset” are defined broadly as a tangible or intangible asset, other than immovable property 
(Article 2(u)). Receivables are thus a “movable asset.” The ST Model Law contains a number of special 
rules for security rights in receivables (e.g. Article on contractual limitations on the creation of security 
rights; Articles 61 to 67 on the rights and obligations of third-party obligors). Such rules as well as the 
general rules contained in the ST Model Law would also be applicable to a receivable denominated in a 
cryptocurrency.  
 
 A right to payment of funds credited to a bank account is a receivable in the ordinary use of the word. 
But it is excluded from the definition of “receivable” under the ST Model Law (Article 2(dd)) as the latter 
contains a special set of rules for bank deposits (Article 25 on effectiveness against third parties and Article 
47 on priority). If any bank should (by clearing regulatory hurdles) accept deposits in a cryptocurrency, 
those rules would be applicable to them. Are they also applicable to cryptocurrency units deposited with an 
online wallet provider? The answer depends on whether the provider falls within the expression “authorized 
deposit taking institution” within the meaning of Article 2(c) which defines the expression “bank account.” 
If it is possible to give a broad and non-technical interpretation to those two expressions,17 an online wallet 
provider may qualify to be an “authorized deposit taking institution” where it is authorized by law to receive 
the deposit of cryptocurrencies. 
 
__________________ 
person in exclusive control of an electronic transferable record, a requirement which must be met to establish 
functional equivalence to the possession of a transferable document (draft Article 11(1) on control).  
13  See the Guide to Enactment for the Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001) para. 29.  
14  See Articles 15 and 77 of the Convention Providing a Uniform Law For Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes 
(1930). 
15  Para. 60 of A/CN.9/920 (2017). 
16  I wish to record my gratitude to Marek Dubovec for his helpful comments on this and next sections. Any 
remaining misconceptions are mine. 
17  The enacting State may alternatively wish to consider, as suggested by the draft Guide to Enactment of the Model 
Law (A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.73, para. 39) as a possibility, replacing the term “authorized deposit-taking institution” 
with a generic term broad enough to include any institution authorized to receive deposits. 
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(b) Units of cryptocurrencies 
 
 We are here concerned with the creation and effects under the ST Model Law of security rights in 
cryptocurrency units themselves rather than in a receivable denominated in a cryptocurrency. The practice 
of granting a consensual lien on cryptocurrency units already exists in financed purchases of them on an 
exchange.18 
 
 The ST Model Law provides that any type of movable asset may be encumbered (Article 8(a)) by a 
security agreement. Cryptocurrency units are a “movable asset,” defined broadly by the ST Model Law as 
a tangible or intangible asset other than immovable property (Article 2(u)). 
 
 In order to create a security right under the ST Model Law, the grantor must have power to do so but 
does not have to be the owner of the encumbered asset (Article 6 (1)). Indeed, it will not be necessary for 
the asset to qualify for an object of ownership19 since security rights need only to capture the value of the 
asset.  
 
 The encumbered asset must be described in the security agreement “in a manner that reasonably allows 
their identification” (Article 9(1)). This standard is met by a broad description which indicates that the 
encumbered assets consist of all the grantor’s movable assets within a generic category (Article 9(2)).20 It 
follows that a general description “all cryptocurrency” would suffice. 
 
 Where a security right is created in cryptocurrency units, the next question which arises is how to 
make it effective against third parties. One possibility is the registration of a notice with respect to the 
security right in the Registry (Article 18(1)). Another possibility, the possession of the encumbered asset, 
is only available to tangible assets under the ST Model Law (Article 18(2)). The ST Model Law being 
merely a model for legislation, the enacting State may wish to make an exception for cryptocurrency units 
by equating the possession of a private key for cryptocurrency units to the possession of a tangible asset. 
The rationale for Article 18(2) is that the transfer of possession of the encumbered tangible asset eliminates 
the risk that third parties will be misled into thinking that the grantor holds unencumbered title to the asset.21 
The same risk may be avoided where encumbered cryptocurrency units have been transferred to an address 
for which the secured creditor possesses the private key.22 
 
 Under the ST Model Law, the word “money” is defined as currency authorized as legal tender by a 
State (Article 2(t)). A cryptocurrency would be capable of meeting this definition if any State authorized it 
as its legal tender.23 However, “money” is supposed to be a tangible asset under the ST Model Law (See 
Article 2(ll)).24 Consequently, the special rules for preserving negotiability of “money” contained in the ST 
Model Law (Article 48 on priority) are not applicable to cryptocurrencies. It follows that where 
cryptocurrency units are subject to a blanket security right covering all of the granter’s movable assets25 
which has been made effective against third parties by registration,26 the transferee would acquire them 
__________________ 
18  See e.g. para. 3 of the terms of service of Bitfinex.com (https://www.bitfinex.com/terms).  
19  As examined infra at ch. 0, whether cryptocurrency units qualify for an object of ownership would currently be 
an open question under most legal systems. 
20  See also the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (2007) chap. II, para. 58 (p. 79), which 
notes that many legal systems allow encumbered assets to be described in general terms, acknowledging that 
specific identification of individual items may not be practical or even possible for certain assets.  
21  See ibid., chap. III, para. 47 (p. 114).  
22  See ibid., chap. I, paras. 80 and 81 (p. 50), where it is observed that in some States, control over intangible assets 
is treated as a notional possession of them since it achieves the ends comparable to those at tained by the 
possession of tangible assets.  
23  One possibility is to authorise an existing cryptocurrency as a legal tender. There is also the idea of issuing the 
money of central bank on a blockchain ledger, which has been considered in a number of coun tries. The latter 
type of money should, however, be seen as receivables against the central bank denominated in a cryptocurrency 
and accordingly would fall within the foregoing analysis at Ch. 0. 
24  As seen above, a bank deposit is subject to another set of special rules.  
25  See Article 9(2). 
26  See Article 18(1) as well as the Model Registry Provisions Article 11(2).  
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subject to the security right (See Article 34(1) on priority). This is so even if the transferee has no knowledge 
of the security right. It has been pointed out that a similar result arises under Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform 
Commercial Code, which has been considered problematic.27 The ST Model Law would need to be 
amended if it is thought that cryptocurrencies ought to benefit from rules similar to those for money. In the 
meantime, the ST Model Law being merely a model, the enacting State may wish to devise special rules 
for cryptocurrency units to preserve their negotiability. 
 
(c) Blockchain-based tokens representing negotiable documents 
 
 The ST Model Law contains a set of special rules for “negotiable documents”28 (e.g. Article 16 on 
creation, Article 26 on effectiveness against third parties, Article 49 on priority and Article 85(2) on the 
applicable law). But since “negotiable documents” are supposed to be a tangible asset under the ST Model 
Law (See Article 2(ll)),29 electronic negotiable documents, including blockchain-based tokens representing 
negotiable documents, are not subject to the special rules for “negotiable documents.” They instead fall 
within the concept of “intangible asset”, which is defined as “any movable asset other than a tangible asset” 
(Article 2(p)). But it is in practice pointless to create a security right in an electronic negotiable document 
unless it is extended, by virtue of the applicable law, to the tangible asset covered by the document (This 
indeed is what Article 16 does to “negotiable documents”, i.e. paper documents). Furthermore, as a result 
of the non-applicability of Article 49(3) (a provision for preserving the negotiability of “negotiable 
documents”30), a problem similar to that outlined above in the context of cryptocurrency units would arise 
with respect to electronic negotiable documents.  
 
 To avoid those problems, the enacting State may wish to extend the application of the special rules for 
“negotiable documents” to electronic negotiable documents. The adoption of the ETR Model Law would 
have the desired effect so far as the issues are covered by it.31 This is because the ETR Model Law seeks to 
bridge the divide between the paper world and the electronic world by extending the application of paper-
based rules to an electronic record which satisfies the requirements for functional equivalence to the 
corresponding “transferable document” as set out in Article 10 of the ETR Model Law (hereafter 
“qualifying electronic transferable record”). It should be noted that, as examined above, a blockchain-based 
token, too, can be a qualifying electronic transferable record. It should also be noted that the notion of 
“transferable documents” under the ETR Model Law largely overlaps with that of “negotiable documents” 
under the ST Model Law. It follows that a security interest created in a qualifying electronic transferable 
record would be extended to the tangible asset covered by it by virtue of Article 16 of the ST Model Law. 
The requirement of “possession” of a “negotiable document” under Articles 26, 49 and 85(2) under the ST 
Model Law would be met by the “exclusive control” (Article 11 of the ETR Model Law) of a qualifying 
electronic transferable record. Consequently, Article 49(3) (the provision for preserving the negotiability of 
“negotiable documents”) would also be applicable to a qualifying electronic transferable record under 
“exclusive control,” which avoids the problem identified above. But the determination of “the State in 
which the document is located” under Article 85(2) is not assisted by the ETR Model Law since the latter 
contains no provision for determining the place in which an electronic negotiable document is deemed to 
be located. 
 
__________________ 
27  See e.g. Bob Lawless, “Is UCC Article 9 the Achilles Heel of Bitcoin?” 
(http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/03/is-ucc-article-9-the-achilles-heel-of-bitcoin.html) (2014); Jeanne 
Schroeder, “Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code” (2015-2016) 24 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1.  
28  The Model Law contains no definition of this term. According to the Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, 
Introduction, para. 20 (p. 10), it means a document, such as a warehouse receipt or a bill of lading, that embodies 
a right to delivery of tangible assets and satisfies the requirements for negotiability under the law governing 
negotiable documents. 
29  The Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, too, was prepared against the background of paper-form 
negotiable documents (ibid., p. 11 at fn. 25). 
30  See ibid., ch. V, para. 167 (p. 228). 
31  At its 50th session (July 2017), the UNCITRAL has decided that the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law on 
Secured Transactions should state that States adopting both model laws ought to consider their relationships, 
leaving the States to make their own analysis.  
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(d) Blockchain-based tokens representing securities 
 
 Under the ST Model Law, “non-intermediated securities” are securities (i.e. shares and bonds)32 other 
than those credited to a securities account (Article 2(w)). “Securities account” is in turn defined as meaning 
an account maintained by an intermediary to which securities may be credited or debited (Article 2(ii)). A 
blockchain would make it possible to trade securities on a P2P basis and hold them without the involvement 
of a trusted intermediary. Blockchain-based tokens representing securities (cryptosecurities) would, 
therefore, be “non-intermediated securities.” They are also unrepresented by a “certificate”, which under 
the ST Model Law refers only to a tangible document subject to physical possession.33 It follows that 
cryptosecurities would fall within the definition of “uncertificated non-intermediated securities” (Article 2 
(mm)). They would accordingly be subject to special rules for such securities as contained in the ST Model 
Law (Article 27 on effectiveness against third parties and Article 51 on priority). Thus, a security right in 
cryptosecurities is made effective against third parties by the conclusion of a control agreement (between 
the grantor, the secured creditor and the issuer) (See Article 27) and has priority over a security right in the 
same cryptosecurities for which registration is made in the Registry (See Article 51(3)). 
 
(e) Use of a blockchain-based distributed-ledger platform as a Registry for security rights 
 
 Under the ST Model Law, the registration of a notice in the Registry renders the security right effective 
against third parties (Article 18(1)). Can a distributed-ledger platform serve as a Registry? 
 
 The ST Model Law contains in Chapter IV a set of rules called “Model Registry Provisions.” Those 
rules envisage the existence of a registrar who administers the Registry (Article 27). Public blockchains are 
not administered by any specific person and accordingly would not fit this profile. The administrator of a 
private blockchain may, on the other hand, be appointed by the enacting State to be a registrar under  
Article 27. Through the power of appointment and dismissal, the enacting State is ultimately in charge of 
the Registry’s operation. It would in fact be unlikely for any State to put faith in public blockchains since 
they are not controlled by any specific entity. Besides, the consensus algorithm of a public blockchain which 
relies on the “longest chain rule” is incompatible with the provisions in Article 13. The former leaves the 
possibility that in the event of a fork, records in a chain will be abandoned in favour of those in another 
chain which eventually becomes longer. The latter, on the other hand, makes the registration of a notice 
effective when the information in the notice is entered into the Registry record and provides that the 
information must be entered in the order in which each notice is submitted. With a private blockchain, it 
should be possible to devise a consensus algorithm compatible with the provisions in Article 13. 
Furthermore, blockchain ledgers, which are an append-only log, are perfect to fulfil the requirement that 
the Registry must preserve all information contained in the record (Article 29(2)). It follows that distributed 
ledgers on a private blockchain platform may serve as a Registry. 
 
5. Proprietary restitution of blockchain-based tokens 
 
 Having examined the existing works of UNCITRAL, we will now turn our attention to a problem 
which is untouched by UNCITRAL or any other international organizations. There are a number of 
circumstances which raise the question whether it is possible to obtain the restitution of blockchain-based 
tokens by means of proprietary claims. Among the private-law issues arising from the use of the blockchain 
technology, uncertainty over the availability of such claims seems to be a problem of particular significance. 
It also calls for a globally unified solution. 
 
 What follows will illustrate the problem, outline the legal bases of claims which may be made, and 
identify the issues involved in such claims. It will then explain why the problem calls for a globally unified 
solution and consider what approach should be taken to make a uniform law. 
 
__________________ 
32  See para. 54 of the draft Guide to Enactment (A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.73).  
33  Ibid., para. 40. 
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(a) Illustration of the problem 
 
 The pre-existing forms of electronic money, which are often in the shape of pre-paid cards, provide 
the holders with credits redeemable from the issuers. Accordingly, most legal problems may be handled 
under the law of obligations. By contrast, holding cryptocurrency does not by itself entitle the holder to any 
claim against anybody. Accordingly, proprietary issues become more important. 
 
 The significance of proprietary issues is most evident where insolvency hits the holder of 
cryptocurrency units who, in a variety of circumstances, is under obligation to return the units to another 
person. That other person may join other creditors in the insolvency proceedings, which would usually yield 
to him only a partial recovery. But if he could make a proprietary claim to obtain the restitution of the units, 
he would be able to make a full recovery.34 The availability of such a claim is, however, currently unclear. 
The problem arises in a number of circumstances such as those described in Cases 1 to 3 below. 
 
 Case 1: Theft of cryptocurrency units.  
 
 Suppose that cryptocurrency units have been stolen by means of, for example, malware and then 
transferred to third parties. The original holder may have a claim in tort for damages covering the value 
of the stolen units against the thief or against a mala fide transferee. But it would not lead to a full 
recovery in the case of insolvency of the thief or transferee. If the original holder has a proprietary 
claim for the restitution of the units, he will be able to obtain a full recovery. 
 
 Case 2: Mistaken remittance of cryptocurrency units.  
 
 Suppose that cryptocurrency units have been mistakenly remitted to a wrong address or in a wrong 
quantity. The sender may have a personal claim against the recipient in unjust enrichment for the 
restitution of the value of the units. But it would not lead to a full recovery if the recipient has become 
insolvent. If the sender has a proprietary claim for the restitution of the units, he will be able to obtain 
a full recovery. 
 
 Case 3: Entrusting of cryptocurrency units to another person.  
 
 While the blockchain technology allows cryptocurrency units to be held and traded without the 
involvement of intermediaries, the users may opt to entrust ancillary service providers with their 
cryptocurrency units for reasons of convenience. Thus, instead of holding their cryptocurrency units 
themselves, some may use an online wallet, entrusting their units to the wallet provider. Again, many 
users of cryptocurrencies buy and sell them through an online exchange and in the course of 
transactions entrust the exchange provider with their cryptocurrency units. These customers would 
have a contractual claim for the return of their cryptocurrency units or their value from the provider of 
wallet or exchange. But it would not lead to a full recovery if the provider becomes insolvent. If the 
customer has a proprietary claim for the restitution of the units, he will be able to obtain a full recovery. 
 
 There is a real case in point. Mt.Gox was once the world’s biggest provider of a Bitcoin exchange. It 
became insolvent and entered into winding-up proceedings. Most of the creditors were its former customers 
who had entrusted it with bitcoins and/or fiat currencies. One of them filed a suit against the insolvency 
representative, seeking a full recovery of the bitcoin units of which, or the value of which, he had a 
contractual right to return from Mt.Gox. He did so by asserting ownership over them rather than making a 
personal contractual claim.35 
 
 The proprietary issues also have practical significance outside the context of insolvency. Thus, if 
cryptocurrency units have been seized by a creditor of the holder, the person who has a proprietary claim 
__________________ 
34  It should be noted that for creditors who have no proprietary claim for restitution,  there remains the possibility 
of obtaining priority over other creditors conferred by a statutory lien.  
35  For the outcome of the case, see infra ch. 0. 
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for the restitution of the units would be able to challenge the seizure. Such situations can also arise from a 
number of circumstances including those described in Cases 1 to 3 above.  
 
 The significance of the proprietary issues extends beyond cryptocurrencies to non-monetary tokens 
which may be traded and held on a blockchain, such as those representing securities (cryptosecurities),36 
those for controlling domain names and those used in an ICO (Initial Coin Offering).37 Circumstances 
analogous to those described in Cases 1 to 3 above will raise the question whether it is possible to obtain 
their restitution by means of proprietary claims. 
 
(b) Legal bases of proprietary claims for restitution 
 
 A proprietary restitutionary claim may most obviously be based on ownership. The legal systems 
which have inherited the Roman law concept of ownership, dominium, would allow an action to be filed 
for rei vindicatio (vindication of property: an owner’s claim against the possessor for the return of the 
property)38 which may be made outside insolvency proceedings. The plaintiff’s claim in the Mt.Gox case 
outlined above falls within this category. 
 
 For other legal systems, notably common law systems, rei vindicatio is an alien concept. Thus, in the 
English common law, the tort of conversion fills the gap of the missing vindicatio. Although nominally 
tortious, it has become the remedy to protect the ownership of goods.39 The delivery of the goods may be 
ordered at the discretion of the court,40 which will be exercised where the defendant is insolvent.41 
 
 In some legal systems, a proprietary restitutionary claim may alternatively be made on the basis of a 
resulting or constructive trust. Where the claimant can show that he has an equitable proprietary interest in 
property that is in the possession of the defendant, the court may declare that the property is held on trust 
for the claimant and it will order the defendant to transfer this property in specie to the claimant.42 Many 
claims to a resulting or constructive trust are motivated by the principle that property held by the bankrupt 
on trust for another person does not form part of the bankrupt’s estate.43 Thus, in Re Goldcorp Exchange 
Ltd,44 a dealer in gold became insolvent and its customers sought a declaration that the dealer had held 
bullion on trust for them. In another case, Chase Manhattan v. Israel-British Bank,45 a transfer of a dollar-
denominated bank deposit was made in error and the transferee was subsequently would up. The transferor 
sought a declaration that the transferee had become a trustee of the paid sum for the transferor. It can be 
anticipated that a claim to a resulting or constructive trust will be triggered to obtain the restitution of 
blockchain-based tokens in such circumstances as those described in Cases 1 to 3 above. 
 
(c) Issues involved in the claims of different legal bases 
 
 Where an ownership-based vindicatio claim is made to seek the restitution of blockchain-based tokens, 
the first issue which must be addressed is whether such tokens qualify to be an object of ownership. Thus, 
__________________ 
36  See e.g. Philipp Paech, “Securities, intermediation and the blockchain: an inevitable choice between liquidity 
and legal certainty?” (2016) 21(4) Unif Law Rev 612, 637. 
37  It is a means of raising capital which IT start-ups have begun to use. They issue and sell coins (tokens) on a 
blockchain which entitle the holders to receive services and dividends from them. Besides the private -law issues 
examined by this article, this method raises regulatory issues: See e.g. the U.S. Securities and Exchange  
Commission, “Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The 
DAO” (Release No. 81207 / July 25, 2017).  
38  e.g. section 985 of the German BGB (Civil Code).  
39  OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, para. 308 (House of Lords). See also Andrew Burrows (ed.) English Private 
Law (3rd ed., 2013) paras. 17.304 and 17.309 [Donal Nolan and John Davies].  
40  Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s 3. 
41  See Richard Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency (2nd ed., 2016) para. 2.108. 
42  See e.g. Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1 WLR 328, 335 (English Court of Appeal); Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 
CLR 101 [3] (High Court of Australia). 
43  Andrew Burrows (ed.) English Private Law (3rd ed., 2013) para. 4.152 [William Swadling].  
44  [1995] 1 AC 74 (Privy Council). 
45  [1981] Ch 105 (English High Court).  
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in the Mt.Gox case outlined above, the Tokyo District Court dismissed the claim by denying that bitcoin 
units could be an object of ownership.46 The court’s reasoning rested on a formal analysis as it relied on the 
Japanese law concept of “shoyûken,” a concept which signifies ownership but is statutorily limited to 
tangibles as its objects. Some legal systems, like Japanese law, restrict the object of ownership to tangibles 
while others extend it to intangibles.47 In the systems which belong to the latter camp, the exact category of 
intangibles which qualify as an object of ownership may not be set in stone. In the legal systems which 
currently restricts the object of ownership to tangibles, whether the law should remain static is another 
question. The blockchain-based tokens may compel the legislature and judiciary in each State to consider 
de lege ferenda (with a view to the future law) whether their concept of ownership should embrace them.48  
 
 A case may be made for treating certain kinds of them as being an object of ownership by 
distinguishing them from other digital assets or data on account of, inter alia, their amenability to exclusive 
control by the holders.49  
 
 The same issue will arise where the restitution of blockchain-based tokens is claimed in tort of 
conversion.50 It has been litigated whether the remedy of conversion is available to protect intangibles such 
as choses in action,51 information in a database52 and domain names.53 The blockchain-based tokens will be 
a latest addition to this list. 
 
 If blockchain-based tokens, or certain kinds of them, qualify to be an object of ownership, the next 
question to be addressed is what should be the test for determining the owner. It would accord with the 
intuition of many users of such tokens to consider that the holder of the private key for the address at which 
tokens are held owns them. This intuition presumably stems from the fact that the holder of the private key 
has an exclusive control over the tokens. But the rule cannot be as simple. For one thing, there are situations 
which require an elaboration of what it means to be the holder of a private key as where the private key has 
been intentionally or accidentally disclosed to two or more persons. For another, there may be circumstances 
in which it is thought that an ownership-based claim for the restitution of tokens should be allowed against 
the present holder. Each of the circumstances described in Cases 1 to 3 above merits consideration in this 
light. Thus, the case for allowing such a claim may be considered to be stronger where the holder is a thief 
(Case 1) or an online wallet provider (Case 3) than in other situations. Such circumstances as described by 
Cases 1 and 2 would also raise the questions whether the nemo dat rule (that no one can give a better title 
than he himself has) should prevail and when exceptions, if any, should be made.54  
 
__________________ 
46  The judgment of the Tokyo District Court on 5 August 2015 (2015WLJPCA08058001).  
47  Akkermans classifies German and Dutch laws into the former category, while French law in the latte r (Bram 
Akkermans “Property Law” in Jaap Hage & Bram Akkermans (ed.) Introduction to Law (2014) 71, 78). Von Bar 
and Drobnig add Greek law to the former camp and the laws of Portugal, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, 
and Scotland to the latter (Christian von Bar and Ulrich Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and 
Property Law in Europe A Comparative Study (2004) 317). 
48  For academic discussions, see e.g. Shawn Bayern, “Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The 
Classification of Bitcoin” 71 Wash & Lee L Rev Online (2014) 22, 34; Joshua Fairfield, “BitProperty” 88 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 805 (2015); David Quest, “Taking security over bitcoins and other virtual currency” (2015) 7 JIBFL 401; 
Matthew Lavy & Daniel Khoo, “Who Owns Blockchains? An English Legal Analysis” 
(http://sclbc.zehuti.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed47875 (2016).  
49  It should be noted by way of contrast that the digital assets of an online game disappear if the provider of the 
game erases the data on its server.  
50  Sjef van Erp, “Comparative Property Law” in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 1044 at 1062, notes that what qualifies as an object of property law is a 
fundamental property law question which is as pressing in the civil law systems as in the common law systems. 
The author cites domain names, the right to use a wireless network and emissions quota as examples of possible 
new objects. 
51  OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21 (House of Lords).  
52  Your Response Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 281 (English Court of Appeal). 
53  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F 3d 1024 (2003) (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).  
54  For a consideration under English law, see Joanna Perkins and Jennifer Enwezor, “The legal aspect of virtual 
currencies” [2016] 10 JIBFL 569. 
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 Where a proprietary claim arising from a resulting or constructive trust is made to seek the restitution 
of blockchain-based tokens, it is not necessary to consider whether such tokens can be an object of 
ownership in the sense of a source of vindiatio claim. Intangible assets are capable of being trust property55 
and so will be blockchain-based tokens. But another issue, no less difficult, will arise: under what 
circumstances the holder of blockchain-based tokens is deemed to hold them on trust for the claimant.  
 
 Whether the claim for restitution is based on ownership or arises from a resulting or constructive trust, 
it gives rise to the additional question, namely in what way the tokens must be identified. If specific 
identification were required, it would have to be possible to technically trace the tokens of which restitution 
is sought. The transactions of blockchain-based tokens are traceable since they are recorded immutably in 
the blockchain. This should make the task of identification of blockchain-based tokens easier than would 
be the case with tangible goods. It should, however, be noted that while transactions are traceable on a 
blockchain, tokens are less so unless they are individually coloured. Consequently, it will often be difficult 
to specifically identify the tokens of which restitution is sought. It is important, however, to realise that 
what matters in law is not technical traceability but normative traceability. To affirm normative traceability, 
it may be enough to be able to say that the person from whom the restitution is sought could be deemed to 
hold all or part of the units of which the restitution is sought. To illustrate the point by an easy case, suppose 
that Alice had 70 units at her address. Bob has stolen them through a phishing attack and transferred them 
to his address in which they have been mixed up with the 30 units he had held there. Unless the stolen 70 
units had been coloured, it will not be technically possible to say which of the 100 units Bob now holds at 
his address are originally Alice’s. It is, however, possible to say that Bob holds the stolen 70 units. The 
question will certainly become more difficult if Bob makes a transfer from his address. But it may be 
possible to normatively trace the stolen units up to some point.  
 
(d) Why the problem calls for a globally unified solution 
 
 If each national legal system is left to its own device, divergent positions may emerge over each of the 
issues examined above. Thus, legal systems may come to differ as to whether blockchain-based tokens 
qualify as an object of ownership and what are the tests for determining owners. Although legal uncertainty 
arising from divergence among national laws may be mitigated if the governing law is predictable, it is not 
clear for reasons examined below what law governs proprietary claims for the restitution of tokens on a 
public blockchain. The lack of clarity and predictability of governing law, coupled with the novelty and 
practical significance of the problem, makes a strong case for a globally unified solution. 
 
 New issues of contract law, by contrast, do not immediately call for a globally unified solution. Rather, 
there is a lot to be said for leaving them to be dealt with by each domestic law for the time being. This is 
because party autonomy is well established as a principle of choice of law for contractual issues.56 It allows 
contracting parties to choose the legal systems which they find will provide the best rules for their contract. 
This provides legal certainty for the parties and may at the same time motivate the national law makers to 
compete with each other with a view to making their legal system attractive for parties’ choice. When 
favoured rules eventually emerge, an international unification may then be attempted along such rules.  
 
 For proprietary issues, party autonomy is generally not accepted as a choice-of-law principle. In the 
first place, it is unworkable between the parties whose relationships are not contractual except to the extent 
ex post (after the event) choice is permitted. Furthermore, the freedom of parties to choose the governing 
law by agreement can produce the fragmentation of governing law among different pairs of parties. Such a 
result might not be seen so unpalatable in the eyes of some legal systems, typically common law systems, 
which handle proprietary questions relatively, namely by asking which of the two competing litigants has 
the better right. On the other hand, the legal systems which have inherited the Roman law concept of 
__________________ 
55  With respect to an emissions quota, see Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10. 
More generally, equitable property interests can be created over assets which the common law does not regard 
as property: See Calnan, supra note 41, para. 2.69.  
56  As reflected in Article 2 of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, a text 
which has been endorsed by UNCITRAL (Report of the 48th session (2015) A/70/17 para. 240).  
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ownership, dominium, would favour the absolute exclusivity, or the erga omnes (“towards everyone”) 
effect, of ownership. It is true that this conceptual absoluteness tolerates some relativism to creep in at the 
evidential level due to difficulties of proof:57 since the perfect proof of ownership tracing up all prior 
transactions to the first owner would be difficult or impossible, it is described as a devil’s proof (“probatio 
diabolica”). At the choice-of-law level, however, it makes more sense to specify a single law for 
determining ownership irrespective of who, among a number of stakeholders, are the litigants in a particular 
case.  
 
 With respect to tangible goods, it is well established that proprietary issues are governed by the law of 
the country where it is situated (lex situs). With respect to intangibles, of which blockchain-based tokens 
are an example, choice-of-law rules are far from settled. With respect to an emissions quota, which is 
financially valuable data like a blockchain-based token, it has been suggested that the proprietary issues 
should be subject to the law of the country where it is registered.58 This connecting factor does not work 
with a blockchain-based token since it is not registered on a national registry. Where a consortium 
blockchain is used, it may be possible to ascertain the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected by having regard to the country in which it is administered. On the other hand, a public 
blockchain is not administered by any specific entity and the tokens are recorded on ledgers which are 
distributed on a borderless network. This makes it difficult to localize tokens on a public blockchain and 
consequently renders the governing law of their ownership unclear. 
 
 The same problem of uncertainty exists where a restitutionary claim is made for the tort of conversion. 
It has been suggested that the claim should be characterized as proprietary for choice-of-law purposes since, 
although it is nominally tortious, property rights are ultimately at stake.59 As seen above, this 
characterization does not lead to clear choice-of-law rules where tokens on a public blockchain are the 
object of the claim. 
 
 The governing law of a proprietary restitutionary claim arising from a resulting or constructive trust is 
no clearer. Some have argued that it should be specified by the choice-of-law rules for unjust enrichment60 
on the ground that constructive trusts arise in response to unjust enrichment.61 Others have argued that the 
proper characterisation is proprietary on the ground that the issue of whether property is impressed with a 
trust lies at the heart of such a claim.62 Whichever characterization is adopted, the governing law is not clear 
where tokens on a public blockchain are the object of the claim. Thus, we have seen above that the 
proprietary characterization would not lead to clear choice-of-law rules. The characterization of unjust 
enrichment would result in the application of the law of the place of enrichment.63 In the case of transfer to 
an address on a public blockchain, the place of enrichment is unclear since the blockchain is borderless. 
This may be contrasted with the case of transfer of deposit to a bank account. The place of enrichment 
would then be easily identifiable through the geographical location of the branch office with which the 
account is held.  
 
__________________ 
57  Peter Birks, “The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership” (1985) Acta Juridica 
1, 28. 
58  Koji Takahashi, “Conflict of Laws in Emissions Trading” (2011) 13 Yearbook of Private International Law 145. 
59  James Fawcett & Janeen Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law  (14th ed., 2008) 794 
and 821.  
60  This characterisation seems, however, unsupportable in the context of the Rome II Regulation which contains 
rules for unjust enrichment (Article 10) because its full title (Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations) indicates 
that it is concerned with personal remedies rather than proprietary remedies. See e.g. Adeline Chong, “Choice of 
Law for Unjust Enrichment/Restitution and the Rome II Regulation” (2008) 57 ICLQ 863. For a contrary view, 
see e.g. Peter Huber (ed.) Rome II Regulation (2011) Art. 1 para. 26 [Ivo Bach]. 
61  See e.g. George Panagopoulos, Restitution in Private International Law  (2000) 70. 
62  See e.g. Adeline Chong, “The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts” (2005) 
54 ICLQ 855. 
63  See Christopher v Zimmerman (2001) 192 DLR (4th) 476 (British Columbia Court of Appeal). 
  
93 
(e) Approach to a uniform law making 
 
 We have seen above various circumstances in which proprietary claims may be made to obtain the 
restitution of blockchain-based tokens. We have found that uncertainty over the availability of such claims 
is a significant problem. We have further seen a strong case for devising a globally unified solution to that 
problem. A globally unified solution may be formulated by an instrument in the form of a convention or 
model law. We will now consider what should be the approach to making a uniform law instrument. 
 
 As we have seen, there are divergent legal bases on which proprietary restitutionary claims may be 
made under the existing legal systems. Thus, some legal systems allow a claim for rei vindicatio based on 
ownership while others require a similar claim to be framed in the tort of conversion. Some legal systems 
know the principle of a resulting or constructive trust while others do not. It follows that if a uniform law 
uses the expression of rei vindicatio, it risks alienating States in whose legal systems this concept is 
unknown. The same is true if a uniform law uses any other terms of art such as the tort of conversion, 
resulting trust and constructive trust. A uniform law should instead choose neutral terms or, in their absence, 
use terms in a non-technical sense. Thus, if the English word “ownership” is used, care should be taken not 
to equate it with a notion of any particular legal system such as the French propriété,64 German Eigentum,65 
Japanese shoyûken66 and indeed the English law concept of ownership.67 Again, if the expression 
“proprietary restitutionary claim” is used, the uniform law should steer clear of the dogmatic debate in 
English law over whether its cause of action is unjust enrichment or the vindication of a property right.68 
This stance would also accommodate the legal systems, typically civil law systems, which do not grant 
proprietary remedies in response to unjust enrichment.69 
 
 By choosing neutral terms or using terms in a non-technical sense, a uniform law can avoid getting 
mired in doctrinal debates prevailing in the existing legal systems. There is indeed no need for a uniform 
law to address the issues involved in the claims of different legal bases as identified in the foregoing 
analysis, at any event in the context of the specific domestic legal systems in which they arise. Thus, it is 
not the task of a uniform law to address whether, for example, the Japanese law concept of shoyûken should 
cover bitcoin units. What a uniform law instead should do is to prescribe the results for a selection of 
circumstances which each legal system should produce.70 It should thus address whether proprietary 
restitution should be permitted in such circumstances as those described in Cases 1 to 3 above. Even if it 
should happen that after a careful consideration, the drafters decide not to grant proprietary restitution in 
any of such circumstances, it would still be better to enunciate the position than leaving it uncertain.  
 
 Once a uniform law has been formulated, the enacting States have options: either (1) work out how to 
reconcile the prescribed results with its existing legal framework or (2) introduce the uniform law as 
containing a sui generis framework. The option (2) would be difficult if the existing law had already 
produced legislation or a body of case law on the subject matter. But it may be a viable option with respect 
to a novel asset like blockchain-based tokens. 
 
 Finally, it will be necessary to say a few words about execution procedure. When it comes to the 
execution of a decision allowing a proprietary claim for the restitution of blockchain-based tokens, it will 
be necessary to have them transferred to the successful claimant by way of obtaining the private key. The 
__________________ 
64  Article 544 of the French Code civil. 
65  Section 903 of the German BGB (Civil Code). 
66  Article 206 of the Minpo (Japanese Civil Code).  
67  It is an elusive concept but is conventionally defined as the residue of legal rights in an asset remaining in a 
person after specific rights over the asset have been granted to others. See Ewan McKendrick & Roy Goode, 
Goode on Commercial Law (4th ed. 2010) 34. 
68  See e.g. Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (3rd ed., 2015) 7. 
69  George Panagopoulos, Restitution in Private International Law  (2000) 61. 
70  This approach to a uniform law making is described as a functional approach and favoured by Hideki Kanda, 
“Methodology of Harmonization and Modernization of Legal Rules on Secured Transactions -- Legal, Functional 
or Otherwise?” (a paper delivered at the UNCITRAL Fourth International Colloquium on Secured Transactions 
(2017), available at the UNCITRAL website). 
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process may encounter difficulties where the defendant resists disclosing the key. In some legal systems, a 
compulsory mechanism such as the threat of sanctions for contempt of court may be available to compel 
disclosure. Where the key is stored in a tangible medium such as a hard disc or paper, the seizure of the 
medium may be possible under some legal systems. It would not be necessary for a uniform law to 
harmonise this aspect of law since, as with other procedural issues, the method of execution may be left to 
the lex fori, i.e. the law of the place where the procedure is to be taken. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
 The legal issues which we have examined above are diverse. Some of them concern the use of 
distributed ledgers generated by the blockchain technology such as the legal effects of data messages 
recorded therein. As well as generating distributed ledgers, the blockchain technology makes it possible to 
trade tokens online on a P2P basis and hold them without the involvement of intermediaries. Those tokens 
are an object of unprecedented type. Thus, bitcoin units, for example, only exist conceptually as an entry in 
a blockchain address. They cannot be copied or stored in a tangible medium since there is no such thing as 
a string of alphanumeric characters for each of the units: what can be stored is rather the private keys to 
reassign them.71 Such unique features72 of blockchain-based tokens are a rich source of novel legal issues. 
 
 In the first half of this article, we have examined the existing UNCITRAL works to see what legal 
issues raised by the blockchain technology may be resolved under them. With principles such as those of 
technological neutrality and functional equivalence, the existing works are flexible enough to accommodate 
the blockchain technology. While there are a few unanticipated issues which the technology raises, they 
may be dealt with by further developing those works. 
 
 In the second half of the article, we have examined the circumstances which raise the question whether 
it is possible to obtain the restitution of blockchain-based tokens by means of proprietary claims. Among 
the private-law issues arising from the use of the blockchain technology, the uncertainty over the availability 
of such claims is a problem of particular significance. It also calls for a globally unified solution but is 
untouched by the existing works of UNCITRAL or any other international organization. UNCITRAL has a 
rich experience in the areas of particular relevance such as electronic commerce, insolvency and security 
interests. It also has a good record of respecting the divergence of existing legal frameworks while at the 
same time working towards harmonization. All this makes UNCITRAL an ideal and the natural forum for 
providing a globally unified solution to the problem identified. 
 
  
__________________ 
71  Antony Lewis, “A gentle introduction to digital tokens” (https://bitsonblocks.net/2015/09/28/a-gentle-
introduction-to-digital-tokens/). 
72  Perkins & Enwezor, supra note 54, see certain virtual currencies as a new form of property under English law as 
they share characteristics of both intangible property and choses in possession . 
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Lost and found in smart contract translation —  
considerations in transitioning to automation in legal architecture1  
 
Scott Farrell2, Heidi Machin and Roslyn Hinchliffe, King & Wood Mallesons, Australia 
 
 “Smart contracts” can be different things to different people, from a theoretical term for self-executing 
computer code, to legal contracts which use automated processes to ensure performance. The relevance of 
smart contracts has evolved since their conception. The development of blockchain and other distributed 
ledger technology has enabled more sophisticated use of smart contracts, supporting their evolution from a 
theoretical possibility to a practical reality.  
 
 The transition to automation in legal architecture through smart contracts should improve transactional 
productivity, efficiency and risk management. However, this transition also involves a translation of legal 
rights, obligations and remedies into a framework which is, at least partly, digital. It is critical that this 
translation is conducted carefully, so that nothing is unknowingly lost with the change in expression. 
Further, it gives rise to issues of legal recognition which do not arise for traditional contractual frameworks 
and to which harmonized cross-border solutions need to be found. 
 
 In this paper, we set out what smart contracts are, legal considerations in their creation and issues of 
legal recognition and harmonization which need to be considered further if the potential for these contracts 
to transform cross-border trade and finance is to be achieved.  
 
1. Smarter contracts  
 
 The term “smart contracts” is not new. Early references to “smart contracts” can be found in data and 
computer science papers from the late 20th Century. In 1996 Nick Szabo described smart contracts as being: 
 
 “a set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on 
the other promises.”3 
 
 In other words, a digitally executable set of obligations which requires minimal external inputs to 
ensure performance. The architecture of the smart contract automates the performance of obligations. 
However, these smart contracts are more than mere automated processes for enabling performance, they 
also have the means of ensuring the performance. 4 Accordingly, there is confidence that the transaction can 
be completed. This is sometimes referred to as “tamper-proof” execution. It is this ability to perform “on 
its own” which makes the contract “smart”. However, despite their name, these smart contracts may be 
created only as processes for effecting transactions and it may not be integral to their design that they have 
any recognition at law.  
 
 The connection between smart contracts and legal contracts has arisen as new technology has allowed 
use of smart contracts to be expanded into more complex transactions and relationships. Blockchain and 
other distributed ledger technology has permitted smart contracts to be applied to a broader architecture 
where digital assets and digital value can both be maintained. In this more complex architecture, self-
__________________ 
1  This paper in part draws on the remarks made to the combined meeting of the Financial Stability Board and the 
Committee of Payments and Market Infrastructure on Uses of Distributed Ledger Technology in Financial 
Markets and Issues for Financial Authorities at the Bank of England on 21 October 2016 and to the 2016 
UNCITRAL Emergence Conference Regional Perspectives on Contemporary and Future Harmonization Agenda 
in International Trade Law on 13-14 December 2016, in each case by Scott Farrell. 
2  Scott Farrell is a member of the Australian Government’s FinTech Advisory Group. However, none of the 
comments made in this paper should be taken to have been provided in this capacity.  
3  Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets , 1996. 
4  An example of this is a vending machine which completes transactions automatically by delivering the item 
purchased once the payment has been made. Completion of this transaction requires no input from the owner of 
the machine. Instead, the architecture of the system controls the timing and the manner of the parties’ 
performance.  
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executing computer code can be used to effect transactions, exchanging the digital assets for digital 
payments. This has allowed smart contracts to be applied in a broader range of transactions, including those 
where legal enforceability is as important as operational execution. Some early definitions of smart 
contracts are not able to describe this expanded application, particularly as some parts of those transactions 
are too complex to be automated. A revised definition of smart contract is warranted, and one has been 
supplied by Clack, Bakshi and Braine: 
 
 “A smart contract is an agreement whose execution is both automatable and enforceable. Automatable 
by computer, although some parts may require human input and control. Enforceable by either legal 
enforcement of rights and obligations or tamper-proof execution.”5  
 
 This definition defines a contract to be a smart contract if at least some parts can be performed by a 
computer programme automatically, without human input, whilst also being enforceable either through the 
appropriate legal system or because the execution of the obligations by the computer cannot be undone. It 
is a contract which is effective either through self-execution of computer code or legal force. The coded 
contract and the legal contract are linked. This linkage between computer code and law is the basis for the 
issues discussed in this paper.  
 
 Before considering those issues, it is worth describing why smart contracts warrant consideration. In 
summary, it is because they improve the efficiency, speed and performance of contracts. Efficiency is 
improved because of the automation of contractual actions, which reduces the need for human involvement 
and, as a result, the potential for human error. Speed is improved as actions can occur in real time as 
information is collected and verified. Performance is improved as the terms are unambiguous and results 
predictable and auditable. This has the potential to reduce the risk of disputes. These factors are similar to 
those which drive the use of financial market infrastructure for critical transactions. Indeed, when 
appropriately used with distributed ledger technology, smart contracts have the ability to perform the same 
functions as centralised financial market infrastructure — which is particularly important for those 
transactions where such infrastructure is not currently available, or impossible to obtain.6 
 
 It is fundamental to a legal examination of smart contracts to consider whether it is possible for a 
contract which is set out in computer code to be valid at law. This is considered in the next section. 
 
2. A contract in code 
 
 As described above, a smart contract achieves efficiency, timing and performance improvements 
because of automation of the contract’s terms. This automation is effected through the computer code which 
governs the automated performance. This raises a critical issue — whether contractual provisions which 
are expressed in computer code can be valid and effective under law. This is sometimes regarded as a 
difficult hurdle to clear for the widespread use of smart contracts in complex and regulated areas, such as 
finance. Often this issue is considered in the context of a contract which is expressed entirely in computer 
code. In such cases, basic contractual formation issues can cause concerns, such as the identity of parties, 
the identification of terms, the time of creation and the governing law. 
 
 However, before considering these issues, it is important to keep in mind that not all of a smart contract 
needs to be set out in code. Some terms of contracts which are more complex than the immediate transfer 
of value and property are likely to not be efficiently encoded. This is because computer code (like 
mathematics) is well adapted to represent terms which are expressions of logic but not terms which are 
based in concepts such as reason or conscience. Further, they are not useful to represent terms which are 
based on the exercise of discretion that is outside of clearly defined frameworks. 
 
__________________ 
5  Clack, Bakshi and Braine, Smart Contract Templates: foundations, design landscape and research directions , 
2016. 
6  This comparison is considered further in section 5 of this paper.  
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 For example, code could be used to represent the contractual agreement that, if an event happened: 
 
 “the price is to be adjusted by subtracting the product of x and y.” 
 
 This provision can be coded easily because it is an expression of logic. However, code would not be 
useful to accurately represent that, if an event happened: 
 
 “the price is to be adjusted by the party in a commercially reasonable manner.” 
 
 Or: 
 
 “the price is to be adjusted by negotiation between the parties in good faith.” 
 
 These two provisions are based in the exercise of reason, conscience and discretion in the future. They 
cannot be easily coded because their meaning is not able to be comprehensively expressed as a matter of 
logic. An attempt to do so would create the risk of divergence expressed in natural language between the 
meaning of the original contractual provision and its expression in code.  
 
 Real commercial and financial contracts are a mixture of contractual provisions based in logic, reason, 
conscience and discretion. Accordingly, there are a mixture of provisions which are able to be efficiently 
coded and those which are not. It follows from this that if smart contracts are to be used meaningfully in 
commercial contracts then they will need to be blends of both coded and natural language terms. As the 
logical provisions are usually applicable during the normal life-cycle of contracts (as opposed to the 
provisions which apply when unexpected events occur) then this is where the most efficiency should be 
obtained from using coded terms.7  
 
 This context changes the nature of the fundamental legal issue with contracts expressed in code. As 
complex contracts will need to be blends of natural language and code the primary concern is no longer 
whether a contract can be created because the natural language elements of the contract should be able to 
satisfy these requirements. Instead, the concern should be whether a contract can be valid if part of it is 
expressed in natural language and part in computer code. An alternative to a blend of coded and natural 
language terms is to retain the entire contract in natural language and use code to separately perform those 
terms. However, this duplication creates the risk of a discrepancy, the risk that the actions being performed 
by the code do not match the legal meaning of the natural language contract. 
 
 This is an area where local laws will be particularly relevant and there is a role for harmonisation of 
those laws to facilitate cross-border transactions. Key issues for consideration include: 
 
- Legitimacy of multilingual contracts. In one sense, a contract which includes provisions which are 
expressed in code is similar to a contract which includes provisions which are expressed in different 
languages. If contracts which are expressed in more than one language are not effective under local 
laws, then it is likely that contracts expressed partly in code and partly in natural language may not be 
effective either.  
 
- Understanding of coded terms. If a contract is partly expressed in code then the understanding of that 
code by the parties is relevant. This relevance can be a matter of regulation, such as whether particular 
parties (such as consumers) can be bound by terms which they do not understand, or it can be a matter 
of fundamental contract law, such as whether there was sufficient mutual understanding of the terms to 
form the contract at all. 
 
__________________ 
7  This separation in contractual architecture between provisions applicable in the ordinary life-cycle of 
transactions and those applicable in other circumstances can be best seen in the contractual frameworks used in 
the international derivatives market. Life-cycles provisions are contained in transaction confirmations whilst 
other provisions are contained in the master agreements which govern them.  
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- Evidence of coded terms. Even though the parties can agree to express specific terms of their 
relationship in computer code, it is important that that expression is admissible in any judicial and 
arbitrary proceedings which arise out of that relationship. An inability to admit this record of the parties’ 
agreement would impair its legal effectiveness. 
 
 These issues can be seen in context if the circumstances are changed only slightly, by replacing the 
reference to provisions expressed in code with provisions expressed in a foreign language. If part of a 
contract was to be performed in a foreign country then it could be more efficient to express that part of the 
contract in the language of that foreign country, so that the people having to perform can understand the 
terms in their own language. Each of the issues described above would also apply to such a bi-lingual 
contract. Hopefully, they are able to be solved under local laws in exactly the same way.8 Whatever the 
solution reached under local laws, there would need to be consistency across jurisdictions which seek to be 
involved in an international smart contract marketplace. 
 
 Of course, there is a difference between the creation of a smart contract comprised of both natural 
language and coded terms and ensuring its enforceability. The self-executing nature of the coded provisions 
does not guarantee their effectiveness at law. This is because the law does not accept that everything which 
has been done must have been lawful. The fact that the terms are in code, does not mean that the code has 
become the law. This is discussed in the next section of this paper. 
 
3. The code is not law  
 
 The effect of self-executing performance of smart contracts has been described as “the code is law”, 
because the coded provisions have effect without external input or control.9 However, this is usually not 
intended to be a comment on the applicability of the law. Of course, smart contracts do not change or replace 
law and the law still applies to a smart contract regardless of the code.10 This means that a key issue in 
translating contracts into smart contracts is to determine which laws need to be contemplated in the smart 
contract design, because they will apply regardless of the smart contract’s code. Building this into the smart 
contract architecture allows the smart contract to work with the law, instead of trying to work against it. 
Two categories of such laws are those which interrupt or reverse performance and those which change the 
contract’s terms. 
 
Laws which interrupt or reverse contractual performance 
 
 Laws can interrupt the performance of contracts, or cause the reversal of performance of contracts, for 
different reasons. In essence, these laws have this effect because they express the public policy that the 
result of interrupting or reversing the parties’ private contract is more important than compelling those 
parties to fulfil their obligations under that contract in accordance with its terms. It is not possible to contract 
out of these laws; they apply regardless of its terms or its performance. Accordingly, it is not possible to 
“code” out of these laws either. 
 
 One example are laws which render obligations under a contract to be void or voidable. This can 
happen because of the insolvency or bankruptcy of one of the parties, the contract is found to be 
unauthorized, improper or fraudulent or the purpose of the contract, or the conduct of the parties is contrary 
to regulation or otherwise unlawful. If a smart contract contains coded terms which effect payments and 
deliveries between the parties over a period of time then those terms could conflict with those laws (for 
__________________ 
8  Assuming the local law is meant to be technologically neutral.  
9  Indeed, that is the very expression used by some leading commentators, such as Lawrence Lessig. Lessig’s 
original work was in fact called The Code is Law and other laws of cyberspace (1999). Lessig published a second 
edition of this in 2006 called Code 2.0.  
10  This point was expressly noted by Lessig. In Code 2.0 Lessig notes: “Of course, for the computer scientist codes 
is law.” but “Code is not law, any more than the design of an airplane is law. Code does not regulate, any more 
than buildings regulate. Code is not public, any more than a television is public.” Another way of expressing 
could be that code is law for machines, but law is code for legal entities. They each work in different frameworks.  
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example, if one of the parties becomes insolvent before all of those payments and deliveries have been 
made). 
 
 If the smart contract is to remain efficient, it is important that it is sufficiently flexible in order to 
operate in compliance with these laws. This is particularly the case where the technology on which the 
coded parts of the smart contract operate is, from a technology perspective, immutable. This would be the 
case for smart contracts held on a blockchain or other distributed ledger technology.11 In these 
circumstances, there needs to be included in the smart contract architecture a method for relieving the 
contract from the constraints of that technology. If there is a difficulty with including this in the coded terms 
then the flexibility could be provided through the natural language provisions which also form part of the 
smart contract.  
 
 Importantly, this is not a question of changing those laws so that they do not impact on smart contracts. 
The laws exist to achieve a policy outcome which is deemed more important than individual contract 
certainty. This should apply equally to traditional contracts and smart contracts (technological neutrality 
works “both ways”). What is important from an efficiency perspective is that the contract is designed so it 
has a means to operate other than in conflict with such laws. 
 
Laws which change contractual terms 
 
 Laws can also change the terms of a contract. This can happen by terms being implied by law (such 
as under consumer protection legislation), terms being found void and removed, or even by rectification if 
a court finds that the terms do not reflect the true agreement between the parties. 
 
 This is also a significant consideration in translating contractual provisions into a “smart” form. If a 
subsequent change in terms required by law is not able to be included in the operation of a smart contract, 
then there is a significant risk that the automated performance of the contract will not be consistent with the 
terms of the real agreement between the parties — there will be a risk of a “discrepancy” between agreement 
and performance.  
 
 Theoretically, it is possible for the coded terms of a smart contract to be drafted so as to automatically 
respond to certain laws. For example, Marino and Juels12 have proposed the inclusion of standards in smart 
contracts dealing with rescission by court, which have the effect of halting automatic performance of the 
smart contract if an order is made by an appropriate court, and providing for the contract to automatically 
compensate partial performance. However, given the immense complexity of laws and potential factual 
circumstances, it would not be feasible, nor computationally efficient, to include such automated standards 
covering all potentially applicable laws and events, particularly where the underlying transaction or 
surrounding facts are complicated. 
 
 Accordingly, it is also important from an efficiency perspective that the design of the smart contract is 
sufficiently flexible to be able to respond to a change in its terms imposed by law without creating an 
unavoidable discrepancy between those terms and its automated performance. 
 
Flexing the code 
 
 It is noted above that smart contracts need to be designed with sufficient flexibility to work with the 
laws which will apply to them, and to other contracts. However, this need for flexibility in a smart contract 
can compete with the certainty provided by the coded parts of that contract. The efficiency of a smart 
contract arises from its automatic operation and there are practical limits to the flexibility which can be 
included in such automation. Current technology does not facilitate an efficient incorporation of all of the 
__________________ 
11  The immutability of a blockchain arises from its “append only” nature. This means that new information can be 
added, but the existing information cannot be altered.  
12  Marino and Juels, Setting Standards for Altering and Undoing Smart Contracts , Rule ML, 2016 pp. 151-166. 
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possible events which could occur into the fabric of the code of a smart contract. This leaves the question 
as to how the necessary flexibility can be achieved. 
 
 One possibility for achieving the effect of a reversal or change in terms is to create that result through 
the creation of a new smart contract which, when added to the existing contracts, has the effect of the desired 
reversal or change. An example of this would be a new transaction which exactly offsets an existing 
transaction, negating its effect. However, this solution is not perfect as the very reason for the reversal or 
change in performance could also legally prevent such new transactions from being legally effective. This 
could apply in the insolvency of one of the parties where the new transactions themselves could be void if 
they are entered into after insolvency has commenced.13 
 
 An alternative approach is for the architecture of the smart contract to include an “off ramp”, which 
allows the contract to be governed by the natural language terms agreed between the parties instead of the 
code. This would allow the code to govern the performance of the contract whilst it is still accurately 
reflecting the parties’ relationship and then ceases to govern performance where it does not. The flexibility 
can be left to the natural language terms in this circumstance. This mechanism can be useful in other 
circumstances too, such as where there is a breach or termination of the contract. This is considered in the 
next section of this paper. 
 
4. Code-breaking 
 
 As has been discussed, an attractive feature of smart contracts is that they can ensure performance 
through their self-executing nature. The “tamper-proof” nature of their execution means that performance 
can, as a practical matter, be counted on. There isn’t a need to consider what happens in the case of breach 
as the opportunity for it occurring is limited, assuming the proper operation of the smart contract. However, 
this issue is more complex when smart contracts are used for more than the simplest transactional 
relationships. 
 
 If a contract contains executory provisions which are to be performed at some time in the future, then 
it is always possible that they won’t be able to be performed. As described in the previous section of this 
paper, it won’t be possible to legally compel performance if one of the parties is insolvent — even if the 
contract is self-executing as a matter of process. Also, if there is a failure to perform some of the obligations 
of a contract, for whatever reason, the other party may want to terminate. This means that the provisions of 
a smart contract still need to deal with breach and its consequences. 
 
 It would be possible to include automated provisions to deal with some of these events. For example, 
if there were a failure to perform some obligation then the code could ensure that no further obligations 
need to be performed, make some sort of calculation as to the damage which is payable as a result and also 
effect that payment. However, this will not be sufficient to deal with termination rights which arise as a 
result of law, or termination rights which are discretionary rather than automatic. This is important because 
under many laws, if a party to a contract defaults then the other party is not compelled to terminate and it 
may choose not to do so. That choice could be made on the basis of other factors which are entirely beyond 
the scope of the contract itself — such as the impact on other contracts or relationships or information on 
the circumstances of other, unrelated entities. Attempting to comprehensively catalogue the consequence 
of breach in the code is either going to over-simplify the existing rights of a non-defaulting party under a 
contract (the divergence risk described earlier), or involve such a heavy use of code to contemplate the 
range of possibilities so as to make its use inefficient.  
 
 There is a further consideration related to breach. At common law, it is possible to willingly breach a 
contract. There are consequences which arise as a result, such as an obligation to compensate the other 
party, usually through the payment of damages. Nevertheless it is an option which parties to a contract have, 
and in certain circumstances (such as pending insolvency), it is an option which can prove to be important. 
__________________ 
13  Where this is needed for important financial market infrastructure, such as clearing systems, it u sually needs 
legislation for these effects to be given a “safe-harbour” from other laws. 
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 It arises because of the reluctance which common law courts often have to granting orders for specific 
performance in the case of ordinary breach of contractual terms. This right to deliberately breach a contract 
is not consistent with the self-execution of coded terms. Such coded terms do not allow for deliberate breach 
because the terms are performed automatically. This represents another possible divergence between a 
traditional contract and coded terms of a contract. 
 
 For each of these two issues, there is a solution which would avoid the risk that the terms of the smart 
contract were different to those of the traditional contract on which it was based. That would be to include 
the flexibility to allow the terms of the contract to be governed by its natural language provisions instead 
of the coded provisions (the “off-ramp” described in the previous section). This would seem conceptually 
simple to implement in the case of breach of the contract. In the case of providing the same unilateral right 
to breach which exists under traditional contracts, this could be achieved by providing each party with the 
right to move the contract from its coded terms to its natural language terms at any time, and through this 
providing the ability to exercise the discretion not to perform. 
 
5. Recognizing smart contracts 
 
 The previous sections of this paper have identified legal challenges in translating traditional contracts 
into smart contracts. Many of these can be addressed in the design of the smart contract architecture rather 
than changes in law. However, as smart contracts increase in relevance and scope, there is likely to also be 
a need to consider developments in law to recognize smart contracts themselves. Two examples of this 
include recognition as financial market infrastructure and as some sort of entity at law. 
 
Smart contracts as financial market infrastructure 
 
 Smart contracts can perform the same functions as financial market infrastructure. Indeed, some of the 
initial use cases, such as clearing and settlement and payments, are in the performance of those functions. 
Smart contracts and financial market infrastructure have a shared purpose, being to provide confidence to 
their users in the performance of transactions. Financial market infrastructure achieves this through the 
regulation and oversight of the operator and the legal protection given to its rules and regulations. Smart 
contracts achieve this through their self-executing nature, reinforced by their resilience when they are held 
on a blockchain or distributed ledger. 14  
 
 This comparison of function and purpose between financial market infrastructure and distributed smart 
contracts can disguise a fundamental difference between them in their relationship with law. A key 
foundation of the transactional certainty enjoyed by users of financial market infrastructure is the legal 
protection which insulates those transactions from the local laws which would otherwise interfere with 
them. For example, local laws often protect the operation of clearing houses from the impact of the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of participants. Smart contracts on their own do not have equivalent protection 
and, as described earlier in this paper, are subject to the full application of local laws despite their self-
executing nature. 
 
 Application of the legal protection given to financial market infrastructure would solve a number of 
the “translation” issues already described in this paper. If the terms of the coded contract were applied 
despite the operation of other laws, then the need to consider flexibility in smart contracts would be reduced. 
However, this protection is usually offered only to the most important systems in a jurisdiction, such as its 
payment systems, exchanges and clearing houses. These are highly regulated. Also, the availability of that 
protection is usually dependent on meeting the international principles applicable to financial market 
infrastructure. 
 
__________________ 
14  The decentralization means that a smart contract which effects clearing and settlement can operate like a clearing 
system without a clearing house. 
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 The international benchmark used for determining what is important to the safety of the financial 
market infrastructure is the Principles of Financial Market Infrastructures.15 This forms a common 
language across jurisdictions to determine what is important and how it needs to be protected. These 
Principles identify legal standards as being critical to the “safety and efficiency” of the financial market 
infrastructure and they identify other principles which depend on legal constructs for their effectiveness.  
 
 Where this leaves smart contracts is that if they perform systemically important functions of the same 
nature as financial market infrastructure then they should warrant the same legal protection as is provided 
to that infrastructure. However, it will be important that before they do so, they meet the same regulatory 
requirements including the international standards for the provision of that protection. Of course, the 
consideration of smart contracts in this context cannot be completely separated from consideration of the 
blockchain or distributed ledger on which they are held. This technology must contribute to the satisfaction 
of these requirements.16 
 
Smart contracts as legal entities 
 
 In the sphere of technology and data science, a smart contract can be referred to as an entity to which 
payments and deliveries can be made and from which payments and deliveries can be received. This is most 
relevant in multi-party smart contracts such as the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO).17 From 
the perspective of traditional contract law this would seem nonsensical as the smart contract is the 
relationship between legal entities and is not a legal entity itself. However, this deserves further 
consideration.  
 
 A multi-party smart contract, like the DAO, can operate as a business vehicle which facilitates 
economic co-operation between those who participate in it. Instead of articles of association and 
shareholders agreements, they operate according to bylaws expressed in the interlocking software code. 
They have no registered offices, directors or employees. Once the smart contracts are created and deployed 
on a blockchain or other distributed ledger technology then human involvement is limited as the operation, 
management and control is automated. Decisions can be made by collective votes made by persons who 
hold tokens, which represent investments which have been made (these investments are made by 
contributing digital currency “to” the smart contract).  
 
 From an historical perspective, there are a number of types of entities which are now supported by 
some level of recognition, but which originally were formed as agreements between persons to jointly 
undertake commercial enterprises. These include partnerships, companies and trusts. Legal recognition was 
made available to clarify their relationships with other entities, and facilitate their regulation.18 If these 
multi-party smart contracts increase in use, then these same issues may arise. For example, it may become 
important for such arrangements to have in place governance arrangements which are beyond the code and 
regulation through legal recognition could be a means of achieving this.19 Accordingly, it is not impossible 
that multi-party smart contracts could be recognized in the same way.  
 
 There are a number of ways in which such recognition could be provided under local law if it were 
decided to be beneficial. Of course, these entities are unlikely to be constrained by international borders 
__________________ 
15  Published by CPSS-IOSCO, April 2012. 
16  Consideration of the manner in which blockchain and distributed ledger technology can meet the PFMIs is a 
worthy subject of a separate paper. 
17  The DAO was a smart contract created on a distributed ledger platform intended to au tomatically facilitate the 
investment of digital currency into projects. Its terms were said to be limited to its code. It failed with spectacular 
effect when the code was found not to be consistent with many participants expectations when one participant 
was able to withdraw funds well in excess of those contributed by it.  
18  The process of recognition of company status under 19 th Century English law, through unincorporated 
associations to deed of settlement companies, bears some interesting comparisons.  
19  Indeed, the absence of an external governance arrangements was a contributing factor to the difficulties 
experienced in connection with the DAO’s failure. There is an analogy to the need for natural language provisions 
in bilateral smart contract to complement the coded provisions of a smart contract.  
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and the issues of recognition become more complex when the conflicts of laws issues which arise with 
cross-border transactions are added. This is considered in the next section of this paper.  
 
6. Conflicts beyond between code and law 
 
 This paper has described circumstances in which the interaction between smart contracts and laws 
which will apply to them cause a need either for care to be taken in the design of the smart contract’s 
architecture or for consideration to be given to adjustments to local laws. However, commercial contracts 
often operate in a cross-border context with the result that there is a need to consider more than just one 
country’s laws. This needs to be taken into account in smart contract architecture and expands the 
consideration of adjustments in law into a need to consider harmonization of those adjustments and laws. 
 
 It might initially be thought that the issues of conflict of laws arise because part of the smart contract 
is expressed in code. For example, one of these issues could be that the governing law of the contract could 
be difficult to ascertain from the code. However, this issue is likely to be able to be solved with smart 
contracts which have both coded and natural language provisions as the natural language provisions could 
record the parties’ agreement as to the governing law in the same manner as is used for traditional contracts. 
 
 Far more complex conflict of law issues arise because of the combination of smart contracts with 
blockchain and distributed ledger technology. This is because the resulting distributed nature of the smart 
contract means that its coded provisions exist, and are being performed, simultaneously in multiple places, 
some of which could be in different legal jurisdictions. Importantly, this is not an issue which arises in other 
cross-border commerce. Two examples of the issues which require consideration are: 
 
- The location of the smart contract itself. A contract’s location could be relevant for different reasons, 
including in connection with the applicability of regulation or taxation. Also, it could be important for 
dealing with the proprietary aspects of contractual rights, such as transfer of those rights or granting a 
security interest over them. Local laws do not always provide that the location of a contract for these 
purposes is a matter of the parties’ agreement. It can be a matter of objective determination based on 
the place of performance. Of course, tests have been developed in local laws to work this out for 
traditional contracts. However, these tests are not likely to operate effectively when applied to a smart 
contract which is partly held on, and effected through, a distributed ledger located in multiple places 
equally and simultaneously. 
 
- The location of property evidenced by the contract. The terms of a smart contract are able to execute 
a transaction in, and evidence the ownership of, other property. The property could be currency, 
securities or other assets which are recorded on a blockchain or distributed ledger. The location of that 
property is likely to be relevant to the application of a number of local laws, including those related to 
taxation, duties and taking security. The concept of applying these laws to assets which are recorded on 
a register is not new and the possibility of multiple registers also exists with some current asset holding 
systems, such as for dematerialized and intermediated securities. However, what is different about 
property held in smart contracts on a distributed ledger is that there is no hierarchy between the different 
records. They are equal in status and synchronized. It is not the same as the holding of property in 
different layers of custodian and clearing system accounts where a “chain of title” can be tracked 
through the different registers. Accordingly, the tests used for a hierarchy of accounts are not likely to 
be effective when applied to multiple, unsubordinated, registers. 20 
 
 This is not a comprehensive list of potential cross border issues. Others include legal issues relating to 
privacy, data regulation, anti-money laundering laws and licensing for regulated services. However, these 
alone demonstrate a need for a solution which is more than the terms of the parties’ agreements. Instead, a 
harmonized approach is needed across jurisdictions which seeks to take advantage of the efficiency, speed 
and performance benefits provided to commerce by smart contracts.  
__________________ 
20  For example, applying “PRIMA” (place of the relevant intermediary approach) in these circumstances would be 
challenging.  
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7. Lost and found in translation 
 
 This paper submits that legal challenges in translating traditional contracts into smart contracts for use 
in commercial transactions requires care in ensuring that nothing is lost, and that some new solutions be 
found. 
 
 Ensuring nothing is lost requires flexibility beyond the use of computer code. This is needed because 
of the inability of the logic expressible in code to describe the richness of all of a contract’s provisions or 
the law which might be applicable to it. This does not mean that smart contracts have no application beyond 
the simplest of transactions. Instead it means that there needs to be significant care in the design of the 
smart contract’s architecture to provide the flexibility required for real world operation.  
 
 The solution to be found is a contribution by law itself, particularly when it comes to cross-border 
application. This is because the normal principles used to determine applicability of laws do not contemplate 
an architecture which can operate independently of the parties and which can operate in multiple 
jurisdictions equally and simultaneously. This contribution is in the form of local law recognition of 
particular elements of smart contract architecture and cross-border harmonization of those local laws.  
 
 The depths of legal analysis needed to conduct both local law recognition and cross-border 
harmonization of these laws effectively may seem beyond the scope of the current proofs-of-concept and 
pilots which are being developed for smart contracts and the blockchain and distributed ledger technologies 
on which they are maintained. However, given the expanding use cases, and the time needed for that 
analysis to be completed and implemented, it would seem that there is little time to lose.  
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A Digital Revolution in International Trade? The International Legal Framework for Blockchain 
Technologies, Virtual Currencies and Smart Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 
Riccardo de Caria, University of Torino, Italy 
 
A. Introduction and definition of the key notions 
 
 This work investigates the legal dimension of the ongoing “blockchain revolution”1. In particular, it 
tries to understand to what extent this potentially breakthrough technology also implies a legal revolution: 
do blockchain technologies, virtual currencies and smart contracts require new legal avenues to be 
developed, or is it instead appropriate to simply adapt existing legal categories to the new reality? In either 
case, how are and should they be regulated? 
 
 A specific object of inquiry in this regard is the role of UNCITRAL and its potentially crucial 
contribution it can provide to the creation of a worldwide legal environment that is suitable for the 
development of blockchain-based applications, contracts, businesses, and so forth. 
 
 After drawing a background picture of how such innovations could revolutionize the world of 
international trade (B.), the article gives an overview of the state of the art of the legal context in which 
they have currently been framed (C.), then moving on to focus on the specific issue of how UNCITRAL 
could helpfully intervene in their development (D.). Finally, some conclusive remarks are offered (E.). 
 
 Before starting the actual analysis, though, I believe it is necessary to devote some space to defining 
the most relevant notions used in this work, i.e. virtual currencies, Blockchain and distributed ledger 
technology, and (decentralized) smart contracts. 
 
Virtual Currencies 
 
 Even if a universally-accepted definition is missing, the so-called virtual currencies (often also referred 
to as cryptocurrencies2) have recently been defined: 
 
- by the International Monetary Fund, as “digital representations of value, issued by private developers 
and denominated in their own unit of account”3; 
 
- by the European Central Bank, as “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, credit 
institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an alternative to 
money”4 and “a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a public 
authority, nor attached to a legally established currency, which does not possess the legal status of 
currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons, as a means of exchange and possibly 
also for other purposes, which can be transferred, stored or traded electronically”5; 
__________________ 
1  For a definition and explanation of the term ‘blockchain’, see slightly below in the body of the article. 
2  A brief note on terminology is needed: both “virtual” and “crypto” currencies are “digital currencies”; in fact, as 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) clarified: “Digital currency can mean a digital representation of either 
virtual currency (non-fiat) or e-money (fiat) and thus is often used interchangeably with the term ‘virtual 
currency’” (See FATF, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks , FATF REPORT, June 
2014, p. 4). The difference between the two is that (only) the latter is a virtual currency in which the relevant 
information is carried with encryption protection. However, the terms are often used as synonyms.  
3  IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 
2016, p. 7. 
4  ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, 2015, p. 33. 
5  Opinion of the European Central Bank of 12 October 2016 on a proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC , 
(CON/2016/49), p. 7. 
  
106 
- by other European Union institutions, as “a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a 
central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but is accepted by natural 
or legal persons as a means of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically”6; 
 
- by the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT), as “digital representation of value that can be digitally 
traded and functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer 
of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued nor guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above 
functions only by agreement within the community of users of the virtual currency”7; 
 
- by the Superintendent of Financial Services of the State of New York, as “any type of digital unit that 
is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value. Virtual currency shall be broadly 
construed to include digital units of exchange that: have a centralized repository or administrator; are 
decentralized and have no centralized repository or administrator; or may be created or obtained by 
computing or manufacturing effort”8. 
 
 The most prominent example of such currencies is most certainly the Bitcoin9, that legal scholarship 
has started to carefully investigate10. 
 
Blockchain and distributed ledger11 technology 
 
 An arguably appropriate definition, provided by the ECB, describes the blockchain as “the ledger 
(book of records) of all transactions, grouped in blocks, made with a (decentralised) virtual currency 
scheme”12. 
Virtual currencies are usually (and Bitcoin is the first example) based on the distributed ledger technology 
(DLT)13, i.e. a technology that, through computing and cryptography, has made possible to keep and validate 
multiple copies of a central ledger (a sort of distributed database) across an IT network; each ledger keeps 
a copy of the digital database of all the transactions ever happened (a transactions record), which is formed 
by a lot of blocks of encrypted electronic records, linked together and disseminated through a dense IT peer-
to-peer network. 
 
 Anyone can check the database, but no one is able to modify it; thus, “this technology, in principle, 
enables a decentralised, rapid, resilient and rather secure means of recording any sort of transaction together 
with the history of previous transactions in a ‘distributed ledger’”. This scheme, originated with Bitcoin14, 
__________________ 
6  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on 
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and 
amending Directive 2009/101/EC — 2016/0208 (COD).  
7  FATF, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, FATF REPORT, June 2014, p. 4.  
8  But: “Virtual currency shall not be construed to include any of the following: (1) digital units that: (i) are used 
solely within online gaming platforms; (ii) have no market or application outside of those gaming platforms; (iii) 
cannot be converted into, or redeemed for, fiat currency or virtual currency; and (iv) may or may not be 
redeemable for real-world goods, services, discounts, or purchases; (2) digital units that can be redeemed for 
goods, services, discounts, or purchases as part of a customer affinity or rewards program with the issuer and/or 
other designated merchants or can be redeemed for digital units in another customer affinity or rewards program, 
but cannot be converted into, or redeemed for, fiat currency or virtual currency; or (3) digital units used as part 
of prepaid cards”: 23 CRR-NY 200.2 NY-CRR, Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the 
State of New York. 
9  Launched in 2008 by Nakamoto: Satoshi Nakamoto,  Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, (2008); 
for useful background materials, see also http://www.projectbitcoin.com/ and https://bitcoin.org/en/.  
10  To be sure, literature exists mostly on smart contracts: see below, note 17. 
11  Another brief note on terminology is needed here: the terms blockchain (or block chain) and distributed/shared 
ledger are often used interchangeably. 
12  ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, 2015, p. 33. 
13  BIS, CPMI report on digital currencies, November 2015, pp. 5 ff.; available at 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf; see also IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, 
IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 2016, pp. 18 ff. 
14  See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008). 
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commonly known as “blockchain technology”, is often based on open source software, publicly available. 
To sum up, “a block chain is a type of database that takes a number of records and puts them in a block 
(rather like collating them on to a single sheet of paper). Each block is then ‘chained’ to the next block, 
using a cryptographic signature. This allows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be shared and 
corroborated by anyone with the appropriate permissions”15. 
 
 The importance of blockchain technologies has been underlined also by the IMF, that recognizing the 
possible benefits of virtual currencies (i.e. increasing speed and efficiency in making payments and 
transfers), stated: “the distributed ledger technology underlying some VC schemes offers benefits that go 
well beyond VCs themselves”16. 
 
(Decentralized) smart contracts17 
 
 Already more than 20 years ago, Szabo defined smart contracts as “a computerized protocol that 
executes the terms of a contract”18; in other words, a smart contract is a contract written in computer 
language which is automatically executed by a machine. 
 
 Therefore, by applying the blockchain technology to smart contracts, they would be not only self-
executing and self-enforcing, without any need for intermediaries but, in addition, every transaction would 
be automatically recorded in the distributed database. Thus, blockchain-based smart contracts19 may be 
referred to as “decentralized smart contracts”, given the absence of a central database/register. 
 
B. International Trade: Virtual Currencies, Smart Contracts and Blockchain 
 
 International trade might be severely affected by such new technologies for a number of reasons: 
firstly, a lot of companies are starting to accept payments in Bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) all over 
the world20; secondly, blockchain technologies may allow significant cost savings21, and potential 
__________________ 
15  Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain , a report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, 
2016, p. 17.  
16  Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 2016, 
p. 35. 
17  See Perugini, M. L. & Dal Checco, P., Smart Contracts: A Preliminary Evaluation, December 2015. Available 
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729548; Raskin, Max, The Law of Smart Contracts, (September 22, 2016), 
Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842258; Savelyev, A., 
Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher School of 
Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885241. 
18  Szabo, N., Smart Contracts, 1994, unpublished (the original document is unavailable on the Author’s website, 
but the definition was referred to in other later publications); Szabo, N., Formalizing and Securing Relationships 
on Public Networks, First Monday, [S.l.], 1997. Available at: 
http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469; Szabo, N., The Idea of Smart Contracts, 1997; available 
at: http://szabo.best.vwh.net/idea.html; Szabo, N., Secure Property Titles with Owner Authority, 1998; see also 
Mark S. Miller, Computer Security as the Future of Law, 1997. Available at 
http://www.caplet.com/security/futurelaw/. 
19  It is worth pointing out that the notion of ‘smart contracts’ could encompass any automatically-executed machine-
based agreement (such as purchasing a snack from a vending machine), whereas blockchain-based smart 
contracts are a much narrower notion (some analogies between the two might still be usefully applied, as will be 
pointed out in Part D.). 
20  E.g. EY Switzerland: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-news-release-switzerland-accepts-
bitcoins-for-payment-of-its-services/$FILE/ey-news-release-switzerland-accepts-bitcoins-for-payment-of-its-
services.pdf. 
21  Investigating the possible advantages of the technology goes far beyond the purposes of this paper; I will  just 
observe that businesses may consider adopting this technology for many different reasons (e.g. immutability, 
digitization, automation, paperless processes, rapidity, absence of middle-man, etc.).  
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applications to everyday business are on their way22; lastly, what if instead of paper contracts, some 
businesses started to use smart contracts23? 
 
 Moreover, what appears to be more appealing is that smart contracts are automatically enforced 
without any need for a third party24; the reduction of transaction and litigation costs for undertakings may 
be massive. 
 
 In other words, while traditional currencies require a central system of administration/central registry, 
virtual currencies do not, being decentralized by nature and self-executed by a software25. The same may 
be said with regard to smart contracts: if they are self-executed, there is no need for a central third party 
(i.e. judges, arbitrators) to administer them: there is (at least in theory26) no way of breaching them27. 
 
 We can imagine a scenario in which two enterprises, through a (decentralized) smart contract, define 
and regulate their business relations and payment obligations so that they are automatically executed via 
Bitcoin. Platforms to draft and use smart contracts in everyday life already exist; the best-known example 
is Ethereum, “a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as 
programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference. These apps 
run on a custom built blockchain, an enormously powerful shared global infrastructure that can move value 
around and represent the ownership of property. This enables developers to create markets, store registries 
of debts or promises, move funds in accordance with instructions given long in the past (like a will or a 
futures contract) and many other things that have not been invented yet, all without a middle man or 
counterparty risk”28. 
 
 Going back to the opening point of this paragraph, it seems rather likely that international trade will 
be affected by virtual currencies, blockchain technologies and smart contracts. In any case, what is needed 
__________________ 
22  See e.g. the R3 project: “R3 is a financial innovation firm that leads a consortium partnership with over 50 of the 
world’s leading financial institutions. We work together to design and deliver advanced distributed ledger 
technologies to the global financial markets” (http://www.r3cev.com/about/). In addition, as mentioned below in 
the article, the first blockchain-related patents are being filed. 
23  The advantages and disadvantages of using smart contracts instead of a traditional paper contract should be 
evaluated on a case by case analysis, keeping in mind the objectives of each single agreement and the peculiarity 
of the situation. In any case, it has been observed that “it is quite possible to expect that at some moment of time 
Smart contracts will become routine technology, like Internet itself in 90s years of the last century” (Savelyev, 
A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher School 
of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p.  20). 
24  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p. 18: “There is no need to seek for 
enforcement of Smart contract by addressing the claims to third party — judiciary or other enforcement agency. 
And it is one of the main “selling points” of this contractual form”. 
25  IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 
2016, p. 6. 
26
  But, in practice, huge scandals have already made the deadlines, such as the “DAO case”, speaking of which it 
has been said that “to date, the largest application of this kind of thinking has been the creation of a decentralized 
autonomous organization or DAO in 2016. The idea was to create an investing entity that would not be controlled 
by any one individual, but by shareholders voting based on their stakes on a blockchain. The entity was funded 
with $150 million. Soon after this money was raised, about $40 million of those funds were diverted from the 
organization, using part of the code that no one had anticipated” (Raskin, M., The Law of Smart Contracts, 
(September 22, 2016), Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842258, p. 36) and that “recent example with the hack attack on Ethereum DAO in 
June 2016 shows that certain mechanism of reaching a consensus between the parties to Smart contract on c ertain 
unexpected (non-programed) events is necessary” (Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the 
Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 
71/LAW/2016, 2016, pp. 22-23). 
27  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p. 18: “Smart contract cannot be 
breached by a party to it”. 
28  https://www.ethereum.org/.  
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is at least a study-and-watch approach29 to be ready when and if such innovations will come into the game 
of international trade. A similar position has been expressed, among the others30, by the Bank for 
International Settlements, which recognized that “digital currencies and distributed ledgers are an 
innovation that could have a range of impacts on many areas, especially on payment systems and services. 
These impacts could include the disruption of existing business models and systems, as well as the 
emergence of new financial, economic and social interactions and linkages”31 and concluded by saying that 
“central banks could consider — as a potential policy response to these developments — investigating the 
potential uses of distributed ledgers in payment systems or other types of FMIs”32. The same applies to 
authorities, institutions, and more generally to States’ Legislatures. The IMF for instance has even proposed 
some principles which could guide national authorities in further developing their regulatory responses to 
virtual currencies33.  
 
 What is missing, however, are some recommendations on how to take advantages of blockchain in 
doing business, especially how to accept payment in virtual currencies minimizing legal risks and how to 
write and use a legally binding smart contracts and what consequences arise from it. 
 
 With specific regard to international trade, moreover, it has recently been launched an interesting 
project called “Incochain”, that is to say, incoterms translated into decentralized smart contracts. According 
to the description of the project, “Incochain is a project that is creating smart contracts for world trade. The 
combination of existing incoterms, or standardized international commercial terms, smart contracts and 
blockchain technology is where we are taking the industry — to completely paperless and mobile 
applications. Be it import or export, air, ocean, rail, or trucking, there is a lot of paperwork. This project 
clearly defines the obligations and risks of buyers and sellers and offers a dashboard system in a 
decentralized manner yet it can be utilized cross sector, be it international and maritime law, cargo 
insurance, banking and accounting, customs and government (including duties and taxes), warehousing, 
and transportation sectors”34. 
 
 Virtual currencies, blockchain technologies and smart contracts are already being experienced in 
international trade, even if in their embryonic form. But what about the legal issues they raise? 
 
C. The Current Legal Framework 
 
 To be sure, an international legal framework tailored on virtual currencies and blockchain technologies 
and applications does not exist35; however, at national/regional level, some legal systems (e.g. the State of 
New York in the US36) have adopted a regulation on the subject matter, while others (e.g. the EU37) are 
__________________ 
29  The same approach has been adopted by the ECB; see Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, ECB, 2015, 
p. 33. 
30  See e.g. the Special Address of CFTC Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo Before the Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corporation 2016 Blockchain Symposium  in which it was highlighted “The Need for a “Do No Harm” 
Regulatory Approach to Distributed Ledger Technology”. 
31  BIS, CPMI report on digital currencies, November 2015, available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf p. 
17. 
32  BIS, CPMI report on digital currencies, November 2015, available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf p. 
18. 
33  IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 
2016, pp. 35 ff. 
34  https://hack.ether.camp/public/incochain.  
35  For an exhaustive picture of the current legal framework all over the world, see Tasca, P., Digital Currencies: 
Principles, Trends, Opportunities, and Risks,  Deutsche Bundesbank and ECUREX Research, ECUREX Research 
Working Paper, 7th of September 2015 (version: October 2015), pp. 43 ff.  
36  I refer to the Virtual Currencies regulation: Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of 
New York, Title 23. Financial Services, chapter I. Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 
200. Virtual Currencies. Available at: https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Browse/Home/ 
NewYork/NewYorkCodesRulesandRegulations?guid=I7444ce80169611e594630000845b8d3e&originationCont
ext=documenttoc&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default).  
37  See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 
2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist 
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willing to do that, but currently it is not possible to predict when, if and to what extent such regulations will 
ever be adopted38. 
 
 This may be due in part to the complexity of these technologies, and mostly to the more general 
inability of modern States’ legislative process to follow the rapid evolution of technology. Moreover, some 
Institutions/Authorities expressed a fear to stifle innovation, and favoured an approach of precautionary 
monitoring, rather than pre-emptive regulation39. In any case, it shall be pointed out that a trend is emerging: 
in the US, digital currencies are usually classified as commodities40, while in the EU41, at least at national 
level, they are often classified as units of account42. 
 
 In addition, it has been observed that, even if “there is currently no EU legislation on virtual 
currencies”, this “does not mean they are completely unregulated in Member States. Rather, patchworks of 
national legislation, compatible to a varying degree, exist in some Member States, while others have no 
legislation at all”, and that “in many Member States, nothing more than a series of opinions and warnings 
has been issued by central banks or regulators”43.  
 
 With regard to the blockchain, it must be said that, being a (neutral) technology, it seems much more 
reasonable to wait and regulate the possible uses of it, rather than the technology itself, paying attention, 
once again, not to stifle innovation. As of today, it seems that no national, regional or international 
regulation exists. Nonetheless, the topic is clearly under consideration at the legislative/regulatory level: as 
it has been said, “today is all about blockchain brainstorming”44. 
As regards the need for a specific regulation, it has been noticed that “the growing interest in blockchain 
technology, independent from a VC scheme, a priori raises fewer policy concerns, because the technology 
would be used in a closed system administered by regulated financial institutions”45. 
 
 However, “bitcoin may have triggered something which goes well beyond virtual currencies. Although 
the blockchain technology was initially meant to implement Bitcoin’s currency business model, it now 
seems to be emerging as a promising means to achieve a number of other goals. Blockchain technology 
could find its way into the mainstream financial markets. The technology may be used in a variety of 
__________________ 
financing and amending Directive 2009/101/EC. 
38  Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction , EPRS | European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, p.10: “It is too early to assess the possible 
impact of the forthcoming EU legislation on virtual currencies, but there is little doubt that it will be profound. 
Whether it will affect the growth of the emerging virtual currency industry, or provide it with a more stable 
regulatory framework, thus increasing its acceptance as money and eventually allowing it to become mainstream, 
is an open question”. 
39  See for example Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Report on Virtual Currencies, (2016/2007(INI)), 
3.5.2016; the IMF recommended that “regulatory responses should be commensurate to the risks without stifling 
innovation” (IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — 
SDN/16/03, January 2016, p. 35); also the New York Department of Financial Services has clarified that t here is 
a need to “strike an appropriate balance that helps protect consumers and root out illegal activity, without stifling 
beneficial innovation” (http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1407171.htm); and the UK HM Treasury has stated 
that: “regulatory requirements must be proportionate to the risk posed, to avoid unnecessarily stifling competition 
and innovation in a nascent industry” (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/414040/digital_currencies_response_to_call_for_informati 
on_final_changes.pdf).  
40  See CFTC press release at: http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7231-15.  
41  See the annex to ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, 2015 pp. 34 ff. 
42 See Tasca, P., Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities, and Risks , Deutsche Bundesbank and 
ECUREX Research, ECUREX Research Working Paper, 7th of September 2015 (version: October 2015), p. 56. 
See the annex to ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, 2015 pp. 34 ff. 
43  Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction , EPRS | European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, p. 7. 
44  Digital Transformation in Government and Blockchain Technology, speech delivered by Minister for Cabinet 
Office Matt Hancock at D Digital Catapult, Kings Cross, London on the 26 th April 2016. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/digital-transformation-in-government-and-blockchain-technology.  
45  IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 
2016, p. 24. 
  
111 
application where data have to be transmitted without risk of corruption. The handicap for Blockchain 
technology might be that it first appeared in the particularly sensitive and highly regulated field of 
currencies, having attracted the regulators’ attention while still at an immature stage, and with its potential 
not fully understood”46. 
 
 Therefore, it is indeed possible that a regulation on virtual currencies indirectly provides some rules 
related to the blockchain technologies, and this may well have negative effects on the blockchain47. No 
doubt that the technology is at the center of the stage (for instance, Bank of America recently filed 15 
blockchain-related patents48) and, as a consequence, careful steps must be taken.  
 
 Speaking of smart contracts, their legal status is totally “unclear”49, and very little has been written 
with this regard50; I will try to address some potential issues in part D. However, the fact that there is no 
specific regulation on such issues does clearly not mean that current laws and general principles of law may 
not be applicable to them, or that they are unregulated at all: virtual currencies may well be considered as 
any other currency, and/or as means of exchange, while the blockchain and smart contracts are indeed pieces 
of software51. To be sure, in the absence of specific regulations, these technologies must be regulated by 
existing laws52. 
 
 For example, the ECJ made clear, applying the relevant provisions of the existing European VAT 
Directive, that the exchange of traditional currencies for units of the ‘bitcoin’ virtual currency is exempt 
from VAT53. 
In the US, Judge Teresa Pooler wrote that “the Florida Legislature may choose to adopt statutes regulating 
virtual currency in the future. At this time, however, attempting to fit the sale of Bitcoin into a statutory 
scheme regulating money service business is like fitting a square peg in a round hole” and stated that the 
sale of bitcoin does not constitute a “money service business” in a case regarding unauthorized money 
transmission and money laundering54. However, in another case55, it was reached the (opposite) conclusion 
that Bitcoins qualify as money since they “are funds within the plain meaning of that term [and] can be 
accepted as a payment for goods and services or bought directly from an exchange with a bank account. 
They therefore function as pecuniary resources and are used as a medium of exchange and a means of 
payment”56. 
__________________ 
46  Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction , EPRS | European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, p. 10. 
47  Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction, EPRS | European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, p. 10, note 7. 
48  Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction , EPRS | European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, p. 10, note 9. 
49  Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, January 2016, 
p. 23. 
50  See Perugini, M. L. & Dal Checco, P., Smart Contracts: A Preliminary Evaluation, December 2015; Raskin, 
Max, The Law of Smart Contracts, (September 22, 2016), Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming. 
Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842258; Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the 
Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 
71/LAW/2016, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885241.  
51
  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law, Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p. 20: “it is possible to argue that each 
Smart contract by its legal nature is also a computer program in a meaning of IP law”. 
52
  See e.g. Tasca, P., Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities, and Risks , Deutsche Bundesbank and 
ECUREX Research, ECUREX Research Working Paper, 7th of September 2015 (version: October 2015), p. 26: 
“The general orientation is to adopt the current legislation already in place in order to deal with digital 
currencies in Europe”.  
53  Case C-264/14. 
54  Case n. F14-2923, Criminal Division, section 13 of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, 
Florida. See also http://www.coindesk.com/court-reject-bitcoin-money-florida-espinoza-trial/. 
55  See U.S. v Murgio et al, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, No. 15-cr-00769. 
56  See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-cyber-bitcoin-idUSKCN11P2DE.  
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 It should be noticed, however, that most of the policymakers’, central banks’, authorities’ (and judges’) 
concerns57 have until now regarded almost exclusively monetary policies58, financial aspects59, or issues 
related to public law and tax law60, with a particular focus on money laundering and financing of terroristic 
activities61, while a lot of practical issues concerning substantive private/trade law have been left unanalysed 
and unanswered, apart from some analysis on consumer protection62; I move on to consider such issues in 
the next paragraph. 
 
D. Legal Questions Related to the Substantive Private Law Governing International Trade. The Role of 
UNCITRAL 
 
 The technologies discussed through this paper may become relevant in the future of international trade 
but, as already mentioned, while from a public law point of view a lot of analysis has already been carried 
out, it seems that, as far as commercial law is concerned, a lot of questions still need to be answered. 
 
 This paragraph will briefly outline and address some legal questions that may arise using this 
technology in this respect, how such questions may be resolved on the basis of the current legislation, and 
how they should be addressed by policy makers. 
 
 The first problem is related to the legal status of virtual currencies: in fact, as already mentioned, some 
legal systems have already legislated on this field, a lot of authorities have given their opinion, and the EU 
is evaluating if, when and how to legislate. 
 
 However, with regard to contract law, the provision to accept payments in virtual currencies may be 
dealt with through an ad hoc provision in a commercial agreement; with regard to problems arising from 
their legal status, in absence of a specific regulation, authorities will likely (try to) apply the current 
legislation. 
 
 Real troubles for businesses come with what I referred to in paragraph A. as “decentralized smart 
contracts”, i.e., smart contracts based on blockchain technologies, which automatically execute any given 
contract, providing a proof of that performance in the distributed ledger. 
__________________ 
57  For a general overview, see the chart at p. 52 in Tasca, P., Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities, 
and Risks, Deutsche Bundesbank and ECUREX Research, ECUREX Research Working Paper, 7th of September 
2015 (version: October 2015). 
58  See for example BIS, CPMI report on digital currencies, November 2015, available at 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf, which concluded at p. 21 that “There could also be potential effects on 
monetary policy or financial stability”; Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their introduction, 
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, pp. 4 ff.; see 
also IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, 
January 2016, pp. 33 ff.; finally, see ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, ECB, 2015, p. 32. 
59  See for example CPMI report on digital currencies, BIS, November 2015, available at 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d137.pdf in which it is concluded (p. 21) that “There could also be potential effects 
on monetary policy or financial stability”; Scheinert, C., Virtual currencies, Challenges following their 
introduction, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, Members’ Research Service, PE 579.110, 2016, 
pp. 4 ff.; see also Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — 
SDN/16/03, January 2016, pp. 31 ff.; finally see ECB, Virtual currency schemes — a further analysis, 2015, p. 
32. 
60  See IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, 
January 2016, pp. 30 ff. 
61  See for example the UK national risk assessment (available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_201
5_final_web.pdf), where it has been written that “The money laundering risk associated with digital currencies 
is low, though if the use of digital currencies was to become more prevalent in the UK this risk could rise ”, or 
the Europol Report on the Changes in the Modus Operandi of Is in Terrorist Attacks (available at: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_
attacks.pdf), where they investigated the possible use of Bitcoin by terrorist to finance their activities.  
62  See IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations , IMF Staff Discussion Note — SDN/16/03, 
January 2016, pp. 28 ff.  
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 In this regard, the first thing to notice is that, “using the blockchain functions imposes some technical 
limits: as a matter of facts, indirect e-commerce performances are not digitally executable. Therefore, the 
scheme is not covering any agreement regarding goods or services that, even though purchased on the 
Internet, have a material consistence or are to be performed in the real world, like a book delivery or a 
maintenance service”63. 
 
 This is due to the dichotomy between real and virtual world: let us imagine that, through a smart 
contract, A buys and object from B (who regularly pays the agreed price), but thereafter C steals the real 
good from A; at this point, on the blockchain there is no way to change the status of owner of A, who may 
well sell his virtual “title” to D, who will never physically possesses the good which has bought but, at the 
same time, will never be able to stop the payment automatically executed by the smart contract. This is why 
it seems possible to argue that smart contracts may function only with digital goods and digital inputs64. 
Nonetheless, even if such limitation had to be applied, smart contracts would still be applicable to a lot of 
goods of the modern era. But what is the legal nature of smart contracts? 
 
 On the one hand, some have recently argued that a “smart contract can be regarded as a legally-binding 
agreement”65; on the other, it has been said that “smart contracts are simply a new form of preemptive self-
help”66. 
 
 With regard to the idea that smart contracts are themselves autonomous and self-sufficient legally-
binding agreements, it shall be noticed that in fact they will almost always represent the translation of part 
of an already reached agreement into digital code: this is because they simply perform automatically the 
contract but they can enforce only provisions that may be executed in the digital world. In this regard, it 
has been said that using smart contracts “there is no need in conflict of laws provisions, since there are no 
collisions of various legal systems. Mathematics is universal human language. Thus, Smart contracts are 
truly transnational and executed uniformly regardless of the differences in national laws”67, and even that 
smart contracts do not create a proper obligation in its legal meaning68. 
 
 Such conclusion, though, seems difficult for me to be agreed upon. Firstly, even considering smart 
contracts as legally-binding agreements, they would a fortiori be subject to contract law, and it is clear that 
the applicable law will have a strong influence on them; for example, with regard to illegality and 
unconscionability, every country has its own peculiar rules, and a contract may well be valid in one place 
and null and void in another one. 
 
 Moreover, smart contracts do clearly create obligations which stand independently from the digital 
code of the smart contracts: if for example there is a bug in a smart contract between A and B, and A has 
undertaken to transfer her property in exchange for an agreed sum of money to B, she would still be obliged 
to transfer her property to B even if the smart contract does not work (similarly, if a vending machine does 
not deliver the chosen good after the insertion of the coin, it is clear that the owner of the selling machine 
is still obliged to perform and deliver the good). 
 
 In any case, by entering into a smart contract, parties undertake to perform the obligation therein 
encapsulated; in addition, since — as was said — almost always smart contracts will be a translation of a 
precedent agreement already reached, the obligations of parties would nonetheless be, at the very least, to 
start the execution of the smart contract (i.e. to press the button that starts to operate the smart contract). 
__________________ 
63  Perugini, M. L. & Dal Checco, P., Smart Contracts: A Preliminary Evaluation, December 2015, p. 10. 
64  Perugini, M. L. & Dal Checco, P., Smart Contracts: A Preliminary Evaluation, December 2015, pp. 10 ff. 
65  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law, Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p. 10 and ff.  
66  Raskin, M., The Law of Smart Contracts, (September 22, 2016), Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming, 
abstract. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842258. 
67  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, p. 21.  
68  Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , Higher 
School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, pp. 17 ff.  
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 Generally speaking, in spite of the conceptual dissimilarities, there actually do not appear to exist too 
many differences between the functioning of a smart contract and that of a mechanical vending machine, 
or that of a software that suspends the supply of a service in case of missing payment (e.g. Netflix allows 
users to legally watch streaming videos in exchange for a monthly payment; in case of missing payments, 
the software will simply suspend the service, not allowing users to log in69): the fact that the interruption is 
performed by humans, by software, or by smart contracts with a record in the blockchain, does not in 
practice seem make a relevant difference legally-wise. 
 
 I therefore agree with the scholars who concluded that, “independently from being digitally expressed, 
every contract is ruled and guaranteed by the law and the parties will be free to file the Court for 
compensation in case a void agreement has been performed or execution has been spoiled by a 
malfunctioning due to a system bug”70. 
 
 Another interesting point that was made by the scholarship is the idea that smart contracts are simply 
a new form of self-help measures, which parties to a contract adopt in order to ensure the performance of 
their agreements without the need of judicial enforcement71. This is consistent with the above-mentioned 
observation that what usually happens, at least at the moment, is that two parties reach an agreement and 
thereafter translate part of it into a smart contracts, and then leave the duty to perform it to the machine. In 
this case, all the relevant legal questions arising from smart contracts must be dealt by the competent judge 
under the applicable contract law. 
 
 In any case, independently of the legal nature of such contracts, another issue to be faced is the 
probative value of blockchain technology; also, and connected to this, one might wonder: “what happens 
when the outcomes of the smart contract diverge from the outcomes that the law demands”72? Once again, 
the answer depends on the applicable law. 
 
 Of course, a national agreement, concluded by national businesses and to be performed only on the 
national soil, would clearly be subject to the corresponding national law, and the jurisdiction would be 
determined according to the procedural law of that country. 
 
 But in relation to international trade, everything is different: it is self-evident that smart contracts may 
generate enormous problems if the applicable law and the competent jurisdiction are not clearly determined 
in the agreement; however, as observed above, smart contracts, by their very nature, cannot contain 
provisions not executable by software (such as the one regarding the applicable law), nor are they built with 
the intention to depend on a third-party judicial enforcement, and, therefore, it is still hard to imagine how 
they could include provisions on jurisdiction and applicable law73. 
 
 It would therefore appear to be necessary, if such contracts have to be adopted in day-to-day trade 
practice, a general agreement (or at least an ad hoc provision) that establishes, among the other things, that, 
in case of need of judicial enforcement, related to the general agreement itself, or to the smart contracts 
depending upon it, what is the applicable law and which judge has the jurisdiction. 
 
 In relation to international trade, this problem may otherwise be without solution; trying to establish 
the applicable law of a smart contract, in the absence of an explicit choice by the parties, would trigger the 
well-known problems amplified by the advent of the Internet: should we apply the lex loci delicti? The lex 
__________________ 
69  https://help.netflix.com/legal/termsofuse?locale=en&country=IT: “If a payment is not successfully settled, due 
to expiration, insufficient funds, or otherwise, and you do not change your Payment Method or cancel your 
account, we may suspend your access to the service until we have obtained a valid Payment Method”. 
70  Perugini, M. L. & Dal Checco, P., Smart Contracts: A Preliminary Evaluation, December 2015 , p. 25. 
71  Raskin, M., The Law of Smart Contracts, (September 22, 2016), Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming, 
pp. 32 ff. 
72  Raskin, M., The Law of Smart Contracts, (September 22, 2016), Georgetown Technology Review, Forthcoming, 
pp. 25 ff. 
73  See Savelyev, A., Contract Law 2.0: «Smart» Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law , 
Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 71/LAW/2016, 2016, pp. 20 ff.  
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loci contractus? The lex loci rei sitae (the place where the server on which the digital property virtually 
exists?)? The lex loci protectionis? Or should we use other criteria? 
 
Similar problems would arise with regard to jurisdiction. 
 
 Therefore, there appears to be a great need of a solution to these uncertainties, or at least a model 
provision/law that deals with them, in order to avoid that, in a near future, if such contracts happen to start 
truly spreading, businesses start to use smart contracts giving them too much confidence and, in case of 
failure of the software, no one knows where to file a lawsuit, according to which law, and therefore how to 
predict its possible outcome. 
 
 Excessive faith in technology without adequate knowledge of the inevitably arising legal problems 
may cause a disaster, especially in international trade. It appears to be crucial to adopt an international 
approach to solve these issues; otherwise, each country may provide for different regulation on the subject 
matter, thus introducing indirect obstacles to international trade. It appears to be better to propose a 
framework in advance, than to wait for a number of national laws that eventually will need to be harmonized 
and unified, because of the inevitable disparities. Given the rapid evolution of the technologies under 
consideration, it is inevitable that further studies and analyses must be carried out; nonetheless it is desirable 
that UNCITRAL, with its expertise in the field, leads this process. 
 
 This could be achieved through a proposed model law/rules which may be acceptable worldwide, or 
offering a legal guide or practical recommendations, in any case providing the technical assistance required 
for a similar endeavour. If this happened, many of the above-indicated questions would automatically and 
systematically find a solution, thus allowing for a proper exploitation of the potential of this innovation in 
international trade. 
 
E. Conclusions 
 
 This paper has tried to outline the legal landscape arising from blockchain technologies and their 
applications, such as decentralized smart contracts and virtual currencies; it has tried to investigate if and 
to what extent such technologies may imply a legal revolution, or if it is sufficient to simply adapt the 
existing legal categories to them. 
 
 While I recognized that decentralized smart contracts, blockchain and virtual currencies may become 
mainstream technologies, I believe that they are not going to cause a legal revolution. 
 
 Even recognizing that a lot of regulatory issues arise from a public law perspective, this paper also 
focused on the less analysed issues related to international trade law. In this regard, the implementation of 
blockchain-based smart contracts creates problematic legal questions, particularly in relation to the 
applicable law and to jurisdiction. In fact, decentralized smart contracts are indeed designed with the 
purpose of avoiding the need of an intermediary to assure the exact performance of a contract, and to be 
self-sufficient and autonomous; however, sometimes, either for a bug, or for other reasons related to the 
dichotomy between real and virtual world, the intervention of a third party may be necessary to correct 
them, and to reach the required lawful outcomes of the given contract. 
 
 Nonetheless, considering that smart contracts can arguably be deemed actual contracts in their legal 
meaning, or at the least some form of self-help technology chosen by parties to ensure compliance with 
contractual obligations, it seems that most of the legal questions arising with smart contracts can and should 
be dealt with current contract law provisions; however, it is necessary to identify which national contract 
law applies to decentralized smart contracts, and this may be resolved through an ad hoc provision in the 
agreement or through the proposition of legal rules applicable to the most problematic aspects of smart 
contracts, i.e. applicable law and jurisdiction. Under this perspective, a contribution by UNCITRAL in 
devising model provision/agreements dealing with and regulating smart contracts would seem to be able to 
bring a really valuable contribution to the healthy development of these new contractual practices, and thus 
indirectly favour the continuing growth of international trade, keeping pace with technological innovations. 
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Cross-Border Smart Contracts: Boosting International Digital Trade through Trust and 
Adequate Remedies 
 
Sara Hourani, Bournemouth University, United Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
 
 Cross-border digital contracting in recent years has witnessed the development of smart contracts that 
can be used for a variety of automated electronic transactions.1 A number of internet platforms such as 
Ethereum have emerged that offer to create smart contracts and expand their application to these different 
transactions.2 This expansion is bound to have an impact over the manner in which trade is currently 
conducted which raises the importance of regulating these new digital contracts.  
 
 As these contracts are based on programmable software their lack of flexibility as opposed to natural 
language contracts could lead to not fulfilling the parties’ expectations, thereby leading to a potential breach 
of contract. This paper briefly assesses the role that the UN Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts and the UNCITRAL Technical Notes on Online Dispute 
Resolution can have in such a situation. The paper then emphasises the current gaps in the international 
legal framework with regards to smart contracts and their breach that requires for further research and legal 
regulation. 
 
What are Smart Contracts? 
 
 Smart contracts were first referred to by Nick Szabo in the 1990s as “a set of promises, specified in 
digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.”3 On this basis it can 
be said that smart contracts are software codes that embed the terms and conditions of a contract and that 
run on a network leading to a partial or full automated self-execution and self-enforcement of the contract.  
 
 The automated performance of the contract is enabled as a result of the transfer of contractual terms 
and conditions into an algorithm or technology-enabled rules-based operations that signal for actions, such 
as payment, to be taken once the relevant conditions have been fulfilled.4 In this light, it has been suggested 
in a recent report by the Smart Contracts Alliance that smart contracts can be used for complex transactions 
to enable for a simpler performance of these and to help with cutting down on costs.5 Examples of such 
uses include using contracts for better visibility in supply chains, for mortgages or for trade finance. 
 
Execution Issues and Remedies in Smart Contracts: Current Applicable UNCITRAL Texts 
 
 Smart contracts have been designed to ensure that the contract would be performed adequately without 
any risk for breach. However, the code embedding the contract terms can contain bugs or produce results 
that are not in accordance with the expectations of the parties.6 Therefore, this would mean that the smart 
contract can be potentially breached in such cases as its performance would not be as expected or intended 
by the parties. The question that ensues is whether there are current rules or guidance under the UNCITRAL 
texts for establishing liability and providing adequate remedies for breach in such circumstances. 
__________________ 
1  Such transactions include the facilitation of automatically executed derivatives for example. See Hedgy 
https://angel.co/hedgy (last accessed January 2017). 
2  See Ethereum https://www.ethereum.org/ (last accessed January 2017). 
3  N Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, 1996.  
4  Smart Contracts Alliance in collaboration with Deloitte Report, Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases for Business & 
Beyond: A Technology, Legal & Regulatory Introduction-Foreword by Nick Szabo, December 2016 
http://digitalchamber.org/assets/Smart-contracts-12-use-cases-for-business-and-beyond.pdf (last accessed 
January 2017). See also, P De Filippi and S Hassan, ‘Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology: From 
Code is Law to Law to Law is Code,’ First Monday, Volume 21, Number 12, 5 December 2016 Section IIA.  
5  See Smart Contracts Alliance in collaboration with Deloitte Report, supra n 4.  
6  Smart Contracts Alliance in collaboration with Deloitte Report, supra n 4, p. 10. 
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 The UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications applies to the use of electronic 
communications used in the formation or performance of a contract between parties whose places of 
business are in different places.7 According to this Convention, a smart contract8 would be considered to be 
legally valid as these form electronically through computer code. Moreover, Article 12 disposes that 
contracts formed as a result of automated messages are legally valid and enforceable under the Convention. 
Nevertheless, there is no legal provision that offers further indication on liability in an automated contract 
and from whom remedies would have to be given. 
 
 Self-enforcement functions as conflict prevention in smart contracts9 but issues of enforceability in 
the context of cross-border smart contracts due to jurisdictional variations can still arise.10 In order to further 
solve this dilemma, smart contracts can incorporate an online dispute resolution clause in their code.11 Also, 
an ODR clause would be useful to avoid any ‘wrongful’ irreversible performance of the contract without 
having recourse to an external source. The UNCITRAL Technical Notes on ODR offer guidance on what 
an ODR procedure would include and would also be compatible to be applied to an ODR provision in smart 
contracts. Once the ODR process gives a result, it can issue an adequate remedy for the condition or 
problem. 
 
Current Gaps in the International Legal Framework: 
 
 The breach in performance by software driven automated contracts, such as smart contracts, raises 
important liability questions that currently do not have a direct answer in the available international legal 
texts. This also has implications over the remedies that the aggrieved party would be entitled to in such a 
context. As opposed to natural language contracts where it is clear that if the seller for example makes a 
late delivery due to his own wrongdoing the buyer would be entitled for relevant remedies from the seller. 
Errors committed as a result of codes make it more difficult to establish which party caused the breach or 
is liable because of it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The UNCITRAL texts are equipped in dealing with smart contracts to a certain extent as they recognize 
automated electronic contracts and offer enforcement solutions to these through ODR. It is however the 
case that there is a current regulatory gap with regards to establishing liability in cases of breach of smart 
contracts which raises a need for an international text on these. Consequently, such a text would contribute 
to the removal of any current obstacles in trading via smart contracts by reinforcing the users’ trust in their 
use which would boost international digital trade. 
 
 
 
  
__________________ 
7  Article 1 of the Convention. 
8  Apart from smart contracts touching on the exceptions in Article 2.  
9  R Koulou, ‘Blockchains and Online Dispute Resolution: Smart Contracts as an Alternative to Enforcement, ’ 
SCRIPTed, Volume 13, Issue 1, May 2016, p. 65. 
10  See R3 and Norton Rose Fulbright White Paper, Can Smart Contracts be Legally Binding Contracts: Key 
Findings,’ p. 5 http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright--r3-smart-contracts-white-paper-
key-findings-nov-2016-144554.pdf (Last accessed January 2017). 
11  Ibid. 
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Information Management in International Trade: 
Role of UNCITRAL in Advancing International Single Window Environment 
 
Trisha Rajput, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The various international and regional institutions that have been engaged in the work on issues related 
to trade in digital economy has to a certain extent directed their efforts following the mantra of “trade 
facilitation”. Some of those efforts have supported the implementation of national and regional single 
windows across jurisdictions to fulfil import, export, and transit-related regulatory requirements. 
Interoperability and internationalization of national single windows is the next logical step, as it will allow 
collaborative information sharing for both public and private sector stakeholders in global supply chains.  
 
 The purpose of this paper is to present the concept of international single window environment (ISWE) 
as an information channel and review the legal framework necessary for implementing it. ISWE is proposed 
as an information channel characterised by interoperability between various national single windows. The 
proposed ISWE will serve as information interchange channel which has the potential of enhancing the 
visibility of the entire supply chain.  
 
 With the entry into force of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA),1 several WTO Member 
States are likely to move to the broader use of electronic transactions through use of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) to meet their multilateral treaty obligations. For example, the TFA 
suggests that member-states should implement national single window (NSW) and recommend the use of 
ICT methods for trade. The paper considers the contribution of the TFA and suggests that once majority of 
the WTO Member States establish single windows, most of the necessary infrastructure for creating ISWE 
would be present. The paper examines past and on-going efforts of some of the relevant international and 
regional institutions2 are examined in contextual detail to provide a legal basis for interoperability of 
National Single Windows through ISWE. In this context the contribution of UNCITRAL to develop the 
supplementary legal framework for ISWE is elaborated.  
 
 ASEAN Single Window is utilised as an example of regional single window interoperability to identify 
the prospects and challenges of interoperability. 3 Since 2005, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has been working to develop both the technical and legal frameworks for a regional Single 
Window referred to as the ASEAN Single Window (ASW). During the past several months ASW has 
supported electronic exchange of customs declaration and certificate of origin between five Member States 
on a pilot basis. Building upon the interim findings from the ASW experience the paper emphasises that 
full potential of ISWE can be realised through integration of Government-to-Government (G2G), Business-
to-Government (B2G) and Business-to-Business (B2B) information. Such integration of information into 
an interoperable environment will allow flow of real-time data that can offer numerous possibilities to 
enhance the visibility of international supply chains. It is argued that single window integration at 
international level should include transport and related commercial requirements in order to improve 
information flows among all supply chain actors. 
__________________ 
1  WTO. Trade Facilitation Agreement (WT/MIN(13)/36 or WT/L/911) 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci36_e.htm on 22 February 2017, the organization 
obtained the required acceptance from two-thirds of its 164 members for the TFA to take effect. 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_27feb17_e.htm. 
2  The efforts of institutions considered are the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN/ESCAP), United Nations Centre for 
Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), United Nations Network of Experts for Paperless 
Trade and Transport Facilitation in Asia and the Pacific (UNNExT), World Customs Organization (WCO), World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  
3  It is to be noted that the ASW is conducting live operations on a pilot basis. Therefore, the interpretation of the 
empirical findings should not be related to the fully operating single window. The period analysed in this study 
is significantly short. Therefore, this effect should be interpreted as short -run effect of ASW on exports. 
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 However, the integration of transport and commercial requirements in the scope of ISWE is where the 
challenge lies. The inclusion of the transport stakeholders into the single window system requires complex 
coordination that can capture the existing relationships between carrier interests, shipper interests, ports, 
transport authorities, insurance providers, etc., from legal and technical perspectives. Emergence of new 
technology has opened up possibilities for creating technical solutions for such complex arrangements. The 
issue of dematerialization of transport and commercial documents in another challenge. In this respect, the 
contribution of UNCITRAL on the issue of dematerialisation of bill of lading is profound. However, what 
remains unanswered is the supporting framework that would support the channelizing of dematerialised 
information through ISWE which is an information exchange channel. The ISWE needs to be supported by 
a legal framework for trusted transboundary transaction. In this context UNCITRAL could make a 
significant contribution through its work on trust and identity management.  
 
2. Trade Facilitation 
 
 Over the last several years, numerous multilateral and regional institutions have been engaged in law-
making initiatives related to e-commerce, paperless trade, electronic single window and cross-border e-
transaction. Most of these initiatives feature under the broad heading of trade facilitation. Trade facilitation 
initiatives are commonly considered to create standards and guidelines for the exchange of goods and 
services across borders.4 Commercial aspects of trade have also been considered within the ambit of trade 
facilitation by certain institutions.  
 
 WTO defines trade facilitation as: 
 
 the simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures, where trade procedures are the 
activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing 
data and other information required for the movement of goods in international trade.5 
 
 UN/CEFACT defines trade facilitation as: 
 
 the simplification, standardization, and harmonization of procedures and associated information flows 
required to move goods from seller to buyer and to make payments.6 
 
 OECD defines trade facilitation as:  
 
 the simplification and standardization of procedures and associated information flows required to 
move goods internationally from seller to buyer and to pass payments in the other direction.7 
 
 The above-mentioned definitions are particularly interesting because they emphasise on the flow of 
information connected with the physical movement of goods.8 This flow of information, which can be 
enhanced through digitalization of trade processes, help businesses and governmental agencies to manage 
__________________ 
4  See the definitions of trade facilitation as used by institutions such as WTO, UN/CEFACT and WCO.  
5  WTO, A Training Package: What is Trade Facilitation? www.gfptt.org/sites/default/files/refread/Training-guide-
final.pdf.  
6  UNECE, Trade Facilitation Implementation Guide. http://tfig.unece.org/details.html. 
7  OECD. 2005.The Costs and benefits of Trade Facilitation.  http://www.oecd.org/trade/facilitation/35459690.pdf. 
8  A typical international supply chain features the physical movement of goods, the financial aspects of the 
transaction, and the flow of information within the various actors in the supply chain. The three layers exist as 
parallel processes with limited interaction between them. However, the use of ICT may enhance interaction 
between the three layers. Basu Bal, A., Rajput, T. 2015. Creating Sustainable Global Supply Chains Through 
Single Window and Paperless Trade Initiatives: Efforts of WTO and UNCITRAL in Perspective presented at 
UNCITRAL Emergence Conference, Macau, 30 November. 
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risks and reduce transaction costs. 9 An important practical tool for coordinating trade processes10 and 
procedures at the border to ensure smooth flow of information is an electronic single window facility.  
 
 Single window is defined by the WCO as: 
 
 An intelligent facility that allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized 
information and documents with a single entry point to fulfil all import, export and transit related 
regulatory requirements.11  
 
 The benefits of single window system are well established.12 Doing Business data reveals that less time 
was spent on customs clearance in countries that utilise electronic systems for the submission and 
processing export and import customs declarations.13 Many of the upper middle-income countries use single 
windows and in several other countries the implementation process is underway. Some examples of national 
single window systems are International Trade Data System (ITDS) of US, UNI-PASS Korean Customs 
system and KTNET u TradeHub national trade single window of Korea, TradeXchange of Singapore and 
PortNet of Finland. ISWE is proposed as an information interchange channel characterised by 
interoperability between the various national single windows.  
 
3. TFA Can Contribute Towards Creating ISWE  
 
 One interesting aspect that emerges from evaluating the single window reform across countries is that 
implementation is fragmented than desired.14 Such fragmentation created the need for a comprehensive 
trade facilitation reform which would consolidate and multilateralize the commitments of States to create 
efficient trading processes and procedures at the borders.15 The TFA,16 which is the result of the Bali 
Ministerial Conference in December 2013,17 is a step in that direction. Article 10 of the TFA mandates that 
all Members of the WTO shall endeavour to establish and maintain a single window enabling traders to 
submit documentation for export, import and transit of goods through a single entry point. It is important 
to mention that the implementation of a single window system develops on the GATT 1994 Article VIII 
__________________ 
9  There exists a positive correlation between digitalization and economic growth For more discussion on the issue 
Doing Business-Trading Across Barriers: Technology Gains in Trade Facilitation. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/case-studies/2016/tab. 
10  The concept of Single window is supported by several the border management models. Aniszewski, S. 2009. Co-
ordinated Border Management — A Concept Paper. WCO Research Paper N° 2. Also see Doyle, T. 2011. 
Collaborative Border Management. World Custom Journal 4(1): 15-21. G. Mc Linden, E. Fanta, Widdowson, D., 
and Doyle, T. 2011.Border Management Modernization Handbook 
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821385968. Arvis, J-F., Mustra, M. A., Ojala L., Shepherd, 
B., Saslavsky, D. 2010. Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/ConnectingtoCompete.pdf.
 
11 WCO, Single Window Information Store
 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/activities-and-
programmes/single-window/single-window.aspx. 
12  Tsen, J.K.T. 2011. Ten Years of Single Window Implementation: Lessons Learned for Future. 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Trade_Facilitation_Forum/BkgrdDocs/TenYearsSingleWindow.pd
f. For more discussion, see Lawrence, R.Z., Hanouz, M. D., and Doherty, S. 2012. The Global Enabling Trade 
Report 2012 Reducing Supply Chain Barriers: The Enabling Trade Index 2012  
http://www.news1.co.il/uploadFiles/252620875835419.pdf; Carballo,. J., Graziano, A., Schaur, G., Martincus, C. 
V. 2016. The border labyrinth: information technologies and trade in the presence of multiple agencies.  IDB 
Working Paper Series; 706. Research has shown that single window systems have positive impact on increasing 
the number of exporting firms and on improving international trade flows. Implementation of streamlined 
procedures to process export permits through the single window in Costa Rica resulted in an increase in the 
number of exporters by 22.4%.  
13  World Bank, Doing Business. 2017. Equal Opportunity for All. Washington, DC: World Bank. DOI: 10.1596/978-
1-4648-0948-4.  
14  Choi, J. Y. 2011. A Survey of Single Window Implementation. WCO Research Paper No. 17.  
15 OECD. 2013. Interconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains  
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/interconnected-economies-GVCs-synthesis.pdf. 
16  See note1. 
17 WTO. 2013. Bali Ministerial Declaration and Decisions http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ 
mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm.  
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concerning Fees and Formalities connected with the importation and exportation, where paragraph 1(c) 
recognizes “the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for 
decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirement”. The single window system 
under the TFA has to be implemented by the Members of the WTO thereby allowing traders to lodge 
information with a single body for the purposes of all import or export related regulatory requirements. This 
system seeks to ensure that all procedures, data and requirements related to the trade transaction is handled 
and overseen by one agency which takes the responsibility of combined controls. In addition to making the 
procedural requirements for the traders simple and standardized, this system facilitates information flows 
enhancing efficiency.  
 
 Once the TFA is fully implemented, it will result in an environment where WTO Member States would 
have an operational Single Window (to facilitate import, export and transit-related regulatory functions) 
across jurisdictions that will establish the infrastructure for the ISWE. As mentioned above, the concept of 
the ISWE simply stated refers to an environment which is characterized by interoperability18between 
various national single windows. The interoperable environment reflects the position where national single 
windows communicate with each other to exchange relevant information. In practice the discussion on 
ISWE must begin with the deliberation on different technological and organizational models for making 
interoperability possible. After surveying existing literature it is revealed that two models are proposed for 
the design of interoperability, namely centralised server model19 and gateway model.20 More recently, cloud 
computing has also been suggested as a way forward to build a supranational single window.21 The 
technological framework that is selected for the creation of the ISWE framework may entail distinct legal 
and political deliberations. If a centralised server model is adopted for ISWE then a central server may be 
used to host a gateway which will facilitate the trade data exchange. This model seems simple from a 
practical perspective but it poses problematic political questions. One such question is which Member State 
will host and be responsible for the maintenance of the central server? The main concern relates to flow of 
trade-related data between exporting country and importing country transmitted via a third country where 
the central server is installed. The legal questions pertaining to such a model is connected with data 
retention, accessibility, archiving etc. The other option is for the Member States’ national single windows 
to be connected to each other through a common gateway application. 
 
 One crucial factor which is central to the concept of interoperability is that the national single windows 
which will ultimately participate to create the ISWE should actually be able to communicate or exchange 
the relevant information. Simply stated the single windows must be interoperable. For this purpose, it is 
important that the relevant international standards be used as guidelines for the implementation of single 
windows across jurisdictions. The TFA provides to this effect. Article 10.3 of the TFA provides that 
Members are encouraged to use relevant international standards or parts thereof as a basis for their import, 
export, or transit formalities and procedures, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement. It is 
important to note that there are several important international instruments that have been developed by 
various international institutions with respect to developing or upgrading single windows. There are three 
important UN/CEFACT recommendations which is specific to single windows. They are as follows: 
 
__________________ 
18  The term “interoperability” is defined as the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange and use 
information across borders without additional effort on the part of the trader. UN/CEFACT. 2015. 
Recommendation and Guidelines on Single Window Interoperability: Supporting Cross Border Interoperability 
of Trade Regulatory Single Window System: Draft Recommendation No. 36; Keretho, S., Pikart, M., 2013. Trends 
for collaboration in international trade: Building a Common Single Window Environment  ECE/TRADE/411 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Publications/ECE-TRADE-411.pdf where interoperability is 
defined as the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together.  
19  Centralized Gateway Model” whereby the Gateway is installed in a single Central Server for the common use of 
all participating countries. 
20  “Distributed Gateway Model” whereby the Gateway is installed separately in the national network perimeter of 
each participating country.  
21  Pugliatti, L. 2011. Cloud Single Window: Legal Implications of a New Model of Cross-Border Single Window. 
World Customs Journal 5(2):3. 
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- UN/CEFACT Recommendation 33 defines the concept of single windows and recommends the 
government to establish single windows.22 
 
- UN/CEFACT Recommendation 34 focuses on the issues connected to the implementation of single 
windows.  
 
- UN/CEFACT Recommendation 35 focuses on legal aspects of single window facilities.  
 
 Single windows need to be supported by a legal framework to formalise and induce trust in the 
emanating transactions in addition to technological or organizational infrastructure.23 Many of the legal 
issues pertaining to the establishment and operation of single windows can be addressed through contracts 
and memoranda of understandings between relevant participants but others can be addressed through 
recourse to international standards. There are several standards that are relevant in context of single 
windows which have been developed by intergovernmental agencies and international organizations such 
as UNCEFACT,24 UNNExT25 and WCO26.  
 
 It is important that countries seek recourse to international standards so that the single window 
architecture is interoperable globally. Important legal issues considered by UNCITRAL related to electronic 
commerce such as authentication, and the legal status of electronic documents are hugely relevant in context 
of single window operation. It should be noted that UNCITRAL basic e-commerce laws such as the UN 
Electronic Communications Convention; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (MLEC); 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures (MLES) provides legal framework for the operation of 
single window facilities. The new Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records is also relevant because 
the processes connected with single window transactions are electronic but still based on paper.27  
 
 Once the interoperable environment is set up it will allow for collaborative information sharing for 
both public and private sector stakeholders in global supply chains. This information will in turn enhance 
visibility of the supply chain itself and various actors involved in the process. More importantly it has the 
__________________ 
22  UN/CEFACT. 2005. Recommendation and Guidelines on Establishing a Single Window to Enhance the Efficient 
Exchange of Information between Trade and Government, Recommendation No. 33, (ECE/TRADE/352, July 
2005). https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/recommendations/rec33/rec33_trd352e.pdf  
23 UN/CEFACT. 2013. Establishing a legal framework for international trade Single Window (Recommendation 
No.35). http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Publications/ECE-TRADE- 401E_Rec35.pdf. 
24  UN/CEFACT. 2013. Data Simplification and Standardization for International Trade (Recommendation No.34). 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Publications/ECE-TRADE-400E_Rec34.pdf; UN/CEFACT. 2014. 
Revision of Recommendation 14: Authentication of Trade Documents. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ 
cefact/recommendations/rec14/ECE_TRADE_C_CEFACT_2014_6E_Rec 14.pdf.  
25  UNNExT. 2012. Single Window Planning and Implementation Guide http://unnext.unescap.org/tools/implement-
guide.pdf recommends single window implementation framework SWIF and identifies ten smaller and easier 
manageable components critical to single window development. The ten components include: identification and 
management of stakeholder requirements; single window vision articulation; establishment of stakeholder 
collaboration platform; business process analysis and simplification; data harmonization and document 
simplification; design of service functions and application architecture; establishment of standards and 
interoperability; introduction of legal infrastructure; enforcement of business and governance models; execution 
of IT infrastructure and solutions; UNNExT, UNESCAP/UNECE. 2012. Electronic Single Window Legal Issues: 
A Capacity Building Guide. http://unnext.unescap.org/pub/tipub2636.pdf; UNNExT 2012. Business Process 
Analysis Guide to Simplify Trade Procedures http://unnext.unescap.org/pub/tipub2558new.asp; UNNExT. 2012. 
Data Harmonising and Modelling Guide for Single Window Environment. 
http://unnext.unescap.org/pub/tipub2619.pdf ; UNNExT. 2012. Guide for the design of Aligned Forms for 
Paperless Trade http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trade/Publications/ece_372_ManualForDesign  
AlignedTradeForms.pdf. 
26  WCO. 2011. How to Build SW Environment http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/activities-and-
programmes/single-window/single-windowguidelines.aspx#{228E2A1B-6B48-4D59-9FF4-1451CBCF62EC}; 
WCO. 2009. Data Model (version 3.0) http://wcoomdpublications.org/data-model-
3.html?id=836&___store=english&___from_store=french.  
27 UNCITRAL. 2016. Draft Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records . A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.139, 
A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.139/Add.1 and A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.139/Add.2 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/LTD/V16/051/96/PDF/V1605196.pdf?OpenElement.  
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potential to meet the requirements of entire international supply chain as opposed to the piecemeal benefit 
presented by single point data submission at the national level. This will also reduce the volume of trade-
related paperwork required of traders by making them shared electronically. Sharing of trade related 
documents prior to arrival of goods through the ISWE environment would minimise time and costs 
associated with cargo clearance.  
 
 To build the ISWE that complements the highly interconnected international trading scenario, the 
border agencies need to work together to encompass the entire supply chain where the goods can be assessed 
for admissibility and clearance prior to their arrival at the physical border. Measures of co-ordination and 
co-operation range from policy to documentary and physical control amongst domestic and international 
border agencies. However, the co-operation and co-ordination between international border agencies is 
based on a political mandate and can manifest through international agreements and ratification of relevant 
conventions. In this context the proposed TFA’s role can be instrumental in achieving the desired result, as 
it will lead to political commitment from WTO Members because of its multilateral nature. Article 12 of 
the TFA is a building block in that direction because it emphasises the importance of customs cooperation. 
It has to be recognized that the cooperation is not easy to achieve as each Member State may have its own 
requirements and set of rules that need to be harmonized internally as the first step and then build a 
relationship based on trust with other Member States. Article 12 of the TFA can be helpful from a futuristic 
perspective when considering the ISWE because it would establish the process and procedures for the 
purposes of exchange and interaction between border agencies of different jurisdictions.  
 
4. Legal Issues Relevant For ISWE 
 
4.1. The Legal Basis for Establishing Cross-Border Interoperability 
  
 The interoperability of Single Windows leading up to the creation of ISWE requires a legal basis. 
Interoperability can be established through a multilateral agreement that would obligate parties to 
harmonize technical and administrative requirements of their national single windows. Connecting single 
windows at a multilateral level requires international cooperation and coordination and for that political 
will is imperative. This may seem a herculean challenge but the advantages of connected environment 
would steer action in creation of interoperability. Perhaps a TFA style multilateral Framework Agreement 
may be undertaken through a trade driven institution such as the WTO which could provide the legal basis 
for ISWE. The pragmatism of a multilateral approach may be contested but after the implementation of the 
TFA, interoperability is the next step to facilitate trade. Once the economic benefits become clear from 
regional initiatives such as the ASW, there would be willingness to emulate interoperability at international 
level.  
 
 Another approach could be that interoperability is built at regional level. In such a case there will be 
several regional interoperable single window environments which may then serve as the building blocks in 
the grand scheme of creation of ISWE. However, integrating the fragmented regional interoperable 
environments may present technical and legal challenges. It should be noted that interoperability is guided 
by the robust structure of national single windows. Therefore, national single windows should be supported 
by legal frameworks and cross-border exchange of data authorised under national law. 
 
4.2. Identification, Authentication and Authorisation Procedure  
 
 The legal issues related identification, authentication and authorisation are pertinent when considering 
the interoperability because it ensures that the individuals accessing and participating in the processes of 
the ISWE have the authority to do so. The lack of universally accepted standard for the electronic signature, 
authentication approach and authorization procedure can pose significant challenges from legal perspective.  
 
 Matters are also complicated by UN/CEFACT Recommendation No. 14 which states that, as far as 
possible, the requirement of a signature (manuscript or its electronic functional equivalent) should be  
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eliminated unless it is essential in the context of the transaction.28 This simply means that a certain 
authentication method be used depending on the nature of the transaction. For example, a low level 
authentication may be adequate for certain tasks. This seriousness (associated risk assessment) related with 
a certain transaction may vary across jurisdictions. In context of authentication methods, it is pertinent that 
countries which participate in exchange of information between their single windows ensure that their 
method is reliable and secure for the purposes of information exchange between traders and the local single 
window. In addition, when countries are exchanging information between single windows then the 
authentication method must ensure safe and secure cross-border transmission of information. 
 
 For ISWE to work, member countries that participate in creation of the environment must agree on a 
common standard or mutually recognize the standard in information exchange. The question that arises is 
how can countries achieve this practically? Participating countries may seek recourse to instruments which 
have been developed by various international institutions such as UNCITRAL, 29 UNESCAP30 and OECD31. 
The only associated complication is when international standards, model laws and toolkits are implemented 
in different ways by countries. This in itself can pose a challenge for supporting cross-border transactions. 
Consider the issue of e-signatures. Although, the importance of concepts of “functional equivalence” and 
“technological neutrality” has been emphasised in relevant international instruments32 but countries have 
adopted different approaches in implementing them in context of e-signatures. Some countries adopt a 
regulatory approach to e-signatures33 while the others take a more flexible view.34 Individually these 
approaches are fine but in the ISWE context both approaches need to interoperate. Implementing a common 
standard for identification, authentication and authorization procedures for transactions seem to be most 
efficient. 
 
4.3. Data Related Issues  
 
4.3.1. Accuracy and Integrity of Data 
 
 Interoperability of national single windows will allow exchange of data and for this reason the data 
has to be accurate, seamless and secure. The accuracy of the data is crucial to the success of the ISWE 
because it is correlated with the element of trust desired by participants in the ISWE. Business entities 
demand secure and reliable e-commerce transactions. Ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the data is 
connected with the responsibility of actors for submitting correct data for the processes in the ISWE which 
is also connected to the issue of liability. Draft Recommendation 36 indicates that the issue of accuracy and 
__________________ 
28  UN/CEFACT. 2014. Revision of Recommendation 14: Authentication of Trade Documents.  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cefact/recommendations/rec14/ECE_TRADE_C_CEFACT_2014_6E_Re
c 14.pdf. 
29  UNCITRAL. 2005. UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Convention.html  
UNCITRAL.1996. Model Law on Electronic Commerce http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/ 
electronic_commerce/1996Model.html; UNCITRAL.2001. Model Law on Electronic Signatures 
//www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2001Model_signatures.html; UNCITRAL. 
2009. Promoting Confidence in Electronic Commerce: Legal Issues on International Use of Electronic 
Authentication and Signature Methods http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/08-55698_Ebook.pdf.  
30  UNESCAP. 2016. Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Paperless Trade in Asia and the 
Pacific, 2016E/ESCAP/RES/72/4 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/ESCAP/RES/72/4&Lang=E.  
31  OECD. 2007. Recommendation on Electronic Authentication and OECD Guidance for Electronic Auth entication 
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/38921342.pdf.  
32  See note 28 for UN/CEFACT instrument and note 29 for UNCITRAL instruments that encourages technological 
neutrality.  
33  Few countries have prescriptive e-signature laws such as Brazil, India, Israel and Malaysia. 
34  A minimalist approach is adopted by the USA. The two-tier approach that is a hybrid of minimalist and 
prescriptive approaches is adopted by the European Countries, China and South Korea. For more discussion, 
refer to ADOBE. A Global Overview of Electronic Signatures https://acrobat.adobe.com/content/dam/doc-
cloud/en/pdfs/adobe-global-overview-of-electronic-signatures.pdf ; Spyrelli, C. 2002. Electronic Signatures: A 
Transatlantic Bridge? An EU and US Legal Approach Towards Electronic Authentication. Journal of Information 
Law and Technology (2) https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2002_2/spyrelli/.  
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integrity of data be addressed in the Framework Agreement leading to interoperability. Such a Framework 
Agreement address issues such as fraud and other behaviour that may impact the effectiveness of the ISWE 
alongside the associated liability. 
 
4.3.2. Right to Obtain Data; Privacy and Protection of Commercial Transactions 
 
 The treatment of information and right to obtain data varies across jurisdictions. Countries have 
different policies with respect to public documents. For example, the Swedish approach is different to that 
of the USA regarding what is considered confidential and what become available as a public document. In 
addition, it should be noted that important constitutional issues may be connected to the right to obtain data. 
A differential treatment of information could cause complications when the data is being transferred from 
one jurisdiction to another.  
 
 The issue of data protection and data privacy is an area of concern for the ISWE. Data protection is of 
fundamental consideration as the consumer loses a degree of control over personal data when provided to 
the service provider for processing. These issues are quite important because stakeholders involved in the 
international supply chain demand a certain level security of their data. The stakeholder such as a traders 
are protective of their trade data because it reflects their business strategy. From an interoperability 
perspective it is important that ISWE provides for privacy technically but also legally. If one single window 
shares a trade data with the other single window, then some level of certainty need to be provided for the 
stakeholders in the sense that there will be no unauthorised access to and dissemination of the data. In 
addition, some clarification of legal issues arising from private data processing at different geographical 
locations in the world is also required. 
 
 In most cases, data protection and privacy are issues that are addressed nationally. These issues have 
addressed in a fragmented manner regionally and there is limited harmonisation at an international level.35 
However, commercial secrets, trade data are regulated in many countries which could provide the basis for 
protection but some sort of minimum standards need to established for the purposes of information sharing.  
 
4.3.3. Data Trails and Electronic Archiving  
 
 Data or information may be required on a later date for the purposes of dispute resolution, etc. 
Therefore, issues concerning data retention would have to be clarified in context of the ISWE because 
different countries have different approaches to access to information and transparency which is 
problematic specially in context of archived data.  
 
4.4. Liability issues  
 
 Liability in context of ISWE may arise because of data processing errors, data breach, wrongful 
submissions, etc., which may result in loss to party (buyers, shippers, freight forwarders, financial 
institutions) utilising the operations of ISWE. A party may be held liable for his or her acts or omission 
which has harmful consequence in context of ISWE. The issue of liability is quite complex because of the 
cross-border context. For instance, to assess the liability of the party it would be imperative to determine in 
which jurisdiction the liability is to be determined and what court should consider the dispute and which 
substantive rules may apply. It is imperative that liability and legal recourse be considered through the 
contractual arrangement of parties participating in ISWE and also through agreements between the States 
involved.  
 
__________________ 
35  OECD. 2013. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data  
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.
htm; UNCITRAL considered working in this area at its 39 th Plenary Session in 2006 but prioritized its work on 
international commercial and trade law over data protection law. 
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4.5. Dispute Resolution  
 
 Dispute resolution mechanism is needed to provide a fast and reliable remedy in case of disputes 
arising from ISWE operations. The disputes may range from being administrative, civil and criminal in 
nature. Draft recommendation 36 suggests the inclusion of dispute resolution through arbitration in the 
Framework Agreement.  
 
5. ASW — A Case Study for Interoperability  
 
 ASW creates an interoperable environment which connects and integrates National Single Windows 
(NSW) of ASEAN Member countries at the regional level.36 The legal foundation of the ASW can be found 
in the Agreement to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window,37 Protocol to Establish and 
Implement the ASEAN Single Window38 (Implementation Protocol) and Protocol on the Legal Framework 
to Implement the ASEAN Single Window39 (Legal Framework Protocol). Currently the ASW supports the 
exchange of intra-ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD) and Certificate of Origin (ATIGA 
Form D) on a pilot basis among seven Member States and will be include exchange of other type of data in 
the future.40 Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam have already tested ATIGA Form D using 
the ASW architecture.41 
 
 Article 1 of the Legal Framework defines the ASW as an environment where NSW of the Member States 
operate and integrate. Further, the purpose of the ASW can be deciphered from Article 5 which defines the ASW. 
The Article provides that the ASW is a regional facility to “enable a seamless, standardized and harmonized 
routing and communication of trade and customs-related information and data for customs-clearance and release 
from and to NSW”.42 It is estimated that the ASW will reduce the cost of trading by 8%.43 
 
 The ASW architecture is based on the distributed gateway model where the NSW of the ASEAN 
Member States are connected to the ASW Gateway Application through a secure ASW network. This ASW 
Gateway Application is regionally developed and installed by each Member State. In addition, the 
centralized regional services support the interaction of the MSWs. It is a facility which administrates and 
maintains standard formats, codes and other basic information of ASW.  
 
 The quantifiable benefits of interoperability in context of the ASW still remains to be seen as and when 
more data is available.44 However, the expected benefits of the ASW will be for both governments and 
business. For example, the pre-arrival information received will enable expedited movement of goods that 
would benefit traders. It will also allow the border authorities to apply risk management procedures more 
efficiently. Most importantly, ASW has the potential to harmonise and streamline national procedures that 
will be beneficial for businesses. 
 
__________________ 
36  Several ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Philippines have 
already developed and implemented the NSW system. Brunei, Lao, Cambodia and Myanmar have not 
implemented Single Windows.  
37  Signed on 9 December 2005. http://asean.org/?static_post=agreement-to-establish-and-implement-the-asean-
single-window-kuala-lumpur-9-december-2005-2.  
38  Signed on 20 December 2006. http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/23084.pdf.  
39  Signed on 9 September 2015. http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20150915020056.pdf.  
40  ASEAN Website: http://asw.asean.org/.  
41  ASEAN Website: http://asw.asean.org/about-asw.  
42  Article 5, Protocol on the Legal Framework to Implement the ASEAN Single Window  
43  It is indicated that a large portion of saving is attributed to the reduction in documentation dispatch. UNNExT, 
Towards an Enabling Environment for Paperless Trade-ASEAN Single Widow: A Regional Single Window for 
ASEAN Connectivity, Brief No. 13, May 2015. http://www.unescap.org/resources/unnext-brief-no-13-asean-
single-window-regional-single-window-asean-connectivity.  
44  Please refer to the joint paper by Basu Bal, A., Rajput, T. and Alizada P., International Single Window 
Environment: Prospects and Challenges presented at the ADBI Conference on 28-29 November 2016 
(forthcoming ADBI Working Paper publication). 
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 Currently, there are several challenges for a fuller implementation of ASW both from participation and 
functional perspectives. The first challenge is that ASEAN Member States are at different levels of 
economic development. Some of the Member States do not have a single window yet which can be 
integrated into the ASW environment. Implementing a single window at the national level is a matter of 
resources, expertise and national priority and political will.  
 
 The second challenge is that the ASEAN Member States have their own customs regimes and laws 
governing issues relevant for their respective NSW. This can pose a challenge for interoperability and legal 
certainty. The notion of legal certainty has been in demand since centuries with respect to the commercial 
transactions. The quest for induction of the ubi commercium, ibi ius has been the propelling force towards 
emergence of commercial customs and emergence of institutions for the settlement of commercial 
disputes.45 In other words, the Latin adage reflects the insight that the efficiency of markets and trade depend 
on legal certainty. In the context of the ASW, the notion of legal certainty is related to the ability of the 
businesses to predict and ascertain the meaning and effect of the legal framework. The hope is that a 
predictable rule oriented framework of the ASW will reduce risk associated with cross-border trade 
processes for businesses. In the same context, the success of the ASW will depend on how legal regimes of 
ASEAN Member States interoperate, especially to support cross-border transactions. In addition, some 
other legal issues crucial for providing the legal framework such as functional equivalence of paper and 
electronic documents, mutual recognition of digital signatures, etc. still need to be addressed.  
 
 For the future of ASW some interesting suggestions have been put forward. The first and foremost 
concerns the enlargement of scope of regional transactions for cross-border exchange of data within 
ASEAN and also between ASEAN and its dialogue partners. Other suggestions made in the same report are 
implementing the ASEAN Customs Transit System for the exchange of data in a single transit declaration 
directed to facilitate free movement of goods within the region; and launching a central trade repository for 
trade related information that can be accessed by traders. 46  
 
 An important aspect that merits consideration with respect to the ASW is the identification of key 
stakeholders. The identification is important because it will help in developing a business model for that 
can support the architecture’s operation and maintenance. UN/CEFACT Recommendation and Guidelines 
on Single Window Interoperability No. 36 also highlights the importance of identification of stakeholders.47 
The draft Recommendation indicates that it is crucial to identify what stakeholders require from 
interoperability for the assessment of feasibility. In such a case stakeholders’ needs become the key drivers 
of the system. Identification of the role and benefits of stakeholders of the ASW is crucial for its success. 
Once the stakeholders and their needs are identified, a suitable business process48 can be built for the 
operation and maintenance of the ASW.  
 
6. Integration Of Commercial Requirements In ISWE And Role of UNCITRAL 
 
 The discussion on stakeholders brings us to the consideration about the scope of ISWE. The question 
that arises is: whether the ISWE environment should focus primarily on trade regulatory issues? This 
question is of tremendous important because the arguable merit of implementing an ISWE is for creating 
an information channel which would address the entire supply chain. However, the ISWE which is primarily 
driven by has trade regulatory processes and data would entail the flow of G2G, B2G data which is not 
__________________ 
45  Petersmann, E.U.2006. Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of 
Dispute Settlement in International Trade. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law  
27(2) 273.  
46  UNNExT.2015. Towards an Enabling Environment for Paperless Trade-ASEAN Single Widow: A Regional Single 
Window for ASEAN Connectivity Brief No. 13. 
47  UN/CEFACT.2015. Draft Recommendation and Guidelines on Single Window  (Recommendation No.36) 
http://www1.unece.org/cefact/platform/download/attachments/48562914/150424+Rec36+Internal+Review+v1_
1.pdf.  
48  UN/CEFACT Rec. 36 defines business processes “as the way participants intend to play their respective roles, 
establish business relations and share responsibilities to interact efficiently with the support of their respective 
information systems”.  
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inclusive of the entire supply chain operations. It is submitted that the full potential of ISWE can be realized 
through integration of G2G, B2G and B2B information which is possible through the interoperability 
between single windows that include transport and commercial requirements. It is further submitted that 
the commercial aspects of international trade when enmeshed with transport requirements in the single 
windows at the country level will form the building block for an ISWE which will encompass G2G, B2G 
and B2B interactions. The single windows thus proposed should function as an interface between trade, 
customs and transport stakeholders by developing extensive inter-linkages to share information. Such 
integration will allow flow of real-time data that can offer numerous possibilities to enhance the visibility 
of international supply chains. The inclusion of the commercial and transport requirements in the ISWE 
will entail the participation of transport stakeholders such as carriers, shippers, ports, transport authorities, 
insurance providers, etc. The participation of such stakeholders is necessary to make the integration of G2G, 
B2G and B2B information possible.  
 
 Regulatory aspects of transport requirements have already been included in certain national single 
window systems to fulfil reporting and/or customs requirements. For example, the EU Maritime Single 
Window initiative simplifies and harmonizes the administrative procedures applied to maritime transport 
by making electronic transmission of information standard and also rationalizes ship-reporting formalities.49 
It is noteworthy that the commercial and financial aspects of international trade which are enmeshed with 
transport are not captured through the existing transport oriented single window initiatives. The inclusion 
of the commercial aspects in existing transport single windows is understandable as addition of various 
transport stakeholders into the single window system would require complex coordination that can capture 
the prevalent relationships between carrier interests, shipper interests, ports, transport authorities, insurance 
providers, etc., from legal and technical perspectives. 
 
 The question arises how can commercial and financial aspects of international trade connected with 
transport be included alongside the regulatory transport requirements in the ISWE. In the above context it 
is submitted that the emergence of blockchain, federated cloud computing and distributed ledger technology 
has opened up the possibilities for creating technical solutions for the complex arrangements of stakeholders 
in the transport industry. However, it should be noted that the enabling legal framework to support these 
technologies remains incomplete across jurisdictions. 
 
 The issue of dematerialization of transport and commercial documents in another challenge. In this 
respect, the contribution of UNCITRAL on the issue of dematerialisation of bill of lading is well settled. 
To illustrate, A bill of lading performs three functions, namely, it serves as evidence of the contract of 
carriage, acts as receipt for the goods, and is a document of title. The first two functions are easily replicated 
electronically as they essentially relate to transfer of information. The challenge lies in replicating the 
document of title function electronically which has implications under contract and property law. The 
Governing Framework Approach which has been created by UNCITRAL and CMI has settled the issue of 
dematerialization of bill of lading. The two relevant instruments are Rotterdam Rules and Model Law on 
Electronic Transferable Records. 
 
 The more pertinent question that arises is how can the relevant dematerialised information be 
channelized to fulfil the trade functions in an electronic business environment? It is submitted that the 
dematerialised information can be channelized to fulfil the trade functions in an electronic business 
environment through an information exchange channel. The ISWE can serve as information exchange 
infrastructure through which dematerialised information be channelized to fulfil the trade functions in an 
electronic business environment to facilitate the entire supply chain. However, for the ISWE to function as 
an information interchange channel, it should support trusted transboundary electronic interaction.50 Trusted 
transboundary electronic interaction is possible if interoperability is agreed at political, legal, 
__________________ 
49  The Reporting Formalities Directive 2010/65/EU requires all EU Member States to establish National Single 
Windows (NSW) to enable ships to report formalities when arriving in and/or departing from EU ports.  
50  See UNECE. 2016. Recommendation for Ensuring Legally Significant Trusted Transboundary Electronic 
Interaction 
https://www2.unece.org/cefact/display/uncefactpublic/Recommendation+for+ensuring+legally+signifi cant+trus
ted+transboundary+electronic+interaction.  
  
131 
organizational, semantic and technical levels. It should be noted that large enterprises have already achieved 
trusted transboundary electronic interaction contractually. Large enterprises use electronic data interchange 
(EDI) provided by large logistics service providers, such as DHL or UPS. These large logistics service 
providers have their enterprise resource planning (ERP), transport management and logistics systems that 
are connected to the ERP system of the large enterprise at one end and with customs and port authorities 
interface on the other end.51 This set up excludes entities that do not have advanced internal ERP systems 
and do not use the services of such large logistics service providers.  
 
 The issue of legal interoperability of trust has to be aligned through a supporting legal framework so 
that exchanged data through the ISWE is accorded proper legal weight across jurisdictions. The ISWE 
needs to be supported by a legal framework for trusted transboundary transaction. UNCITRAL may serve 
as a forum to create such legal framework for establishing necessary level of trust between the participants 
of the trusted infrastructure that will ensure legal significance of transboundary electronic exchange of data 
issued in different jurisdictions. In this context UNCITRAL could make a significant contribution through 
its work on trust and identity management. In 2015, several proposals were submitted to UNCITRAL 
recommending that it undertake a project to develop a basic legal framework covering identity management 
and trust services as well as of cloud computing to facilitate international cross-border interoperability.52 
Working Group IV has now been tasked to move forward with such a project.53Also, organizational 
interoperability and semantic interoperability will require preparation of recommendations that can be 
agreed and understood by all parties. UN/CEFACT may take a leading role to prepare recommendations on 
how to build and manage national trust infrastructures in a best way so they would be interoperable with 
each other for trade facilitation.  
 
 Another effort worth noting is the Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-Border Paperless 
Trade in Asia and the Pacific,54 which was adopted by UN/ESCAP and is open for signature from 1 October 
2016. Article 1 of the Agreement states that the objective is to facilitate cross-border paperless trade by 
enabling data exchange and mutual recognition of electronic trade data among willing ESCAP member 
States through dedicated intergovernmental framework to develop legal and technical solutions. This 
Agreement provide ESCAP member States with a digital complement for better implementation of the 
WTO TFA as well as on-going bilateral and sub-regional initiatives, such as the ASW. Article 5 of the 
Agreement sets out the general principles to facilitate interoperability between paperless trade systems and 
to ensure that solutions developed under the agreement lead both to higher levels of trade facilitation and 
regulatory compliance. Article 12 provides a comprehensive action plan to develop standardized solutions 
and protocols for cross-border electronic exchange and recognition of trade-related data and documents, 
including pilot projects. UNCITRAL participated in the drafting process of the Agreement with a view to 
ensuring its consistency with UNCITRAL texts on e-commerce.55 
 
 
 
 
__________________ 
51  Gleaned from discussions with Abhinayan Basu Bal, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden.  
52  See in general UNCITRAL — Report of Working Group IV (Electronic Commerce) on the work of its fifty-third 
session (A/CN.9/869); Legal Issues Related to Identity Management and Trust Services  (A/CN.9/891); Possible 
future work in the area of electronic commerce — legal issues related to identity management and trust services 
— Proposal by Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Poland (A/CN.9/854); Overview of identity management — 
Background paper submitted by the Identity Management Legal Task Force of the American Bar Association  
(A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.120); Online dispute resolution for cross-border electronic commerce transactions: 
Submission by the Russian Federation  (A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.136); and Possible future work in the area of 
electronic commerce — Contractual issues in the provision of cloud computing services — Proposal by Canada 
(A/CN.9/856).  
53  See UNCITRAL. 2016. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its 
forty-ninth session (A/71/17) 48. 
54 http://www.unescap.org/resources/framework-agreement-facilitation-cross-border-paperless-trade-asia-and-
pacific.  
55  See note 54 above. 
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7. Concluding Remarks  
 
 TFA’s entry into force may serve as impetus to engage in the preparation of a multilateral Framework 
Agreement to provide the legal basis for ISWE. UNCITRAL has recently started work on identity 
management and trust services as well as cloud computing to facilitate cross-border interoperability. In the 
coming years this effort may ensure legally significant trusted transboundary electronic interaction to 
include the commercial and transport aspects in ISWE. 
 
 The efforts of various international institutions discussed above indicate that trade facilitation 
initiatives have picked momentum across the globe. What may be found in all such initiatives are a number 
of interwoven commercial and trade law issues that may need to be addressed. If UNCITRAL has to be 
relevant as an institution engaged in the modernization and harmonization of rules on international business 
in the digital era it should co-operate with other international institutions engaged in facilitating trade. This 
is because UNCITRAL rules only provide a piece of the puzzle of international trade in the digital era. Both 
public and private law initiatives are relevant in context of single window, paperless trade and e-commerce 
issues. It is suggested that deeper cooperation between UNCITRAL, WTO, UNNeXT, WCO, UN/CEFACT 
can create synergetic norms in the area of both public and private law for facilitating trade in the digital era. 
UNCITRAL has the potential to support ISWE by providing a strong law framework that would contribute 
to achieve SW interoperability and enhanced information management. In addition, UNCITRAL’s work 
must focus on build an inclusive trading environment in particular for the SME’s and for that it must 
continue to lay emphasis on equality of opportunities for business actors participating in international trade.  
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Logistics Contracts: Outdated International Regulation? 
 
Ezequiel T. Condoluci Santa Maria, Queen Mary University of London, United Kingdom 
 
Introduction 
 
 As the title suggests, the main issue of this paper is to raise the question of whether the current 
international legal framework is fitted to rule over Logistics Contracts (LCs)1 or not, analysing its nature as 
a Sui Generis2 one, with its own identity and distinct from other commercial contracts. 
 
 It is important to highlight the key role that UNCITRAL3 may have on the regulatory harmonisation 
process for LCs. It seems to be the natural institution to coordinate and boost the potential modifications 
over the current international legal framework regarding them.  
 
 In this paper, LCs will mean : those commercial contracts by which logistics services providers 
perform “logistics services” such as transport, warehousing, handling of goods in general (among others) 
to cargo owners (usually producers of goods). 
 
 Nowadays the international logistics services providers offer a wide range of services to meet the needs 
of international trading companies on a worldwide basis. Cargo owners need someone with expertise to 
treat their goods in an efficient way to enable the final delivery for consumption and as a consequence of 
that, logistics operators have become more aware of their clients’ needs usually assuming the role of real 
partners in their businesses. 
 
 Within this document those companies moving freight around the world will be broadly called 
“Logistics Operator” (LO)4 with a focus on big LCs handling a significant number of goods. 
 
 In order to shed light on the potential need of specific international regulation and probably some 
harmonization as well, the first stage of the analysis will allow to assess whether or not LCs should be 
considered as Sui Generis contracts even when the doctrine and most of the national and international 
regulations do not give this special categorization to them. 
 
 The intention of this document is to highlight the importance of logistics as an economic activity in a 
global international trade context and to provide the reader with some key elements which might enable 
him to consider the LC as an independent commercial contract with a Sui Generis nature. It will take into 
account the potential inefficient or insufficient regulation for these contracts in some local jurisdictions and 
international conventions. 
 
  
__________________ 
1  Or “LCs” for plural. 
2  C. O. S Mawson, Dictionary of Foreign Terms, (2 ed., New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, ISBN 0-690-
00171-1, 1975, p.328): “Sui Generis: Of its (his, her, or their) own kind; in a class by itself; unique”. 
3  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
4  Or “LOs” for plural. 
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Chapter 1: Logistics, Pure logistics services and LC concept 
 
Section 1.1: Logistics Concept 
 
 Etymologically, the word “logistics” comes from “logisticus”5 (Medieval Latin) meaning “of 
calculation” and from the Greek “logistikos”6 (λογιστικός), meaning “skilled in calculating” while the 
Oxford dictionary on-line defines it as “the detailed organization and implementation of a complex 
operation”7.  
 
 Moreover, the European Logistics Association defines it as “the organization, planning, control and 
execution of the goods flow from development and purchasing, through production and distribution, to the 
final customer in order to satisfy the requirements of the market at minimum costs and capital use”8. The 
modern concept of logistics derives from the French “logistique”9 as France was one of the first countries 
to implement the term in the way it is recognized nowadays.  
 
 Within the commercial field, until the early 80’s, transportation of goods, their distribution and the 
different systems of warehousing, were organized in a relatively independent way. 
 
 As the world became more globalized, the different processes of production that had been implemented 
among different countries geographically located in distant parts of the planet ended up in a more cohesive 
reality. 
 
 Nowadays, it can be affirmed that logistics is the major enabler of our economy and lifestyle. 
 
 All the goods manufactured need to be located close to consumers and most of the time this task is 
usually a really complex one.  
 
 Furthermore, regarding the European Union countries, the 2015 Report of the European Commission, 
affirmed that the whole European logistics market size (including the EU28 countries) amounted to about 
€ 878 bn in 2012.10  
 
 These brief references clearly show the importance of the logistics activity in the commercial markets 
of those jurisdictions considered in the present document. 
 
 Therefore, it is clear that during the last decades the concept of logistics has been modified in order to 
provide a comprehensive service to cargo owners. 
 
 The traditional services of carriage of goods and warehousing are no longer considered as individual 
services when a complex logistics operation system is implemented. Indeed there are much more tailor 
made services particularly linked to them and of a pure logistics nature that the LO performs in order to 
offer general handling of goods within a certain timeframe according to the requirements of the cargo owner. 
Regarding the extension of this paper, the contracts of Carriage of Goods and Warehousing, which are 
almost always present on LCs, are not going to be discussed. 
__________________ 
5  Love to Know Corp. — Your Dictionary, ‘Logistic’ definition: <http://www.yourdictionary.com/logistic> 
accessed 30 July 2016. 
6  E. H. Pflugfelder, Communicating Mobility and Technology, a material rhetoric for persuasive for 
transportation, (Rouledge. Pg. 87). 
7  Oxford University Press — Oxford Dictionary, ‘Logistics’ definition: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/english/logistics> accessed 30 July 2016. 
8  Concargo Pty (Ltd), ‘Definition of Logistics’: <http://www.concargo.com/client-lounge/definitions/logistics/> 
accessed 30 July 2016. 
9  Larousse Dictionary, ‘Logistique’ definition: <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/logistique/47678> 
accessed 30 July 2016. 
10  European Commission Report, ‘Logistics and Multimodal Transport’: <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/ 
logistics_multimodal/logistics/index_en.htm> accessed 30 July 2016.  
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 These are regulated contracts in the international framework and later on some brief references will 
be provided. Instead, pure logistics services will be described as follows.  
 
Section 2.1: Pure logistics services: Brief overview  
 
Sub-Section 2.1.1: Cross Docking11 
 
Cross Docking can be defined as a logistics service: 
 
 [W]here products from a supplier or manufacturing plant are distributed directly to a customer or retail 
chain with marginal to no handling or storage time. Cross docking takes place in a distribution docking 
terminal; usually consisting of trucks and dock doors on two (inbound and outbound) sides with minimal 
storage space. The name ‘cross docking’ explains the process of receiving products through an inbound 
dock and then transferring them across the dock to the outbound transportation dock.12 
 
 In order to implement this particular service as a logistics operation, it is important for the cargo owner 
to analyse how it will impact on the improvement of his business.  
 
 Some classic examples to implement this logistics model are cases in which food is involved. Food 
needs to be kept at a certain temperature and to be transported within a short time-frame. For cases involving 
already packaged goods which need to be delivered to certain clients of the cargo owner on a regular basis 
under specific instructions which are usually non compatible with normal storage of goods, Cross Docking 
is deemed as a really interesting logistics solution. 
 
Sub-Section 2.1.2: Material handling (picking)13 
 
 The material handling of the goods is an essential service in every logistics operation. 
 
 It means the general classification, allocation and particularly the way by which goods will be 
“collected” when dispatch is necessary. 
 
 There are different “systems” by which these tasks can be performed by the LO and certain software 
will be always necessary to implement them. It will depend on which software is available to determine 
which system can be implemented regarding each particular LC. 
 
Sub-Section 2.1.3: Packaging, Inventory and Security 
 
- Packaging: The cargo owner may not have the expertise to assume the role of “allocating” the goods to 
the correct path and it could be costly to prepare the goods either for consumption or storage.  
 
The LO will contribute to allocated the goods either for storage or final consumption.  
 
This service is usually associated with other logistics services and it is an important part of most LCs.  
 
The process of treatment of scrap is usually linked to this service of logistics operations. 
 
- Inventory:14 Inventory costs are usually a big concern of every cargo owner and LO. 
 
__________________ 
11  Adaptalift, ‘Logistics and Materials Handling Blogs’ : <http://www.aalhysterforklifts.com.au/index.php/  
about/blog-post/what_is_cross_docking_understanding_the_concept_definition> accessed 30 July 2016. 
12  Ibid. 
13  The Logistics Business Ltd., ‘Order Picking: How efficient is your system?’ : <http://www.logistics.co.uk/order-
picking-how-efficient-is-your-system/> accessed 30 July 2016. 
14  The Logistics Business Ltd., ‘Inventory Optimization’: <http://www.logistics.co.uk/products/inventory-
optimisation/> accessed 30 July 2016. 
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From the cargo owner perspective, he is trusting the LO to handle his goods during a certain period of 
time on a specific route and he wants to have total control of what is going on during the storage stage. 
 
From the perspective of LOs, it is a big concern since he assumed the liability in case of any loss or 
damage and he will be interested in keeping a certain control over his stock.  
 
Different software is used for these aims and details will depend on each single LC. 
 
- Security: Security services are often being offered by LOs as a complement of the main logistics 
services since cargo owners are concerned about the security of their goods.  
 
Even when the LO assumes his duty of care over the goods, there are some circumstances in which, 
even when insurance policies had been obtained for that specific purpose, the cargo owner will be happy 
to know that security services can strengthen the preservation of his goods. 
 
Section 3: LC Concept  
 
 As previously defined, the LC is as a commercial contract by which the LO agrees to perform certain 
logistics services in favour of the cargo owner for consideration.  
 
 Regarding the logistics services mentioned in the provided definition, it is important to highlight the 
fact that it will depend on the requirements of each cargo owner. Furthermore, there are some services that 
are mainly present on every LC: these are the traditional carriage of goods and warehousing services which 
are going to be discussed later on.  
 
 On the other hand, all those logistics services exclusively provided by the LO have been examined as 
well. Those services basically consist of the handling of goods in a certain way that permits to allocate them 
within a certain timeframe and way as already instructed by the cargo owner. It is important to mention that 
the scope of the services included in the LC is not always clearly described on it and sometimes certain 
issues can arise during the term of the contract related with certain common confusions usually from the 
cargo owner’s perspective.  
 
 A good example could be within the service of warehousing15. Worldwide cargo owners usually 
consider that this service includes a comprehensive service of the handling of goods. It is an ‘all inclusive’ 
service since the goods stay at the warehouse up to the moment that they are picked up. On the contrary, 
for the LO this service means just the service of storage of goods. Additional services involving handling 
should be clearly provided on the contract in order to avoid any kind of misunderstanding.  
 
 Even when the LC is tailor made for every particular case, there are certain clauses that are always 
present on every single LC — or should be — and somehow these can be deemed as “mandatory” elements 
for any LC.  
 
 Considering the required limitations regarding the extension of this paper some of them will be just 
mentioned as follows: Minimum volumes, Liability for damages of the Goods clauses16, KPI (Key 
Performance Indicators)17, Contract term and termination clause18, Choice of law and Court clause19 and 
the Insurance clause20. 
 
__________________ 
15  DSV, ‘Logistics Contract Negotiation’: <http://www.uk.dsv.com/logistics-solutions/Expert-Insights/Logistics-
Contract-Negotiation> accessed 30 July 2016. 
16  See n 15. 
17  Oxford University Press — Oxford Dictionary: ‘Key Performance Indicator’ definition: 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/key-performance-indicator> accessed 30 July 2016. 
18  See n 15. 
19  See n 15. 
20  See n 15. 
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Chapter 2: LC Regulation: International Overview 
 
Section 2.1: International Approach  
 
 The LC can be analysed from a local approach within different jurisdictions but as there is usually an 
international element in every big logistics operation — even more when our work is focusing on big LOs 
— the relevant international legal framework will be highlighted in this section. 
 
 As Diplock LJ stated in the English Fothergill case21 supporting the idea that international conventions 
should be interpreted considering the international origins of the rules and not being limited by the rigid 
local legislations,22 regardless of the factual possibility of applying different legal approaches for 
international LCs, when analysing the international framework for LCs in detail, there is no direct reference 
to this contract among the current international conventions.  
 
 Therefore it can sometimes be difficult to adapt certain legal concepts and rules extracted from 
regulations aimed to rule on different commercial contracts such as international carriage of goods. 
 
 Firstly, it is necessary to highlight once again the idea that, within most of the European countries the 
LC has not being considered as such by local regulations and somehow, as a result of that, international 
conventions are mostly not even applying the concept of “logistics”. 
 
 It is interesting to consider the Swedish approach in regards to this issue since the question of the 
possibility of applying international conventions on carriage of goods to LCs has been strongly debated in 
Scandinavian legal literature23 and is yet unresolved by case law24. 
 
 Within the European international context, two different legal conceptions seem to coexist when 
considering the nature of LCs.  
 
 According to one of them the LC is mainly a contract of carriage of goods with additional services and 
according to the other one the LC is a totally different contract from the carriage of goods by which different 
logistics services are efficiently settled and performed following certain instructions of the cargo owner and 
in a certain timeframe. 
 
 The latter approach seems to be more comprehensive considering how the LC works in real legal 
practice nowadays. Furthermore, as will be described later, German Standard Terms for contracting usually 
apply a similar approach categorizing the LC under the concept of “mixed contracts”25. Thus, rules for 
carriage of goods will apply for the actual performance of carriage under the scope of the LC and other 
specific regulations will apply for those other services considered under the LC such as warehousing, 
security, etc.  
 
 As mentioned above, within the international framework it is hard find even a brief reference to the 
“logistics” activity. This is the case since, even though this industry has become a key aspect of the 
international economic activity, most legal practitioners and LOs are still considering LCs either as a 
__________________ 
21  Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd — House Of Lords 2 [1981] AC 251; [1980] 2 All ER 696; [1980] 3 WLR 209; 
[1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 295, (33 ICLQ 797): “The language of an international convention has not been chosen 
by an English parliamentary draftsman. It is neither couched in the conventional English legisla tive idiom nor 
designed to be construed exclusively by English Judges. It is addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial 
audience than is an Act of Parliament that deals with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted as Lord 
Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan & Co”. 
22  M. Hoeks, ‘Multimodal Transport Law: The Law Applicable to the Multimodal Contract for the Carriage of 
Goods’, (Kluwer International 2010, pg. 134). 
23  V. Ulfbeck: ‘Contracts of Logistics under the Rotterdam Rules’, (The journal of International Maritime Law, Vol. 
17, 2011, p. 219). 
24  Ibid., (p. 220). 
25  Ibid., (p.221). 
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contract of carriage of goods and/or a warehousing one; and the lack of specificity in international 
regulations seems to reflect that. 
 
 Among the main international conventions that are nowadays applied to LCs the following regulations 
are usually considered: 
 
- Hague Visby Rules26 and Hamburg Rules27: may apply to international carriage of goods by sea where 
LOs and/or cargo owners are based on signatories countries of these conventions depending the scope 
of each particular LC. The limits of liability stated on the Hague Visby Rules are usually taken into 
account by the parties when analysing pros and cons among other aspects.28  
 
- International Convention of Multimodal Transport 1980 United Nations Convention on International 
Multimodal Transport of Goods (Geneva, 24 May 1980) United Nations (UN) (ICMT): The ICMT 
seems to be the first international attempt to consider global and complex logistics operations by 
considering different means of transport for international carriage of goods contracts. Its art. 1 defines 
the “international multimodal transport” as: “the carriage of goods by at least two different modes of 
transport on the basis of a multimodal transport contract from a place in one country at which the 
goods are taken over by the multimodal transport operator to a place designated for delivery situated 
in a different country”. 
 
 Even though this convention is not taking a comprehensive approach in relation to international 
logistics, since it only refers to the international carriage of goods, it is necessary to recognize that, ruling 
on different means of transport, contributed to shed light on the legal framework of international logistics 
which usually includes more than one means of transport. 
 
- Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) — (Geneva, 19 
May 1956) United Nations (UN):29 Regarding transportation of goods by road, the Convention for the 
CMR applies to almost all the transportation of goods within the countries of the EU.30 
 
- United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea (Rotterdam Rules 2009): The Rotterdam Rules need to be mentioned as part of this section since, 
even when they have not been enforced yet, it is the most recent convention aimed to govern the 
international carriage (totally or partly) by sea which is a key means of transport usually included in 
international LCs. 
__________________ 
26  The Hague-Visby Rules — The Hague Rules as Amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968.  Article X: “The 
provisions of these Rules shall apply to every bill of lading relating to the carriage of goods between ports in 
two different States if (a) the bill of lading is issued in a contracting State, or (b) the carriage is from a port in 
a contracting State, or (c) the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that these Rules 
or legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract; whatever may be the nationality of 
the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the consignee, or any other interested person”. 
27  United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg, 1978) (the “Hamburg Rules”) Article 2. 
Scope of application 1: “The provisions of this Convention are applicable to all contracts of carriage by sea 
between two different States, if: (a) the port of loading as provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is 
located in a Contracting State, or (b) the port of discharge as provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is 
located in a Contracting State, or (c) one of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract of 
carriage by sea is the actual port of discharge and such port is located in a Contracting State, or (d) the bill of 
lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is issued in a Contracting State, or (e) the 
bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea provides that the provisions of this 
Convention or the legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the cont ract”. 
28  See n 21. 
29  International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) — (Geneva, 19 May 1956) United Nations (UN): Chapter 1 — 
Scope of Application, Article 1 1: “This Convention shall apply to every contract for the carriage of goods by 
road in vehicles for reward, when the place of taking over of the goods and the place designated for delivery, as 
specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting country, 
irrespective of the place of residence and the nationality of the parties.” 
30  B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn: ‘Carriage of goods by sea, land and air: unimodal and multimodal transport in the 
21st century’, (Abingdon: Informa Law, 2014, pg.254).  
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 The inclusion of the possibility of warehousing on the Port Terminal31 can be considered as an 
important progress of ruling over LCs. It seems to be the first time that carriage of goods has not been 
regulated by an isolated contract as was the case on previous occasions. As a consequence, the wording of 
this convention can be deemed to be a closer approach to logistics operations as they are actually performed 
nowadays. 
 
 Regardless of that, several problems have been detected regarding some mandatory rules that this 
convention imposes on the cargo owner/shipper such as “delivery ready for carriage”32 or the mandatory 
rule about providing information of the goods.33 Therefore, if one of the main features of the Rotterdam 
Rules was to transfer liability from the cargo owner/shipper to the LO, these rules are likely to raise different 
legal issues especially in those cases where logistics services have been totally outscored by the LO. Some 
examples are the lack of “necessary information” by the cargo owner/shipper for the general handling of 
the goods or the factual impossibility of the cargo owner/shipper to do the “delivery ready for carriage”34 
when all the packaging is undertaken by the LO. 
 
 Considering the required limitations regarding the extension of this paper, it is not possible to provide 
details of different local approaches. Regardless of that, jurisdictions such as France35, England, Germany36, 
Sweden37 and Uruguay38 have been researched and it is necessary to mention that there is currently no local 
legal system including a particular regulation on LC´s. Instead, the rules on the contracts of carriage of 
goods and warehousing will generally apply to LCs. 
 
Chapter 3: Specificity of the LC Object  
 
 As was mentioned previously there are different services included on every LC. At least either the 
service of carriage of goods or warehousing will be always present in a LC. 
 
__________________ 
31  Rotterdam Rules: Art. 1.7: “Maritime performing party: A performing party to the extent that it performs or 
undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations during the period between the arrival of the goods at the 
port of loading of a ship and their departure from the port of discharge of a ship. An inland carrier is a maritime 
performing party only if it performs or undertakes to perform its services exclusively within a port area ”. 
32  Rotterdam Rules. Art. 27: “Unless otherwise agreed in the contract of carriage, the shipper shall deliver the 
goods ready for carriage. In any event, the shipper shall deliver the goods in such condition that they will 
withstand the intended carriage, including their loading, handling, stowing, lashing and securing, and 
unloading, and that they will not cause harm to persons or property”. 
33  Rotterdam Rules Art. 29: “Shipper’s obligation to provide information, instructions and documents: 1. The 
shipper shall provide to the carrier in a timely manner such information, instructions and documents relating to 
the goods that are not otherwise reasonably available to the carrier, and that are reasonably necessary: (a) For 
the proper handling and carriage of the goods, including precautions to be taken by the carrier or a performing 
party; and (b) For the carrier to comply with law, regulations or other requirements of public authorities in 
connection with the intended carriage, provided that the carrier notifies the shipper in a timely manner of the 
information, instructions and documents it requires. 2. Nothing in this article affects any specific obligation to 
provide certain information, instructions and documents related to the goods pursuant to law, regulations or 
other requirements of public authorities in connection with the intended carriage”. 
34  See n 60 (p.221-222). 
35  Khezami S., ‘Le Contrat de Logistique’, (Centre de Droit Maritime et des Transports, Université de Droit 
D’économie et des Sciences D’Aix — Marseille); Kembeu J., ‘Le contrat de prestations logistiques, contrat 
complexe ou contrat sui generis? Etude de la notion et du régime du contrat de prostrations logistiques’, (14ème 
Journée doctorale en transport, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées) <http://afitl.ish-
lyon.cnrs.fr/tl_files/documents/vie-association/journee-doctorale/presentations2009/Jacques_Kembeu.pdf > 
accessed 08 January 2017. 
36  DSLV — Deutscher Speditions- und Logistikverband e.V. (German Association for freight forwarding and 
logistics), ‘General terms and conditions of logistics-services providers’<http://www.jcl-
logistics.com/assets/PDF/AGB/LogistikAGBenglisch. pdf> accessed 08 January 2017 
37  Forslund H.: ‘Logistics service performance contracts: design, contents and effects’, (School of Management and 
Economics, Växjö University, Växjö, Sweden, Emerald 2008); Ramber J., ‘The Future of Transport operators 
and Service Providers’, (Heinonline, 46 Scandinavian Stud. L. 135 2004); Olander M. and Norrman A.: ‘Legal 
analysis of a contract for advanced logistics services’, (Lund University, Lund, Sweden, Emerald 2012).  
38  INALOG: <http://www.inalog.org.uy/> accessed 08 January 2017. 
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 These are modalities of LCs and not contracts themselves when considering logistics operations. 
 
 Additionally, the LC should not be considered as a mere juxtaposition of logistics services; on the 
contrary it should be deemed as a really precise commercial contract which efficiently connects different 
services in a logistic way in order to make the supply chain work properly according to the needs of the 
cargo owner.  
 
 What is intended to be established is the nature of the LC and the analysis of the specificity of its object 
can help to determine it. As mentioned previously, there is a large variety of services that could be included 
under a LC: carriage of goods, warehousing, material handling (Picking, etc.), inventory, packaging and 
often security.  
 
 The real possibility of adapting the main object of the contract while the contract conserves its own 
identity as LC; and more important, the fact that there are different services of a logistics nature which 
efficiently connect logistics services considering not only taking goods from “A” to “B” as the traditional 
models suggested, but also doing so in conformity with a certain schedule and with the particular rhythm 
of the cargo owner´s business, is what distinguishes this contract and renders it unique.  
 
 Regarding liability issues that may arise when the LC is tried to be adapted to carriage of goods or 
warehousing regulations, (among others) the extended liability of the LO over the goods seems to deserve 
a revision. 
 
 At a descriptive stage, it is possible to assess that transportation liability rules and warehousing ones 
are not the same. They are directed to different contexts so the problems and solutions that may arise are 
distinctive.  
 
 The problem arises when the role of LO is defined as someone with real expertise on logistics who is 
going to carry, store and handle the goods. 
 
 It is at this point that it can be affirmed that the liability in LOs is extended. When providing 
transportation services, liability will not be terminated when the goods are delivered as is the case in a 
carriage of goods contract. This is because of the fact that it is the same LO who is formally taking the 
goods when the transportation service is over.  
 
 The same happens when analysing the storage of the goods stage by a LO. Once the storage service is 
completed, the goods may be taken by the same LO who acted as warehouse man but who will be also 
acting as carrier. 
 
 However, if a situation is considered in which the obligation and liability of the LO is still active until 
the delivery of the goods is finalised — in regard to delivery for final consumption (even when other 
logistics services have been provided in between) the LO will be still liable for the goods but under the 
terms of the carriage of goods contract. So, what about any issue arising during the storage of the goods? 
In this case, strict liability (English law) under the contract of carriage of goods could be applied to the LO 
but it might not present a fair solution. Especially since among different regulations, the duties of the 
warehouseman are not usually deemed as an “obligation of result39” (applied on Civil Law jurisdictions. 
But even when this concept is not usually applied under common law legal systems, “strict liability” sets 
up similar consequences).  
 
 And what about those cases in which there is a regular supply chain provided by the LO to the cargo 
owner in which certain goods are taken by the LO, carried, stored, carried to another smaller warehouse 
and regularly part of these goods are delivered to final destinations for final consumption? This is usually 
the case of fast moving consuming goods (FMCG) owners who completely outsource their supply chain 
services. Should the first delivery of only a part of the goods be deemed as partial delivery or as a final one? 
__________________ 
39  Result obligation: obligations to deliver a certain result. 
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In the last case, how should the liability be assessed in regard to those goods still stored under the control 
of the same LO? The duties of the LO should be deemed already covered? Even when a contract can 
consider several factual situations, the current regulation is not giving precise solutions to this kind of 
questioning since the LC is still tied to outdated models of law: mainly the traditional contracts of carriage 
and warehousing. 
 
 As mentioned previously, when researching different local regulations, no references related to the 
issue of liability of LOs could be found. Not even the word logistics is usually mentioned among their 
rulings. Most of the local legal frameworks just directed their efforts solely to transportation and 
warehousing services.  
Nonetheless, within the international legal framework, as already discussed, the attempt of the Rotterdam 
Rules (2009) seems to be an interesting approach as some logistics services were considered within its 
content. 
 
 One example is the definition of “inland carrier” in art. 1.7 already provided by which the following 
definition of “Maritime performing party” is stated: “A performing party to the extent that it performs or 
undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations during the period between the arrival of the goods 
at the port of loading of a ship and their departure from the port of discharge of a ship. An inland carrier 
is a maritime performing party only if it performs or undertakes to perform its services exclusively within 
a port area”. 
 
 Therefore, the inland carrier will be someone who is providing services within the port terminal such 
as: warehousing and general handling of the goods; similar to the idea of a LO. 
 
 Additionally, this convention also presents an original feature regarding the previous conventions such 
as the Hamburg Rules40 in regard to the period of liability of the carrier. Art 12.1 of Rotterdam Rules states: 
“The period of responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention begins when the carrier or 
a performing party receives the goods for carriage and ends when the goods are delivered” 
 
 Moreover, in art. 13.1, it states that: “The carrier shall during the period of its responsibility … 
properly and carefully receive, load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, unload and deliver the goods.” 
 
 The terms “keep” and “care for” can allow thinking about a warehousing service provided by the 
“carrier” under the convention but it is necessary to bear in mind that the intention of the article is to 
examine the obligations of the “carrier” as defined in art. 1.541 and even when storage is considered there 
is the limitation of art. 1.7 which has already been discussed. 
 
 This is an interesting approach to the idea of LOs considering the way logistics services are performed 
nowadays, but it is quite limited since the Rotterdam Rules do not consider the full logistic service that a 
LO is actually providing to cargo owners. Indeed the scope of the convention would be the main limit since 
it is aimed at International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly by Sea). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The specificity of the object of the LC, as was indicated in chapter 3 represents an essential particular 
element of this contract considering the multiple possible scopes it can encompass while keeping the same 
legal identity.  
 
 The fact that logistics services are no longer considered as merely moving goods from “A” to “B” as 
was regarded by the traditional conception, but as to consider the transportation and the storage of goods 
__________________ 
40  Hamburg Rules Art. 4.1: “The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention covers the period 
during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of 
discharge”. 
41  Rotterdam Rules Art. 1.5: “Carrier means a person that enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper”. 
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within a certain timeframe and according to very specific and detailed instructions from the cargo owner, 
makes the LC a comprehensive legal concept different from the mere transportation or warehousing 
contracts. 
 
 Notwithstanding this contractual uniqueness and the fast path growth of logistics activities in the past 
few decades, local and international regulations still seem to be reluctant to give the treatment LCs might 
deserve. Legal issues related with the liability of the LO seem to be one of the weakest points of most of 
the current legal frameworks ruling over commercial relations under a LC. 
 
 Despite of the unwillingness of legislators to acknowledge the growing importance of LC, as the 
supply chain approach has been shaped by the perspective of big cargo owners, the implementation of new 
logistics models gave the LC an extraordinary impulse to get a tacit and indirect recognition42 which cannot 
be denied nowadays. 
 
 Furthermore, as described in chapter 2, in most of the analysed jurisdictions, the current applicable 
regulations seem to be unfit for logistics processes and particularly dispersed. This is usually deemed as an 
obstacle for predictability for the contracting parties. The applicable legal framework will be determined 
considering the scope of each LC. Thus there seems to be an additional barrier for the LO and cargo owner. 
 
 Moreover, while this recognition still depends on the legislator, legal practitioners and contracting 
parties have moved forward negotiating and agreeing on terms usually based on the guidelines provided by 
Standard Terms for LCs (Logistics chambers). 
 
 An additional unexplored area regarding the functioning of the LC is the “qualification” of the LO by 
the inscription on public registries which should be developed as further research.  
 
 The reasoning behind this suggestion is that as nowadays logistics services are a key aspect of every 
economic structure, it should not be provided by any person or company just because they are able to offer 
or do so. The services offered under LC are (or should be) performed by highly qualified LOs with real 
expertise in the logistics field. Even when intermediary parties are the ones actually performing the services, 
the LO is usually acts as principal and fully assumes liability under most local and international regulations. 
Hence, the inscription would be deemed as a guarantee of transparency of information for cargo owners 
applicable to all contracts (or only to those contracts dealing with certain goods when Public Policy reasons 
arise,) since an authority would be supervising and approving this “qualification”.  
 
 The intention of this work highlighted the existence and nature of the LC considering the relevant role 
of logistics within every economic system. Therefore, various elements allow defending the categorization 
of LCs as Sui Generis.43  
 
 As the LC came to stand out as the de facto main contractual way to agree on terms for national and 
international logistics, legal provisions based on old concepts and business structures such as traditional 
contracts of carriage or warehousing are likely to become outdated. 
 
 Regardless of that, some legal modifications might be expected for the medium and long-term within 
some EU jurisdictions and the international legal framework and UNCITRAL seems to have a key role in 
this task. 
 
__________________ 
42  R. A Etcheverry, Derecho Comercial y Económico, Obligaciones y Contratos Comerciales , (Parte General, 
Astrea, Argentina pg. 114 et seq). 
43  Oxford University Press — Oxford Dictionary, ‘Sui Generis’ definition: “Different of all other…things” 
<http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/sui-generis> accessed 30 July 2016. 
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Rules for Electronic Platforms:  
The Role of Platforms and Intermediaries in Digital Economy 
A Case for Harmonization  
 
Teresa Rodríguez-de-las-Heras Ballell, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain 
 
 
I. From Transaction-Oriented Rules to Platform-Focused Regulation: A Case for a Change of Approach 
 
 In its infancy, the irruption of digital technology did clearly start impacting on the contracting process 
and transforming transaction components (writing, signature, original, message, methods for the 
manifestation of consent, sending and reception of electronic communications). The real challenge posed 
by digital technology at its early stage was to assess which adaptations of existing legal concepts were 
needed and/or which new rules were required by the use of electronic communications and digital medium 
in the negotiation, the formation and the performance of contracts. The pioneering UNCITRAL texts on 
electronic commerce did perfectly understand such needs and flawlessly address them first in the Model 
Laws — UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 1996; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures, 2001 — and subsequently in the Convention — United Nations Convention on the Use of 
Electronic Communications in International Contracts, 2005 -. Within the framework demarcated mainly 
by the principles of functional equivalence and technological neutrality, these international texts set out the 
legal equivalences for paper-based institutions and provide for the basic rules to ensure the legal recognition 
of the use of electronic communications in (international) contracts.  
 
 UNCITRAL Model Laws first and UN Convention afterwards enshrined the fundamental principles 
of electronic commerce law and inspired regional initiatives and a number of domestic legislations. Today, 
it can be firmly affirmed that a legal framework for electronic contracting has been consolidated.  
  
 Nevertheless, the accelerated evolution of digital economy has shown that digital technology is not 
only transforming contractual process and transaction components — as the use of electronic commerce in 
the formation and the performance of contracts reveals — but it is also reshaping structures and 
organizations and even creating new environments for business activities, social relationships, education, 
entertainment, public services or cultural initiatives. The most conspicuous manifestation of such a 
transformative power is the pervasive expansion of electronic platforms. Certainly, digital economy is today 
a platform economy. Electronic platforms are the dominant organizational model1 for business activities, 
social networks, emerging businesses, public environments or educational systems in today digital society.2 
Remarkably, the emergence and increasing popularity of disruptive models, such as sharing-based economy, 
crowdfunding or fintech variants, have not only been made possible but greatly stimulated by the platform-
based organizational solution.  
 
 Rules adopted by UNCITRAL instruments, and their adaptations in domestic and regional texts, did 
successfully deal with and resolve digital challenges related to the use of electronic means and digital 
medium (electronic communications) in the formation and the performance of contracts. These existing 
rules are clearly transaction-oriented. They conceive the transaction as the relevant unit for regulation 
purposes and they build up the rules on the electronic communication as the minimum denominator of 
electronic contracting situations. Such problems, rules and solutions represent the first generation of 
electronic commerce. Legal concerns aroused by electronic platforms usher into the second generation of 
electronic commerce.  
__________________ 
1  MALONE, Thomas W., “Modelling Coordination in Organizations and Markets”, Management Science, vol. 33, 
num. 10, October 1987, pp. 1317-1332; MALONE, Thomas W.; YATES, JoAnne, BENJAMIN, Robert I., 
“Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies”, Communications of the ACM, (30:6), June 1987, pp. 484-497. 
2  A thorough legal and business analysis of electronic platforms (e-marketplaces) in RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS 
HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, El régimen jurídico de los Mercados Electrónicos Cerrados (e-marketplaces), 
Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006.  
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 So as existing rules are essentially transaction-oriented, a platform economy claims an organization-
oriented legal approach. As further explained below, the entering the digital scene of electronic platforms 
poses questions, from a legal perspective, on two fascinating angles: how platforms work and which role 
platforms, or more precisely platform operators, 3 do or should perform in digital economy. This shift from 
a transaction-oriented approach to an organization-oriented one is not a mere change of scale or focus. The 
emergence of platforms in digital economy arouses a number of appealing issues that are new and different 
and go beyond the effect of using electronic communication in the formation and the performance of 
contracts. First, a category of legal issues associated with the fact that platforms become self-regulated 
environment on contractual basis, the extent of such a regulatory autonomy and its implications. Second, 
another category of legal issues arising from the trust-generating capacity of platforms (providing 
mechanisms to control access, supervision systems to monitor compliance, infringements and penalties 
policies, feedback reputational systems, rating techniques, dispute resolution models). Third, a category of 
relevant legal issues regarding the role of platform operators as regulators, supervisors, ‘first-line’ enforcers, 
and service providers, that lead to the debate whether platform operators act as genuine intermediaries and 
to which extent intermediary liability rules are then applicable.   
 
 Electronic platforms, however, have not received at all an all-embracing attention from a legislative 
point of view. Therefore, a legal framework for electronic platforms has not been developed. On the 
contrary, attention to electronic platforms has been, and is still, fragmented, partial and tangential. On the 
one hand, some jurisdictions have addressed liability exposure of electronic intermediaries and devised a 
specific legal liability regime in form of ‘safe-harbour’ scheme — remarkably, US Section 512 Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, EU Directive on Electronic Commerce and its incorporation in domestic legal 
system by Member States -. But it is questionable whether platform operators are genuine intermediaries 
for the purposes of the specific liability regime. Therefore, rules on intermediaries do not fully cover all 
legal angles of platforms. On the other hand, some specific rules have been adopted in relation to sectorial 
platforms such as regulations on crowdfunding platforms4 or Alternative Trading Systems5/Multilateral 
Negotiating Systems or Facilities.6 Given their sectorial scope, these rules do not embrace platforms as a 
__________________ 
3  KANNAN, P KANNAN, P.K., CHANG, Ai-Mei; WHISTON, Andrew B., “The Internet Information Market: The 
Emerging Role of Intermediaries”, in SHAW, Michael J.; BLANNING, Robert W.; STRADER, Troy J.; 
WHINSTON, Andrew B., (Ed.), Handbook on Electronic Commerce, Heidelberg: Springer, 2000, pp. 569-590. 
4  Austrian Federal Act on alternative means of financing (Alternative Financing Act -
Alternativfinanzierungsgesetz, AltFG) — Obligations for issuing bodies as well as operators of internet platforms 
(“crowdfunding”) regarding the financing of terrorism (sec. 4, para. 5 and sec. 5 para. 1 (2)), Federal Law Gazette 
Vol. I No. 114/2015); French Décret nº 2014-1053 du 16 septembre 2014 relatif au financement participatif,  
JORF n°0215 du 17 septembre 2014 page 15228 texte n° 11; German Small Investor Protection Act, 
Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz, Budesgesetzbakatt Teil I, 2015, Nr. 28 vom 09.07.2015; Italian Regolamento sulla 
raccolta di capitali di rischio da parte di start-up innovative tramite portali on-line. Delibera num. 18592, and the 
attached Regulation of 26 June 2013, published in Gazzetta Ufficiale num. 162 dated 12 July 2013; Portugese 
Lei n.º 102/2015 de 24 de agosto, Regime jurídico do financiamento colaborativo , Diário da República, 1.ª série 
— N.º 164 — 24 Auguts 2015; Spanish Business Finance Promotion Act, number 5 of 2015, Ley 5/2015 de 
Fomento de la Financiación Empresarial, as published in the Official Bulletin (BOE) 101 of 28 April 2015 
(LFFE 2015); United States Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 
2012, Pub. L. 112-106, Title III, 126 Stat. 318 (US Crowdfunding Act).  
5  MACEY, Jonathan R.; O’HARA, Maureen, “Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and 
Economics Perspective”, J.Legal Stud., vol. 28, January 1999, pp. 17-54McCARROLL, Elizabeth M., 
“Regulation of Electronic Communications Networks: An Examination of Tradepoint Financial Networs ’s SEC 
Approval to Become the First Non-American Exchange to Operate in the United States”, 33 Cornell Int’l L.J., 
2000, pp. 211-262; MACEY, Jonathan; KANDA, Hideki, “The Stock Exchange as a Firm: the emergence of close 
substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges”, 75 Cornell L.Rev., 1989-1990, pp. 1007-1052 
6  For instance, in European Union, Art.4(15) MiFID defines ‘Multilateral trading facility (MTF)’ as ‘a multilateral 
system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple third -party buying 
and selling interests in financial instruments — in the system and in accordance with non-discretionary rules — 
in a way that results in a contract in accordance with the provisions of Title II’. Today, relevant rules in MiFID 
II and MiFIR — Directive (EU) 2016/1034 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2016 
amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 175, 
30.6.2016, p. 8-11; Regulation (EU) 2016/1033 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2016 
amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on 
market abuse and Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and 
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whole either. The legislative response to platforms is still partial and limited to certain jurisdictions, 
fragmentary in an international context, and to that extent non-uniform.  
 
 The convenience of adopting specific rules on platforms at a general level is at present being 
considered by the European Union,7 China, and other domestic jurisdictions to update, modernize or simply 
expand the scope of their electronic commerce laws. Such a multiplicity of regulatory initiatives, likely to 
lead to diverging outcomes, is not consistent with the natural transnationality, or more precisely a-
nationality, of activities within electronic platforms. More importantly, a multi-jurisdiction regulatory 
approach is frontally colliding with the rationale behind the emergence of electronic platforms: to create 
self-regulated environments, to the maximum possible extent, self-sufficient and disassociated from 
domestic jurisdictions.  
 
 As global digital economy is growing on the basis of platform-based models, disparities in approach, 
or in regulation raise obstacles to international trade, arouse uncertainties, increase risks in electronic 
commerce transactions conducted, indeed, through electronic platforms, and asphyxiate the flourishing of 
innovative and disruptive business models. In absence of a harmonized framework for electronic platforms, 
case law and legal rules at domestic/regional level differ. As a consequence, not only cross-border activity 
and electronic transactions are discouraged, but, above all, efficiencies deriving from and opportunities 
associated to the resort to electronic platforms are missed and the trust-creating potential of electronic 
platforms is seriously undermined.  
 
 The aim of this Paper is first to explain how the digital economy, as a platform economy, needs the 
refocusing of rules on electronic commerce from a transaction-oriented approach to a platform-focused 
regulation, and advocate that such rules on electronic platforms should be uniform, international and the 
result of a harmonizing process. Electronic platforms are a key element in the trust-creating policies for 
digital economy. A common legal framework for platforms would infuse more predictability in digital 
activities, reduce the likeliness of jurisdiction arbitrage, catalyse the development of emerging models, and 
better prepare international legal system for the coming of new disruptive technologies (block chain, 
distributed ledger). The second aim of this Paper is to briefly venture possible issues that should most likely 
be covered within a future uniform legal framework for electronic platforms.  
 
 Considering the above-mentioned aims, the Paper is structured as follows. Part II describes how 
platforms operate and separates platforms into their personal and relational components to construct a legal 
concept. Part III focuses on the role of platform operators and the implications in terms of liability exposure. 
Part IV summarizes possible angles of a regulation on electronic platforms.  
 
 
II. Inside a Platform: A Legal Look  
 
 Electronic platforms, in all their variants (e-marketplaces, sharing-based platforms, business 
communities, social networks, crowdfunding platforms) are and operate as closed electronic environments. 
The closure of an environment does not depend on a specific technology, the use of certain communication 
technique or the level of security that may indeed be high as well in opened environment. The difference 
between an open environment and a closed one is essentially based on a legal factor. As further explained 
below, the closing of an environment is achieved by the use of a contractual infrastructure that create a 
contract-based trustworthy context for the users, self-contained, self-regulated, and, to the maximum 
possible extent, independent from domestic jurisdictions. Hence, an electronic platform, as a closed 
environment, is built by a set of agreements between the operator and the users’ community. In absence of 
specific legal rules, obligations and rights of platform operators are laid down by the contract terms between 
__________________ 
on central securities depositories (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 175, 30.6.2016, p. 1-7. 
7  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market 
Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, SWD(2016) 172 final, COM(2016) 288 final Brussels, 25.5.2016. 
MAXWELL, Winston & PÉNARD, Thierry, Regulating digital platforms in Europe — a white paper, December 
2015, at www.digitaleurope.org (last visit, 14/2/2017).  
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the operator and every user, and, consequently, the role to be actually performed by operators is devised by 
the set of contracts supporting the platform.  
 
 The ultimate aim of a closed environment is in fact to generate trust in an uncertain playing field. Trust 
means predictability, reduction of uncertainties, and minimization of risks. Electronic platforms have 
pervaded the digital economy on the grounds of an efficiency hypothesis — “Electronic Markets 
Hypothesis” (MALONES, YATES & BENJAMIN) —: cost reduction, transparency enhancement, 
integration and syndication opportunities8 and trust generation.  
 
II.1. Building a Platform: Parties and Contractual Relationships in an Electronic Platform  
 
 Platforms are multi-party organizational models organized in two layers. On the one hand, the platform 
operator who manages the platform. On the other hand, the community of users. These are indeed the two 
vectors explaining why the existing transaction-oriented approach is neither sufficient nor adequate. 
Precisely, platform-oriented rules should acknowledge and duly deal with the complexity of the structure, 
the plurality of users, the sense of community, and the relevant roles of the operator in regulating, 
supervising, enforcing and generating trust within the platform.  
 
II.1.A) The Platform Operator 
 
 Electronic platforms are self-regulated communities managed by a platform operator. Despite that some 
functions can be designed and implemented to operate on a decentralized basis, as further explained below, 
electronic platforms are essentially centralized structures. The role of the platform operator is crucial to create 
and maintain a predictable, reliable and trustworthy playing field. The scope and the extent of operator’s 
functions are determined in each case by the membership agreement. When joining the platform, every user 
enters into an agreement with the operator. It is the membership agreement. Subsequently, registered users 
negotiate and conclude contracts among them according to the internal policies (platform rules).  
 
 Rarely, the operator is an individual (sole trader) or natural person. More usually, the operator adopts 
any of the organizational forms, available in the jurisdiction where it is located, to run a business 
(corporations, incorporate joint-ventures, private companies, but also associations, cooperatives or 
partnerships). Interestingly, those organizational forms entailing a distinct and separate legal personality are 
preferred. Likewise, commercial companies and corporations are the most widespread option.  
 
 Platform’s users can anyhow participate in the operator as members or managers. There is no legal 
reason questioning that. Nevertheless, some concerns on the neutrality of the operator and its ability to 
perform its functions on an independent basis may arise. As a matter of fact, should some (or all) users 
become members of the operator (partners or shareholders), the neutrality of its decisions as a regulator or 
as a supervisor in relation to the same users may be questioned and its attractiveness in the market may be 
debilitated accordingly. Therefore, the composition of the operator has to be very carefully considered.  
 
 In managing the platform, the operator provides added-value services, adopts rules, monitors 
compliance and penalizes infringements of internal rules by users. In sum, the operator acts as a service 
provider, a (contractual) regulator, and a (contractual) supervisor. Whereas the provision of services 
(payment management, insurance, inspection, rating, marketing) has a visible commercial impact, 
increasing the appeal of the offer in the market, fostering loyalty of users, and providing additional financial 
support; the tasks of regulating and supervising are key for the creation and preservation of trust.  
 
 A). Provision of services. Beyond basic services supporting the electronic trading infrastructure 
(software, security measures, information exchange), the operator may enhance the commercial appeal 
__________________ 
8  BICHLER, Martin, The Future of e-Markets. Multidimensional Market Mechanisms , Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001; SCULLEY, Arthur B., WOODS, W. William A., B2B exchanges. The Killer Application 
in the Business-to-Business Internet Revolution, New York: Harper Business, 2001; VOLLEBREGT, Erik, “E-
Hubs, syndication and competition concerns”, 21 ECLR, issue 10, October 2000, pp. 437-443. 
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of the platform by providing a varied range of added-value services: payment services, rating, 
insurance, certification, inspection, or logistic services. The provision of added-value services tends 
to increase users’ loyalty (raising switching costs), impede full substitutability with competing offer, 
and favour integration.9  
 
 B). Adoption of Platform Rules (Rulesbook). Electronic platform are self-regulated environments. 
As per the membership agreement, the operator is entitled to adopt rules in form of eligibility 
requirements to access the platform, codes of conduct, negotiation standards, model contracts, 
performance conditions, infringements and penalties policies. By accepting the membership 
agreement, each user takes the commitment to comply with in-force market rules and internal policies. 
Accordingly, whether the user fails to act in accordance to market rules and policies, the operator is 
entitled to claim default remedies.  
 
 C). Supervision and monitoring: Infringement and Penalties Policy. As per the membership 
agreement, the operator is entitled (has the right not the obligation) to monitor and supervise the 
compliance of rules and policies by users and take reasonable measures accordingly. In practice, 
supervision model is frequently based on a decentralized report system where users notify the operator 
any infringements committed by other users (report systems and notice and takedown systems in line 
with the mechanisms implemented to articulate ‘actual knowledge’ under the ‘safe-harbour’ regime 
for intermediaries).  
 
II.1.B). The Users: Building a Community  
 
 The broad term of “users” describes all registered members of the platform irrespective of their 
position (buyer/seller, lessor/lessee, licensor/licensee, investor/promoter, driver/passenger) they may hold 
in the subsequent transactions to be concluded or the relations or interactions of any nature entered into 
within the platform.  
 
 From a legal viewpoint,10 every user is the counterpart of the platform operator in the membership 
agreement and, at the same time, a prospective contracting party in future market transactions in relation to 
other users. From a technical perspective, upon registration, users are entitled to access the platform, use 
the functionalities and be beneficiary of services in conformity with their user profile. In practice, by 
logging with the activated key (password, username, electronic signature), the user is enabled to exercise 
rights and enjoy services in accordance to the contractual framework (membership agreement and service 
provision agreements). User account keys serve as contract-based electronic signatures for the purposes of 
any action to carry out within the electronic platform. It is commonplace that the own platform operator 
acts to that end as a certification agency issuing the keys, monitoring the use and managing cancellation, 
expiration and any further circumstances likely to affect the validity of the contractual electronic signature. 
Nevertheless, the issuance and the monitoring of the electronic signature could also be entrusted to a third 
certification agency. In the latter case, the function of controlling user access would be, at least partially, 
outsourced.  
 
 Upon admission, registered users join the business community, strongly agglomerated and compacted 
by the common compliance of platform policies (internal protocols, rulesbook, codes of conduct, market 
rules).  
 
 Depending on the structure of the market, users can be admitted in the platform to operate solely in 
one of the prospective contracting position (as the vendor, as the licensor, as the lessor) or in both of them 
(either vendor or buyer, licensor or licensee, lessor or lessee). In some sectors, should the scope of the 
__________________ 
9 BAKOS, Yannis; BRYNJOLFSSON, Erik, “Organizational Partnerships and the virtual corporation” in 
Information Technology and Industrial Competitiveness: How Information Technology Shapes Competition, 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, Chapter 4.  
10  In detail, RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, El régimen jurídico de los Mercados 
Electrónicos..., op.cit. 
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platform only cover one stage of the production/distribution chain, users are normally expected to operate 
in the same contracting position in all transactions — i.e. providers of spare parts, on the one hand, and 
manufacturers, on the other -. Accordingly, two different membership agreements should be drafted to sign 
in accordance to the expected contracting position (i.e. a membership agreement model for sellers and a 
membership agreement model for buyers). 
 
 As regards the relationship between the operator and the users, it might be well worth discussing the 
possibility for users to be members of the operator or to anyhow participate in the operator’s decision-
making and the legal consequences likely to derive therefrom. The market of markets offers a wide variety 
of models11 as regards the ownership structure: independent markets, non-independent markets and mixed 
markets. Interestingly, ownership structure is not only an element contributory to the design of the business 
strategy, but also represents one of the decisive factors in the assessment of competitive concerns and in the 
devising of effective and reliable regulatory/supervisory models.  
 
 (i) Independent or neutral markets (neutromediaries). Under an independent model in terms of 
ownership, the management role in the platform is played by a company (or entity) independent from 
market participants. Accordingly, platform users cannot participate or have any interest in the operator 
(i.e. as shareholders). Overall, such a neutrality feature alleviates competition concerns and seemingly 
fortifies the reliability of a centralized regulatory/supervisory model.  
 
 (ii) Non-independent markets (consortium or coalition markets). Under this category, market 
participants (users) are members of the operating company, participate in the decision-making process, 
carry out management tasks or anyhow control the operator. Users may hold majority of the operator 
or simply represent a minority group. Likewise, all users or solely a few of them meeting certain 
conditions might be eligible to participate in the operator. As a consequence, non-independent markets 
can be further classified as supply-biased markets, demand-biased markets or hybrid markets 
depending on the commercial position held by the users who are entitled to participate.  
 
 From a business point of view, the economic rationale behind non-independent markets is rather 
patent. Non-independent models are industry-sponsored marketplaces. Hence, industry features and 
specific market interests are widely considered in the design of the platform and effectively internalized in 
market policies.  
 
 From an economic perspective, according to the scientific literature12 it can be argued that electronic 
marketplaces favour buyers to the extent that reduce vendors’ market power.13 As a matter of fact, electronic 
markets would enhance information distribution and increase price competition. As a consequence, market 
equilibrium would be rebalanced in favour to buyers. As per such an economic rationale, buyers should 
arguably be more inclined to promote the creation of electronic platforms. Contrarily, a quick market 
observation reveals that there are platforms promoted by sellers (offer-biased markets). Very simply, 
expected profits earned as a platform operator could compensate the loss in purchase price as sellers.  
 
 Nevertheless, and despite the above-mentioned strategic reasons, non-independent markets arouse 
several legal concerns though. Remarkably, competition issues are likely to arise in the creation of non-
independent markets involving leading companies in the relevant sector.14  
 
__________________ 
11  A wider classification according to a selection of criteria in RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, 
El régimen jurídico de los Mercados Electrónicos..., op.cit, Chapter 2.  
12  BAKOS, J. Yannis, “Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces”, Management 
Science, vol. 43, num. 12, December 1997; STIGLITZ, Joseph E., “Imperfect Information in the Product 
Market”, en SCHMALENSEE, Richard; WILLIG Robert D., (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, New 
York: North-Holland, 1989, pp. 769-847. 
13  YOO, Byungjoon; CHOUDHARY, Vidyanand, MUKHOPADHYAY, Tridas, “Pricing Strategies of Electronic 
B2B Marketplaces with Two-Sided Networks Externalities”, Proceedings of the 35th Hawai Internacional 
Conference on Systems Sciences, 2002. 
14  Covisint case (IP/01/1155) (38.064) or Volbroker case (IP/00/896) (38.866) -.  
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 (iii) Mixed markets. In these markets, both sector participants and independent players are members 
of the platform operator. Synergies between, on the one hand, the neutrality perception favoured by 
independent markets and, on the other hand, the closeness to the market and the sensitivity to sector 
interests permitted by non-independent markets are triggered. Independent players are usually 
investors or technology suppliers.15  
 
II.1.C). The Membership Agreement 
 
 The membership agreement is concluded between the platform operator and each of the users meeting 
the eligibility requirements and successfully admitted in the platform.16  
 
 Schematically, the membership agreement has the following features: 
 
 (i) It is concluded electronically.  
 
 (ii) It may be a B2B or a B2C contract that is then subject to consumer law. ` 
 
 (iii) Although it is not fitting into a typified contractual model, it reasonable qualifies for being 
deemed a service provision contract with mixed obligations.  
 
 (iv) It is a standard term contract. Terms are pre-drafted by the operator and apply to all membership 
agreements of the same category (vendors, buyers, licensors, licensees). In general, the user is unable 
to negotiate, does not participate in the drafting and has to adhere to the contract on a “take-it-or-leave-
it” basis.  
  
 Even if the membership agreement aims to regulate the relationship between the platform operator and 
each user, its performance casts over the whole community, its terms deal with interaction among users and 
it contains obligations on the user and the operator to be exerted in relation to other users. In sum, the 
membership agreement is the main building material to pile up and flatten the community ground. 
Interestingly, by virtue of the agreement, each user commits to comply with in-force internal policies and 
market rules not only in interacting and dealing with other users. Therefore, in case of breach of rules, the 
operator is entitled to resort to available remedies on grounds of breach of contract and, likewise, injured 
users can ask the operator to adopt agreed measures against the infringing user (according to infringements 
and penalties policy) or claim compensation from the operator on grounds of its default.  
  
II.1.D). Self-Regulation in Practice: Internal Policies, Rulesbook and Codes of Conduct  
 
 In exercising the role of regulator, the platform operator adopts rules of varied nature to govern the 
access, the use of services, the negotiation, conclusion and performance of transactions and the exchange 
information within the platform (internal policies, rulesbook, code of conducts).17 As per the membership 
agreement, users are to abide by the market (platform) rules in force. The most widely adopted model is the 
centralized regulatory one. Under such a model, the operator is empowered by users to freely adopt, modify 
or amend rules to be in force in the platform. More exceptionally, however, users’ involvement in the 
regulatory process may be anyhow encouraged. Should community spirit want to be stimulated, a more 
__________________ 
15  In some deals notified to the European Commission for competition scrutiny, platform operators responded  to 
such hybrid ownership schemes: MyAircraft.com. COMP/M.1969 UTC/Honeywell/i2/MyAircraft.com, 4.8.2000. 
IP/00/912; Chemplorer COMP/M.2096 BAYER/Deutsche Telekom/Infraserv/JV, 6.10.2000, IP/00/1131; ec4ec 
COMP/M.2172 Babcock Borsig/MG Technologies/SAP Markets/JV, 7.11.2000, IP/00/1266; Governet 
COMP/M.2138, SAP/Siemens/JV, 2.10.2000, IP/00/1102; Date AS by Telenor Bedrift AS, Den Norske Bank ASA, 
ErgoGroup As and Accenture Technologies Venture BV (IP/01/638). 
16  About the admission process and the implications of a refusal to deal, RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS 
BALLELL, Teresa, “Refusal to Deal, Abuse of Rights and Competition Law in Electronic Markets and Digital 
Communities”, European Review of Private Law, vol. 22, 5-2014, pp. 685-702. 
17  RAMBERG, Christina, Internet Marketplaces. The Law of Auctions and Exchanges On-line, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
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participatory model should be designed. If so, users would be informed, consulted or even called to vote in 
reform projects, amendments or enactment of new policies.  
 
 
III. The Platform Operator as an Intermediary: The Theory of Reintermediation Cycle 
 
 As far as the legal framework for the provision of online services is concerned, electronic platform 
operators can be deemed intermediary service providers (ISP) in relation to contents, activities and 
behaviours published, transmitted or performed by their users.  
 
 Accordingly, ‘safe harbour’ regime would be applicable to delimit their liability — articles 12-15 
Directive on Electronic Commerce with direct antecedents in US legal model divided into the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 included as Part V of Telecommunications Act (Pub. L. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 230) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat 2860 (28 Oct. 1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 512) -. The European Court of Justice confirmed that 
assertion when expressly held in ECJ 12 Jul. 2011, C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v. eBay International 
AG and Others, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-324/09:  
 
 ‘Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (“Directive on electronic commerce”) must be interpreted as applying to the operator 
of an online marketplace where that operator has not played an active role allowing it to have 
knowledge or control of the data stored’. 
 
 However, case law is not consolidated, decisions are not consistent, and, more importantly, concepts 
and rules are not uniform. When the operator is playing an active role? 
 
 Besides, electronic platforms are contract-based buildings. Such a contractual infrastructure designs 
the liability regime and indeed allocates duties and liabilities between operators and platform’s members. 
Since ‘safe harbour’ regime is based on lack of knowledge and lack of control, operators manage to preserve 
their position with a right (but not an obligation) to monitor and supervise so as to enhance confidence 
without exposing themselves to liability risks. To which extent are platform operators entitled to define 
their obligations (or rights) and delimit their liability exposure? Should their obligations be provided for by 
the law? Or should a specific liability regime be established instead?  
 
 According to economic theories on intermediation, electronic platforms’ operators clearly perform 
intermediaries’ typical functions. Traditionally, intermediaries aim to solve market failures. Information 
asymmetries aggravate failures in digital markets. Therefore, intermediaries take on the challenges to 
facilitate interaction, enable matching, reduce cost, diminish the number and the complexity of relationships 
(‘Baligh-Richartz effect’), and enhance confidence exploiting reputational factors to minimize opportunist 
behaviours and externalities. 
 
 The economic theory of intermediation contributes a functional perspective to the most formalist legal 
concept of intermediary service provider. From a harmonious combination, it is my belief18 that a new 
understanding of electronic intermediation can be advocated. Far from the initial contention that digital 
technology would trigger an intense and definitive disintermediation process, a growing reintermediation 
process is actually explaining the state and the evolution of digital society instead. The intermediation cycle 
turns then from a disintermediation phase to an appealing reintermediation phase.19 
 
__________________ 
18  RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, “El tercero de confianza en el suministro de información. 
Propuesta de un modelo contractual para la sociedad de la información”, Anuario de Derecho Civil, Tomo LXIII, 
Fascículo III, 2010, pp. 1245-1284; and “Intermediación electrónica y generación de confianza en la Red: 
escenarios de riesgos y responsabilidad”, Revista Española de Seguros, núm. 153-154, 2013, pp. 43-68 
19  CHIRCU, Alina M.; KAUFFMAN, Robert J., “Strategies for Internet Middlemen in the Intermediation / 
Disintermediation / Reintermediation Cycle”, Electronic Markets, vol. 9, issue 2, 1999, pp. 109-117 
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 Whereas disintermediation describes the removal of middlemen from processes, chains and markets, 
reintermediation entails not only the reversion of such a trend but also the emergence of new areas where 
intermediation creates value. The reintermediation process is then a complex and multi-faced phenomenon 
intended to mitigate failures, create value and satisfy social and business needs as presented in the digital 
environment. As far as electronic relationships are becoming more closely woven and products and services 
more sophisticated, intermediation needs have been evolving in the digital environment and intermediation 
profiles have redesigned and devised accordingly. Changes in the management and the structure of the 
distribution chain are probably rather evident and easily perceptible. Digital technology forces 
manufacturers and retailers to make innovations in distribution, such as shortening the channel, removing 
intermediate and unnecessary phases, approaching to clients, customizing strategies. Intermediaries have 
achieved to recover their roles in the chain, moving backwards and forwards along the distribution channel 
and learning to provide added-value services to users (recommender systems20, botshops, comparison 
tools). Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is our contention that the reintermediation wave overflows the case 
of electronic intermediation in the distribution channel to provide intermediation services in a range of 
significant areas, in an appealing process less perceptible but crucial for the functioning of the digital world.  
 
 
IV. Key Issues to Consider for a Platform-Oriented Regulation  
 
 The above analysis of the structure and the operation of electronic platforms reveal three new legal 
angles to consider in a platform-oriented regulation, that are not sufficiently dealt with by transaction-
oriented rules.  
 
 First, the two-layer structure of a platform (user layer and operator layer) requires to address the 
question of which obligations the operator may assume in relation to the users, the transactions conducted 
within the platform and/or other aspects related to the activity within the platform or of the platform itself 
in the platforms market (privacy21, IP rights, consumer rights protection, money laundering, 
misrepresentation, authentication, etc). 
 
 Such obligations can be accepted and configured by the terms of membership agreement between the 
operator and the users in exercise of and within the limits of the private autonomy; or they could be provided 
for by legal provisions that might prevent the parties from excluding or limiting such duties. To the extent 
that legal rules impose obligations on the operators, they do also define their possible roles in the digital 
economy as regulators, supervisors, ‘first-line enforcers’, gatekeepers22 in different ways, and certainly trust 
creators. 
 
 Those jurisdictions that are exploring the formulation of rules on platforms tend to prescribe duties on 
platform operators regarding the control of users’ identification, transparency duties, compliance 
monitoring, duty to verify information, or even obligations concerning the performance. Local, fragmented, 
and differing domestic rules are deeply inconsistent with the global nature of digital economy and, besides, 
happen to be highly inadequate (even inoperative in many cases).  
 
 Second, liability rules for platform operators should be very carefully discussed. Whether operators 
are deemed as digital intermediaries, specific ‘safe harbour’ provisions would apply; but whether platform 
__________________ 
20  RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, “Legal Aspects of Recommender Systems in the Web 2.0: 
Trust, Liability and Social Networking”, en PAZOS ARIAS, Jose; FERNÁNDEZ VILAS, Ana; DÍAZ 
REDONDO, Rebeca P. (Eds.), Recommender Systems for the Social Web, Series “Intelligent Systems Reference 
Library” vol. 32, New York (etc): Springer-Verlag, 2012, pp. 43-62. 
21  RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, Teresa, “Legal framework for personalization-based business 
models”, in PAZOS-ARIAS, José J.; DELGADO KLOOS, Carlos; LÓPEZ NORES, Martín (Eds.), 
Personalization of Interactive Multimedia Services: A Research and Development Perspective, Nueva York: 
NOVA, 2009, pp. 3-24. 
22  CHOI, Stephen, “Market Lessons for Gatekeepers”, 92 Nw.U.L.Rev., 1998, pp. 916-966; KRAAKMAN, Reinier 
H., “Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy”, 2 J.L.Econ.& Org., nº 1, Spring 1986, 
pp. 53-104.  
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operators may configure their role by agreement, liability exposure is varied and depends upon the accepted 
degree of involvement and endorsement, if any.  
 
 At present, liability rules for intermediaries are not uniform and, more importantly, the debate about 
the falling of platform operators under the concept of intermediary for the purposes of the ‘safe harbour’ 
regime is opened and lacking of a consensus view. Even more, the implementation of mechanisms proving 
or presuming actual knowledge and the setting of factors revealing diligent/expeditious adoption of 
adequate measures by the intermediary upon awareness.  
 
 Thus, the formulation of a uniform concept of electronic intermediary, the adoption of a set of uniform 
criteria under which the platform operator might be deemed as an intermediary, and the devising of a 
common liability regime for intermediaries (actual knowledge, notice and takedown systems, adequate 
measures, supervision duties, etc) would be relevant areas to focus harmonizing attention.  
 
 Third, as the community-based architecture of platforms enable the articulation of decentralized trust-
generating mechanisms (reputational feedback systems, recommender systems, rating and listing), it might 
be pertinent to consider the elaboration of uniform concepts regarding those decentralized reputational 
systems, reflect on possible common criteria in design and operation (good practices, standards), and clarify 
eventual liability scenarios.  
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Session 5 — The credit economy 
 
 
Can UNCITRAL Instruments Advance  
Supply Chain Finance to Benefit Small and Medium Enterprises? 
 
Abhinayan Basu Bal, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Sweden 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Supply chain management research has shown that a supply chain is as strong as its weakest link.1 
Often that weakest link is a small and medium enterprise (SME) from a developing country and it is starved 
for working capital.2 This paper determines how some of the existing and upcoming UNCITRAL 
instruments can contribute to the advancement of supply chain finance (SCF)3 programmes to benefit 
SMEs. In doing so the paper primarily focuses on the provisions of existing UNCITRAL instruments, 
namely, the draft Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records,4 the Rotterdam Rules,5 and the Model 
Law on Secured Transactions,6 to analyse how flow of information connected to physical movement of 
goods can be extended to the associated financial flows in global supply chains. In this context, the paper 
also refers to the on-going efforts at Working Group I on micro, small and medium enterprises and the 
upcoming work of Working Group IV on cloud computing, identity management and trust services. The 
paper establishes that the red thread connecting various efforts of UNCITRAL can help to channelize 
dematerialised information to enhance visibility by allowing collaborative information sharing between 
stakeholders in global supply chains. 
 
 This paper argues that logistics service providers (LSPs) can allow greater visibility in the supply chain 
processes leading to lower level of inherent risk and allow financial institutions to deliver enhanced SCF 
programmes to SMEs.7 Moreover, if SMEs are able to use dematerialised information, then financial 
institutions can extend SCF services throughout the supply chain.8 Providing better access to finance to 
SMEs promotes sustainable development and fulfils Target # 8.3 of the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals.9 The paper also critically evaluates the law making initiatives of UNCITRAL to show 
that greater institutional cooperation and usage of innovative governance techniques such as 
__________________ 
1  Christopher, M., “Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Creating Value-Adding Networks”, 4th ed. Financial 
Times Prentice Hall, New York (2011).  
2  Y. Wang, “Online Supply Chain Finance: Profound changes in Financing of SMEs”, Contemporary Logistics 6, 
(2012). 
3  SCF is the inter-company optimization of financing as well as the integration of financing processes with 
customers, suppliers, and service providers in order to increase the value of all participating companies”. See 
Pfohl, H-C., Gomm, M., “Supply chain finance: optimizing financial flows in supply chains”, Logistics Research, 
1(3)2009, pp. 149-161. This definition allows for a broad perspective in terms of the various actors that can 
benefit from different SCF programmes and highlights the need for coordination and integration throughout the 
entire supply chain. The definition is also practice-oriented in the sense that it focuses on “value creation for all 
participating companies”. 
4  Draft Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records with explanatory notes, A/CN.9/920 (4 January 2017) 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V17/000/10/PDF/V1700010.pdf?OpenElement  
5  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, United 
Nations Publication, Sales No. E.09.V.9, (2009) http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
transport/rotterdam_rules/Rotterdam-Rules-E.pdf  
6  UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions, United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.V.12, (2016) 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.pdf  
7  See section 5 of this paper for detailed discussion. 
8  See section 6 of this paper for detailed discussion. 
9  Target #8.3 enunciates to “promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job 
creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro -, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services”, United Nations General 
Assembly, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” A/Res/70/1, 21 October 
2015, http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ares70d1_en.pdf  
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recourse/endorsement of private standards may be the way forward for improving trade regulation in the 
digital era. 
 
2. Need for SCF Programmes and the Emphasis on Information 
 
 Twenty years ago, most international trade transactions used intermediated trade finance such as letters 
of credit, which not only supported the transaction by providing funds to the exporter or the importer or to 
both but also provided a sophisticated mechanism to mitigate the risks borne by exporters and importers. 
However, to speed up international trade transactions, in the past two decades trading parties have 
increasingly used open account, a form of inter-firm trade finance, which has exposed the exporter to non-
payment risks.10 Open account is cheaper than a letter of credit, but it does not offer the guarantee of 
payment from a financial intermediary. This left several exporters bankrupt during the financial crisis in 
2007/2009 because the buyers to whom they had extended credit were insolvent.  
 
 Currently there exists a shortfall of 1.6 trillion USD in global trade finance.11 Many multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have found that SME suppliers come under higher degree of financial stress because 
of their inability to raise working capital. Banks have shown reluctance to lend to SMEs because of the 
general economic environment and also due to new banking regulations such as Basel III standards that 
were introduced to boost bank capital, combined with stringent Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) compliance.12  
 
 While many governments have taken measures to support SMEs, the supply chain stakeholders have 
been innovating to harness information through digital technology platforms and digital market places to 
make finance more readily available to SMEs. For example, MNCs are participating in SCF programmes, 
often in conjunction with banks or other financial institutions, in order to help SME suppliers raise working 
capital. The invoices that the SME suppliers issue to the MNCs are transferred to a special purpose vehicle 
or trust, which is in turn funded by banks, institutional investors or, in some cases, the commercial paper 
market. These SCF transactions are often structured very similarly to a trade receivables transaction albeit 
with a key extra benefit for the investor or bank providing the financing, which is a direct payment 
obligation from the underlying debtor. Such financing structure take advantage of a number of legal 
mechanisms in order to achieve particular effects, but the cross-border nature often adds to the complexity, 
with multiple legal systems needing to be taken into consideration. Also, MNCs are combining processes 
of trade finance and cash management to link the financial supply chain with their internal physical supply 
chain processes of the company. Be that as it may, the SCF programmes initiated by MNCs are limited to 
certain parts of the supply chain. 
 
 Another example of private innovation is an intermediated trade finance solution offered by the 
banking industry since 2013, called the bank payment obligation (BPO). This trade finance form is in its 
nature very similar to a letter of credit, albeit not identical.13 The BPO is a standardised interbank 
instrument, which is based on electronic information. Unlike a letter of credit, which requires that physical 
trade documents are manually examined, the BPO requires access to electronic trade data. This data is 
controlled, verified and matched over time in a highly automated process, as new electronic trade data are 
submitted about progress of the underlying trade transaction. However, BPO has not been successful so far. 
The primary barrier in the adoption of BPO is that it requires substantial investment both by banks and 
adopting companies. In its present form BPO is also restricted to a small part of the supply chain as it is 
mainly used by MNCs and large publicly rated companies. It fails to cater to the need of the SMEs.14  
__________________ 
10  See Love, I. Role of Trade Finance, Chapter 13 in Gerard Caprio (ed.), The Evidence and Impact of Financial 
Globalization, Academic Press: 1 edition (2012).  
11  Di Caprio, A., Beck, S., Yao, Y., Khan, F., “Trade Finance Gaps, Growth and Jobs Survey”, ADB Briefs No. 64, 
August 2016, p. 1, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/190631/trade-finance-gaps.pdf  
12  Ibid., 2. 
13  Wynne, G. L. and Fearn, H.: “The bank payment obligation: will it replace the traditional letter of credit — now, 
or ever?” (2014) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law  102-104. 
14  Only 50 corporates and 20 banks can use BPO. See Dab, S., Ramachandran, S., Chandna, R., Hanspal, R., 
Grealish, A. and Peeters, M., “Embracing Digital in Trade Finance”, Boston Consulting Group, October 2015, p. 
  
158 
 Based on the above examples, the question that arises is — how can the benefits of SCF be fostered 
across the entire supply chain? The answer lies mainly in managing information flows and creating security 
interests.15 This is because electronic platforms are used to provide real-time transparency of physical and 
financial flows in various SCF solutions. Cross-border information flows have recently caught the attention 
of both international and national policymakers. In addition to efforts at UNCITRAL, several international 
institutions such as UN/ESCAP, UN/CEFACT, UNCTAD, WCO and WTO are currently working on 
various aspects of information flows to facilitate trade. Also, many national jurisdictions have promulgated 
cross-border data transfer regulations to prevent data from leaving the nation’s borders to protect citizens’ 
data from foreign surveillance, and also to protect personal data privacy and data security.16  
 
3. Financing of Receivables: Example of some SCF Programmes 
 
 The journey of collateral available to businesses has moved progressively from immovable property 
(land) to movable property (goods and machinery), and subsequently, from tangibles to intangibles 
(invoices). Some of the popular SCF programmes involve monetization of the supplier’s trade account 
invoices that are known as receivables. Earlier, there were predominantly two types of receivables 
financing: factoring and invoice discounting. In the past few years two variations of the above structures, 
namely, discounting of individual invoices over an online platform and reverse factoring have been 
popularised by companies to make their cash flows efficient. They are discussed briefly to highlight the 
legal differences between structures.  
 
3.1. Open account SCF programme 
 
 Open account SCF programme is mostly popular in the US and some parts of Europe. It involves three 
parties, namely the supplier, the buyer and the bank. The supplier signs up to negotiate and sell its 
receivables owed by the buyer to the bank. The supplier sells goods to the buyer, generating an invoice that 
it posts on the SCF platform for the buyer’s confirmation. Once the buyer confirms the invoice as valid, the 
related receivable becomes eligible for purchase by the bank. Only confirmed invoices are eligible for 
purchase; so a specific transaction can be sold if both the supplier and the buyer agree to have it sold. In 
confirming the invoice, the buyer agrees that it will pay the bank the full amount of the invoice on its due 
date without any claim, abatement, deduction, reduction, or offset of any kind. This confirmation enables 
the bank to look directly to the buyer for payment. The buyer may still request deductions and make similar 
claims against the supplier, with those offsets potentially applying to future invoices, but the buyer will not 
be permitted to challenge the amount owed on the receivable sold to the bank.  
 
 The open account based SCF programme became popular in the US when it established the unitary 
model of security interest on personal property, based on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
The unitary concept of security interest brought all secured transactions on personal property and fixtures 
under the same roof where a transaction in substance secures payment and performance of an obligation 
regardless of its form or who has title to the collateral. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are some of the 
prominent jurisdictions which has enacted their laws based on a similar unitary model. The Continental 
European countries do not follow the unitary concept of security interests as in the US and consequently, 
title and receivables financing are carried out based on personal property security laws.  
 
__________________ 
12. 
15  The tax structure, accounting standards, and the regulatory environment of financial institutions of a jurisdicti on 
also have an important effect. They are left outside the scope of this paper.  
16  Unfortunately, such regulations may also be viewed as new non-tariff measures that increasingly pose challenge 
to the international trading community. Moreover, extraterritorial application of such laws adds to the concern. 
The regulations on cross-border data flows can take variety of forms; for example, some governments require 
prior consent for data transfers abroad, some require local servers to be established within the  territory, some 
have outright ban of personal citizens’ information flow out of the economy, and some require copies of 
information sent abroad to be stored domestically. 
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3.2. Negotiable instrument based SCF programme 
 
 Negotiable instrument based SCF programme is the dominant structure in many jurisdictions outside 
the US and Europe as selling intangibles can be cumbersome and may expose the investor to additional 
legal risks, such as fraud and insolvency. The parties involved in such a programme are the supplier, the 
bank and sometimes the buyer. The supplier submits invoices, which the buyer approves. However, the 
supplier also creates a draft, a bill of exchange, a negotiable promissory note, or any other form of negotiable 
instrument. The supplier sells the negotiable instrument to a bank, who then takes physical possession of 
the instrument, and presents it to the buyer for payment on the invoice maturity date. The invoices sold as 
negotiable instruments give the bank priority against claims of the buyer’s other creditors, including in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. The law relating to negotiable instruments apply to such transactions.  
 
3.3. Non-recourse receivables purchase 
 
 Receivables purchase is used worldwide and involves primarily the supplier and the bank. It entails a 
supplier selling to the bank its rights to certain accounts receivable owed by a buyer. The buyer does not 
have to confirm each invoice before the receivable can be sold. The downside of this arrangement for the 
bank is that there is no direct confirmation from the buyer that it will pay the bank. Thus, the bank has to 
make sure that what it is acquiring from the supplier is a valid and enforceable claim against the buyer. The 
bank usually conducts significantly more due diligence on the supplier before entering into such a 
transaction, and ensures that the supplier is transferring the receivables via a legal true sale. 
 
4. SCF Dependent on Network Effects and Legal Framework: Swiss Post Case 
 
 A contract for sale is the starting point of any commercial transaction and it is closely interrelated with 
other contracts relating to carriage of goods, insurance and financing. Once the goods are shipped through 
a LSP, the seller issues an invoice to the buyer and is entitled to payment within a stipulated number of 
days. The LSP as transporter has knowledge about the location of the goods and may also physically possess 
the goods. In addition, it often holds valuable insight on the seller’s and buyer’s business conditions. Over 
the years LSPs have developed their own practices to track goods in international supply chains, and now 
they have the possibility to turn this knowledge into an opportunity to develop related financial services.  
 
 An alternative approach in the supply chain can be that a LSP is not only responsible for transport, 
handling and storage, but also emerges as a financier. For instance, a Swiss LSP buys the goods from the 
manufacturer and obtains an interim legal ownership before selling them to manufacturers’ customers after 
a certain time. The LSP is also supported by a purchase guarantee from the manufacturer, which the 
manufacturer has negotiated in framework agreements with its customers. The rationale of this alternative 
approach is to achieve an improvement in the inventory financing within the supply chain by adopting a 
“network perspective”. The financial justification for assuming ownership to the goods by the LSP has 
already been discussed in financial literature.17 It is submitted that there is a legal reasoning as well that 
necessitates transfer of ownership to the LSP. Under Swiss law, creating a security interest in moveable 
property requires more than a pledge agreement. Since there is no security interest register in which the 
information about a pledge agreement is publicly available, an enforceable pledge of moveable property 
requires that the pledgor physically deliver the property to the lender in compliance with the 
Faustpfandprinzip (which literally means the fist pledge principle).18 A Swiss court will not consider a 
pledge to be perfected if the transaction structure is an obvious attempt to circumvent the Faustpfandprinzip. 
Therefore, the transfer of ownership to the LSP is necessary for compliance with Swiss laws. 
 
__________________ 
17  Swiss Post that offers both logistics and financial services teamed with P&G to offer the above-described SCF 
programme in Switzerland. See Erik Hofmann, (2009),”Inventory financing in supply chains: A logistics service 
provider-approach”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 39 Iss 9 pp. 
716 — 740, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09600030911008175  
18  See Wyss, L., The pledge of moveable property in secured financing transactions, Walder Wyss & Partners, 
NewsLetter No.78 June 2008, https://www.walderwyss.com/publications/513.pdf  
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 The above illustration shows that the commercial laws of a jurisdiction and the level of enforcement 
determines the environment in which contracting occurs. Commercial law specifies the property rights 
associated with the commercial transaction, and enforcement of these rights determines the confidence of 
contracting parties in the contract. A jurisdiction’s commercial laws should clearly define how a collateral 
lien can be perfected, how collateral priority is determined, and how notification of a lien is made. The 
“World Bank Doing Business — Measuring Business Regulations” publishes a Getting Credit score for 
countries by measuring the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions.19 
 
5. Visibility, Competition and Collaboration in Supply Chains to Enhance SCF 
 
 In the Swiss Post example, the LSP linked the cargo to the purchase order, which resulted in efficient 
financing of the supply chain. Swiss Post could execute this SCF solution as the setting was national and it 
had both in-house logistics and financial services that provided the visibility and financial strength to offer 
competitive financing solution. This may not be true for most LSPs and therefore it would be reasonable to 
expect that they cooperate with banks to combine visibility and financial strength.  
 
5.1. Collaboration to Increase Visibility and Reduce Risk 
 
 Banks find lending to SMEs costly and risky than lending to MNCs. Transaction costs in terms of 
administration and monitoring are higher, information less transparent and, moreover, the availability of 
adequate collateral for covering small firms’ higher default risk is limited.20  
 
 
Figure 1: The real risk profile of the supply chain vs. the one expected by the bank.21 
 
 Figure 1 above shows that a bank determines the fee based on the expected risk profile of the physical 
supply chain. The blue line shows that a more competitive fee can be charged if the bank has more 
information available to adjust its risk profile as the physical supply chain evolves. The LSPs hold such 
information that they can share with banks and create value.  
__________________ 
19  World Bank, Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations, http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-
credit  
20  Supra, note 11. 
21  Bryant, C., Camerinelli, E., “Supply Chain Finance: Euro Banking Association European market guide”, version 
2.0, June 2014, p. 80, https://www.abe-eba.eu/downloads/knowledge-and-research/1406_EBA_Supply_ 
Chain_Finance_European_Market_Guide_Second_edition.pdf  
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Figure 2: Making the real risk profile of the supply chain visible.22 
 
 Figure 2 above shows that information can be used to reduce the fee that a bank charge, not because 
risk is reduced but because it is more accurately priced. Therefore, the LSPs can be seen as valuable partners 
by banks and financial institutions to make SCF event-driven. 
 
5.2. Collaboration on a Collective Basis is the Future of SCF 
 
 A supply chain covers the entire chain, starting from the first supplier to the end customer. This is not 
a serial process but a complex, inter-related network of partners, suppliers, contract manufacturers, packers, 
resellers, etc. The focus of SCF is on creating liquidity in the supply chain through various buyer or seller-
led programmes. However, current programmes are restricted in certain portions of the chain. To encourage 
the development of SCF programmes across the entire chain, it is necessary to have both competition and 
collaboration between various market participants in the SCF space. As competition intensifies between 
participants, collaboration would be the key to deliver a successful programme. Collaboration between 
banks, alternative financiers, LSPs, etc., increases the possibility of electronic exchange of purchase orders, 
shipping and delivery documents, invoices, etc. across trusted and reliable B2B networks. 
 
 One possible way forward is to create a four-corner model such as the BPO that will promote 
collaboration between business entities on a bilateral basis through partnerships or commercial contracts, 
technical outsourcing, and cooperation with B2B networks. But, this is a closed model and entails high 
investment for both the banks and the clients. Another possibility is that market participants collaborate on 
a collective basis by focussing on their core area of competence for overall market development and also 
to benefit individually. This is an open model based on peer-to-peer approach which would allow increased 
potential for risk distribution with other financing partners, higher scalability and potential for market 
penetration, and additional sources of funding for businesses. This would also give rise to joint-industry 
initiatives in the areas of regulation, standards, and infrastructural development. However, there are 
challenges that include increased commercial and operational complexity, technical interdependency and 
the need for well-defined standards, and friction between market players over revenue sharing.23  
 
6. UNCITRAL Instruments can Advance SCF 
 
 Several international instruments may be necessary to promote SCF throughout the supply chain. 
However, the various instruments will have different objectives — whether a fiduciary purpose, the 
promotion of international trade, or other socio-economic policies. This paper argues that efforts of 
UNCITRAL, namely, the draft Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records, the Rotterdam Rules, the 
__________________ 
22  Ibid., p. 82 
23  Ibid., p. 111 
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Model Law on Secured Transactions, the on-going deliberations at Working Group I on the draft legislative 
guide on an UNCITRAL limited liability organization, and the deliberations at Working Group IV on 
contractual aspects of cloud computing and the legal issues related to identity management and trust 
services, can increase visibility in global supply chains.  
 
6.1. Electronic Records to Promote Dematerialised Information Exchange 
 
 Large enterprises see value in using electronic data interchange provided by large LSPs, such as DHL 
or UPS. These large logistics service providers have their enterprise resource planning (ERP), transport 
management and logistics systems that are connected to the ERP system of the large enterprise at one end 
and with customs and port authorities interface on the other end. Generally, SMEs do not have advanced 
internal ERP systems and do not use the services of such large logistics service providers. They continue to 
use a mix of electronic and paper based information and documentary exchange, which puts them at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the large enterprises. Moreover, SCF is not efficiently extended to SMEs 
as they are outside the range of electronic visibility. 
 
 In 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Rotterdam Rules.24 One of the objectives 
of the Rotterdam Rules is to facilitate e-commerce by establishing a legal framework for electronic bills of 
lading.25 The provisions on electronic transport records in chapters 3 and 8 of the Rotterdam Rules are 
specifically designed to fill the gap in the area of carriage of goods in relation to e-commerce. The Rules 
also contain three separate chapters dealing with delivery of the goods, the rights of a controlling party, and 
the transfer of rights,26 which may serve as a way to solve the problem of how to provide for negotiable 
electronic transport records.27 The Rules has not yet entered into force and therefore the provisions are not 
currently in use. 
 
 To promote electronic communications in international trade and also support the Rotterdam Rules, 
UNCITRAL Working Group IV on Electronic Commerce in November 2016 finalized the Model Law on 
Electronic Transferable Records.28 This Model Law aims to facilitate dematerialization of all paper-based 
transferable documents or instruments that allow to claim the payment of a sum or the delivery of goods.29 
One of the difficult issues that this Model Law will resolve relate to the requirement of physical possession 
of the paper document. Article 10 of the Model Law provides a functional equivalence rule for the 
possession of a transferable document or instrument. Functional equivalence of possession is achieved 
when a reliable method is employed to establish control of that record by a person and to identify the person 
in control. The notion of control when used as a substitute for possession requires a reliable method for 
identifying the current party in control of a specific electronic record as the said notion typically focuses on 
the identity of the person entitled to enforce the rights embodied in the electronic transferable record.30 The 
__________________ 
24  The principal goal underlying the development of the Rules is the creation of a modern and uniform law 
concerning the international carriage of goods by sea, in order to reduce transaction costs, increase predictability 
and stability, and engender greater commercial confidence in international maritime commerce. The Rotterdam 
Rules have so far received 25 signatures and 3 ratifications, by a mix of developing and developed countries, 
including strong seafaring and trading nations, as well as traditional carrier and shipper nations. See “Status of 
the Rotterdam Rules” http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html . 
Pursuant to article 94, the Convention requires ratification or accession by at least 20 states to enter into force.  
25  The Rotterdam Rules uses the term “negotiable transport documents” to refer to bills of lading and the term “non-
negotiable transport documents” to refer to sea waybills. The Rules uses the term “electronic transport records” 
to refer to the electronic equivalent of bills of lading.  
26  Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
27 For a detailed discussion see van der Ziel, G. J., “Delivery of The Goods, Rights Of The Controlling Party And 
Transfer Of Rights”, Journal of International Maritime Law 14: 606, (2008). See also, Basu Bal, A., Electronic 
Transport Records: An Opportunity for the Maritime and the Logistics Industries. Journal of Transportation Law, 
Logistics and Policy 81(1): 37, (2014). 
28  Supra, note 4. 
29  An indicative list of transferable documents or instruments includes: bills of exchange, cheques, promissory 
notes, consignment notes, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, cargo insurance certificates and air waybills.  
30  See draft article 9, supra, note 4. 
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method of identification may be accomplished through a closed system31, or through an open system32. 
Under the draft model law, the notion of original and uniqueness has been connected to control. Emphasis 
has been given to reliably ensure that the claim may be presented to the debtor only once.33 
 
6.2. Industry Standards as a Governance Technique 
 
 Limited international legislation in an area often makes the market adopt private standards to create 
trust among participants. International institutions in their attempt to keep up with technological and 
industry convergence may align their instruments to voluntary standards. A small but potentially significant 
inclusion of such a provision that refers to industry standards in an international instrument is article 
12(a)(vii) of the UNCITRAL Draft Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records. This article that deals 
with “general reliability standard” provides: 
  
 For the purposes of articles 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, and 19, the method referred to shall be: 
 
 (a) As reliable as appropriate for the fulfilment of the function for which the method is being used, 
in light of all relevant circumstances, which may include: 
 
… 
 
 (vii) Any applicable industry standard; or … 
  
 In the above provision, firstly, it is to be noted that the word ‘may’ is an option and should not be read 
as an empowering formulation. Secondly, the wording ‘any applicable industry standard’ does not clarify 
what industry the standards are referring to and who in that industry will set the standards. Neither does it 
say whether the industry is composed of its participants, or is it some kind of a regulatory body. It may well 
be that the standards referred to in the article are the one agreed and adopted in a relevant industry. Such 
industry based mechanism for setting standards may be favoured in cases where public sector bodies do not 
have the necessary technical knowledge and where existing incumbents in the industry have a strong interest 
in influencing the development of standards. For example, bills of lading standards may be developed by 
the maritime industry; and trade finance standards may be developed by the banking industry. Thus, 
accepted standards are the ones that are recognized in the industry within which the parties to the transaction 
operate. However, if a supply chain view were to be adopted, it would be difficult to restrict the definition 
of the accepted standards based on the participants of the relevant industry, because new peers might be 
coming in from different industries. 
  
 Be that as it may, it is not impossible to impose standards, and that in due course it can be ensured that 
the standards are set in a fair way so that the newcomers to the market would not be precluded. 
Technological and industrial convergence has made it necessary for policymakers to cooperate and 
deliberate more horizontally, as the core of digitization is networking. International institutions should work 
closely with private standard setting entities, as it is increasingly relevant to rely on private standards created 
by highly specialized professionals. It is submitted that voluntary standards may emerge as a governance 
technique to regulate trade in the digital era and industry associations can play an important role in 
formulating such standards. 
 
__________________ 
31  The closed system includes the token model “which identifies the person in the record itself” and the registry 
model “which identifies the person in a separate registry.” UNCITRAL, “Legal issues relating to the use of 
electronic transferable records”, A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.115, (2011). 
32  The open system is decentralised and uses block chain token which does not identify the holder in the record, 
i.e. in the token itself. A block chain ledger displays the addresses in which tokens are kept, the addresses are 
cryptographic identities (pseudonyms), and the private keys corresponding to the addresses are secret. See 
Takahashi, K, “Blockchain Technology and Electronic Bills of Lading”, Journal of International Maritime Law 
22: 209 (2016). 
33  See draft Article 11, supra, note 4. 
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6.3. Model Law on Secured Transactions to Promote Credit Availability 
 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions is based on the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
on Secured Transactions. The Model Law is intended to assist States in developing modern secured 
transactions laws with a view to promote the availability of credit. Taking a security interest enables a 
creditor to have priority over competing creditors if the debtor files bankruptcy. The Model Law is 
developed as concise text, to be used as tool for implementation of the Guide’s recommendations and setting 
out a regime for secured transactions in 107 Articles plus 33 Model registry provisions. Many of the 
solutions provided in the Model law are inspired by Article 9 of the US UCC, which governs security 
interests and applies to any transaction that creates a security interest in personal property.  
 
 The Model Law provisions integrate the treatment of all transactions fulfilling a security function and 
the replacement of a wide range of security devices with a single concept, the security interest. Under the 
Model Law a security interest can be made effective against third parties by registration, by the taking of 
possession or, in the case of financial collateral, the taking of control. The notice filing through registration 
can be done in advance of the security being created, so that the register is then a warning that a security 
has been or may be taken. Only one filing is required for all transactions between the same parties involving 
the same kind of collateral. The priority rules of the Model Law are designed to produce a commercially 
reasonable outcome for typical disputes. Filing is a priority point, in that priority between security interests 
generally depends on the date of perfection.  
 
6.4. Increase Visibility for SMEs by Reducing Information Asymmetry 
 
 Information asymmetry has been a challenge for small and medium businesses when they seek finance 
to fuel their growth. Since the 1960s, private sector finance has played an increasingly critical role in driving 
economic growth. However, lesser disclosure requirements and often, shorter formal trading history make 
it harder and more expensive for investors and financiers to acquire the required information to make 
accurate assessments about creditworthiness. As a result, SMEs continue to find it hard to get the finance 
they need to participate in the formal economy. Also, stringent banking regulations have further excluded 
SMEs through KYC and AML requirements. 
 
 Lack of visibility prevents SMEs from providing the information required by banks to grant access to 
debt. Also, SMEs are not able to signal to the trading partners their quality as suppliers. For the past several 
years, regulators around the world have recognized that jurisdictional disclosure and registration measures 
need to be redesigned to encourage SME trade participation and boost economic growth. Several options 
have been designed in various parts of the world to break down information asymmetry at the outset of 
market entry.  
 
 UNCITRAL Working Group I is currently deliberating on legal issues surrounding the simplification 
of incorporation and to good practices in business registration, both of which aimed at reducing the legal 
obstacles encountered by SMEs throughout their life cycle. It is submitted that this initiative along with 
other initiatives such as a global identifier system can increase visibility and enhance the chances of funding 
for SMEs. 
 
6.5. Liability Rules on Cloud Computing and Identity Management Necessary for Collaboration on a 
Collective Basis 
 
 In November 2016 UNCITRAL WG-IV started its deliberations on cloud computing, identity 
management and trust services. For banks the identity of the counterparty is of fundamental importance as 
it is necessary for verifiability and other regulatory reasons, such as KYC and AML requirements. There 
are several legal concerns for the identity provider, relying party and the user/data subject. Major among 
them is liability. Other concerns may relate to data integrity, e-contracts and e-signatures, cyber security 
law, privacy and data protection law, dispute resolution, etc. Since the deliberations have just started there 
is room for much discussion on this subject in the near future.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The expansion of SCF programmes throughout the supply chain has to be supported by a robust legal 
framework. It will result in greater financial inclusion, with the potential to raise SME visibility to improve 
confidence and transactional efficiency, freeing up capital and other resources to invest in productive output.  
 
 With the exception of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 34 entering into force on 22 February 
2017, the multilateral trade negotiations are moving at a glacial pace. The new business realities such as 
digital trade and global value chains need quick action from policymakers. Multilateral initiatives are 
possibly not well suited to deliver for digital trade in the short run, as many States do not want to commit 
themselves to such evolving areas without fully understanding the implications. The need for SCF to 
support SMEs is an immediate problem. Therefore, private law solutions will dominate in the short run and 
UNCITRAL is possibly the most suited institution to create harmonized laws that can facilitate SCF. The 
UNCITRAL instruments and initiatives discussed above are new and therefore it can be hoped that States 
will soon start using them in creating or updating their national legislation.  
 
 The use of financial technology can provide opportunity for the next wave of global growth to come 
from a facilitative approach to law making, combined with an appreciation of how information can be used 
to achieve positive outcomes. It creates an important opportunity for policymakers, working together, to 
deliver highly usable policy outcomes and provide benefits for collaboration between the physical and 
financial layers of the supply chain. 
  
__________________ 
34  WTO, “Agreement On Trade Facilitation”, 15 July 2014, WT/L/931, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm. 
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E. Rogers College of Law), United States of America 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The newly adopted Model Law on Secured Transactions crowns a longstanding effort of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to facilitate access to finance through 
secured credit. In the context of security rights, the engagement of UNCITRAL dates back to 1968, when 
the possibility of designing a modern and harmonized legal framework was considered and followed by 
exploratory studies.1 In 2002, UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI (Security Interests) commenced its work 
“on the development of an efficient legal regime for security rights in goods involved in a commercial 
activity.”2 The rationale for developing a modern and internationally harmonized legal framework for 
security rights in movables (tangible and intangible assets) is to broaden access to credit at a lower cost 
and, consequently, further international trade and economic growth. The mandate of Working Group VI 
was fulfilled in 2007 when UNCITRAL adopted the Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (Legislative 
Guide), equipping national law reformers with an instrument to design a modern legal framework for 
secured transactions along the lines of the recommendations set forth therein. Working Group VI assisted 
national policymakers with the adoption of two additional instruments complementing the Legislative 
Guide — the Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property (2010) and the Guide on the 
Implementation of a Security Rights Registry (2013). Finally, in 2016, the Model Law on Secured 
Transactions (Model Law) was adopted. These instruments benefited from the discussions that occurred 
during the last UNCITRAL Congress, titled “Modern Law for Global Commerce” (2007),3 when several 
issues pertaining to secured transactions law were discussed using the Legislative Guide as a point of 
reference. In light of recent economic, social, and technological developments in the last decade, it is now 
time to re-examine some of those issues and explore new ones in connection with the instruments on 
security rights adopted by UNCITRAL, particularly the Model Law.  
 
 One of the drivers for defining UNCITRAL standards that guide domestic secured transactions law 
reforms has been the assumption that a modern legal framework allows regulated credit institutions, or 
banks, to accept a wider range of collateral in order to benefit from reduced capital requirements. Amongst 
the various issues relating to securing obligations with movable assets, one panel at the 2007 Congress 
examined the regulatory impact of secured transactions on regulated financial institutions under the 
Legislative Guide.4 It was noted then that an expeditiously enforceable security right with the highest 
priority allows banks to benefit from lower capital charges. The same panel advanced a parallel with 
mortgages over immovable property, noting that these arrangements are recognized under international 
capital standards elaborated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as a factor that may 
reduce the risk associated with a loan.5 Following this logic, one of the justifications for modernizing 
__________________ 
※  The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) via 
the University of Warwick Impact Acceleration Account (ES/M500434/1). All views expressed in this 
article are solely the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official position of any government or  
organization. 
1  See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its First Session 
(A/7216, 1968) paras. 40-48; Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work 
of its Third Session (A/8017, 1970) paras. 139-145. 
2  Report of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the Work of its First Session (A/CN.9/512, 2002) para. 1.  
3  UNCITRAL, Modern Law for Global Commerce, Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law Held on the Occasion of the Fortieth Session of the Commission, Vienna, 9-12 July 
2007 < https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/09-83930_Ebook.pdf > accessed 20 June 2017.  
4  UNCITRAL, Modern Law for Global Commerce (n 3) 124.  
5  Ibid., It is worth noting that, following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, new capital adequacy standards have been 
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secured transactions laws along the lines of the Legislative Guide was that security rights in movable 
property would benefit from a similar regulatory treatment. This expectation also underscores the Model 
Law, which was designed to be in line with the Legislative Guide, as well as many secured transactions 
reform projects at the national level. However, such an assumption is not entirely correct and reflects an 
over-simplification of the functioning of international capital requirements.  
 
 It is argued here that the relationship between secured transactions laws and capital requirements 
should be more carefully explored to ensure an effective coordination between these two critical areas of 
the law. Our argument builds upon a research project comparing legal and regulatory treatments for certain 
types of assets — financial collateral and tangible assets — taken as collateral to secure commercial 
obligations.6 Through this prism it emerged that secured transactions law and capital requirements, in 
pursuing different programmatic objectives, namely access to credit and financial stability, are based on a 
different understanding of what should constitute a valid protection against credit risk.7 In particular, capital 
requirements display a traditionally sceptical attitude towards the possibility of using movable assets as 
valid credit protection against credit risk. Practical experiences in law reforms at the national level show 
that banks in a number of developing countries have not been able to significantly increase the volume of 
secured credit, notwithstanding the implementation of a novel secured transactions law regime. One of the 
chief reasons for this is the lack of coordination between secured transactions law and capital requirements 
which, in turn, does not provide an incentive to banks to engage in secured lending when movable assets, 
such as equipment or receivables, are offered as collateral. To address this and other related issues limiting 
credit creation through the banking system, different strategies may be developed at the national level.8 
However, these strategies are naturally confined within the perimeters established by the two distinct legal 
frameworks i.e. secured transactions law and capital requirements. Accordingly, the problem should also 
be addressed at the international level; precisely by furthering coordination between UNCITRAL 
instruments and the Basel framework — promulgated by BCBS and composed of the Second and Third 
Accords (Basel II and Basel III).9 
 
 Pursuant to the Basel framework, security rights trigger capital charges below the level of those 
attributed to unsecured credit only if the soundness of individual banks and the stability of the entire banking 
system are deemed to be preserved. If this is not the case, banks are required to treat secured credit in the 
same manner as unsecured credit, frustrating the purpose of reforming national legal regimes for secured 
lending. This is not to say that banks or, more generally, the banking industry, do not benefit from a modern 
secured transactions regime. On the contrary, if legal certainty is ensured and the creation, priority, publicity, 
and enforcement of security rights are governed by a predictable and coherent legal regime, banks are likely 
to extend loans to borrowers that absent such a modern secured transaction law would not be possible or 
issued at a high cost. Nonetheless, the lack of coordination between the efforts to modernize the law 
pertaining to security rights in movable assets and the efforts to strengthen the stability of the financial 
system may generate the unintended consequence of limiting bank loans generating a gap in the market for 
secured credit. Such a gap is likely to be filled by lenders operating outside the banking system, within a 
sector commonly referred to as “shadow banking.”10  
__________________ 
defined and are currently debated. In general, the new approaches to calculate capital charges over immovable 
property are more stringent than the one considered at the time of the 2007 UNCITRAL Congress.  
6  Giuliano Castellano and Marek Dubovec, ‘Regulatory Perspectives on Security Rights’ (mi meo 2017). 
7  Ibid. 
8  For other reasons impeding the use of collateralized transactions — such as the lack of expertise and the need 
for training on asset-based lending — and for a possible solution to address these issues, including 
recommendations on how to coordinate secured transactions law and capital requirements at the national level, 
see Giuliano Castellano and Marek Dubovec, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Regulatory Dimension of Secured 
Transactions Law Reforms’ Uniform Law Review (forthcoming 2017/2018).  
9  BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards — A Revised Framework (BIS 
2004, revised 2006) (Basel II); BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and 
Banking System (BIS 2010, revised 2011) (Basel III).  
10  See Financial Stability Board, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking: Recommendations 
of the Financial Stability Board (Basel 2011). In the literature, see Steven Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Shadow 
Banking’ (2012) 31 Review of Banking and Financial Law 619. 
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 It follows that furthering cooperation and coordination between UNCITRAL and international 
prudential regulators, notably the BCBS in conjunction with the Financial Stability Board, is of pivotal 
importance, at least for three reasons. First, coordination would reinforce the understanding of the differing 
objectives of these two legal regimes governing secured credit. This is, in essence, an attempt to build 
bridges. Second, UNCITRAL and BCBS would better achieve their objectives in discharging their tasks in 
a coordinated fashion. Third, the result of this inter-institutional coordination would offer guidance to 
national law reformers and regulators, fostering cooperation and capacity building in both areas of law. 
Overall, the instruments developed by UNCITRAL would contribute to addressing stability concerns as 
part of its broader agenda of promoting sustainable development and supporting innovation. Similarly, 
BCBS, alongside other relevant organizations, would be in a position to assess whether and, if so, in what 
instances secured transactions laws contribute to the stability of credit-based economies. The proposed 
coordination entails an inter-institutional dialogue potentially leading to a recalibration of international legal 
and regulatory standards. More immediately, a Guide to indicate how national law reforms may be 
implemented to promote, simultaneously, access to credit and financial stability could be prepared to ensure 
coordination between domestic regulatory environments and the Model Law. 
 
 
II. The Perimeters of the Issue: The Problematic Intersection between Secured Transactions Law and 
Capital Requirements 
 
 We have noted elsewhere that the dissonance between secured transactions law and prudential 
regulation stems from different rationales and operational logics characterizing these two areas of law.11 
While secured transactions law is concerned with the establishment of a legal environment that is conducive 
to private negotiations in order to stimulate economic growth, prudential regulation, through capital 
requirements, responds to a regulatory rationale that is sustained by the necessity of controlling the risk 
associated with banking activities. Capital requirements are imposed on banks with the intent of preventing 
excessive risk-taking, which may have detrimental implications for the stability of individual banks as well 
as for the entire financial and economic system. This reflects a twofold rationale. First, following the 
paradigms of micro-prudential regulation, minimum capital standards are concerned with the solvency of 
individual banks. Second, in line with the increasing need to focus on the macro-prudential dimension of 
financial regulation, capital requirements aim at maintaining the stability of the financial system in its 
entirety. Upon these premises, capital requirements prescribe the standards to calculate the amount and the 
composition of regulatory capital, i.e. that portion of own (or “unborrowed”) funds that banks must hold 
against the risks generated by their operations. Promoting economic growth also permeates the debate over 
the definition of an optimal level of regulatory capital.12 In this respect, capital requirements should not 
stifle banks’ ability to expand the availability of credit in support of economic growth and development. 
Hence, capital requirements — by controlling the associated risk — strike a balance between economic 
growth and financial stability, by influencing and, to an extent, limiting the lending choices of individual 
banks. 
 
 At the heart of the Basel framework to calculate regulatory capital is the Risk Weighted Asset (RWA) 
approach. RWA is a form of legal technology that establishes capital requirements in proportion to the level 
of risk taken by a bank. To each and every financing operation corresponds a coefficient that should be used 
to calculate the corresponding capital charge. Such coefficients reflect the likelihood of repayment and the 
level of liquidity for different classes of financing operations and borrowers. To calculate risk-weighted 
capital charges, banks may adopt different methodologies. Basel II, in fact, introduced three methodologies 
to determine the regulatory capital. Under the basic methodology, known as “standardized approach,”  
Basel II and Basel III statutorily prescribed the RWAs to calculate capital charges in accordance to the 
__________________ 
11  See Castellano and Dubovec (n 6). 
12  See Jihad Dagher and others, ‘Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital’ (2016) IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/04; 
Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About 
It (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014).  
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riskiness of various operations.13 For instance, small business loans are risk-weighted at 75 percent,14 and 
only security rights over highly liquid assets, such as bank accounts, may be considered to reduce credit 
risk and thus capital charges. RWAs feed into the capital adequacy formula and, assuming there are no other 
risks, capital charges are calculated by multiplying: (1) the loaned amount, by (2) the risk-weight, by (3) 
eight percent. By way of example, a small business loan with a value of 100,000 euros requires a capital 
charge equal to or greater than 6,000 euros. Under the standardized approach, RWAs are defined by 
regulators and the possibility of considering factors mitigating credit risk is limited. With the introduction 
of two additional Internal Rating-Based (IRB) methodologies — the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (F-
IRB) and the Advanced Internal Rating-Based (A-IRB) — banks have been allowed, upon regulatory 
approval, to adopt their own estimations to adjust RWAs and ultimately benefit from lower capital charges. 
The probability of default and the resulting losses associated with lending operations may be calculated 
using the banks’ own estimations. Hence, through IRBs, the risks associated with a specific lending 
operation may be further mitigated taking into account specific factors, such as the protection offered by a 
security right in tangible assets or receivables. However, even under the IRB variants, a security right may 
lead to reduced capital charges only if banks comply with specific regulatory requirements.  
 
A. Secured Transactions in the Basel Framework: Credit Risk Mitigation 
 
 Regardless of the methodology adopted, to unveil how secured transactions are considered in the Basel 
framework, it is necessary to look at the function that those instruments are to perform from a regulatory 
perspective. Secured transactions are funded credit protections, belonging to the broader category of Credit-
Risk Mitigation (CRM) techniques.15 CRMs are primarily designed to lessen the risks associated with 
individual financing operations and, eventually, with a bank’s entire portfolio of financing operations. When 
CRM techniques are employed, the resulting RWA charge should be lower than that imposed for an 
otherwise identical transaction not supported by any CRM.16 However, if providing inadequate credit 
protection, secured transactions may result in capital charges that correspond to those applied to unsecured 
credit.17 This is because collateralized transactions generate new risks, including: legal risk, hindering the 
exercise of secured creditors’ rights; operational risk, arising from defective procedures to monitor, inspect, 
or assess the value of encumbered assets; and liquidity risk, arising from difficulties in the disposal of 
collateral.18 A security right reduces a capital charge below the level of that applicable to unsecured loans 
only if it ensures the appropriate management of those risks, thus promoting the soundness of individual 
banks and the stability of the entire banking system.  
 
 Under the Basel framework, to determine whether a given CRM reduces capital charges, banks must 
deploy specific procedures and follow the prescriptive rules of either the standardized approach or, if 
authorized by national regulators, one of the two IRB variants. Subsequently, depending on the 
methodology adopted, various provisions apply to determine if a given type of transaction constitutes an 
eligible CRM and its corresponding coefficient for the computation of the risk-weighted capital charge.19  
 
__________________ 
13  Kern Alexander, ‘The Role of Capital in Supporting Banking Stability,’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran, and 
Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation 344 (OUP, Oxford 2015).  
14  Basel II (n 9) para. 69. 
15  CRMs are defined as techniques whereby “exposures may be collateralized by first priority claims, in whole or 
in part with cash or securities, a loan exposure may be guaranteed by a third party, or a bank may buy a credit 
derivative to offset various forms of credit risk;” Basel II (n 9) para. 109. 
16  Basel II (n 9) para. 113. This principle is a mainstay for CRM and has been restated in BCBS, Second 
Consultative Document: Revisions to the Standardised Approach for Credit Risk (BIS 2015), issued for 
consultation on 11 March 2016 (Second Consultative Document) para. 104. 
17  There are some exceptions to this rule and in some instances non-eligible CRMs may also result in lower capital 
charges; see Basel II (n 9) para. 77. However, the application of these exceptions does not affect the regulatory 
treatment of security rights here examined.  
18  Basel II (n 9) para. 115.  
19  This may occur in different fashions. In general, if a coefficient is not statutorily attributed to a specific operation, 
the risk-weight of the collateralized transaction results from the reduced exposure calculated after the CRM is 
multiplied by the risk-weight of the counterparty; Basel II (n 9) para. 148. 
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 For CRMs to mitigate credit risk and thus discount capital charges, the Basel framework identifies a 
series of specific requisites.20 Encumbered assets should be sufficiently liquid with a predictable value over 
time or included in a list of assets that contains collateral considered to be very liquid, such as gold, bank 
accounts, and certain types of debt and equity instruments.21 Moreover, banks should demonstrate — 
through written and independent legal opinions — that they have the right to liquidate (or retain) the 
encumbered asset promptly in the event of the grantor’s default or insolvency, in all relevant jurisdictions.22 
The intent of these provisions is to ensure that lower capital charges correspond to lower levels of credit 
and liquidity risk by focusing on the effective realization of the value of encumbered assets. Legal certainty 
and enforceability of security rights are of paramount importance and they are reflected in the entire set of 
granular provisions concerning the eligibility of CRMs for different classes of assets and types of 
transactions. Yet, rather than looking to the secured transactions legal framework for defining what legal 
certainty and efficient enforcement entail, the Basel framework appears to be primarily focused on 
identifying assets that are easily sold in secondary markets and for which enforcement is generally more 
expeditious. Through these lenses, the resulting regulatory framework strongly privileges transactions 
secured with liquid assets, such as financial collateral, over those that are less liquid, such as equipment. 
Movable assets taken as collateral are considered eligible credit protections only when banks adopt one of 
the IRB variants.23 
 
B. Capital Requirements Meet Secured Transactions Law 
 
 The regulatory understanding of what constitutes an eligible credit protection reveals a number of 
discrepancies with the legal framework anticipated by the Model Law, some of which are illustrated in this 
section. First, the Basel framework requires the security agreement to contain a detailed description of the 
movable assets.24 On the contrary, the Model Law recognizes that a reference to “all assets,” or to all 
movable assets within a category, suffices.25 Second, the Basel framework does not consider how banks 
may exercise their right to conduct regular inspections to ensure the integrity of the encumbered assets.26 
Hence, the implementation of the relevant provisions from the Model Law is de facto irrelevant to this 
end.27 It thus remains to be determined whether a requirement to inform the grantor prior to any inspection, 
which may be agreed on by the parties under the Model Law, would impair the effectiveness of the credit 
protection, from a prudential regulation perspective. Third, capital requirements demand that banks be able 
to rapidly enforce their rights by retaining or liquidating encumbered assets in the event of the financial 
distress or insolvency of the grantor. For security rights in tangible assets, the Basel framework compels 
banks to ensure that the value of the collateral may be realized within a reasonable timeframe. Also in this 
respect, legal systems have adopted different approaches. The Model Law, for instance, prescribes that the 
secured creditor must provide a notice of the intention to repossess the encumbered asset.28 It is uncertain 
whether such a requirement corresponds to the prudential expectation of rapid and effective enforcement 
of security rights. Fourth, the Basel framework establishes that only security rights enjoying first priority 
are eligible credit protections.29 The problem is more complex, however, as in most legal systems, 
preferential claims reflect specific policy choices.30 Thus, a precise graduation of competing claims is often 
__________________ 
20  The regulatory framework for CRMs is contained in Basel II and their treatment is specified for the standardized 
and IRB approaches. It comprises two methods, i.e. simplified or comprehensive; see Basel II (n 9) para. 121. 
The framework is currently under revision following the Second Consultative Document (n 16) Annex 1. The 
Capital Requirements Regulation adopted in the EU contains most of the proposed changes; see Castellano and 
Dubovec (n 6).  
21  For the general principles on CRMs, see Basel II (n 9) paras. 123 and 125; for the list of eligible financial 
collateral, see Basel II (n 9) para. 145. 
22  Basel II (n 9) para. 118. 
23  Basel II (n 9) paras. 521 and 522. 
24  Basel II (n 9) para. 522. 
25  UNCITRAL Model Law art 9. 
26  Basel II (n 9) para. 522.  
27  According to the Model Law, a secured creditor may inspect the collateral, as established by the agreement 
between the parties, but in a commercially reasonable manner. UNCITRAL Model Law art 53(2).  
28  UNCITRAL Model Law art 77(2)(c).  
29  Basel II (n 9) para. 522. 
30  See José M Garrido, ‘No Two Snowflakes are the Same: The Distributional Question in International 
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difficult to determine. Moreover, depending on the characterization of a given security right (e.g. an 
acquisition security right), a different priority status may be attributed.31 A fifth issue relates to registration. 
The Basel framework generally establishes that banks must take the required actions to fulfil legal 
requirements to ensure “the enforceability of security interest (e.g., by registering a security interest with a 
registrar).”32 However, this locution may lead national lawmakers (and regulators) to intend registration as 
the only mechanism to render a security right effective against third parties.33 Furthermore, given that the 
Basel framework does not differentiate among registration systems, a law that requires the registration of 
the actual security agreement and its review by a registrar prior to its entry into a paper-based system, may 
accord with international capital requirements similarly to a law that establishes an electronic registry 
system where a simple notice with respect to a security right suffices. 
 
C. Identifying the Consequences of an Uncoordinated Interaction between Capital Requirements and 
Modern Secured Transactions Law 
 
 A direct consequence of the thus far uncoordinated co-existence of these two areas of law is the 
reduced effect of secured transactions reforms. The provisions on eligible collateral clearly prioritize 
financial instruments and, to a more limited extent, receivables, thus failing to provide the same level of 
credit-cost reduction for grantors involved in farming or manufacturing, whose assets are crops or 
equipment. One of the reasons for this dichotomy is the difficulty in assessing the value of tangible 
collateral, which is comparatively higher for used equipment than for financial instruments or receivables. 
Furthermore, the Basel framework reflects the legitimate concerns about the liquidity of tangible assets that 
are more difficult to dispose of upon default, compared to offsetting a balance on a deposit account.34 
Historical data on tangible collateral is often unreliable or non-existent due to the absence of secondary 
markets and the inability of banks to properly assess and monitor their value. It follows that reforming 
secured transactions laws per se is not sufficient to broaden access to credit extended through the banking 
system.  
 
 A second and related effect is that the implementation of a reformed secured transactions law is more 
likely to benefit those lenders that are not affected, or less affected, by capital requirements, such as micro 
and online lenders, and lessors. In fact, the stringent requisites set forth by capital requirements naturally 
induce banks to be selective when considering certain assets as security for loans. The banking industry’s 
retraction from these lending operations leaves part of the demand for (secured) credit unmet, widening a 
gap that is increasingly filled by non-bank operators, which are not subject to capital requirements. These 
lenders are less constrained to cater to borrowers deemed too risky for banks. Higher interest rates may be 
charged to these borrowers not only in order to compensate for greater risks, but also because non-bank 
lenders’ cost of capital is higher as compared to regulated banks. Ergo, the sole adoption of a modernized 
and simplified legal regime for securing obligations with movable assets, may broaden access to secured 
credit in terms of the types of potential borrowers, but, given the greater involvement of non-bank operators, 
may not necessarily reduce the cost of secured credit. 
 
 
__________________ 
Bankruptcies’ (2011) 46 Texas International Law Journal 459. 
31  Floating vs fixed charges. 
32  Basel II (n 9) para. 123. 
33  For instance, the European Banking Authority (EBA) noted that: “[a] lien is perfected by registering it with 
appropriate statutory authority so that it is made legally enforceable and any subsequent claim on that asset is 
given a junior status;” EBA, Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Assigning Risk Weights to Specialised 
Lending Exposures under Art 153(9) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) (2015) Consultation Paper 
EBA/CP/2015/09, at n 43. For a more detailed examination of the implementation of the  Basel framework in 
Europe, see Castellano and Dubovec supra (n 6). 
34  See David Clementi, Risk Sensitivity and the New Basel Accord, Speech by Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
England (London, April 2001). 
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III. Concluding Remarks: Towards a More Structured Coordination  
 
 From the above, it appears that coordination between secured transactions law and capital 
requirements is an essential piece to foster innovation and sustainable development via legal reforms. Such 
coordination is needed to ensure that legal rules promoting access to credit are also informed by financial 
stability considerations, and vice versa. Ideally, the Basel framework should reference international 
standards that exemplify a modern secured transactions system, such as the Model Law, provided that those 
standards ensure a prudentially sound legal regime for extending credit through the banking system. For 
instance, the Basel framework may encourage States to reorder the nexus of preferential claims in order to 
render the techniques to manage credit risk more effective, thus supporting the implementation of the 
relevant article of the Model Law. Moreover, BCBS may indicate that only notice-based electronic registries 
satisfy the prudential requirements because of the lower level of legal risk and reduced costs, as compared 
to document-registration and paper-based systems. As a result, current gaps and grey areas would be 
clarified — promoting a more harmonious and coherent implementation of both secured transactions laws 
and capital requirements. Ultimately, the question of whether to amend some of the existing soft-law 
instruments should be explored with the intent of maximizing the impact and the effective implementation 
of the core legal components sustaining credit-based economies.  
 
 To reach this ambitious, yet attainable, goal there are two practical steps that could be taken. First, a 
dialogue between UNCITRAL, the BCBS, and other interested bodies should be established. The primary 
intent is to elucidate critical aspects of the interaction of the two areas of law, such as with regard to the 
standards for describing encumbered assets in security agreements and in respect to whether enforcement 
of security rights through authorities other than courts would satisfy the policy expectations pursued by the 
Basel framework. Within this dialogue, official inquiries should be conducted to reveal the extent to which 
the simultaneous application of a modern secured transactions regime and capital requirements affects the 
cost of credit and stimulates shadow banking activities.  
 
 To define an inter-institutional mechanism for cooperation, UNCITRAL’s past and current 
experiences indicate a possible way forward. The UNCITRAL Secretariat has been traditionally keen to 
ensure coordination with existing legal texts and projects carried out by international and regional 
organizations. During its 49th Session, the Commission acknowledged these efforts, particularly the 
coordination with the World Bank, the European Commission, the International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).35 The Commission renewed the mandate of the Secretariat to continue its 
coordination activities, but also extended it to focus more on providing training and technical assistance.36 
The 49th Commission also considered a specific report on the coordination of the UNCITRAL Secretariat’s 
activities in the area of security rights with various organizations.37 Although at that time there was no 
reference to prudential regulation or capital requirements, the possibility of fostering coordination between 
UNCITRAL and BCBS is expressly mentioned in a note of the Secretariat presented to the Commission for 
its 50th Session.38 In view of this explicit novel interest, a dialogue with prudential regulators could start by 
following the mechanism deployed, in the field of security rights, to coordinate the activities of 
UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on Private International Law, and UNIDROIT.39 To this end, meetings 
were held (in 2008 and in 2009) between the aforementioned multilateral institutions to: (i) assure the 
__________________ 
35  UNCITRAL, 49th Commission Report, para. 126. 
36  Ibid., para. 127.  
37  United Nations General Assembly, UNCITRAL Coordination Activities (A/CN.9/875) 10-11.  
38  United Nations General Assembly, UNCITRAL Possible Future Legislative Work on Security Interests and 
Related Topics (A/CN.9/913) 8. The note of the UNCITRAL Secretariat reflects the discussion held during the 
Fourth International Colloquium on Secured Transactions (Vienna, 15-17 March 2017) organized with the 
purpose of gathering views and advice concerning possible future work on secured transactions law. The program 
of the Colloquium is available here: < http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia/4thint.html > 
accessed 20 June 2017. 
39  See UNCITRAL, Hague Conference and UNIDROIT, Texts on Security Interests: Comparison and Analysis of 
Major Features of International Instruments Relating to Secured Transactions (United Nations, May 2012) < 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security/2011UNCITRAL_HCCH_Unidroit_texts.html > 
accessed 20 June 2017. 
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coherence of the substantive terms of the instruments that they sponsor; and (ii) avoid overlap and 
inconsistency among activities and instruments.40 
 
 A second essential step that UNCITRAL can immediately undertake is to prepare a Guide for States 
that decide to implement the Model Law. The proposed Guide should set out how a legal regime for secured 
transactions should be modernized in line with the policy objectives of prudential regulation and the 
specificities of capital requirements. To this end, the Guide should include specific recommendations for 
adapting domestic legislative and regulatory frameworks to international legal standards. In particular, it 
should illustrate to national law reformers and regulators how to assist their domestic banking industry to 
meet the conditions for tangible and intangible assets to be considered as valid credit protections, such as 
by providing a list of eligible collateral, by incentivizing the creation of secondary markets, and by 
determining what kind of non-eligible collateral could be used to calculate capital charges for loans that are 
past due, or non-performing. The Guide would have utility beyond the projects aimed at implementing the 
Model Law, as it could be equally useful for those economies that have opted to follow different models, 
such as the model laws developed by the Organization of American States and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
  
__________________ 
40  Ibid., 1.  
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A Review of Security Rights Over Movable Property in Namibia 
 
Hilleni Tangi N. Shikongo, Legal Officer, Office of the Attorney-General, Namibia 
 
Introduction  
 
 Security is important because it allows persons to access credit from financial institutions. Real 
security is the security a creditor may acquire by exercising a limited real right over a thing owned by the 
debtor to enforce payment by the debtor. Real security is, for instance, created by mortgage over immovable 
property and pledge over a movable thing. 1  
 
 Security rights over non-possessory movable assets, is unrecognized and unregulated in Namibia. It is 
this gap that creates a barrier to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that are in need of access to credit 
and where the only property they have is movable, and where such property cannot be possessed by the 
credit grantor.  
 
 This article argues for legal reform and development to allow improved access to credit for the benefit 
of the Namibian economy. It considers the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions a vital 
key to assist Namibia in the development of an effective legal framework for security interests over movable 
property.  
 
The Current Position in Namibia 
 
 Mortgage bonds, notarial bonds, pledges and cession are the most common types of security over 
movable property in Namibia.2 These forms of security, although recognized in our law do not all allow for 
non-possessory security rights.  
 
 Section 50(5) of the Deeds Registries Act, 1937 (Act No. 47 of 1937) provides that debts and 
obligations owing to various creditors and arising from different causes of action may not be secured by 
one mortgage bond. This poses an additional barrier to debtors who are unable to register multiple bonds 
owing to the various creditors that they may owe.  
 
 Notarial bonds also provide a favoured sense of security because a creditor may register the notarial 
bond over the movable property with the Registrar of Deeds in terms of sections 61-62 of the Deeds 
Registries Act, 1937. The registration of this bond does not automatically dispossess the property from the 
debtor. There is no perfect security prior to insolvency or default, and at the point of insolvency there is no 
payment of security unless the creditor is in possession of the movable asset. The creditor may however, in 
the event of default on the part of the debtor, apply to the High Court for possession of the movable assets. 
 
 Creditors would prefer to enter into pledge agreements with debtors, allowing them to take possession 
of the movable property to perfect security. However, taking possession of the property may not always be 
possible due to the nature of the property and the reality of the debtor to part with the property.  
 
 The Namibian High Court correctly reflects the Namibian position as it is today in Commercial Bank 
of Namibia Limited v Rossing Stone Crushers as follows:3 
 
 “Applicant as bondholder is not a secured creditor in the event of the insolvency of the respondent, 
and is entitled only to a preference over the concurrent creditors of the respondent with respect to the 
proceeds of assets subject to the bond in so far as they fall into the free residue of the estate. Should 
applicant however be able to take possession of the bonded property prior to the insolvency of the 
respondent it will have a secured claim as it then holds the property subject to a pledge.” 
__________________ 
1  Amoo S.K. Property Law in Namibia. 2014. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press. p. 13.  
2  LEXAfrica. Insolvency and Restructuring Guide for Africa 2015 . P.70. 
3  Case No. A 40/93 heard by Frank J in the High Court of Namibia on 10 March 1993.  
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 This is the reason why lenders and particularly commercial banks in Namibia, are unwilling to provide 
credit where the only available asset is movable. Consequently, the availability of credit particularly to 
SMEs is limited. In the absence of possession of the movable asset in order to perfect security other types 
of security over movable assets are neglected and lenders are better of being pledgees than in a position of 
bondholders.  
 
 The resulting lesson for Namibia is that there is a clear need to register security interests over movable 
property. The benefit of registration is two-fold firstly, it will create a secured claim for the holder of the 
security; and secondly, it will provide certainty about the assets encumbered. The registration of the security 
interests over movable property will therefore result in the validation and recognition of non-possessory 
security over movable assets, allowing for lenders to provide credit to persons and, especially SMEs who 
can only provide security in the form of movable assets.  
 
 This article proposes a fair consideration of the international best practices, and particularly the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, in developing the relevant legislative framework 
for Namibia. This article maintains further that the UNCITRAL Guide on the Implementation of a Security 
Rights Registry will provide the urgently needed guidance to Namibia with respect to the establishment and 
operation of security rights registries4 and that the provisions of these two UNCITRAL Guides should form 
part of the domestic legislation.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 The Namibian courts have already pointed out that the fact that the bondholder over specific movables 
may be in an even a worse position points to a need for law reform in this area.  
 
 This means that Namibia needs to undertake the task of recognizing and developing a legal framework 
for security rights over non-possessory movable property. The legal reform must consider the specific types 
of movable assets recognized as registrable, the appropriate legislation for the registration of rights over 
movable property, and how this reform impacts the Deeds Registries Act, 1937 and the manner in which 
commercial institutions currently grant credit.  
 
 There will be a need to determine a broad scope of the type of entities or institutions that can take a 
secure interest over the identified movable asset. The registration of security interests over movable assets 
will need to define the kinds of transactions that can benefit from the registration of such interests. By 
effecting this legislative reform, Namibia will be furthering its Constitutional objective to secure economic 
growth, prosperity and life of human dignity for all Namibians as provided under Article 98 of the Namibian 
Constitution. It is the duty of the State to establish a financial and legal framework that understands and 
addresses the barriers to access to finance.5 
 
 
 
  
__________________ 
4  The Law Reform and Development Commission of Namibia. Discussion Paper on Issues relating to the 
Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936). 2015 . p. 62-63.  
5  Ibid.  
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The Role of Model Law in Modernizing National Laws on Secured Transactions 
- In context of Chinese law 
 
Xiaoyang Li, China University of Political Science and Law, People’s Republic of China  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) will celebrate its 50th 
anniversary. In the past 50 years, UNCITRAL has made a great contribution to the harmonization of 
international trade law. Among these numerous advances achieved by UNCITRAL are the removals of legal 
barriers and the creation of an efficient as well as a transparent legal environment, both of which have 
greatly enhanced the development of international business. Moreover, UNCITRAL serves as a platform 
for bringing us together. 
 
 For Chinese legal researchers, practitioners and students, another function of UNCITRAL is even more 
impressive and influential than those mentioned above — UNCITRAL provides us with valuable, practical 
and high-quality reference tools with which to modernize our national laws. A good example is the CISG 
convention, which serves as a model for the codification of Chinese Contract Law. 1This paper intends to 
examine the potential contribution UNCITRAL can make in another working field — that of secured 
transactions.2 
 
 In 2016, UNCITRAL published the Model Law on Secured Transactions (ST Model Law). In the 
meantime, Chinese authorities have been engaged in drafting the Chinese civil code. This development 
presents a good opportunity to review the current Chinese laws with reference to the ST Model Law and 
the previous UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (ST Guide). However, as it is 
impossible to accomplish such a massive task, this paper will present a brief snapshot of the problems faced 
by the Chinese regime of secured transactions and will examine how ST Model Law and ST Guide fit into 
the Chinese context generally.  
 
 
II. The Approach to Secured Transactions 
 
A. Chinese law: the formal approach 
 
 The starting point of our examination is to understand that the Chinese regime is comprised of both 
the Chinese security law (CSL)3 and the Chinese property law (CPL)4, along with a number of judicial 
interpretations and administrative rules. Normally, Title 4: Security Rights of CPL is more commonly used 
than CSL in secured transactions owing to the fact that CSL was enacted in 1995 whereas CPL came into 
force in 2007. In light of the dramatically fast pace of development of Chinese society, it is not difficult to 
understand why some articles of CSL cannot meet the demands of economics. As article 178 of CPL states, 
in case of any inconsistencies between the provisions of CSL and of CPL, CPL shall prevail. Generally, no 
matter whether we apply CPL or CSL, they all adopt the traditional formal approach. 
 
__________________ 
1  Liming WANG: ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and China ’s 
Contract Law’, in Thirty-five Years of Uniform Sales Law: Trends and Perspectives, Proceedings of the High 
Level Panel held during the Forty-eighth Session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law , 
Vienna, 6 July 2015. 
2  Working Group VI was entrusted with the work on security interests in UNCITRAL’s 56th session in 2001 
(A/56/17 paras. 351 and 358). The most significant work products of Working Group VI are the Legislative Guide 
on Secured Transactions and the Model Law on Secured Transactions. 
3  Translation of CSL, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383719.htm. 
4  Translation of CPL, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471118.htm. 
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1. Three devices for secured transactions and their scopes 
 
 As in most civil law jurisdictions, numerous clausus is established as a fundamental principle in CPL. 
According to article 5 CPL, the types and contents of proprietary rights shall be determined by law.5 There 
are three forms of security rights provided by CPL: mortgage, pledge and lien. The nature of a lien here is 
“possessory”, as a method of self-act, rather than a consensual arrangement, so it will not be discussed in 
this paper. 
 
 A mortgage is characterized as a non-possessory security in CPL.6 All movable assets, as long as they 
have not been prohibited from being mortgaged by laws or administrative regulations can be covered by 
the mortgage.7 There is no limitation on the parties to a transaction as to the types of transactions and the 
obligations secured. However, the floating mortgage is an exception in that it has a limited scope: i.e., the 
assets covered are limited to four types, which are shown in the following diagram; only enterprise, 
individual business and agricultural can make such arrangement.8 
 
 CPL defines a pledge of movables as a possessory security. There is no restriction on the scope of a 
pledge, and the same with a mortgage. To relieve the inconveniences in trade caused by the traditional 
possessory method and as a response to practical demands, 9 CPL further develops the pledge of rights, 
especially as regards the receivables.10 The scope of the encumbered assets covered by the security rights 
in CPL is comprehensive, which can be viewed in this diagram: 
 
Forms 
of rights 
Mortgage of 
movables 
Floating 
mortgage 
Pledge of rights Pledge of movables  
Assets 
covered 
A. Equipment;  
Raw materials; 
Semi-finished 
products; Finished 
products. 
B. Vehicles 
C. Vessels and 
aircraft under 
construction. 
D. Any other asset 
that is not prohibited 
from being 
mortgaged by law or 
administrative 
regulations. 
Current and 
future equipment, 
raw materials, 
semi-finished 
products, finished 
products 
Any movable that is 
not prohibited from 
being pledged by law 
or administrative 
regulations. 
A. Bills of 
exchange; 
Cheques; 
Promissory notes 
B. Bonds; 
Certificates of deposit 
C. Warehouse 
receipts; Bills of 
lading 
D. Transferrable 
fund units 
E. Intellectual 
property rights 
F. Receivables 
G. Other property 
rights which may be 
pledged as provided 
for by laws and 
administrative  
2. Other security arrangements  
__________________ 
5  As a traditional and fundamental principle in civil law, the numerous clausus was introduced into CPL without 
argument. In recent years, this principle is being challenged in academy. See Yeong-Chin, Su, In Search of New 
Civil Code (PKU Press, Beijing, 2012), 117-227; Tze-Shiou, Chien, Economic Reasoning and the Law (Angle 
publishing, Taipei, 2014), 79-101; Jer-Shenq, Shieh, Property Law (Sanmin, Taipei, 2012), 49-52. 
6  The “mortgage” defined in article 179, CPL is fundamentally different with other jurisdictions. It is more similar 
to the “charge” in English law. See L. Gullifer, Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security 
(Sweet&Maxwell, London, 2013) para. 1-47. 
7  Article 180, CPL. 
8  Article 181, CPL. 
9  Liming Wang, Research on Property Law (RUP, Beijing, 2013), 568. 
10  Though it is controversial in academy, the Supreme Court held “The pledge of receivables not only consists with 
the international commercial practice, it creates a new path for security, which will have significant impacts on 
Chinese economics”. See The research group of property law, Supreme People’s Court, The interpretation and 
application of property law (PCP, Beijing, 2007), 670-672. 
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 Although the CPL follows a relatively comprehensive approach which can cover a large array of assets, 
the use of title — including the transfer of title and the retention of title — and the use of contract — such 
as financial leases, sale and resale or sale and leaseback for security purposes — are still very common in 
Chinese financial practice.  
 
 In terms of security over specific movables, those arrangements are usually more practical and safer 
than choosing devices provided by CPL. This is because they are convenient, low cost as regards legal 
procedures, low risk in terms of their enforcement and, more significantly, give more consideration to the 
economic demands of the parties. By contrast, the mortgage registration of movables is complicated, 
sometimes even impossible, as will be discussed later. The use of pledge will prevent pledger from using 
them, which is uneconomic and hinders the flow of business. 
 
 Chinese law is at the crossroads of how these two arrangements can be characterized. Some 
arrangements have been affirmed by other laws: for example, with the retention of title, Chinese contract 
law (CCL) has demonstrated its effectiveness.11 According to article 134 CCL, parties of a contract for sale 
can make an agreement that the ownership of goods will still belong to the seller if the buyer does not pay 
or perform other duties. With respect to financial leases, CCL sets out a section (from article 237 to 250) 
specially dealing with these and confirms that without an opposite agreement, the lender has complete 
ownership (not priority) of the leasehold during the lease term.  
 
 However, Chinese courts sometimes carry out re-characterization for reasons of functionality. In its 
judicial rules relating to private loans, the Supreme Court re-characterizes the contract of sale for securing 
the loan as the loan contract. Therefore, the lender cannot claim for the borrower to transfer the title of the 
asset to secure the loan. 12 
 
 In contrast, with regards to the transfer of title of movables, Chinese courts are reluctant to make such 
a re-characterization for three reasons. The first is that CPL is a piece of legislation following the formal 
approach and if courts characterize the transfer of title as a security, they have to go a step further to 
determine which category (mortgage or pledge) it falls into to ascertain which part of CPL applies.13 The 
second is that transferring the title of movables does not require registration in most cases and sometimes 
can be realized by virtual delivery, which cannot fulfil the requirement of publicity of security rights.14 Such 
a re-characterization would indirectly deny any proprietary encumbrance imposed by the transfer of title. 
The third is that CPL prohibits any pre-contractual agreements being made before the enforcement of the 
security rights which would have the effect of automatically transferring title to the creditor if the obligation 
were not performed on time.15 Transfer of title, once re-characterized as a security right, would contravene 
that prohibition. The basic policy underlying those three reasons is respect for common practices in business 
and the desire to adjust the rigid regime to accommodate credit demands. As a result, the transferee of the 
title has absolute ownership, a “super-priority” from a functional point of view. 16 
 
 In summary, though CPL takes a formal approach, in financial practice the approach is always 
functional. As new and ever-more complex forms of secured transactions continue emerge, courts are faced 
with the task of resolving disputes arising from these developments. Furthermore, without integrated 
criteria, secured transactions in different forms, though with the same purpose, would be reviewed 
__________________ 
11  Translation of CCL, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383564.htm. 
12  Article 24, The Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation of Private Loan. 
13  That is also the difficulty Chinese courts faced in characterising the new types of security. See the second tribunal 
for civil cases, Supreme People’s Court, The Judicial Guidance of Security Cases (Law Press, Beijing, 2014), 
36. 
14  Lacking publicity is an important ground for the opinion that the new types of security should not be recognized 
as proprietary by courts. ibid.36. 
15  Articles 186 and 211, CPL; Office of Civil Law, Commission of Legislative Affairs, Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, The clause explanations, legislative reasons and related rules of P.R.C property law  
(PKU Press, Beijing, 2007), 340-341. 
16  Financial institutions, courts and related parties all tend to not deny the effectiveness of new types security based 
on the transfer of title or contractual arrangements. Supra note 13, 34-35; Lixin Yang: “A forming atypical 
security in customary law”, China Legal Science, 2013-3, 74-84. 
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separately in law and cause substantial unfairness. “Re-characterization” is not a technical difficulty for 
Chinese courts. But the premise to make re-characterization is other arrangements for security can also be 
placed in a frame to ensure their publicity, priority and enforcement without discrimination. 17 
 
B. Solution given by UNCITRAL: A Unitary, functional and comprehensive approach 
 
 The fragmentation of secured transactions law into multiple and often outdated laws dealing differently 
with the transactions that fulfil security functions, and the resulting gaps and inconsistencies, are the 
common concern for the regimes taking a formal approach.18 
 
 The solution UNCITRAL gives is a unitary, functional and comprehensive ST Model Law. “Unitary” 
means there is one integrated concept for all types of security interest, while “functional” means substance 
must prevail over form and the Model Law applies to all types of transaction that fulfil security purposes.19 
Finally, “comprehensive” means the Model Law applies to all types of assets, secured obligations, 
borrowers and lenders. 20 
 
 There are six grounds given by the ST Guide for such an approach, which appear to be convincing:  
 
- An integrated legal statutes and security rights enhance comprehensiveness, consistency and 
transparency. 
 
- A functional approach covering the possessory security rights will help to modernize them. 
 
- Re-characterizing the title finance will balance the interests of creditors and grantors. 
 
- Covering contractual arrangements with security functions will minimize conflict and confusion as to 
the priority of the rights of the different creditors involved. 
 
- A comprehensive regime places all security arrangements in a fair and competitive order of priority.  
 
- An integrated security right can lower the overall cost of secured credit.21 
 
 What are the obstacles to taking such an approach in Chinese law? The traditional civil law theory we 
follow may play a major role. The ST Model Law reviews and strikes at this traditional frame and its 
principles and concepts, taking a functional approach, while we may be reluctant to change those theoretical 
presuppositions to which we have grown accustomed. The problem is whether in a fast-growing market-
oriented society it is still possible or justified for civil law to hold on the old way and refuse to respond the 
need for a modern regime on the basis of those traditional presuppositions?  
 
__________________ 
17  Same opinion, see Xueli Dong: ‘The Unification of Chinese Consensual Movables’ Security’, The Chinese 
Journal of Law, 2014-6,113-115. 
18  S. V. Bazinas: ‘The draft UNCITRAL Model Law on secured transactions’, UNCITRAL library (65366), 24. 
19 See M. Bridge: ‘Secured Credit Legislation: Functionalism or Transactional Co-Existence’, UNCITRAL library 
(43205). 
20  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security/2016Model_secured.html.  
21  ST Guide, chapter I, paragraph 105. These grounds also explain the remarkably worldwide development of the 
functionalism and PPSAs, See L. Gullifer: ‘Personal property security law: where next? (part 2)’, Law and 
Financial Markets Review 2012, 541-546. 
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III. The Creation and Third-party Effectiveness of Security Rights 
 
A. Chinese law: no strict distinction 
 
 Chinese law distinguishes the effectiveness of security rights from the effectiveness of security 
contracts, rather than setting a clear and strict distinction between the creation and third-party effectiveness 
of security rights due to the principle that proprietary rights shall be absolute. 
 
 It has taken a long time for Chinese law to gradually admit the independence of the security contract 
from the security right. Before CPL, article 41 of CSL stipulated that if registration is required, the security 
contract shall come into force only when the registration has been completed, which gives rise to a very 
strong control over party autonomy — i.e. “no registration, no effective contract at all”. The adverse 
consequences of this subsequently came to the fore: when the mortgagor declines to register, the mortgagee 
cannot ask him to do so because their security contract is not effective as a legal ground.22 In 2000, the 
Supreme Court made a technical adjustment in its interpretation of CSL. Article 56, paragraph 2 provided 
that when the security contract had been concluded but was not registered to come into force, the mortgager 
declining to register contrary to good faith shall nonetheless be liable for the losses of the mortgagee.  
 
 There are separate rules for security contracts from those for the effectiveness of security rights. For 
security contracts, the only requirement as to formality is that it must be in written form. The contents of 
contract are decided by parties and normally include the form and amount of the secured obligation, the 
deadline for performance, the details of the encumbered assets and the scope of security. 23 
 
 However, influenced by the principle of numerous clausus, CPL does not regard the security contract 
as an instrument of creating security rights. The only exception to this is mortgages of movables. In that 
case, the security would be created once the contract was concluded. In other circumstances, the creation 
of security rights cannot be accomplished by the contract, causing some inconsistencies.  
 
Security 
Rights 
Mortgage of 
Immovables 
Mortgage of 
Movables 
Pledge of 
Movables 
Pledge of Rights 
Creation Registration  Conclusion of 
contract  
Delivery  Delivery/registration 
Perfection Idem Registration Idem Idem 
 
B. UNCITRAL’s attitude: a fundamental policy  
 
 As indicated in the ST Guide, UNCITRAL regards “distinguishing effectiveness as between the parties 
from effectiveness against third parties” as a fundamental policy of an effective and efficient secured 
transaction regime.  
 
 The main ground for taking such a position as provided by the ST Guide is the avoidance of additional 
formalities in the creation of security rights (even as between the grantor and secured creditor) that go well 
beyond what is normally required for contracting.24 
 
 Similarly, the ST Model Law insists that a security agreement is sufficient to create a security right.25 
Chapter II: Creation of a security right mainly deals with the scope of securities, the security agreement and 
extinguishment. Chapter III: Effectiveness of a security right against third parties involves the methods of 
archiving third-party effectiveness and the proceeds of them. 
 
 
__________________ 
22  Jiaan Liu, Property Law (CUPL Press, Beijing,2015), 165-168. 
23  Articles 185 and 210, CPL. 
24  ST Guide, chapter II, paragraph 6. 
25  Supra note 18, 26. 
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CPL UNCITRAL Model Law 
Mortgage of movables: 
Creation=Effectiveness of contract 
Other security rights: 
Creation=Third-party effectiveness 
Creation=Effectiveness of contract 
 
 Hence, by distinguishing between creation and third-party effectiveness, the ST Model Law simplifies 
the creation of security and ensures the value of party autonomy. In addition, the distinction works well 
from a structural design point of view, enabling the issues Model Law has to deal with to be laid out in a 
more clear, concise and consistent manner. 
 
 
IV. The Registry System 
 
A. Mortgage of movables: new changes 
 
 As previously mentioned, mortgage of movables in CPL can cover nearly all kinds of assets provided 
that it does not contravene any laws or administrative regulations. However, the comprehensive scope 
devised by CPL cannot be realized in practice due to the lack of an effective system of registration. Though 
CPL empowers the administrative departments of industry and commerce (AIC) to act as the registration 
authority as regards mortgages of existing and future equipment, raw materials, semi-finished products and 
inventory to facilitate corporate finance, especially for the small and medium sized enterprises, the registry 
system does not function well, further intensifying the difficulties in credit and stimulating the development 
of the title-based finance.  
 
 This ineffectiveness can be attributed to several factors. To begin with, the scope of registration was 
so limited and vague that AIC often declined to register assets other than the four types listed and business 
bodies not referred to in CPL. Secondly, the registration process was complex and costly, requiring the 
submission of contracts and other proofs, and thirdly the registry record was paper-based and difficult to 
search. What is more, there was no inter-area data system, and as a result inquires could only be made on-
the-spot at the AIC of the place where mortgagor located, leading to poor publicity on a national scale and 
difficulty in determining the order of priority. 26 As a result, banks tightened their lending standards given 
the high risk of credit exposure and often asked for securities over immovables.  
 
 In August 7, 2014, Premier Keqiang Li issued the order of the State Council to publish the Interim 
Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure. Article 6 of the regulation states:  “Administrative 
departments for industry and commerce shall, through the Enterprise Credit Information Disclosure System, 
publicize the following enterprise information generated during the performance of their functions: 
… 
 (2) Registration information of movable mortgages. 
 
 (3) Registration information of equity pledges” 
 
 The new regulation, by the use of the electronic disclosure system, immediately promotes the publicity 
of registration and spurs the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) to revise its methods 
in relation to mortgages over movables. However, it is still very far from an integrated electronic registration 
system for notice registration as proposed by the ST Guide and ST Model Law.  
 
B. Calling for a unified registration system in Chinese practice 
 
 The registration system of security rights in China is very diffuse. We not only set out different types 
of registration in light of the several forms of security rights, even within the same category, we require 
__________________ 
26  Shengping Gao: ‘The legal theory of the registration of movables mortgage’, Legal Science, 2016-2, 15. 
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registration with different authorities with distinct procedures and rules, depending on the nature and use 
of assets, or the identification of parties.  
 
 The pledge of rights can serve as a good example. The different registration systems set up by CPL 
are summarized as follows. Besides these registries, it is still possible to make a registration in the notary 
office.  
 
Types of rights Registry Specification 
Negotiable 
Instruments  
With document of 
title 
Delivery 
 
Without 
document of title 
Registration in related 
departments (Not clear) 
Not Known 
Fund Units 
Securities 
Fund Units & 
Securities 
registered in 
“CSDC”  
China Securities 
Depository and Clearing 
Corporation Limited 
“CSDC” 
Detailed rules for the pledge 
registration of securities 
Securities not 
registered in 
“CSDC” 
State and local 
administrative departments 
of industry and commerce 
“SAIC” 
Measures for the pledge 
registration of securities at 
administrative departments for 
industry and commerce 
Trademarks Trademark Office, SAIC Provisions on the procedures for 
the pledge registration of exclusive 
rights to registered trademarks 
Patents State Intellectual Property Office Measures for the pledge 
registration of patents 
Copyrights National Copyright Administration Measures for the pledge 
registration of copyrights 
 
 Such fragmentation has artificially increased the cost and risk of credit. It not only wastes time and 
resources of both parties, it also cannot ensure nationwide publicity or the order of priority. The unified 
registry itself is a process of resource integration — once it succeeds, all assets can be connected in relation 
to the credit, which would be on an almost infinite scale and fundamentally prevent loan fraud.27 
 
C. What changes UNCITRAL can bring — a successful experiment in China 
 
 The ST Guide highlights the status of registration in the whole regime of secured transactions, as 
“[n]othing is more central to the realization of this goal than the establishment of a general, notice-based, 
registry system.”28 The registry ST Guide envisages is a system functioning to make security interests 
effective against third parties, to serve as an information source for the public to search and to provide an 
objective basis for determining the priority of competing interests.  
 
 In line with the ST Guide, ST Model Law establishes a “single, central registry for registering all 
security rights in all types of movable asset” and provides a set of Model Registry Provisions (MP) to deal 
with “the registration of notices of security interests in a publicly accessible Registry”.29 The supporting 
model provisions are set out in a considerably precise and detailed manner including the requirements and 
proceedings of registration and search, the errors and changes, and the organization and record of registry. 
Those provisions have much referential value because of their delicate and precise design. In addition, the 
__________________ 
27  The tardiness of the revolution of movables finance, Caixin Weekly, 2015-05. 
28  ST Guide, chapter IV, paragraph 1-8. 
29  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security/2016Model_secured.html.  
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notice registry, 30 the grantor’s authorization,31 the advance registration32 and the one notice for multiple 
securities33 work together to make the registry more convenient and low-cost.  
 
 In China, there is currently an effort to establish a unified registry for movables security made by The 
Credit Reference Centre, the People’s Bank of China (CCRC). The CCRC is empowered by CPL as the 
registration authority for receivables. The registry for receivables gradually developed into the CCRC 
Movables Financing Registration.34 The CCRC aims at establishing a comprehensive centralized registry 
for securities in all types of movable asset, which also includes the proprietary rights of which the movables 
consist. Even if the effectiveness of the CCRC’s registration, except the pledge of receivables, has not been 
affirmed by CPL, and may face non-recognition in courts, it is still popular in practice. The figure below 
shows the types and amounts of registrations in October 2016.  
 
 
 
Data Source: http://www.zhongdengwang.org.cn/zhongdeng/2016/201612/d577b25f7a954abb80c6e701820b5bb8.shtml 
 
 There are four characteristics of the CCRC’s system which enable it to function efficiently and 
effectively, and which also make it more similar to the ST Model Law: the nationwide system of integrated 
registration records, the internet-based electronic registry, the notice of registration without the need to 
register the security contract, and formal review.35 Small-and-medium sized businesses have benefited 
greatly from this registry due to its convenience, enabling them to obtain credit easier than before, which is 
shown in the following figure. That is exactly UNCITRAL aims to achieve.  
__________________ 
30  Model Registry Provisions (MP), C: Registration of a notice; H.C. Sigman: ‘Some thoughts about registration 
with respect to security rights in movables’, Uniform Law Review, 2010, 507-509. 
31  Article2, MP. 
32  Article 4, MP.  
33  Article 3, MP.  
34  The CCRC Movables Financing Registration System: http://www.zhongdengwang.org.cn/ 
zhongdeng/index.shtml. 
35  The idea of CCRC’s system, see: http://www.zhongdengwang.org.cn/zhongdeng/  
djln/column_common.shtml. 
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Data Source: http://www.zhongdengwang.org.cn/zhongdeng/2016/201612/d577b25f7a954abb80c6e701820b5bb8.shtml  
 
 In short, the CCRC’s practice tells us the registry designed by the ST Model Law and ST Guide is 
workable, valuable and that there are no technical difficulties in adopting such a registry in China. It will 
be a practical scheme to further detail and normalize the CCRC’s registry with the help of ST Model Law, 
to serve as a practical basis of the forthcoming reforms.  
 
 
V. Priority  
 
 The rules of priority in Chinese law are not well-developed, as the concept of “priority” is not 
perceived in a unified way. In CPL, the term “priority” indicates the breakthrough of the principle of 
“equality among creditors” for secured creditors.36 Another term, “liquidation order”, is used by CPL to 
refer to the competition between mortgages. In Model Law, there is a unified concept of “priority” and a 
comprehensive set of priority rules to deal with the conflicts between a secured creditor and every possible 
competing claimant including other secured creditors, the transferees, lessees or licensees of the 
encumbered asset, the creditors with preferential claims and the creditor with a judgment.37 This represents 
quite a significant difference between CPL and ST Model Law. 
 
 With regard to the priority between competing security rights, ST Model Law sets out a general 
principle-priority which is determined by the order of third-party effectiveness, giving first priority to 
whichever occurs first,38 subject to several exceptions or additions for proceeds,39 commingling,40 
acquisitions41 and negotiable documents42. However, in CPL only the priority between mortgages is dealt 
in a similar way to the Model Law, based on the time of registration. 43 The Supreme Court in its 
interpretation of CSL stipulates that the registered mortgage will prevail over the perfected pledge, which 
appears to be very arbitrary. 
 
__________________ 
36  Article 170, CPL. 
37  Articles 34,36,37 ST Model Law; ST Guide, recommendations 79-84, chapter V, paragraph 11-15. 
38  Article 29, ST Model Law. 
39  Articles 32 and 41, ST Model Law. 
40  Article 33, ST Model Law. 
41  Articles 38-42, ST Model Law. 
42  ST Model Law, chapter V, B. asset-specific rules (except article 50 for intellectual property).  
43  Article 199, CPL. 
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 The Model Law also resolves the potential conflict between secured creditors with the transferees, 
lessees or licensees of the encumbered asset, creditors with preferential claims and creditors with a 
judgment. In Chinese law, such rules are dispersed or even not provided for. 
 
 The comprehensive approach of the Model Law to priority rules can give prospective creditors and all 
related parties a much higher degree of certainty about the order of their interests and the resolution of their 
potential disputes compared with the current Chinese legal regime. This can in turn enhance credit, and in 
addition can ensure the smooth running of the ordinary course of business. Undoubtedly, it is a better 
scheme. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 This paper has briefly discussed four fundamental policies of the UNCITRAL ST Model Law: the 
unitary, functional and comprehensive approach to secured transactions, the distinction between the creation 
and effectiveness of secured rights against third parties, the single, central registry for all security rights in 
all movable assets, and the comprehensive and precise rules of priority. In the context of Chinese law, those 
policies fit well into the fast-developing practices in secured transactions and give convincing answers to 
the existing problems in Chinese law, as analysed in this paper. Those policies should without doubt be used 
to guide the direction of reform, as they can respond to the demands of business, integrate scattered 
resources for credit and ultimately enhance the sustainable development of the economy. 
 
 Aside from the four fundamental policies, ST Model Law provides considerably more detailed and 
practical rules, which provide an all-encompassing and practical scheme to modernize Chinese law. 
Although it is impossible to review every detail of those rules from a Chinese perspective in such a short 
paper, undeniably, the ST Model Law, in combination with the ST Guide, IP Supplement and the Registry 
Guide, can function as a key reference tool for Chinese reform.  
 
  
  
186 
Session 6 — Exit strategies and efficient and effective insolvency regimes 
 
 
A Model-Law Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Duke University School of Law, United States of America; Centre for International 
Governance Innovation, Canada 
 
Introduction 
 
 Court decisions in the United Kingdom regarding the illegality of exit consents,1 and in the United 
States regarding pari passu clauses in Argentine sovereign debt,2 as well as the ongoing Greek debt saga 
and newly arising questions about Ghana, the Ukraine, Venezuela, and other countries, have dramatically 
highlighted the risks of an inadequate legal resolution framework for restructuring unsustainable sovereign 
debt. Even those who are not adherents of sovereign “bankruptcy” believe that the status quo contractual 
approach is “deeply dysfunctional and produces bad law.”3 Unresolved sovereign debt problems are hurting 
individual debtor nations and their citizens, as well as their creditors,4 and (as the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development has observed) are endangering the economic stability of many 
developing countries.5 A sovereign debt default can also pose a serious systemic threat to the international 
financial system.6  
 
 
__________________ 
1  The Chancery Division of the English High Court held, in the Anglo Irish case Assénagon Asset Management 
S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited (formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited) [2012] 
EWHC 2090 (Ch), that exit consents are illegal, casting doubt on the effectiveness of exit consents to restructure 
debt under English law. See, e.g., Patrick S. Kenadjian, The Aggregation Clause in Euro Area Government 
Securities, in COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 143 (Patrick S. 
Kenadjian, Klaus-Albert Bauer & Andreas Cahn, ed. 2013) (observing that the judge in the Anglo Irish case “held 
that it was not lawful for the majority to aid in the coercion of a minority by voting for a resolution which 
expropriates the majority’s rights for nominal consideration[,] thus cast[ing] doubt on the legality under English 
law of any form of exit consent that imposes less favourable conditions on those who refuse to participate in the 
associated exchange offer.”).  
2  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-CV-6978 TPG, 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) 
(holding that the pari passu clause in Argentina’s defaulted bonds contract “prohibits Argentina, as bond issuer, 
from formally subordinating the bonds by issuing superior debt” and “prohibits Argentina, as bond payor, from 
paying [restructured] bonds without paying on the [holdout] Bonds”). Thus Argentina must pay all outstanding 
sums on its defaulted bonds simultaneously if it makes any payment on its restructured bonds). That decision 
was affirmed in its entirety by NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).  
3  Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, in A DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM FOR 
SOVEREIGNS: DO WE NEED A LEGAL PROCEDURE? 262 (Christoph Paulus, ed. 2014). 
4  Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., Frameworks for Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IPD-CIGI-CGEG Policy Brief from 
a November 17, 2014 conference held at Columbia University, at 1 (stating that “[p]oorly designed arrangements 
for resolving sovereign debt problems can lead to inefficiencies and inequities ... Delays in restructuring can be 
very costly. Insufficiently deep restructuring can force the economy through multiple crises and restructuring—
at a high cost.”). 
5  Statement of UNCTAD, Oct. 26, 2016 (also observing that unresolved sovereign debt problems “would thwart 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development before it had taken off”), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1364&Sitemap_x0020_Taxonomy=UNCTAD
%20Home;#1705;#Debt and Development Finance;#1602;#Sovereign Debt Portal.  
6  See, e.g., Jay L. Westbrook, Sovereign Debt and Exclusions from Insolvency Proceedings, in A DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGNS: DO WE NEED A LEGAL PROCEDURE?, at 251 (Christoph Paulus, 
ed. 2014). Cf. e-mail from Eva Hüpkes, Adviser on Regulatory Policy and Cooperation at the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), to the author (July 14, 2015) (observing that “doubts about the ability of states to provide additional 
resources can make financial institutions more fragile, in particular where there are no regimes in place that 
provide authorities with powers and tools to resolve financial firms without use of public funds”). 
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The Contractual Approach Is Inadequate 
 
 One of the main impediments is that the existing “contractual” approach to sovereign debt 
restructuring — the use of so-called collective action clauses (CACs) — is insufficient to solve the holdout 
problem. CACs are clauses in debt contracts that enable a specified supermajority, such as two-thirds or 
three-quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the principal amount, interest rate, maturities and other 
critical repayment terms. The holdout problem is a type of collective action problem in which certain 
creditors, such as vulture funds that may have bought debt in the secondary market at a deep discount, hope 
to extract value from other creditors to obtain more than their fair share of payment. They do this by 
litigating for payment and refusing to agree to a debt restructuring plan that would change critical terms, 
even though the other creditors consider the plan reasonable. Empirical research indeed shows “a drastic 
rise of sovereign debt litigation” by holdout creditors.7 
 
 CACs are insufficient for several reasons. Many sovereign debt contracts lack them, requiring 
unanimity to change critical repayment terms — and thus enabling any party to the contract to act as a 
holdout. For example, after years of trying to include CACs, relatively few Greek debt agreements actually 
contained such clauses and those that did were generally restricted to bond issues. Even in contracts that 
include CACs, the supermajority requirement may be so high (for example, three-quarters) that vulture 
funds are able to purchase vote-blocking positions that enable them to act as holdouts.  
 
 Furthermore, a CAC ordinarily binds only the parties to the particular contract that includes it. The 
parties to any given sovereign debt contract therefore could act as holdouts in a debt restructuring plan that 
requires all of a debtor-state’s debt issues to agree to the plan. Although in 2014 the International Capital 
Market Association (“ICMA”) proposed revised and updated forms of CACs that would aggregate voting 
across debt issues, the experience with standard CACs shows that many sovereign debt contracts will lack 
them. Moreover, even if all new sovereign debt contracts were to include aggregate-voting CACs, it will be 
many years before existing debt contracts, which do not include them, are paid off.8 
 
 CACs have been a step forward in some ways, but they are not a substitute for pursuing a more 
systematic legal resolution framework for helping debtor-states to restructure unsustainable debt. In the 
past, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) unsuccessfully proposed, and recently the General Assembly 
of the United Nations has voted to pursue, a treaty or convention that would govern sovereign debt 
restructuring.9 The political economy of treaty-making, however, makes that type of multilateral approach 
highly unlikely to succeed in the near future.  
 
Advantages of a Model-Law Approach 
 
 A model-law approach to achieving a more systematic legal resolution framework should be legally, 
politically and economically feasible.10 A model law is suggested legislation for national (and sometimes 
subnational) governments to consider enacting as internal law in their jurisdictions. Each government 
__________________ 
7  Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik Enderlein, “Sovereign Defaults in Court” i (May 6, 2014 draft, 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997). That research also suggests “that creditor litigation is 
increasingly common and costly for defaulting sovereigns”). Id. at 1. 
8  See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action 
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring 33 (2014), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4911 (observing that approximately 29% of all sovereign bonds 
outstanding, and approximately 39% of all such bonds governed by New York law, “will mature after ten years”). 
9  In 2014, the United Nations General Assembly voted to begin work on a statutory approach, referred to as a 
“multilateral legal framework,” for sovereign debt restructuring. The resolution was introduced by Bolivia on 
behalf of the Group of 77 developing nations (of which Bolivia was then the chair) and China. See 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gaef3417.doc.htm. The United States and apparently the European Union 
opposes this approach. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been tasked 
with moving this approach forward. There is skepticism, however,  whether any formal framework, such as a 
convention, is feasible—at least in the near future—without U.S. and E.U. support. 
10  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach, 6 JOURNAL OF 
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 343 (2016).  
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enacting a model law should therefore take the steps necessary to make the law effective in its jurisdiction. 
To facilitate cross-border legal comparability, each government enacting a model law should, ideally, enact 
the same legislative text. For that reason, model laws are sometimes called uniform laws. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration exemplifies a model law that has been uniformly 
enacted in an international context; the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United States exemplifies 
a model law that has been uniformly enacted in a subnational context.  
 
 The less formal process of developing and enacting a model law can be politically appealing. Indeed, 
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in an area of law that 
had for many years struggled to realize reform, may have been successful, in part, due to its less formal 
structure as a model law. A model-law approach would not require general acceptance for its 
implementation. Nations and even subnational jurisdictions could individually enact a model law as their 
internal law.11 Contracts governed by that law would thereby become governed by the model law. Choice 
of law thus gives a model-law approach a powerful multiplier effect. 
 
A Proposed Model Law 
 
 The Appendix to this article proposes a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law.12 Among other 
things, the proposed Model Law addresses the holdout problem by legally mandating supermajority voting 
that, assuming the requisite percentages agree, can bind holdout creditors.13 It also enables a debtor-state to 
aggregate creditor voting beyond individual contracts. Aggregate voting is critical for at least two reasons: 
it can prevent creditors of individual sovereign debt contracts from acting as holdouts vis-à-vis other 
sovereign debt contracts; and it allows a debtor-state to designate large enough classes of claims to prevent 
vulture funds (or similar holdouts), as a practical matter, from purchasing enough claims to block a 
restructuring plan or otherwise control the voting. 
  
 The Model Law solves the problem of pari passu clauses.14 Pari passu clauses currently in sovereign 
debt contracts (at least those governed by New York law, which are the majority) effectively require that 
payments to creditors under a given debt contract be made pari passu to all of that contract’s creditors—
even creditors who exchanged their original claims for debt claims under a new debt contract.15 Say, for 
example, that a particular debt contract with Country X has three creditors—Creditor A with a claim of 
$1,000, Creditor B with a claim of 2,000, and Creditor C with a claim of $3,000. If Country X makes a 
$1,000 payment on this debt, that payment must be shared equally and ratably (i.e., on a pari passu basis) 
among the three creditors. Thus, Creditor A would have the right to receive its ratable share ($1,000/$6,000, 
or one-sixth), Creditor B would have the right to receive its ratable share ($2,000/$6,000, or one-third), and 
Creditor C would have the right to receive its ratable share ($3,000/$6,000, or one-half), of that $1,000 
payment. Once sovereign debt claims are modified in accordance with the Model Law’s supermajority 
aggregate voting, however, their principal amounts would, as so modified, legally change.  
 
 The Model Law also addresses the critical need for a financially troubled debtor-state to obtain 
liquidity during its restructuring process. Although this funding has in the past often been provided by the 
IMF, the IMF may be unable, or unwilling, to continue providing funding in the amounts needed.16 Absent 
__________________ 
11  This is especially significant because, as explained below, most sovereign debt contracts are governed by either 
New York or English law. One or both of those jurisdictions — in the case of New York law, a subnational 
jurisdiction — could enact legislation based on a model law. 
12  Earlier versions of this Model Law have been vetted in discussions with working groups of the International 
Insolvency Institute (“III”) and the Centre for International Governance Innovation (“CIGI”). See infra note 34. 
13  This assumes, of course, that the claims of those holdout creditors are governed by the law of a jurisdiction that 
enacts the Model Law. 
14  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
15  Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: Developments in Recent 
Litigation, in 72 BIS PAPERS 121, 124-26 (discussing the meaning of the pari passu clause, in the sovereign debt 
context, in the Bliott case in Belgium and the Argentina case in New York). 
16  Cf. Brad Setser, IPD Task Force on Sovereign Debt brief, The Political Economy of the SDRM 5 (Jan. 3, 2008), 
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Setser_IPD_Debt_SDRM.pdf (observing that “it is 
unrealistic for the major emerging economies to think that the IMF will prevent all default ”). 
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the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority, no one would lend new money without obtaining a priority 
repayment claim. Unless (as in the case of Greece) virtually all of a debtor-state’s indebtedness is held by 
a relatively small number of governmental organizations, it would be impractical to get the existing 
creditors to contractually subordinate their claims to the new money. The Model Law, however, gives such 
new-money lenders priority over existing creditors, provided existing creditors have notice and the 
opportunity to block the new lending if its amount is too high or its terms are inappropriate. (The Model 
Law does not, of course, prevent a debtor-state from also, or alternatively, obtaining such financing through 
a governmental or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.)  
 
 The Model Law contemplates a “neutral international organization” as the law’s supervisory authority. 
It is currently unclear what organization might qualify as truly neutral; existing organizations such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, or a court of the debtor-state may be considered too political or conflicted. That 
temporary lack of clarity should not be confused, however, with an unrelated issue that is inapplicable to 
the Model Law. Formal sovereign debt restructuring solutions, such as a treaty, are often conflated with 
broadly empowered supervisory bodies that exercise debt-restructuring discretion which can impinge on 
national sovereignty. In contrast, the supervisory authority under the Model Law lacks authority to exercise 
discretion. All disputes are adjudicated through binding arbitration. The main role of the supervisory 
authority is administrative and non-discretionary: to fact-check information, to maintain a list of creditors, 
and to oversee the creditor voting process.  
 
 As an option, the Model Law also includes retroactivity. Because most outstanding sovereign debt 
contracts (if not governed by the debtor-state’s law) are governed by New York or English law,17 enactment 
by those jurisdictions of the Model Law, with retroactivity, could greatly facilitate the restructuring of not 
only future but also existing sovereign debt contracts.  
 
 Although retroactive lawmaking is somewhat atypical, as a normative matter it would provide 
significant social benefit and little harm—and thus should be morally imperative. The significant social 
benefit would be the opportunity that a retroactive Model Law could provide to countries, whose 
outstanding debt is or becomes unsustainable, to try to renegotiate that debt to sustainable levels. 
Renegotiation could reduce economic hardship to innocent citizens and deprivation of essential government 
services,18 forestall the likelihood of riots and other popular protests,19 and reduce the potential for financial 
chaos resulting from a country’s debt default.20 At the same time, retroactivity would impose little harm. 
The only parties whose expectations would be impaired would be holdout creditors. But any such 
impairment would be limited to changes that are voluntarily agreed to by a supermajority of pari passu 
creditors based on the debtor-state’s deteriorating economic circumstances, and thus should reflect the 
economic reality—and therefore the reasonable expectations—of what those creditors expect to receive as 
payment under those changed circumstances.21  
 
__________________ 
17  See e.g., Philip R. Wood, Governing Law of Financial Contracts Generally, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 12 (ed. 2007); Setser, supra note 16, at 16 (observing that “[a]lmost all international 
bonds are now governed by New York law, English law, and to a lesser extent Japanese law”). 
18  See, e.g., Nick Robins-Early, What’s Behind the Economic Chaos in Venezuela, June, 2016, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/venezuela-economic-crisis-explainer_us_57507abde4b0eb20fa0d2c54; 
Lucy Rodgers & Nassos Stylianou, How Bad are Things for the People of Greece?, July, 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33507802. 
19  See, e.g., Niki Kitsantonis & Rachel Donadio, Greek Parliament Passes Austerity Plan After Riots Rage, Feb. 
12, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/world/europe/greeks-pessimistic-in-anti-austerity-
protests.html. 
20  See, e.g., Finding Solutions to the Debt Problems of Developing Countries , Report of the Executive Committee 
on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, May 1999, available at 
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/6/4306/lcl1230i.pdf. Cf. James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured 
Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A Study on Relationship between The Fifth Amendment and The Bankruptcy 
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 1016 (1983) (explaining the importance of retroactive bankruptcy legislation).  
21  Even if that impairs a holdout creditor’s ability to blackmail a country’s debt restructuring in order to extract 
value from the other creditors, that holdout behaviour would be morally repugnant.  
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 As a legal matter, retroactivity is permitted under international law so long as it is neither 
discriminatory nor arbitrary. The Model Law’s key operative provisions — supermajority aggregate voting, 
and the granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s debt restructuring — should be neither. 
Retroactivity is also permitted under English law.22 Retroactivity might raise a controversial legal issue, 
however, for sovereign debt contracts governed by New York law.  
 
 The “Contracts Clause” of the US Constitution, in Article I, Section 10, prohibits states, such as New 
York (as opposed to the federal government), from enacting any legislation that impairs existing contractual 
obligations. Nonetheless, I have separately concluded that New York State should be able to frame its 
enactment of the Model Law in such a way as to not violate the Contracts Clause.23 In general, a state has 
leeway to retroactively impair contracts if the impairment is reasonably necessary to further an important 
public purpose and also reasonable and appropriate to effectuate that purpose. This leeway may be even 
greater if the contractual impairment is not substantial. New York State could therefore frame enactment of 
the Model Law, with retroactivity, as an exercise of its police powers to reduce sovereign debt defaults that 
could lead to a systemic economic collapse, thereby protecting economic activity within its borders. The 
Model Law’s supermajority aggregate voting and granting of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s debt 
restructuring are appropriately tailored to reduce that threat. Furthermore, as discussed above, any 
contractual impairment should not be “substantial,” being limited to changes that are voluntarily agreed to 
by a supermajority of pari passu creditors based on the debtor-state’s deteriorating economic 
circumstances.24 
 
Political Economy of the Model Law 
 
 A final question is whether the Model Law would be economically and politically feasible. Some 
nations may be concerned, for example, that enactment of the Model Law might increase their borrowing 
costs by making creditor claims more subject to bail-in. Economists have recently argued and provided 
empirical evidence to the contrary — that uncertainty due to the absence of an effective sovereign debt 
resolution framework actually increases the costs of borrowing.25 However, even if the Model Law would 
increase borrowing costs, it should not exceed the cost increase resulting from aggregate-voting CACs 
being included in all debt contracts, which has been the ideal goal of the contractual approach to sovereign 
debt restructuring.26  
 
 The Model Law should also be politically feasible. As mentioned, its less formal enactment process 
can be appealing to debtor-states. The Model Law would not require general acceptance by the world’s 
nations for its implementation. Jurisdictions that are interested in becoming or continuing as global leaders 
in debt restructuring—especially those with a reputation in finance and the rule of law—should want to 
enact the Model Law, in order to persuade parties to choose their law to govern new debt issuances. 
Countries will want their debt to be governed by a law that solves the holdout problem. Investors will want 
the governing law not only to be that of a neutral jurisdiction but also to reduce uncertainty and disruptive 
litigation.  
 
__________________ 
22  Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and English Governing Law, BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE, FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW (forthcoming 2017 symposium issue on “Public Bankruptcy”), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2952776. 
23  See supra note 10. 
24  See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Cf. Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“To assess whether an impairment is substantial,” a court should “look at ‘the extent to which reasonable 
expectations under the contract have been disrupted’.”) (quoting Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of 
New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir 1997)); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State ‘Bankruptcy’, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 322, 336-37 (2011) (advocating for a consensual debt restructuring process that enables states 
to seek relief from their unsustainable debt burdens and also protects creditor expectations—other than those of 
holdout creditors who are trying to extract value from others).  
25  Stiglitz et al., supra note 4, at 1. 
26  See text accompanying note 8, supra. The inclusion of those types of CACs is also part of the ninth goal of the 
UN’s Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes, discussed below.  
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 It is also informative to assess the Model Law’s political feasibility from the perspective of the politics 
of the IMF’s failed treaty approach. That approach failed for several reasons. Certain emerging market 
countries feared it would raise their cost of borrowing. As mentioned, however, the Model Law arguably 
should reduce or not affect that cost.27 At the time the IMF proposed its treaty approach, many believed that 
exchange offers could solve the sovereign debt problem. Experience, however, has long since undermined 
that belief. Some also opposed the IMF’s treaty approach because of suspicions about the IMF’s conflicting 
role as both treaty sponsor and supervisory authority thereunder. The Model Law, in contrast, is not designed 
by the IMF, nor is the IMF part of its supervisory process. Furthermore, as indicated, the Model Law limits 
the supervisory process to non-discretionary administrative actions. Debtor-states should therefore want — 
and creditors, other than rent-seeking holdouts, should want them — to enact the Model Law. 
 
The Model Law Embraces the UN’s Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes 
 
 The Model Law embraces these Basic Principles (“Principles”), adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2015.28 The first Principle is that “A Sovereign State has the right ... to design its 
macroeconomic policy, including restructuring its sovereign debt ... Restructuring should ... preserv[e] at 
the outset creditors’ rights.” The Model Law may indeed be enacted, voluntarily, by any debtor-state. The 
very fact that it is a “model” law means that a debtor-state could modify its terms. The second Principle 
concerns good faith, holding that “Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail 
their engagement in constructive sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations ... with the aim of a 
prompt and durable reestablishment of debt sustainability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the 
support of a critical mass of creditors through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms.” 
The Model Law’s Preamble states in relevant part that its purpose is to provide effective mechanisms for 
restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt so as to reduce the social costs of sovereign debt crises. Article 
6 of the Model Law requires that the restructuring plan will enable the State’s debt to become sustainable. 
The Model Law’s supermajority voting requirement for restructuring also respects the need for a “critical 
mass of creditors” to support the restructuring terms.  
 
 Under the third Principle, “Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability 
of the actors concerned ... ” The Model Law requires full transparency, including disclosure of any claims 
not included in the restructuring. The Model Law clearly embraces the fourth Principle (“Impartiality”), 
being completely impartial. The fifth Principle concerns equitable treatment: imposing on debtor-states “the 
duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors ... Creditors have the right to receive the 
same proportionate treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor 
groups should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process.” The Model Law 
embraces this Principle by including all of a debtor-state’s debt claims except for internal operational claims 
(such as pension and retiree obligations, tax refunds, unpaid salaries to public employees, and social 
program payments), and also by requiring pari passu claims to be treated alike or else giving their holders 
a supermajority-voting power to veto a restructuring. The Model Law at least de facto respects the sixth 
Principle, that “Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt 
restructurings is a right of States before foreign domestic courts ... ,” by recognizing the reality that a 
creditor obtaining a foreign judgment against a debtor-state cannot use that judgment to attach sovereign 
assets within that state.29 
 
 The seventh Principle, “Legitimacy,” “entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations 
related to sovereign debt restructuring workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the rule of law, 
at all levels. The terms and conditions of the original contracts should remain valid until such time as they 
are modified by a restructuring agreement.” The Model Law fully respects legitimacy in all of these forms. 
The eighth Principle, “Sustainability,” is one of the Model Law’s primary goals. This Principle “implies 
that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a 
__________________ 
27  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
28  “Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes” (A/69/L.84), adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in New York at its Sixty-Ninth Session on 10 September 2015. 
29  For that reason, the Model Law does not include a stay.  
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stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting sustained 
and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, 
warranting the stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights.” The Model Law 
is designed to restructure unsustainable debt in order to achieve a stable debt situation. Its very Preamble 
explains that the Model Law will provide effective mechanisms for restructuring unsustainable sovereign 
debt so as to reduce the social costs of sovereign debt crises, systemic risk to the financial system, creditor 
uncertainty, and the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are costly and create moral hazard. 
  
 The Model Law is explicitly designed to facilitate the ninth Principle, “Majority restructuring,” which 
“implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified majority of the 
creditors of a State are not to be ... impeded by ... a non-representative minority of creditors ... States should 
be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued.” The Model Law 
enables a specified majority of creditors, voting on an aggregate basis, to bind all pari passu creditors, 
thereby preventing vulture funds and other holdouts from impeding a debtor-State’s debt restructuring. The 
Model Law also works in parallel with, and embraces, collective action clauses. A debtor-state could, for 
example, decide to exclude claims that incorporate collective action clauses from the Model Law’s 
operation, so long as it discloses those excluded claims. Creditors on those claims also have the right, if 
they choose, to contractually opt into the Model Law’s terms, conditions, and provisions. 
 
Recommendations 
 
 This article proposes a model-law approach to sovereign debt restructuring as a topic for UNCITRAL 
research. Such an approach would be modest, compared to a multilateral treaty; but the ability of debtor 
nations and their creditors to choose the model law to govern their debt contracts gives a model-law 
approach a powerful multiplier effect, and thus a significant potential impact. As a starting point, this article 
proposes the text of such a law (defined herein as the Model Law), which already has been vetted in 
discussions with leading experts worldwide.30 That vetting also indicates that a model-law approach should 
have widespread acceptance.31  
 
 Even if it achieves nothing else, UNCITRAL’s researching a model-law approach should provide 
incremental steps toward developing norms for a sovereign debt restructuring legal framework that goes 
beyond mere contracting. An incremental approach to developing norms has strong precedent in the legal 
ordering of international relationships,32 especially “where law reformers possess limited authority and 
where the subject [like sovereign debt restructuring] is either controversial or technical.”33 A model law 
could also be pursued in parallel as part of a broader strategy for developing a legal resolution framework 
for sovereign debt restructuring. 
 
__________________ 
30  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
31  Given that vetting, this article’s Model Law should in principle be ready for enactment by interested jurisdictions, 
whether or not UNCITRAL selects this article’s topic for further research. 
32  Cf. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law , 72 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 469, 531 (2005) (observing that “states can be gradually led toward 
stronger legal rules ... by starting with relatively weak international rules backed by little or no sanctions that all 
states feel comfortable joining, but then gradually pushing states to accept successively stronger and more 
challenging requirements”).  
33  Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking, 32 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 851, 852 (2007). Cf. John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for 
International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 939 (2005) (observing that UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency “created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between universalists and 
territorialists … by appearing to be a hybrid of universalism and territorialism[,] ... thus allow[ing] hesitant states 
to ‘acclimate’ to a regime of universalism”). An incremental approach to developing norms has also been valuable 
for addressing international environmental problems, such as climate change. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE 
NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 221 (2006) (arguing that “an incremental ... strategy for change offers the 
best alternative for speeding up the transition to a new environmental regulation”). 
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Appendix  
 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law34 
 
Preamble 
 
 The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for restructuring unsustainable sovereign 
debt so as to reduce (a) the social costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk to the financial system, 
(c) creditor uncertainty, and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts, which are costly and create moral 
hazard. 
 
Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms 
 
Article 1: Scope 
 
 (1)  This Law applies where, by contract or otherwise, (a) the law of [this jurisdiction35] governs the 
debtor-creditor relationship between a State and its creditors and (b) the application of this Law is 
invoked in accordance with Chapter II. 
 
 (2) Where this Law applies, it [shall operate retroactively and, without limiting the foregoing,36] shall 
override any contractual provisions that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Law.  
 
Article 2: Use of Terms 
 
For purposes of this Law: 
 
 (1) “creditor” means a person or entity that has a claim against a State; 
 
 (2) “claim” means a payment claim against a State for monies borrowed or for the State’s guarantee 
of, or other contingent obligation on, monies borrowed; and the term “monies borrowed” shall include 
the following, whether or not it represents the borrowing of money per se: monies owing under bonds, 
debentures, notes, or similar instruments; monies owing for the deferred purchase price of property or 
services, other than trade accounts payable arising in the ordinary course of business; monies owing 
on capitalized lease obligations; monies owing on or with respect to letters of credit, bankers’ 
acceptances, or other extensions of credit; and monies owing on money-market instruments or 
instruments used to finance trade; 
 
 (3) “Plan” means a debt restructuring plan contemplated by Chapter III; 
 
 (4) “State” means a sovereign nation; 
 
 (5) “Supervisory Authority” means [name of neutral international organization]. 
 
__________________ 
34  In writing this Model Law, the author benefited greatly from discussions with colleagues on the International 
Insolvency Institute (III) Working Group on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP Working Group on Cross-
Border and Sovereign Insolvencies. Besides the author, the members of these working groups are, respectively, 
Donald Bernstein, Zack Clement, Allan Gropper, Robin Itkin, Steven T. Kargman, Kenneth N. Klee, Chris topher 
Klein, Bruce Leonard, Charles W. Mooney, Christoph Paulus and Ignacio Tirado; and Mona Davies, Oonagh 
Fitzgerald, Mark Jewett, Bruce Leonard, John Murray, Catherine Walsh and Miranda Xafa.  
35  This would refer to a jurisdiction enacting this Model Law, for example, New York, England, a nation, etc. 
Articles 3(3) and 12 further expand this Law’s application.  
36
  This provision is optional. Retroactivity would be especially powerful if New York State or England enacts the 
Model Law. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
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Chapter II: Invoking the Law’s Application 
 
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition 
 
 (1) A State may invoke application of this Law by filing a voluntary petition for relief with the 
Supervisory Authority.  
 
 (2)  Such petition shall certify that the State (a) seeks relief under this Law, and has not previously 
sought relief under this Law (or under any other law that is substantially in the form of this Law) 
during the past [ten] years, (b) needs relief under this Law to restructure claims that, absent such relief, 
would constitute unsustainable debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure those claims in accordance 
with this Law, (d) agrees to all other terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law, and (e) has duly 
enacted any national law needed to effectuate these agreements. If requested by the Supervisory 
Authority, such petition shall also attach documents and legal opinions evidencing compliance with 
clause (e). 
 
 (3) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so long as such filing has not been 
dismissed by the Supervisory Authority [or this jurisdiction] for lack of good faith, the terms, 
conditions, and provisions of this Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the 
State and its creditors to the extent such relationship is governed by the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) 
apply to the debtor-creditor relationship between the State and its creditors to the extent such 
relationship is governed by the law of another jurisdiction that has enacted law substantially in the 
form of this Law; and (c) be recognized in, and by, all other jurisdictions that have enacted law 
substantially in the form of this Law. 
 
Article 4: Notification of Creditors 
 
 (1) Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the State shall notify all of its known creditors 
of its intention to negotiate a Plan under this Law. 
 
 (2) The Supervisory Authority shall prepare and maintain a current list of creditors of the State for 
purposes of supervising voting under this Law. 
 
Chapter III: Voting on a Debt Restructuring Plan 
 
Article 5: Submission of Plan 
 
 (1) The State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, and may submit alternative Plans from 
time to time. 
 
 (2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan. 
 
Article 6: Contents of Plan 
 
A Plan shall 
 
 (1) designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3); 
 
 (2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims;  
 
 (3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, unless the holder of a claim agrees 
to a less favourable treatment; 
 
 (4) disclose any claims not included in the Plan’s classes of claims;  
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 (5) provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation including, with respect to any claims, 
curing or waiving any defaults or changing the maturity dates, principal amount, interest rate, or other 
terms or cancelling or modifying any liens or encumbrances; and 
 
 (6) certify that, if the Plan becomes effective and binding on the State and its creditors under  
Article 7(1), the State’s debt will become sustainable.  
 
Article 7: Voting on the Plan 
 
 (1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the State and its creditors when it has been 
submitted by the State and agreed to by each class of such creditors’ claims designated in the Plan 
under Article 6(1). Thereupon, the State shall be discharged from all claims included in those classes 
of claims, except as provided in the Plan. 
 
 (2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least [two-thirds] in amount and 
more than [one-half] in number of the claims of such class [voting on such Plan37] [entitled to vote on 
such Plan] agree to the Plan. 
 
 (3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the State that are pari passu in priority, 
provided that (a) pari passu claims need not all be included in the same class, (b) claims of 
governmental or multi-governmental entities each shall be classed separately, and (c) claims that are 
governed by this Law or the law of another jurisdiction that has enacted law substantially in the form 
of this Law shall not be classed with other claims. 
 
Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring 
 
Article 8: Terms of Lending 
 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Article 8, the State shall have the right to borrow money on such 
terms and conditions as it deems appropriate. 
 
 (2) The State shall notify all of its known creditors of its intention to borrow under Article 8(1), the 
terms and conditions of the borrowing, and the proposed use of the loan proceeds. Such notice shall 
also direct those creditors to respond to the Supervisory Authority within 30 days, stating (a) whether 
they approve or disapprove of such loan, (b) the principal amount of their claims against the State, and 
(c) the principal amount of those claims that are governed by this Law or the law of another jurisdiction 
that has enacted law substantially in the form of this Law.  
 
 (3) Any such loan must be approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds in principal amount of 
the claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory Authority within that 30-day period. 
 
 (4) In order for the priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination) under Article 9 to be 
effective, any such loan must additionally be approved by creditors holding at least two-thirds in 
principal amount of the “covered” claims of creditors responding to the Supervisory Authority within 
that 30-day period. Claims shall be deemed to be “covered” if they are governed by this Law or the 
law of another jurisdiction that has enacted law substantially in the form of this Law.  
 
Article 9: Priority of Repayment 
 
 (1) The State shall repay loans approved under Article 8 prior to paying any other claims.  
 
 (2) The claims of creditors of the State are subordinated to the extent needed to effectuate the priority 
payment under this Article 9. Such claims are not subordinated for any other purpose. 
__________________ 
37  The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but reliable notice to creditors then becomes 
more important. 
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 (3) The priority of repayment (and corresponding subordination) under this Article 9 is expressly 
subject to the approval by creditors under Article 8(4). 
 
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes 
 
Article 10: Arbitration 
 
 (1) All disputes arising under this Law shall be resolved by binding arbitration before a panel of three 
arbitrators.  
 
 (2) The arbitration shall be governed by [generally accepted international arbitration rules of (name 
of neutral international arbitration body)] [the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes/ International Centre for Dispute Resolution/ International Chamber of 
Commerce International Court of Arbitration]. 
 
 (3) Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties to an arbitration contractually agree that such 
arbitration shall be governed by other rules, it shall be so governed. Such agreement may be made 
before or after the dispute arises. 
 
 (4) The State shall pay all costs, fees, and expenses of the arbitrations. 
 
Chapter VI: Opt In 
 
Article 11: Opting in to this Law 
 
 (1) Any creditors of the State whose claims are not otherwise governed by this Law may 
contractually opt in to this Law’s terms, conditions, and provisions.  
 
 (2) The terms, conditions, and provisions of this Law shall apply to the debtor-creditor relationship 
between the State and creditors opting in under Article 11(1) as if such relationship were governed by 
the law of [this jurisdiction] under Article 3(3). 
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Panel Session for UNCITRAL Congress 
 
A Global Architecture for Resolution of Financial Institutions 
 
 International trade requires international financing. The resulting interconnectedness of financial 
networks has increased the risk that local contagion and systemic shocks may spread to the global financial 
system. Neither domestic nor current international legal regimes adequately address these risks on their 
own. In an important paper, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution Gap, 
10 Brook. J. of Corp. Fin. And Comm. L. 183 (2015), Prof. Irit Mevorach points out that the orderly 
resolution of financial institutions across national boundaries could be aided by a legal mechanism for 
recognizing resolution orders. Such a global regime could address local commercial law impediments to 
global resolution, while at the same time ensuring that global resolution regimes do not displace local law 
more than is absolutely necessary.  
 
 The panel would explore a potentially crucial role for UNCITRAL in developing such a cross-border 
recognition regime. UNCITRAL’s experience with the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency offers a 
unique expertise and ability to balance the imperatives of local, national and regional resolution within a 
framework that facilitates cooperation and coordination, and provides quick and certain recognition. In 
particular, the panellists will explore the need to balance the imperatives of systemic safety and soundness 
against the existing legal doctrines that allocate financial risk among commercial parties. 
 
 
A Global Framework for Resolution of Financial Institutions
1
 
 
Irit Mevorach, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 
 
 The international legal architecture supporting cross-border insolvency and cross-border resolution is 
incomplete. UNCITRAL in 1997 promulgated its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, a framework 
for global insolvency and restructuring of international commercial enterprises. The Model Law does not, 
however, specifically address the cross-border resolution of international financial institutions. The 
international standard for the resolution of Significantly Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) identifies 
domestic best practices and includes high-level principles concerning the cross-border aspects of resolution 
regimes. However, it does not set forth a detailed cross-border resolution framework with legislative 
provisions that can be enacted uniformly across countries’ legal systems. 
 
 Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and the subsequent series of collapses of global financial 
institutions, there have been urgent calls for action, including by standard-setting institutions, to develop a 
framework for the orderly resolution of financial institutions across national boundaries. Importantly, a 
recent initiative of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) introduced contractual solutions to enhance cross-
border recognition of resolution measures, in particular the stay of termination of financial contracts and 
bail-in. It also emphasized the need for statutory solutions and delineated additional high-level principles 
that can guide legal systems as they develop statutory frameworks. These developments in the bank and 
SIFI resolution context promoted rethinking about the underlying goals of the general insolvency standard 
(within the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the World Bank Principles) on the treatment of financial 
contracts, and as a result enhanced harmonization in this area. However, the international community and 
standard-setters have not yet undertaken a project to develop a comprehensive global framework with 
legislative provisions for cross-border resolution of financial institutions. 
 
 This recent improvement of the general insolvency standard regarding the treatment of financial 
contracts and the increasing cross-sector consistency of best practice standards are likely to accelerate 
harmonization of national resolution-related laws, which in turn can support a cross-border resolution 
__________________ 
1
 Based on Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution Gap, 10 Brook. J. of Corp. 
Fin. And Comm. L. 183 (2015), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2831693  
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framework. However, harmonization is a slow process and progress has been mixed. It is also unlikely that 
full harmonization will ever be achieved. On the policy level, harmonization efforts should be constrained 
to provide room for local developments of resolution regimes. Domestic resolution systems may evolve 
over time and countries may develop innovative concepts and measures to address new challenges. It is 
through such experiences and developments that the regulatory landscape can remain modern and fit for 
purpose. Additionally, even if resolution regimes converge, a cross-border framework would be necessary 
to prescribe the degree of coordination in implementing the (harmonized) measures and the manner of 
cooperation or centralization of the process, in particular whether a certain authority takes the lead in the 
initiation and conduct of measures. 
 
 Currently, the UNCITRAL Model Law is the only global model available for cross-border insolvency 
and hence an expected point of reference when attempting to design a global framework for resolution of 
financial institutions. The Model Law for commercial entities was designed to provide uniformity in the 
application of private international law aspects, while allowing host countries to retain some control in the 
administration of cross-border insolvency. The prevailing argument has been, though, that the Model Law 
was designed for corporate non-bank enterprises, and that it did not address group structures, which are the 
prevalent form of global financial institutions. Financial institutions are arguably more complex and the 
Model Law approach therefore might be too simplistic.  
 
 It is indeed widely acknowledged that the regulation of bank insolvency has certain specific objectives, 
and therefore bank insolvency requires certain special rules. It has been argued in this respect that because 
of the need to consider objectives other than maximization of the estate value, most countries have chosen 
to treat bank insolvencies differently from ordinary commercial insolvencies. Yet, notwithstanding the 
specific concerns and special goals of resolving international banks and particularly global SIFIs, it is also 
important to acknowledge the significant commonalities with general cross-border insolvency. The 
insolvency standard emphasizes goals beyond value maximization for existing creditors. There is a 
consensus that an insolvency regime should balance between a range of interests and may pursue social 
policies. In regards to cross-border insolvency, it is agreed that pursuing the broad range of goals requires 
coordination between jurisdictions, facilitation of the provision of assistance to foreign proceedings, and 
recognition of foreign proceedings, by adopting the Model Law in national regimes. The Model Law aims 
to promote cooperation, greater legal certainty, fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvency 
proceedings, maximization of the value of the estate, facilitation of rescue of distressed businesses, 
protecting investment, and preserving employment. 
 
 The Model Law has focused so far on single companies, yet it did not exclude more complex business 
structures such as groups from its scope. Notably, the practice shows that many cross-border insolvency 
cases of groups have been addressed effectively under the Model Law. Furthermore, UNCITRAL has tasked 
itself to address the “group gap” and to expand the Model Law to include additional tools to facilitate group 
solutions in cross-border cases. Thus, the Model Law is becoming increasingly relevant and can be usefully 
analysed and considered in the process of closing gaps in the cross-border insolvency/resolution 
infrastructure, while bearing in mind the specialness of international financial institutions. 
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Adequate Assurance of Future Performance:  
Learning from (and Harmonizing) Banking and Insolvency Resolution
2
 
 
John Pottow, University of Michigan Law School, United States of America 
 
 UNCITRAL will hopefully turn its attention to cross-border financial institution resolution by building 
upon its successful platform of cross-border insolvency reform. Academics indeed have studied the 
(comparatively) more regulated system of cross-border insolvency to extract guidance. That work, in turn, 
compares domestic treatment of failed banks with failed private companies. For example, the United States 
shares a common attribute with many, though by no means all, systems, namely, that the resolution of 
financially distressed banks is hived off from the otherwise prevailing insolvency system rules for private 
company restructuring. Justifications range from concerns of systemic risk to historical path dependency, 
but for better or worse, banks get special treatment. Indeed, this is true both where there is a specialized 
regime, and also where there is not. 
 
 Two central features of developed insolvency systems is imposition of a creditor moratorium and the 
ability to “assume” (preserve over counterparty objection) valuable debtor contacts. But a glaring exception 
to these pillars is the special treatment of financial contracts, such as repos, swaps, and the like. In the U.S., 
under so-called “safe harbours,” they are exempt from the bankruptcy stay, and counterparties can 
“closeout” (terminate) these contracts over debtor objection. This destroys value for “in the money” 
contracts, contravening the insolvency law mantra of preservation of debtor going-concern value. (The 
purported justification is that such extraordinary treatment is required in the name of capital market 
liquidity; clearance of financial transactions should not be “gummed up” by a debtor’s bankruptcy stay. 
This premise is coming under increasing assault by scholars as possibly exacerbating, not reducing, 
systemic risk.)  
 
 By contrast, bank resolution law temporarily suspends closeout netting and imposes a brief “short 
stay.” This allows regulators to assess an insolvent bank’s portfolio of financial contracts, package and 
transfer the valuable ones to solvent transferees (solvent banks), and thereby both preserve the going-
concern value of the contracts as assets and assure smooth transition and continued performance to the 
counterparty. Some consider it ironic that insolvency law, focused on preserving value, actually fails to 
protect financial contracts by allowing their destruction through the safe harbours, whereas banking law, 
focused on safety and soundness, preserves these contracts’ value, while remaining blasé to hysteria that 
any stay or interference with immediate closeout netting will grind the derivatives market to a halt. 
 
 Whatever the irony, the bank resolution system gets it right, and insolvency law gets it wrong. This is 
an important recognition, because if UNCITRAL follows the well-motivated impulse to use its successful 
insolvency reforms as a “platform” to anchor the design of a financial institutions resolution system, it has 
to recognize—and fix—the serious problem insolvency law presently has with financial contracts. This is 
especially so for two reasons: first, financial contracts are the bread and butter of financial institutions, 
constituting a significant share of their value; and second, many financial institutions do not fit into the 
narrow definition of “bank” and so must avail themselves to the insolvency law system for resolution; thus, 
merely replicating the bank resolution law on its own will be insufficient, even if UNCITRAL wanted to 
unmoor reform from the insolvency law platform. 
 
 The lynchpin of bank resolution system’s successful preservation of financial contract value is the 
assurance that the financial contracts will, post-assignment, be performed, and as such, the counterparties 
will not be harmed by the original debtor’s financial failure. The way this is done in banking law is finding 
a credit-worthy entity to step in and continue business with the counterparty (which bank regulators can 
help identify in the comparatively small world of banking). 
 
__________________ 
2
 Extrapolating to the international level Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy 
and Bank Resolution, 10 Brook. J. Of Corp. Fin. And Comm. L. 155 (2015), available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841956  
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 To integrate this banking regime into the general insolvency system to replace the safe harbours, 
similar assurances of financial contract performance are required to assuage the counterparties that brief 
delay in the exercise of their rights will be harmless. Such assurance can be provided both doctrinally and 
functionally. Doctrinally, the insolvency system could, like the bank resolution system, limit the debtor to 
a short stay to try to sell (or assume) its book of financial contracts, and, more specifically, comply with 
insolvency law’s requirements of curing of defaults and adequate assurance of future performance. 
Functionally, one would “assure that assurance,” so to speak, by providing financing arrangements that 
mimic the solvency of transferee banks, by using backstop credit facilities under an insolvency system’s 
post-bankruptcy credit priority rules. 
 
 In sum, if international financial institution resolution regimes are to be built out on an insolvency 
platform—eying the success of UNCITRAL’s cross-border insolvency work—then imperfections in the 
insolvency regimes’ treatment of financial contracts must first be worked out or else the project will 
collapse. While some creditors might howl at suggestions that their closeout rights might require brief 
deferral, the international winds are already shifting with the ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol, the FSB Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, and the UNIDROIT Principles on 
The Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions, to name just a few. UNCITRAL is well suited to coordinate 
and advance this effort of integration; it must do so mindful of not repeating failures of the past. 
 
 
Bank and SIFI Resolution in the US Domestic Obstacles to International Recognition:  
A Unique Role for UNCITRAL 
 
Edward J. Janger, Brooklyn Law School and Yale Law School, United States of America 
 
 There are three distinct regimes for resolving financial institutions in the United States: (1) banks are 
resolved by the FDIC under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; (2) systemically significant financial 
institutions (SIFIs) are resolved pursuant to the terms of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, either in bankruptcy, 
or if that is not feasible by the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA); and (3) non-bank financial institutions 
that are not systemically important are to be resolved in bankruptcy.  
 
 Resolution for banks under the FDIA is accomplished by dividing the banks into a “good bank” and a 
“bad bank.” The good assets are transferred to (purchased by) a solvent entity, usually another bank, and 
the bad assets are resolved by the government. For both SIFIs and non-SIFI financial institutions, the locus 
of first resort for resolution is bankruptcy court. A key element of SIFI regulation under Dodd-Frank is to 
require SIFIs to develop a resolution plan, sometimes called a “living will.” The living wills set forth a plan 
for resolving the firm in bankruptcy should one of the operating businesses suffer a financial shock.  
 
 These living wills are designed to facilitate and follow a so-called “single point of entry” strategy, 
under which the federal government does not bail out the firm through liquidity injections, but instead the 
investors, “bail-in” the insolvent entity. Namely, under single point of entry, if a subsidiary of a bank holding 
company suffers a financial shock, the group looks to the holding company as a source of strength. The 
holding company is expected to carry sufficient loss absorbing capacity (“TLAC”) to recapitalize the 
insolvent entity. The parent transfers assets to the subsidiary, and then, if necessary, file for bankruptcy 
itself. If the holding company files for bankruptcy, the equity of the subs transfers to a trust that assumes 
the short term, but not the long term obligations of the holding company. The result yields a recapitalized 
subsidiary, and a solvent parent — thus, in theory, calming the markets and stopping a run. 
 
 Central to this goal is that the ability of the operating subsidiary to continue to perform its obligations, 
and that the bankruptcy of the holding company not constitute a default under its various contracts. An 
important aspect of the SPOE structure is that only the holding company files for bankruptcy, and the 
operating companies continue to perform their obligations. It is contemplated that the recapitalization of 
the subsidiary and the transfer of assets to the holding company would be accomplished quickly. Typically, 
under the FDIA, banks are resolved over the weekend, but during that period there is a short moratorium to 
permit assumption by or transfer of the financial firm’s contracts to a solvent entity. This short moratorium 
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does not exist under US bankruptcy law for “financial contracts” which are subject to the so-called 
“bankruptcy safe-harbours.” The Lehman experience illustrates that this makes orderly resolution of a 
financial firm difficult in bankruptcy.  
 
 This problem has been largely remedied for systemically important financial institutions because of 
the creation of the ISDA Resolution Stay Protocol. The Stay Protocol implements a short moratorium by 
contract to allow for orderly treatment of financial institution assets. Indeed, where both of these fail, the 
Dodd-Frank Act offers the OLA as an administrative backstop. There is also legislation pending in Congress 
to implement a short stay by law. Gaps remain, however. First, issues such as fraudulent conveyance may 
endanger the finality of the bail-in transfers, while concerns about adequate assurance of performance may 
delay the assignment and assumption of key contracts, at least across national boundaries. Second, the 
Dodd-Frank regime and the Stay Protocol are only reliably available for SIFIs. Not all financial institutions 
fall into that category. Third, the category of contracts “excepted” from the bankruptcy moratorium under 
the U.S. “safe harbours” and Recommendations 101-107 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is broader 
than those covered by the Stay Protocol. Fourth, the manner in which the stay protocol might be 
implemented in diverse international courts remains uncertain.  
 
 These gaps are uniquely within UNCITRAL’s competence to fill. UNCITRAL currently has two 
existing instruments that could, relatively easily, be supplemented to fill these gaps. To the extent that 
national regimes currently use bankruptcy law as their resolution forum, the UNCITRAL Model Law for 
Cross-Border Bankruptcy provides an effective recognition framework under which resolution orders might 
be recognized across borders. Where financial institutions are involved, it might be necessary to provide 
mechanisms for accelerating recognition and cooperation, but there is no need to reinvent the wheel. With 
regard to the need for short stay treatment of financial contracts, adequate assurance of performance and 
finality, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide for Insolvency could be supplemented to include provisions 
relating to the insolvency of financial firms. These provisions could be brought into conformity with current 
best practices for financial firm resolution, such as: the European Union Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive, European Union Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements, the FSB Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, and the UNIDROIT Principles on The Operation 
of Close-out Netting Provisions. 
  
 Such an effort would require cooperation and consultation between insolvency experts, bankers and 
bank regulators. The work of this project would build on the work of UNCITRAL Working Group V, but 
steps would need to be taken to coordinate this project with the efforts of the FDIC, FSB, the EU and others. 
This is a challenge, but one worth undertaking.  
 
 
European Bank Resolution and Insolvency Priorities 
 
Ignacio Tirado, Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, Spain 
 
 One domain where corporate insolvency and bank resolution systems separate and, at the same time, 
intertwine, involves the hierarchy of claims: on the one hand, the regulation of distressed financial 
institutions tends to have a set of priorities that does not coincide with those generally included in ordinary 
insolvencies; on the other hand, bank resolution systems often make express reference to the general 
hierarchy of claims envisaged in the insolvency law. When the bank has international connections, the 
inconsistency of the system of priorities in different countries makes the application of bank resolution 
systems even more complex. Addressing the inconsistencies between different regimes as well as the 
problems of conceptual interpretation (cross-comparison of priorities) and practical implementation is 
paramount for the adequate understanding of bank resolution regimes. In particular, the following needs to 
be analysed: 
 
 Analysis must begin with a discussion of the conceptual differences between the system of priorities 
in corporate and bank insolvencies. In the case of general insolvency law, the content of priorities shows 
the jurisdiction´s level of consistency with market principles (gauged, for example, by the level of respect 
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of pre-insolvency entitlements) as well as a set of social values (who gets what of what’s left is, in part, a 
decision of social policy). The regulation of bank insolvency, however, is especially concerned with the 
maintenance of financial order and the avoidance of systemic contagion. In terms of priorities, this is 
reflected in the inclusion of early intervention mechanisms and in the pre-determination of certain types of 
creditors that must early, inevitably, and publicly take losses, so that the rest of creditors are protected, panic 
does not spread, and the system continues to operate in an orderly manner. Total Loss Absorbing Capacity 
—TLAC- or the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities —MREL- rules are unique to 
banks, and they represent systems of pre-insolvency priorities. This is complemented — in the most 
advanced systems- by a definition of “bail-in-able” claims (i.e., those claims that must bear the losses when 
—normally- the entity is insolvent). When a third layer of creditors is concerned, bank insolvency mingles 
with corporate insolvency, and often a reference to the general system of priorities is included in the bank 
resolution system. But things are, in practice, far from easy. The application of general corporate law 
priorities to the insolvency of a bank presents a number of problems. 
 
 Problems become bigger when, as is the case for the larger financial institutions, there is a cross-border 
element to the bank´s insolvency. It is not uncommon that private international law rules differ from the 
approach taken in case of corporate insolvency. Insolvency law’s focus on COMI often gives way to the 
place of authorization of the entity, with a single point of entry. Applicable law, however, tends to remain 
with each of the territorial jurisdictions where the banks are active. This entails different systems of 
priorities, and the need to make the treatment of similar creditors consistent. The definition of security 
rights, the diverse typology of the security rights and of certain classes of creditors, the concept of 
administrative expenses, or even the characterization of depositors all have to be managed in a way that is 
consistent and allows for an orderly and value-preserving resolution. There is potential for conflict 
depending on how the different priority regimes apply to relevant liabilities, which provides a further source 
of complication. 
 
 There is more. Concerns about the institutional framework and the protection of basic rights of 
creditors must be addressed. Bail-in powers are often implemented by administrative authorities, without 
any court involvement. This may present problems of constitutionality in some countries. The challenge is 
also conceptual: is it justified, constitutionally, to impose a write-off of what many systems consider a right-
-credit--in cases where the loss of economic value of the claim has not been properly established? Problems 
of discrimination between economically homogenous creditors may also arise. Good examples of the 
problems that may arise can be found in recent years in the midst of the financial crisis. Maybe Iceland´s 
decision to protect national depositors and bail in international deposit holders is a clear case (Icesave case).3 
Further, the cross-border application of certain measures may also present problems of breach of the 
fundamental rights of creditors and their access to justice. Often, decisions will be adopted by “colleges” 
of national resolution authorities that have no separate legal personality and uncertain legal nature. How 
creditors may defend their rights (especially their constitutional right of property) is under-theorized and 
begs rigorous comparative analysis. Even within regionally integrated structures, like the Eurozone, the 
resort to the European Court of Justice or to the European Court of Human Rights is available under at-best 
unclear circumstances.  
 
 Accordingly, if UNCITRAL is to consider moving forward in establishing tools for cross-border 
resolution of distressed financial institutions, it has much work to do on the comparison of priority 
provisions. Scholars have begun that work, myself included but there is much more to do. 
 
 
 
 
  
__________________ 
3  Case E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland, 28 January 2013.  
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Making Global Bail-in Work — A UK Perspective 
 
Riz Mokal, Barrister, South Square, London, United Kingdom; University College London, United 
Kingdom; University of Florence, Italy 
 
“Cross-border banks are international in life, but national in death.” 
 
Background 
 
 The paternity but not the truth of this aphorism is disputed. As the GFC broke in 2007, national 
regulatory authorities were only able to provide mostly local responses to the distress of major cross-border 
banking groups. Even when individually rational, such responses often proved collectively value-
destructive, imposing avoidable costs both on direct financial stakeholders including depositors and on 
various sets of taxpayers. Such uncoordinated responses also failed adequately to mitigate ‘common lender’ 
(a group entity based in one jurisdiction reduces operations as a result of the distress of another member of 
the group based in a different jurisdiction) and ‘wake-up call’ (investors adversely affected in one 
jurisdiction withdrawing from other jurisdictions they considered relevantly similar to the first) effects. The 
result was the creation of additional cross-border channels for the transmission of risk and loss.  
 
 Since the GFC, an impressive cross-border regulatory architecture has been created, but significant 
lacunae remain. A brief assessment of this architecture, and of ‘bail-in’ requirements in particular, 
demonstrates the need for an international instrument to plug these gaps. The assessment draws inspiration 
from the treatment of globally systemically important financial banks (‘GSIBs’). And it examines the 
particular approach of the UK, which is home to four and host to another 14 of the 30 banking groups 
characterised as GSIBs by global regulatory authorities. With such an outsized financial sector, the UK has 
an important stake in and perspective on the resolution of cross-border bank distress. 
 
Post-GFC resolution approaches 
 
 As a matter of post-GFC consensus, the tools required for successfully resolving distressed banks are 
bail-in (conversion of particular types of unsecured debt into equity), a moratorium or ‘stay’ on contractual 
termination (‘closeout’) rights that become available simply because of the onset of distress or 
commencement of the resolution process, and the ability to transfer some or all of the business to a healthy 
buyer (or temporarily to a bridge bank).  
 
 Regulatory authorities led by the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’) have identified 30 GSIBs with 
eleven home states. GSIBs have been identified using a combination of size of exposure, 
interconnectedness, lack of readily available substitutes for their services, cross-jurisdictional claims and 
liabilities, and complexity. Each GSIB is subject to higher capital buffer requirements, total loss absorbing 
capacity (‘TLAC’) made up of sufficient equity and debt to absorb losses and recapitalise relevant parts of 
the group without resort to taxpayer funds, group-wide resolution planning and resolvability assessments, 
and higher supervisory expectations. Each GSIB is placed within the purview of a ‘crisis management 
group’ (‘CMG’) composed of relevant authorities in its home and key host jurisdictions.  
 
 Most GSIBs operate on a centralised basis, and their CMGs have agreed resolution strategies based 
on a ‘single point of entry’ (‘SPE’). The remaining GSIBs operate through regionally distinctly managed 
and financed sub-groupings. Their resolution strategies envisage regional ‘multiple points of entry’ 
(‘MPEs’) that would replicate the SPE model at the respective regional levels and with unavoidable 
additional complexity. Under the SPE model, one group member — usually the holding entity — is 
subjected to a bail-in to recapitalise either it or the transferee of the distressed bank’s critical functions. The 
closeout stay enables value to be kept within the distressed entity long enough to enable such a transfer, and 
consequent upon a successful transfer and in the absence of a subsequent substantive default, closeout rights 
are lost.  
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Bail-In: The UK approach 
 
 The Bank of England’s November 2016 policy identifies three resolution approaches: (i) bail-in to 
keep the bank open, which would be necessary for the largest and most complex banks which would likely 
be performing non-substitutable functions and/or have businesses too large to be assumed by another; (ii) 
partial transfer for banks that perform significant critical functions in the financial markets and for whose 
businesses buyers might be found; and (iii) liquidation in all other cases. Banks likely to fall under the first 
of these approaches are subject to a TLAC about twice the minimum capital buffer, and TLAC resources 
must be subordinate to those liabilities that the bank must continue to discharge if it is to continue to perform 
critical functions. Banks likely to fall under the second approach are subject to lower TLAC requirements 
since only the critical parts of their business that are transferred would require recapitalisation.  
 
Remaining lacunae  
 
 Two critical gaps remain in relation to the cross-border recognition of resolution measures. The first 
relates to the cross-border recognition of stays on closeout rights and respect of substantive rights in 
resolution so long as there is no substantive default under those contracts. This is accomplished through the 
ISDA Stay Protocol, examined by Prof. Pottow;  
 
 The second relates to the cross-border recognition of bail-in measures. Where liabilities that would 
otherwise be part of TLAC resources are governed by non-UK law, the Bank of England requires that the 
governing contracts include a term by which the creditor would agree to the Bank exercising bail-in powers. 
It quickly became apparent that this would not always be practical, such as when such clauses would be 
contrary to the governing foreign law. This has necessitated the Bank in June 2016 promulgating the aptly 
named “Contractual Recognition of Bail-in: Impracticability” document exempting banks from seeking to 
introduce recognition clauses. The resulting lacuna is manifest.  
 
The need for an international instrument 
 
 An obvious solution lies in an international instrument providing for the cross-border recognition of 
both closeout stays and bail-in. As the author of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency that provides 
for the recognition of and assistance for foreign insolvency proceedings, UNCITRAL has unparalleled 
experience in the creation of such an instrument and is uniquely placed to convene the required regulatory 
and legal expertise.  
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Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Insolvency in Africa: a comparative study 
 
Antonia Menezes and Andres Martinez, World Bank 
  
Introduction 
 
 Ms. Obadi owned a medium-sized sole proprietorship, a Bed and Breakfast inn, in East Africa. It was 
relatively successful, with a steady stream of foreign tourists, and as it was in a remote region, it employed 
a number of locals in an area with few jobs. However, following a terrorist attack, the tourism sector 
suddenly shrank in the country, and severely impacted Ms. Obadi’s business. Overwhelmed with business 
debts, she was left with no choice but to close down. As the Bed and Breakfast was a sole proprietorship, 
there was no separation between her personal debts and the debts of the business. As is the case in many 
jurisdictions regarding sole proprietorships, the person and the business were treated as the same entity and 
were regulated by consumer bankruptcy frameworks--as opposed to incorporated businesses where the 
emphasis is largely on the survival of the business she put so much effort into. As a result, Ms. Obadi was 
obliged to file for personal bankruptcy. Due to the fact that there were no efficient attempts to rescue, or at 
the very least, to efficiently liquidate her ongoing business, Ms. Obadi ultimately lost her home and most 
of her possessions.1 This caused her to enter into a spiral of debt from which it would take decades to 
emerge.  
 
 Ms. Obadi’s story illustrates the importance of micro, small and medium enterprise (“MSMEs”) 
insolvency, which, apart from incorporated companies, often comprise unlimited liability partnerships, sole 
proprietorships or sole traders—the latter are especially abundant in jurisdictions, such as those in Africa, 
where the informality is high. MSMEs make up the majority of businesses in the world. Although the 
diversity and sheer number of MSMEs makes it difficult to properly quantify them and measure their 
impact, they represent the majority of businesses in most jurisdictions and are key drivers of employment, 
economic growth, and entrepreneurship.2 Moreover, economic statistics suggest that small/young firms are 
the engines of job creation and that, in order for these firms to thrive, entry and, crucially, exit to and from 
the marketplace must work effectively. Evidence shows that around 20% of these new firms go out of 
business after their first year and just over 50% after five years. In Africa, the figures are even higher, with 
obstacles such as constrained access to credit and limited opportunities for firm growth and trade 
accelerating MSME business failure. In order to encourage the survival of such businesses and in turn 
promote entrepreneurship, employment and the ability to successfully export, the domestic insolvency 
regime needs to be appropriately designed to encourage small business rehabilitation where feasible and 
fast, efficient liquidation, where rehabilitation is not feasible.  
 
 An efficient insolvency system of commercial insolvency (inclusive of both incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses) must be inspired by the “Insolvency Standard” set by the UNCITRAL 
Legislative guide3 and the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes4 
(jointly, “the Insolvency Standard”5). When it comes to insolvency of natural persons, there is no “best 
practice” and countries have adopted a variety of ways to try to address such a complex issue. A few 
jurisdictions simply do not have personal insolvency regimes. Other countries differentiate the treatment of 
natural persons engaged in business activities from those that are merely consumers. Other jurisdictions do 
not establish such separation, treating both corporate and natural persons under the same insolvency 
framework. While one of the main objectives of the corporate insolvency system is to maximize the value 
of the debtor’s estate —including liquidating the company and shutting it down if that provides the highest 
__________________ 
1  In this particular case, there was no exemption of the house as one of the assets excluded from personal 
bankruptcy.  
2  World Bank Group, Report by the Working Group on the Treatment of MSME Insolvency (2017 — forthcoming). 
3  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html   
4  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/557581467990960136/Principles-for-effective-insolvency-and-
creditor-debtor-rights-systems.  
5  As it emerges from the Financial Stability Board’s website, “The ICR Standard is comprised of the World Bank 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (2011) and the Recommendations from the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2010).” http://www.fsb.org/2011/01/cos_051201/.  
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value to creditors —the same cannot be done with an individual. Many social considerations enter to play 
when it comes to the treatment of the insolvency of natural persons.  
 
 Both UNCITRAL and the World Bank Group are interested in understanding how jurisdictions around 
the globe are currently dealing with small business insolvency and whether this can inform the creation of 
best practice principles for MSME insolvency. This paper provides a comparative analysis of how MSME 
insolvency has been dealt with in some African jurisdictions by assessing two models: (1) applying 
individual or consumer bankruptcy regimes to address the insolvency of all natural persons, including those 
engaged in business activities; and (2) applying to those natural persons engaged in business activities a set 
of simplified and stream-lined insolvency provisions that have been adapted specifically for small 
businesses and traders by tweaking a more general commercial insolvency framework. In particular, the 
paper assesses the pros and cons of these models, taking into account issues of particular concern for 
MSMEs in Africa —such as high levels of informality, the prevalence of micro businesses over larger ones, 
and the difficulties in accessing credit without immovable collateral. Ultimately, it seeks to provide input 
for addressing MSME insolvency regulation in a developing country context, as well as more generally 
contributing to the literature on the importance of MSME firm growth and trade.  
 
The importance of MSME insolvency 
 
 MSMEs have several aspects that differentiate them from large corporations when facing a situation 
of financial distress. MSMEs typically have more issues accessing financing, they are more vulnerable to 
macroeconomic shocks and they typically fail in larger numbers than big corporations do. MSMEs are often 
times informal and reasonably unsophisticated compared to large limited liability corporations. MSMEs 
also have a blurred separation between the ownership and the management of the company, which makes 
them quite different from large corporations that have robust corporate governance standards and a 
separation between shareholders and the management body—as well as stricter accountancy regulations. 
Similarly, there is often confusion when it comes to differentiating between the personal debts and assets 
of an individual operating an MSME and the debts and assets of the business itself (particularly at times of 
financial distress). These factors, as well as many others, have a series of natural implications for the 
insolvency of MSMEs.  
 
 In the first place, MSMEs are more reluctant than large corporations to resort to formal insolvency 
proceedings. This is a product of costs, of access to expert advice and of the owner/manager being overly 
optimistic that s/he has solutions for all of the company’s potential issues. Furthermore, the consequences 
of several bankruptcy regimes are quite unappealing for small entrepreneurs and can include separation 
from the administration of the business and, in some cases, even personal prohibitions such as limitations 
on leaving the country without previous notification or approval of the court in charge of the insolvency 
process. These factors, among others, contribute to the stigma surrounding the process that disincentivizes 
MSMEs from seeking judicial arrangements when, perhaps, such a tool could save the business.  
 
 Creditors, similarly, have relatively little interest in a typical MSME insolvency proceeding. While the 
role of creditors in restructuring is paramount, most financial entities (the most common type of creditor in 
insolvency processes) would have a reasonably limited exposure to each MSMEs and they may have 
already provisioned the possible loss —depending on the respective country’s Central Bank regulation. 
Finally, secured creditors (including financial institutions) might also be disinterested in the process if they 
are entitled to proceed with the actions of enforcement.  
 
 Another complexity of MSME insolvency is the limited information that the parties can access during 
the proceeding. As a result of the informality mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, MSMEs’ book 
keeping is generally poor, which results in more challenges at the time of determining the assets of the 
debtor, the list of creditors, and so on.  
 
 Partly due to these factors, MSMEs have limited incentives to resort to insolvency processes to restore 
their viability. In many jurisdictions, if not the majority, insolvency laws are very complex, require the 
involvement of many different stakeholders and have a high cost associated with their implementation. 
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These remedies may or may not be adequate to address MSME insolvency—and this is, partly what inspired 
the current paper.  
 
Why MSME Insolvency in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 From a technical perspective, the African continent provides an interesting region for examining 
different approaches to MSME insolvency regulation. Not only are there a large number of countries, many 
of which are currently reforming their insolvency regimes, but they cover a variety of legal systems 
including francophone and lusophone civil law, anglophone common law, Roman-Dutch and mixed legal 
systems. This paper focuses specifically on certain jurisdictions inspired by English common law (primarily 
in Southern and East Africa) and some jurisdictions inspired by French civil law (primarily in West Africa).  
 
 Secondly, there is evidence that in many African countries, lending to all businesses is perceived as a 
high risk activity, not only vis-à-vis MSMEs. The most reported reason for this is that formal recovery 
through the courts is extremely time-consuming and costly.6 Financial institutions often attempt to offset 
this risk by high collateral requirements—predominantly with immovable collateral. However, micro and 
small businesses are the candidates most likely to fail to meet such collateral requirements and therefore 
struggle to access capital to start, develop and expand their businesses. Over 50% of MSMEs are reported 
as struggling to access capital globally.7 It is therefore unsurprising that small business failure is high, and 
developing tools to promote MSME recovery and growth is therefore particularly important in the Sub-
Saharan Africa region. 
 
 Thirdly, there is traditionally a stigma attached to bankruptcy proceedings. The origin of the word 
“bankruptcy” is already stigmatic, involving the breaking of the bench of those debtors that were unable to 
pay their debts. As commercial law evolved in the last quarter of the previous century, the focus began to 
switch to the economic reason behind the insolvency. This new outlook focused on a non-guilty and non-
punitive approach that emphasized the importance of restructuring and keeping businesses as a going 
concern, keeping entrepreneurs encouraged to continue to innovate, and the like. Not all legislation has 
been modernized, however. It is still common to find many insolvency laws that maintain the traditional 
punitive approach and which contributes to the permanence of the stigma—apart from cultural reasons that 
are even harder to change8. In many countries in the African continent, it is still common to find insolvency 
laws that contemplate imprisonment for a variety of minor business offences such as poor record keeping 
or for not filing certain statements of affairs verified by affidavits and so on. What is more, there is still 
widespread acceptance of limitations of personal movement (not being able to leave the country without 
court permission) in cases of personal bankruptcy.  
 
 In order to encourage the survival of small businesses and in turn promote entrepreneurship, 
employment and the ability to export, the domestic insolvency regime needs to be appropriately designed 
to encourage small business rehabilitation where feasible, and fast/efficient market exit where in all other 
cases. The next sections of this paper describe two comparative systems that aim to do this. 
 
Personal Bankruptcy Frameworks Covering Small Business Insolvency Southern and East Africa 
 
 Many Roman Dutch legal systems in Southern Africa are influenced by English common law (for 
instance, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Namibia). Other jurisdictions, in light of their colonial 
heritage are strongly rooted in English common law, such as Malawi, Zambia, Uganda and Kenya. All of 
these jurisdictions deal with unincorporated small business debts in the manner described in the 
introduction—namely there is only one insolvency regime applicable to all natural persons, regardless of 
whether they were carrying on a business or not. Some of these acts find their inspiration in the UK 
__________________ 
6  World Bank Group assessments. 
7  http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/smes-finance. 
8  An interesting discussion on this topic can be found in the following FT article: 
https://www.ft.com/content/d0509a98-78ab-11e5-933d-efcdc3c11c89. 
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Insolvency Act of 19869. A small unincorporated business, such as a sole proprietorship, going through 
insolvency is therefore obliged to use the same personal bankruptcy framework as consumers would and, 
among other obvious consequences, the insolvency system does not put any emphasis on the survival of 
the underlying business carried by the natural person. As it is well-known, the objectives of the consumer 
business regime are not necessarily the same as the ones of business, therefore, some of the consumer 
solutions applied to an entrepreneur, like the owner of a sole proprietorship, may seem at least theoretically 
controversial.  
 
 In many of the already mentioned jurisdictions under this model, the personal bankruptcy frameworks 
were, or continue to be, extremely outdated and anachronistic—making them unsuitable for addressing 
small business distress. Indeed, it is perhaps unsurprising that across the board in these jurisdictions, there 
were reportedly very few bankruptcy cases, —for individuals or otherwise. For instance, Malawi’s personal 
insolvency law (prior to its recent reform in 2014) dated from 1928.10 Although the law did enable an 
individual to declare his or her intention to present a petition for a declaration of bankruptcy and propose a 
personal bankruptcy arrangement, there were no requirements for banks to provide notice of impending 
bankruptcy to customers, nor any counselling services or institutions for administering and regulating 
Malawi’s personal bankruptcy system.11 In Seychelles, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (prior to its 
reform in 2013) was originally from 1853, albeit with amendments. In Zambia, the personal insolvency 
regime is from 1967 and is reportedly rarely used in practice.12  
 
Unified Insolvency Law 
 
 Many of these countries have recently revised their insolvency regimes, and a trend in the region 
appears to be putting a unified insolvency law in place. A unified insolvency law is a single statute that 
covers individuals, unincorporated businesses and corporates, albeit it in different chapters or sections. Such 
a unified statute has various advantages, including that it is administratively expedient to have all the laws 
relating to insolvency—for corporates and natural persons alike—in a single statute, and that fragmented 
legislation in multiple statutes typically causes unnecessary duplication and confusion. Some of the 
countries that have put a unified insolvency statute in place include: Kenya (2015); Malawi (2014); 
Mauritius (2009); Seychelles (2013); and Uganda (2011). Lesotho and Zimbabwe are also currently drafting 
unified insolvency Bills. It is hoped that by replacing out-of-date personal bankruptcy statutes with a more 
effective personal bankruptcy regime, lender confidence will be increased in lending to MSMEs because 
the improved insolvency process provides lenders with more certainty and predictability with respect to 
recovering on defaulted loans.13  
 
Alternatives to Bankruptcy 
 
 The countries that have reformed their laws in Southern Africa have tended to include an alternative 
to bankruptcy in the legal text. This is particularly important when considering distressed MSMEs. These 
businesses do not have the option to go through a formal restructuring that viable corporates would normally 
undergo in a corporate insolvency regime. Having said this, given the size of a typical MSME in Southern 
Africa, it is debatable whether such a formal rescue procedure would really be suitable. Moreover, including 
such an alternative helps avoid the stigma that bankruptcy proceedings have traditionally carried—
particularly in small communities. Allowing businesses to negotiate debt restructuring without losing their 
reputation maximizes the likelihood of the business being saved, which consequentially makes creditors 
more likely to extend financing. 
 
__________________ 
9  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/contents/enacted.  
10  Laws of Malawi, Cap. 11:01 of April 14, 1928.  
11  World Bank Group, “Malawi: Diagnostic Review of Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy” < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/MW_CPFL_Vol_II_Final.pdf>  
12  World Bank Group Technical Note, Financial Sector Assessment Program 2016.  
13  The World Bank Group, “Debt Resolution and Business Exit.” Viewpoint, 2014. 
https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-simplification/debt-resolution-and-
businessexit/upload/VIEWPOINT_343_Debt_Resolution.pdf at 3.  
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 Examining the new insolvency laws in Malawi, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, the alternative procedure 
is the individual voluntary arrangement (IVA), modelled on a similar procedure in the United Kingdom. 
Procedurally, a natural person debtor (consumer or business owner) enters into an arrangement with his 
creditors on a voluntary basis, thereby avoiding the disadvantages of being declared formally bankrupt. The 
procedure is quick and inexpensive, and from the creditors’ perspective, increases the likelihood of 
receiving reasonable returns. In Malawi, the provisions dealing with individual voluntary arrangements also 
contain a provision allowing for a fast-tracked individual voluntary arrangement. Uganda and Kenya also 
have similar provisions.  
 
 The process itself is quite simple: it permits a debtor to obtain an interim order, whose effect is to 
temporarily suspend the actions of enforcement against the debtor for a certain period of time (usually, a 
few weeks14). In order to be granted the interim order, the debtor has to commit to presenting a proposal of 
a plan to the creditors in order to achieve an arrangement of her or his debts. Once the creditors’ meeting 
takes place, the proposal is considered therein. Kenya has a few more “divisions” within its legislation 
which contemplate an even more expedited process and a special division for when a person lacks any 
assets15.  
 
Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
 Laws such as those in Uganda, Kenya and Seychelles, just to quote a few examples under this model, 
contain provisions for personal bankruptcy without differentiating consumers from business owners, which 
would be directly applicable to business owners of an unincorporated entity, such as a sole proprietorship. 
The bankruptcy process for natural persons contemplated in these jurisdictions begins with a petition that 
may be filed by both the debtor herself/himself and their relevant creditors, if they meet the requirements 
indicated in the respective laws. Once the process is initiated, the debtor is publicly examined and required 
to file an affidavit stating her or his creditors—sometimes under very strict penalties if the debtor fails to 
do so. If the court adjudges the debtor bankrupt, then an authority (typically, an official receiver or a trustee) 
is appointed to take custody and control of the debtor’s estate, among other typical consequences of the 
insolvency process. All of these provisions are reasonably standard in insolvency systems around the World. 
  
 These laws and, generally, laws that fall under this model in Southern and Eastern Africa, contain 
several provisions and omissions that are relevant for MSME insolvency. In the first place, it is important 
to notice that most legislations under this model have a provision that exempts certain personal assets from 
the debtor’s insolvency. In this sense, Uganda for example, prevents creditors from attacking the “a) tools, 
books and other items of equipment which are necessary to the bankruptcy for use personally by him or her 
in his or her employment, business or vocation of a value to be prescribed; b) [….]”16 Kenya has a similar 
provision, authorizing the debtor to keep the “necessary tools of trade”17, while Seychelles’ new insolvency 
law also has a provision exempting the “tools, books, vehicles and other items of equipment as are necessary 
to the bankruptcy for use personally by him or her in his or her employment business or vocation up to a 
maximum value of…”18. Some other provisions, reasonably typical under this model, impose limits to the 
debtors’ activities. These include limitation that forbid the debtor from taking part in the management or 
control of any business or to even be employed by any company that is owned or managed by relatives, 
imposing severe consequences (up to a 2-year imprisonment) in case of contravention19. These systems 
generally do not appear to specify that the appointed receiver or trustee needs to have any specific 
knowledge about the debtors’ affairs. It seems possible, if not likely, that in the case of the Bed and Breakfast 
with which we started the paper, a non-expert (and individual not well versed in the management of such a 
business) could have been assigned. This seems to be the case precisely because the main stakeholders 
involved will be more familiar with consumer cases. If the trustee that takes over the administration of Ms. 
__________________ 
14  For example, both Uganda (Art. 121) and Kenya (Art. 306 (5) establish 14 days as the duration of the interim 
order, giving the court the flexibility to extend it if it deems appropriate.  
15  Division 3, Art. 343 onwards.  
16  Art 31 Uganda’s insolvency law (2011).  
17  Art. 161 (2) Kenya Insolvency Act (2015). 
18 Art. 28 (2) Seychelles insolvency act (2013).  
19  Art 152 Kenya Insolvency Act (2015).  
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Obadi’s estate is inadequate, the likelihood of the business’ survival is indeed slimmer20. Managing a 
business is difficult and managing a business in financial distress, even more so. The incentives of a sole 
proprietor to resort to proceedings like this, precisely for the reasons above, are also quite doubtful.  
 
 Almost all of the jurisdictions have as a final objective a debtor’s “discharge” by which, given certain 
requirements, the debtor would be released from her/his obligations in the future. The notion of “discharge” 
is widely accepted in comparative jurisdictions and it is generally agreed that the notion of discharge is 
essential for debtors to continue to contribute to the economy after an insolvency process. Some of these 
legislations determine that the discharge is obtained by the mere passage of time21, however, some others 
leave the discharge to the discretion of the court after hearing the official receiver—making it possible that 
a debtor’s future income is destined to remain committed to the repayment of the old debts, seemingly, for 
an indefinite period of time22.  
 
 Under this model, none of the personal insolvency laws reviewed appears to require either the trustee 
or the court, in cases of a sole proprietorship or for a trader, to attempt to maintain the business as a going 
concern. This invites reflection upon whether these regulations are suitable (or not) for the particular case 
of unincorporated MSMEs.  
 
Bespoke Frameworks for Small Business Insolvency: West Africa 
 
 The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA) comprises seventeen 
West African States that predominantly are francophone with civil law legal systems. OHADA recently 
adopted a revised uniform insolvency law that is directly applicable on all member state jurisdictions. 
Among other reforms, the law provides for the new simplified regulation of MSMEs. Developed in 
recognition of the fact that most businesses in the OHADA region are small-scale and that the longer it 
takes to address their financial distress, the less likely it is that there will be a possibility to recover any 
assets. These appear to be the first insolvency provisions in Africa that have been specifically designed for 
small businesses and it will be interesting to monitor how successfully they address MSME insolvency. 
 
 The OHADA insolvency law differs from the previously described Roman-Dutch/common law 
jurisdictions insofar as the scope of the insolvency law specifically includes small businesses and natural 
person owners of unincorporated businesses. It states that it is applicable to every natural person 
undertaking an independent professional, civil, commercial, artisanal or agricultural activity, as well as 
every legal person in private law, including public enterprises.23 The OHADA states ultimately agreed that 
in the context of their diverse member state economies, a “small business” would constitute a 
proprietorship, partnership or other natural or legal person having less than or equal to 20 employees and a 
turnover not exceeding 50 million francs CFA (around US$80,000) in the 12 months prior to proceedings.24 
Moreover, these MSMEs have the option to select simplified proceedings, but are not obliged to do so.25 
This provision was to ensure that due process was retained and businesses could retain the option to go 
through more extensive judicial procedures if they deemed it necessary. 
 
 The simplified proceedings apply to three of the four procedures set out in the law, namely règlement 
préventif (preventive settlement); redressement judiciaire (reorganization) and liquidation des biens 
(liquidation). They are simplified insofar as many of the formalities related to the filings or hearings are no 
longer necessary, in order to facilitate faster processes.  
 
__________________ 
20  Some legislations contemplate the possibility for the trustee to “allow the bankrupt to continue to manage the 
estate or part of it” (i.e. Uganda’s law, Art. 34), but this is a faculty of the trustee, and by no means an obligation.  
21  Kenya Insolvency Act (2015), Art. 254 
22  See, for example, Uganda’s law Art. 42. (3). 
23  Article.  
24  Article 1-3. 
25  Article 1-2. 
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Règlement Préventif (Preventive Settlement)  
 
 The simplified provisions for règlement préventif or preventive settlement, are in the form of 
derogations from the ‘main’ or overall règlement préventif proceeding. They provide that any small 
business conforming to the definition (set out above) may open proceedings before they are in a state of 
insolvency. The filing requirements are simplified. For instance, the procedure can be opened even if no 
plan or arrangement has been provided, and although documents demonstrating the financial situation of 
the small business need to be filed, these do not need to be audited and comprehensive financial statements 
or cash-flow statements are not needed as they are with the general proceeding.26 In the event that any other 
documents required to be submitted cannot be provided, or can only be provided incompletely, the request 
must indicate the reason for their absence. As stated above, the debtor may request that the simplified 
procedure should not be applied and that regular proceedings are instead opened. The decision of the 
competent court to apply the simplified procedure is not subject to appeal. The simplified procedure also 
imposes shorter timeframes compared to the general procedure, for instance, regarding the administrator’s 
obligation to file the report containing the agreement between the debtor and its creditors (2 months since 
the opening of proceedings instead of the regular 3, with a possible extension of 15 days instead of 1 month). 
The restructuring plan is required to be prepared by the debtor with the assistance of the administrator and 
can have more simplified content than the plan under the general proceeding. 
 
Redressement judiciaire (reorganization)  
 
 As with preventive settlement, the form of simplified reorganization proceedings is a derogation from 
the general reorganization process.27 As with the general proceeding, the filing must be made by an 
insolvent debtor within 30 days of insolvency (using the cash-flow test), but with fewer documents required 
and must be accompanied by a sworn statement attesting that it meets the conditions of a simplified 
reorganization. The reorganization plan must be filed, with the assistance of an administrator, within 45 
days of the declaration of insolvency.28 Unlike the more detailed reorganization plan in the general 
reorganization process, in the simplified proceeding, the plan may be limited to payment terms, debt relief 
and the possible guarantees that the entrepreneur must make to ensure its execution. The financial 
statements and economic records are not required to be submitted alongside the simplified reorganization 
plan.29 The court can decide to convert a general reorganization to a simplified reorganization within 30 
days of opening the proceedings following representations from the administrator.30 At the request of the 
debtor or administrator, the court can decide not to follow the simplified reorganization process.  
 
Liquidation des biens (liquidation)  
 
 The conditions for opening the simplified liquidation are the same as reorganization. As well as 
meeting the definition of small business, however, there is an additional condition that the debtor does not 
own any immovable property. A sworn statement must be submitted attesting that the debtor meets the 
relevant conditions for a simplified liquidation proceeding. After the opening of a liquidation process, the 
liquidator may, within thirty days of his appointment, prepare and file a report with the competent court. 
On the basis of this report, the court may apply a simplified liquidation procedure after having heard or 
summoned the debtor. The court has the right to refuse to apply the simplified liquidation proceedings, even 
if the relevant conditions are met. Unlike with the general liquidation proceeding, the court may determine 
that the sale of the debtor’s property should be a private sale agreement.  
 
__________________ 
26  Article 6-1. 
27  Article 145-1. 
28  Article 145-3. 
29  Article 145-4. 
30  Article 145-5. 
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Comparative Assessment 
 
 At this stage, it is difficult to assess which insolvency regime is most effective for MSMEs. Very little 
data has been collected with respect to common law systems in order to understand whether small 
businesses have been effectively rescued using tools such as IVAs. The OHADA provisions are too new 
and have not been implemented yet in all applicable countries, so it is similarly difficult to know if they 
will be used on a wide-scale basis. 
 
Business debts are treated as distinct from consumer debts 
 
 Although many of the goals of consumer and business insolvency are similar, there are a few areas 
where these objectives are not necessarily aligned. The treatment of a natural persons’ insolvency when 
they are engaged in business activities together with consumer insolvency may end up having a detrimental 
effect if the result is to disregard the importance of maintaining and maximizing the possible value of the 
business that the person managed to build. The opposite is also true: Treating small unincorporated traders 
as large corporations may have the opposite unfair effect, which is to impose extremely complex, lengthy 
and costly procedures to a small trader that is not sophisticated and most certainly not incentivized to resort 
to such procedures.  
 
 An added layer of complexity to this matter is that distinguishing between the personal and business 
debts of a natural person can be extremely challenging, as identified in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide31, 
which may make it extremely complex to attempt to trace a distinction solely on that basis. It seems that, 
at least from a theoretical point of view, a regime that deals specifically with MSMEs without forgetting 
the human qualities of the entrepreneurs (i.e. by contemplating a “discharge”, for example) may be a 
positive solution to these types of problems.  
 
 Business debts are a product of the market, and there is accordingly a strong rationale for treating them 
purely with economic concerns and efficient market functioning policies in mind; whereas consumer 
insolvency raises many other social considerations that policy-makers might want to consider. This is not 
to say that traders or entrepreneurs should not be afforded certain protections or incentives in an insolvency 
regime, but rather that governments might be interested in drawing a line between the treatment of debts 
incurred whilst in the course of commercial activity and those incurred in non-business dealings.  
 
 Both “models” mentioned above capture to some extent some of these positive and negative aspects. 
The OHADA model seems to focus more on the business aspects of the entrepreneur, in an attempt to 
achieve a higher survival rate of businesses as a going concern. The Southern and Eastern African model 
seem to focus more on the entrepreneur as a natural person and, therefore, on the possibilities of obtaining 
a discharge—however, with less regard to rescue or sale of an individual’s business as a going concern. 
 
The focus on fast and cheap insolvency proceedings is an important consideration 
 
 All businesses are deterred by the prospect of lengthy and often costly legal proceedings, and this 
becomes an even bigger obstacle for smaller businesses. Creditors also suffer as a result of lengthy 
proceedings, with value continuing to leach from the debtor’s estate and minimizing creditor recovery. The 
World Bank Group Doing Business Report 2017 reports that it takes around 3 years to complete insolvency 
proceedings in Sub-Saharan Africa with an average of 20 cents on the dollar ultimately recovered by 
creditors.32 In comparison, in OECD High Income countries, it reportedly takes 1.7 years on average to 
undergo insolvency proceedings, with creditor recovery being around 73 cents on the dollar.33 Given the 
__________________ 
31  “…it is often difficult to separate an individual’s personal indebtedness from their business indebtedness for the 
purposes of determining how they should be treated in insolvency. Different tests may be developed to facilitate 
that determination, by focusing, for example, upon the nature of the activity being undertaken, the level of debt 
and the connection between the debt and the economic activity.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, page 39.  
32  http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency. 
33  Ibid. 
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size of an average MSME in Africa, reportedly between 1-9 people,34 it is highly unlikely that any value 
would be left for creditors after such lengthy liquidation proceedings—let alone the possibility of saving 
the business. The OHADA Insolvency Law is therefore theoretically appealing insofar as it cuts a lot of 
procedural steps that might not be needed for MSMEs of the size contemplated by that law. Moreover, by 
allowing the fast-track MSME procedures to be optional, the OHADA insolvency law protects those who 
are concerned that due process might not be followed, or alternatively, those businesses that have more 
complex cases and deem it necessary to have additional hearings and judicial oversight. The Southern and 
Eastern African model may also present an alternative for expedited proceedings, given that the natural 
person insolvency procedure looks simpler than that for corporations. In the end, the success of both models 
will largely depend on the specialization of the courts and stakeholders involved in the application of these 
laws.  
 
Pre-insolvency procedures are being increasingly recognized as important, particularly for MSMEs 
 
 The recent Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council (May 2015) 
emphasized the importance of pre-insolvency procedures for encouraging business rescue and enabling 
entrepreneurship. In this sense, IVAs, may be considered effective pre-insolvency procedures and the same 
can be said about the preventive settlement procedure in the OHADA insolvency law—which is opened, 
monitored and closed by a judge.35 Particularly in many African countries, where there are concerns 
regarding transparency and problems of enforcement, this added institutional force behind the agreed 
arrangement might encourage the parties to trust and accordingly use the procedure before the business is 
in a state of insolvency. Of course, the down-side is that this procedure is court-based and therefore public, 
but there is an additional procedure in the insolvency law which covers contractual conciliation.36 Another 
downside is that when the transparency issues affect, precisely, the courts, then the court procedure may 
not be an advantage for the parties.  
 
 In spite of these advancements, there are still areas that are sorely lacking in many African insolvency 
regimes, which will need to be addressed in order to truly provide an effective insolvency regime for 
MSMEs. Two examples are as follows: first, most MSMEs in Africa are micro entities operating in the 
informal sector. It is therefore highly unlikely that any of them will start insolvency proceedings. Secondly, 
there is a serious lack of financial literacy amongst many entrepreneurs on the continent and access to debt 
counselling advice is often difficult. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This analysis aims to highlight the importance of MSMEs in African economies, and why insolvency 
regimes play an important role in ensuring the success of these enterprises. It examines two different 
methods for handling small business insolvency in various African jurisdictions. Namely, personal 
bankruptcy regimes that cover natural person insolvency including both consumers and unincorporated 
enterprises, and insolvency provisions that are simplified from the main commercial insolvency procedure 
and are applied to certain trade debts (including sole proprietorships). This paper acknowledges that there 
is currently a lack of data and existing empirical evidence to assess, beyond theoretical considerations, 
which model is preferable to address MSME insolvency in the regions highlighted in Africa. Moreover, the 
paper also acknowledges that there are key problems that MSMEs face in Africa that are not addressed by 
either insolvency regimes, which will continue to impede business start-ups, access to credit and creditor 
recovery. As stated in the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa, “Over the next 20 
years…Sub-Saharan Africa will become the main source of new entrants into the global labour force.” It is 
accordingly crucial that governments have put supporting legislative frameworks in place to support both 
the entry, restructuring and exit of these businesses, particularly MSME entrepreneurs.
__________________ 
34  African Research Associates. 
35  Note, for a pure out-of-court and confidential procedure, the OHADA law provides for conciliation, which is 
open to all businesses, regardless of size. 
36  As well as reglement preventif, the OHADA insolvency law has a pre-insolvency contractually negotiated 
arrangement called conciliation. 
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Proposal to UNCITRAL on Arbitration & International Insolvency  
 
James Peck and Samuel Bufford, International Insolvency Institute, United States of America 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 As international insolvency proceedings become more common, more widespread, and more 
significant to the world economy, there is a major opportunity for UNCITRAL to provide very significant 
advice on issues involving the intersection of insolvency law and international arbitration.  
 
 The New York Convention / Model Law / Arbitration Rules are effective, universally respected and 
have stood the test of time. Less clear is the link between the New York Convention / Model Law / 
Arbitration Rules dispute resolution systems and insolvency systems, which come into play when financial 
problems of multinational businesses demand resolution. While existing rules and model laws on arbitration 
and insolvency have created valuable tools fostering international trade, the connection and collision of 
these regimes should be clarified to the extent necessary to establish a more harmonized and efficient 
common set of rules.  
 
 The purpose of this proposal is to request that UNCITRAL consider undertaking a project on the 
intersection between international arbitration and international insolvency law and to authorize the 
assignment of this work to a working group or representatives from more than one working group. 
 
 This project would study the impact on a pending arbitration of the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings by a party to the arbitration. Among the questions that this project should address would be 
whether, and to what extent, an international arbitration may proceed after the opening of such an insolvency 
case, and how the arbitration case should interact with (a) the insolvency case and (b) any related insolvency 
cases that may be opened in other countries respecting the same debtor or the other members of a corporate 
group of which the insolvency debtor is a member.1 
 
 This project would also study the question whether a prepetition agreement to arbitrate should be 
enforced after the commencement of an insolvency case to resolve a dispute between the debtor and a 
creditor or to determine the monetary value of the creditor’s claim in the insolvency case. Countries have 
taken divergent views on the question whether an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable after an insolvency 
filing by one of the parties. It would be useful for UNCITRAL to clarify the circumstances under which an 
agreement to arbitrate, or an arbitral award, should be enforceable even though the award arises in or relates 
to an insolvency case. 
 
 At a later date, UNCITRAL might authorize a study of the use of international arbitration proceedings 
in international insolvency cases to resolve conflicts between such insolvency cases pending for the same 
or related debtors in more than one country (such as the Nortel case), where there is no single insolvency 
court that can take jurisdiction over the entire group of cases.  
 
 Each project could result in UNCITRAL recommendations to be published in a Legislative Guide and 
Explanatory Notes.2 Perhaps a separate Legislative Guide and set of Explanatory Notes would be useful for 
these projects. 
 
 Each of these projects is urgent because there is no other group that can address these matters as 
effectively on an international basis,3 and they have become increasingly important in connection with the 
__________________ 
1  See, e.g., Sara Nadau-Sėguin, When Bankruptcy and Arbitration Meet: A look at Recent ICC Practice, 5 No. 1 
DISP. RESOL. INT’L 79 (2011). 
2  See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as amended in 2006 (published as Part Two of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commerci al 
Arbitration 1985 with amendments adopted in 2006).  
3  This proposal does not address purely domestic insolvency law and domestic arbitration cases, which can be 
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reorganization or rehabilitation of financially troubled business entities that are heavily involved in 
international trade and commerce.  
 
 
II. Background 
 
 International commerce has changed dramatically, particularly in the last 15 to 20 years. In today’s 
world, it is unusual to find a significant financial insolvency or restructuring that does not have significant 
and occasionally critical international aspects. In contrast, international arbitration has a somewhat older 
and more developed provenance. 
 
 In the 19th and 20th centuries, prior to the New York Convention / Model Law / Arbitration Rules, 
business financial crises were departmentalized and, for the most part, localized in the countries in which a 
business had its primary operations. Consequently, the financial difficulties of a business were resolved 
within national boundaries and under the supervision of a domestic court, which had sufficient jurisdiction 
and authority to oversee, guide and control all aspects of the company’s insolvency or restructuring. 
 
 With globalization, all of that has changed. Major businesses have almost universally become 
globalized with operations in many different countries. For example, Nortel carried on business in 141 
countries and Lehman carried on business in even more countries. Under classical territorial insolvency 
systems, when a financial crisis would hit a parent company and affect its subsidiaries, individual 
insolvency cases would be opened in many countries where the company or a subsidiary had operations. 
For instance, that might have involved up to 141 separate insolvency proceedings for the Nortel entities.  
 
 Under conventional procedures, each reorganization would have no connection with any of the others, 
and business between the units of the global enterprise would come to a halt as insolvency cases in each 
country would open proceedings to take control of the assets in that particular country.4 Such an approach 
is not optimal, because economic values of enormous magnitude may be dissipated as a result of the 
fragmentation of such cases or intercompany disputes may be so expensive that there is far less for 
distribution to creditors.  
 
 The modified universalist insolvency regimes that have largely replaced territorial insolvency systems 
in most countries, together with the UNICTRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, have promoted 
cooperation among national insolvency cases filed by cross-border entities. UNCITRAL Working Group V 
is now drafting a model law on the cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups that is expected to further 
clarify certain of the law in this area. 
 
 Nevertheless, any Model Law depends on the discretion of local courts for the implementation of 
coordination and cooperation provisions relating to international insolvency cases.5 In addition, there is no 
international court that can resolve cross-border disputes with finality and certainty. 
 
 In our view, international arbitration would provide a valuable tool for resolving cross-border disputes 
so that prospects for successful reorganizations can be dramatically improved. The New York Convention 
/ Model Law / Arbitration Rules are, in fact, the only way in which international businesses in financial 
difficulty with serious creditor problems can avoid the worst effects of the international 
compartmentalization of multinational businesses. The international arbitration system results in arbitral 
__________________ 
regulated by a State’s internal law. 
4  This is largely what happened in the Lehman Brothers cases, even though fewer than a hundred of the possible 
7,000 insolvency cases were commenced in approximately 20 countries.  
5  While, in form, articles 25 and 26 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency mandate 
cooperation and communication between courts and administrators in international insolvency cases in general 
terms, the details of such cooperation and communication are left to the discretion of the courts, the 
administrators and the parties. 
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awards that are enforceable6 essentially worldwide.7 If the general acceptance of the New York Convention 
can be harnessed to the international insolvency regime, the resulting team can provide a much more 
powerful international dispute resolution system to deal with the financial crises of international enterprises. 
In the United States, courts have begun to make use of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) techniques, 
and arbitration in particular, in international insolvency cases. In prominent U.S. bankruptcy cases such as 
Madoff, General Motors and Enron, U.S. bankruptcy courts have required the use of ADR procedures such 
as settlement negotiations and mediations. In some cases, the courts have mandated arbitration to be 
followed by court review de novo if any of the parties refused to accept the award.8 Indeed, U.S. insolvency 
law specifically permits an insolvency tribunal, with the express agreement of the parties, to authorize “final 
and binding arbitration” of “any controversy affecting the estate.”9 While the use of arbitration in such cases 
thus far has been limited, there is clearly a growing interest among U.S. bankruptcy judges and insolvency 
practitioners to use arbitration to resolve complex insolvency disputes where appropriate. Insolvency 
practice tends to expand the use of ADR gradually from negotiations and mediation to arbitration. The 
broader international use of such techniques in international insolvency cases could make a major 
contribution to the success of international insolvency cases. 
 
 
III. A Project to Study the Intersection of Arbitration and Insolvency Law 
 
 If an insolvency case is opened for a party to a pending domestic arbitration proceeding, the domestic 
insolvency law usually determines whether the arbitration may continue. However, domestic laws often 
vary as to whether an international arbitration may continue if it violates an insolvency moratorium (or a 
court order) emanating from the country where the insolvency case is pending.10  
 
 In most such cases, there is a moratorium under the insolvency law of the country where the insolvency 
case has been opened. Any attempt by a creditor to arbitrate the dispute may be a violation of the 
moratorium.11 However, if the creditor commences arbitration in another country, the court administering 
the insolvency case may lack any power to punish the violation. In addition, the arbitrator may not even be 
informed of the pending insolvency case and the applicable moratorium. UNCITRAL’s recommendations 
should clarify the law in this area, we believe in support of a moratorium on the arbitration. 
 
 Even if the arbitration demand is not covered by an insolvency moratorium (for example, because the 
insolvency law is territorial and the arbitration is outside of the country where the insolvency case is opened, 
or the creditor demanding arbitration is not covered by the moratorium), the debtor’s power to participate 
in the arbitration may be substantially impaired. The debtor may have insufficient funds to pursue the 
arbitration or the insolvency court may refuse permission to the debtor or administrator to spend insolvency 
estate money (principally belonging to other creditors) on such an arbitration case.12 
__________________ 
6  Where proper procedures are followed in structuring an international arbitration, the main impediment to the 
enforcement of an arbitral award is the public policy of the country where enforcement is sought. See NY 
Convention, art. 5. 
7  At the present time, more than 150 countries (including every active trading country) are parties to the New York 
Convention on Arbitration. 
8  Edna Sussmann & Jennifer L. Gorski, Capturing the Benefits of Arbitration for Cross Border Insolvency 
Disputes, Arthur W. Rovine (ed.), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: the Fordham 
papers 2013, Kluwer 2013, 158, 168.  
9  See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c). Notably, this rule does not require that the stipulation of the parties be in writing. 
Typically the stipulation would be made oral in open court on the record, and confirmed with a written court 
order. 
10  While a moratorium on creditor collection actions in light of a pending insolvency case may result from a court 
order, the laws of many countries provide for the automatic imposition of a moratorium on creditor collection 
activities upon the opening of an insolvency case. 
11  The arbitration case may not be in violation of a moratorium resulting from the commencement of an insolvency 
case in a universalist country. This outcome depends on whether the moratorium covers the dispute to be 
arbitrated. If, for example, the party requesting the arbitration of a dispute is a secured creditor, and the applicable 
moratorium does not apply to secured creditors, there is no violation of the moratorium.  
12  A party to an arbitration case is typically required to pay a fee to the arbitration seat for the administration of the 
arbitration, and to make a deposit for the fees of the arbitrators, as well as  to pay its own lawyers to participate 
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Under the modified universalist view of insolvency law (which is supported in UNCITRAL documents on 
insolvency law), such an arbitration case should not be permitted to proceed absent authorization from the 
relevant insolvency court. For such issues, we believe UNCITRAL should clarify the primacy of the 
insolvency law of the State where the insolvency case is opened, and the circumstances where it is 
appropriate for the court to permit the arbitration to proceed by vacating or modifying the moratorium  
A dispute between a debtor/administrator and a creditor may also arise in an insolvency proceeding where 
an underlying pre-insolvency agreement contains an arbitration clause. In some circumstances, the 
insolvency court may consider an arbitration case to be an appropriate method to liquidate the claim, which 
then becomes allowed in the insolvency case and the creditor receives its pro rata share of the insolvency 
estate in due course.13 We believe that the reference of such a dispute to arbitration (especially where the 
parties are from different countries) should often be authorized under both insolvency law and arbitration 
law. However, public policy considerations may be involved and a court may conclude that the issue should 
not be arbitrated under the circumstances. We believe that UNCITRAL’s review of the law on this question 
and its recommendations would be useful to both the insolvency and the arbitration communities. 
  
__________________ 
in the arbitration). 
13  If such an arbitration case is already in process, the insolvency tribunal may wish to have the parties complete 
the arbitration to liquidate the claim for the purposes of the insolvency case.  
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Conflict and Consistency in Cross border Insolvency Judgments1 
 
Rosalind Mason, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia  
John Martin, Partner, Henry Davis York, Sydney, Australia  
 
 While business is global, law is local.2 When a debtor becomes subject to a collective insolvency 
proceeding that crosses jurisdictional borders, a key factor for the international business community is the 
extent to which their expectations are met through the interplay of the legal systems involved. Despite 
efforts since the late twentieth century, there remains uncertainty around the impact of competing 
insolvency laws on existing rights and interests and party expectations. This affects international trade and 
commerce as parties assess a jurisdiction’s insolvency laws and its capacity to handle cross-border elements 
as part of their risk assessment in doing business there.3  
 
 Where an international business is undergoing a cross-border insolvency, differences in domestic 
insolvency laws can produce different outcomes on a disputed issue depending on where it is litigated. This 
may lead to local creditors or the foreign representative initiating additional local insolvency proceedings 
(followed by the commencement of litigation in that jurisdiction), or simply selecting an alternative location 
to litigate that issue.4 Litigation of disputes involves a contest between multiple parties, and those other 
parties will similarly be examining the various jurisdictions in which proceedings to resolve the dispute 
may properly be commenced, and making forensic decisions based on the likely outcome(s) in each such 
location.  
 
 Domestic insolvency laws which were once drafted to deal with individual traders or single corporate 
entities must now deal with multiple forms of business association often interwoven into complex business 
structures and engaged in integrated business and financial operations. In the cross-border sphere, this 
complexity increases the risk of multi-state parallel litigation. 
 
Two examples of Multi-State Parallel Litigation 
 
 The September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, a global financial services firm, with various 
entities within the group filing in insolvency across numerous jurisdictions, provided challenges to debtors, 
creditors, regulators and courts alike. This has been so despite the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-border Insolvency in many of the jurisdictions connected with the case.5 It is also despite the 
execution of a Cross-border Insolvency Protocol6 by the insolvency representatives in many of the 
proceedings involved.  
 
__________________ 
1 The authors acknowledge the contribution and feedback provided on this topic by co-panellists and participants 
at the International Insolvency Institute Annual Conference, Tokyo, June 2016.  
2  As Lord Millett wrote: “Legal theory, based on the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of the national state, has 
parted company with the commercial reality and the needs of modern business”: ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: The 
Judicial Approach’ (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 99.  
3  World Bank, Doing Business Report 2016, measures the time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a commercial 
insolvency and the strength of the legal framework for insolvency as part of its assessment of countries ’ business 
regulation.  
4  For both the commencement of a local insolvency proceeding, and the initiation of litigation, local jurisdictional 
requirements would need to be met. 
5  For example, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Japan, Republic of Korea and Australia. Steps 
were also taken, as permitted under the UNCITRAL Model Law, to communicate by letter between the American 
Bankruptcy Court and the English High Court: Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2009] EWHC 2953.  
6  http://www.ekvandoorne.com/files/CrossBorderProtocol.pdf. 
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 A key challenge in Lehman was the different domestic law on the effect of ipso facto clauses7 in an 
insolvency context, evident in conflicting judgments in parallel legal proceedings issued in the United States 
and England.8  
 
 An Australian collateralised debt obligation (“CDO”) beneficiary, Perpetual, commenced proceedings 
in England against the Trustee to compel distributions, and the same Trustee was also named as a defendant 
by the Lehman counterparty in proceedings commenced by Lehman in the Bankruptcy Court in New York. 
The subject matter of the litigation was essentially identical, but the legal framework differed, with only 
the US Bankruptcy Court obliged to take account of the ipso facto provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code 
in deciding the case, a consideration which Judge Peck of the US Bankruptcy Court found to be decisive. 
Lehman was successful in the US proceedings, whereas the opposite outcome was achieved in the UK 
proceedings. While the sum in dispute in the litigation was measured in the tens of millions of dollars, the 
authors understand that the outcome would dictate the position on similar CDOs valued in the multiple 
billions of dollars. The international element, and the inconsistent outcomes it produced, provided a layer 
of complexity that has added years to the resolution of the substantive issue in dispute, and the inconsistent 
decisions have to date compelled private settlement through negotiation to resolve the disputes.  
 
 The collapse of Nortel Networks, a global networking and telecommunications firm, operating on an 
integrated global business model has similarly presented unique cross-border challenges. In January 2009, 
Nortel Network Corp and other Nortel Canadian debtors filed for insolvency protection under Canadian 
legislation; the United States debtors filed under Chapter 11; and Nortel entities incorporated in Europe, 
Middle East and Africa were placed in administration in England. It was agreed, by entry into a protocol, 
to liquidate the group’s assets, including valuable patents, and, in order to improve their value, to resolve 
entitlement after the sales were completed. The asset sales produced proceeds to be allocated among 
stakeholders totalling USD7.3billion, representing USD2.85B on account of the sale of business lines, and 
USD4.5B on account of the sale of residual intellectual property rights. The business lines were sold in 
2009 and 2010, and the residual intellectual property was sold in June 2011. 
 
 The Protocol required the parties to attempt to reach agreement on the allocation issue, which they did 
attempt, though unsuccessfully. The allocation issue was then referred for decision (as contemplated by the 
Protocol) to a joint hearing by both the US and Ontario courts, conducted between May and September 
2014.  
 
 On 12 May 2015, first instance decisions in the parallel proceedings on the allocation issue were issued 
by the respective Courts,9 the effect of which was described by Justice Newbould of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice in the following terms: 
 
 “Judge Gross in Wilmington and I have communicated with each other in accordance with the Protocol 
with a view to determining whether consistent rulings can be made by both Courts. We have come to 
the conclusion that a consistent ruling can and should be made by both Courts. We have come to this 
conclusion in the exercise of our independent and exclusive jurisdiction in each of our jurisdictions.”10 
 
__________________ 
7  That is, contractual provisions to modify the scheme for payment priority. In the United States, the ipso facto 
clauses were considered unenforceable and any attempt to enforce them would violate the automatic stay: 
Lehman Brothers Holding Inc v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 422 BR 407 at 421 (Bankr SDNY 2010).  
8  Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWHC 1912 (Ch); Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160; Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38. Lehman Brothers Holding Inc v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd 422 BR 407 (Bankr SDNY 2010). The District Court Southern District New York granted a review 
of Judge Peck’s decision. However pending the appeal, the parties settled. (Note the Bankruptcy Court had 
directed the parties (422 BR 407 at 423) to attend a status conference to be held for the purposes of exploring 
means to harmonize the decision of the US and English courts.   
9  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2015] ONSC 2987; In re Nortel Networks Inc (Bankr Court, D Delaware, 
2015).  
10  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2015] ONSC 2987 at [10]. 
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 Appeals were filed in both Canada and the US, though a Canadian Appeal Court11 later dismissed the 
leave application to appeal. At the time of writing,12 the US appeal proceedings are subject to a settlement 
agreement, but the approval of that settlement is being vigorously contested.  
 
 Although consistent decisions were produced by both Courts, the outcome may well have been 
otherwise. Indeed, if the settlement is not approved, inconsistent decisions may well be the outcome 
following the appellate process in the US.  
 
 One may ask, rhetorically, how would the allocation of the USD7.3B be addressed in this circumstance 
of ultimately inconsistent final decisions?  
 
 It must be acknowledged that the Nortel proceedings are inherently complex, even disregarding the 
international element. That said, it is perhaps reasonable to infer that the “international element” — the 
perceived differences in relevant US and Canadian substantive law and the effect of the difference on 
potential outcomes — has perhaps largely contributed to the dispute resolution process taking the course it 
took. The USD7.3 billion in proceeds received between 2009 and 2011 has presumably still not been 
distributed. 
 
 Judges involved in the Nortel litigation have expressed views in their respective judgments that suggest 
the absence of an alternative process of resolution of the international element was problematic, with Justice 
Newbould declaring “A global solution in this unprecedented situation is required.”13 His Honour described 
Nortel’s early success in maximising sale proceeds as having “disintegrated into value-erosive adversarial 
and territorial litigation described by many as scorched earth litigation.”14 Elsewhere His Honour refers to 
the insolvency proceedings having stretched “over six years at unimaginable expense”.15 
 
 Observations of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Re Nortel Networks,16 cited with approval by 
Judge Gross,17 pointed to a focus by the parties’ lawyers “on some of the technical differences governing 
bankruptcy in the various jurisdictions”18 as impeding a timely resolution to the dispute. The Court 
observed that the cost of delay would largely be borne by pension funds,19 whose members were financially 
dependent on a very significant component of the USD7.3B tied up by the litigation. 
 
A problem in need of a solution? 
 
 Amongst other important objectives, and together with other policy imperatives such as timeliness and 
fairness, insolvency laws seek to achieve an efficient “recycling” of capital.  
 
 The international dimension in both Lehman and Nortel very substantially increased the resolution 
timeline. It appears also self-evident that even in insolvencies of a much more modest size, the existence of 
an international dimension to a dispute will, of itself, likely produce delays where litigation of the dispute 
is advanced in multiple jurisdictions. The perspective of the Hon Judge James Peck, the US Bankruptcy 
Court Judge who presided over the Lehman bankruptcy are illuminating on this issue. In a paper presented 
after his retirement from the bench, the following observations were offered:20 
__________________ 
11  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2016] ONCA 332.  
12  At the time of writing, December 2016, the hearing on confirmation of the Debtors’ chapter 11 plan is scheduled 
for 24 January 2017. 
13  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2015] ONSC 2987 at [208]. 
14  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2015] ONSC 2987 at [208]. 
15  Re Nortel Networks Corporation [2015] ONSC 2987 at [10]. At [208] his Honour suggested the costs “well 
exceeded $1 billion”. 
16 669 F 3d 128, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2011). 
17 In re Nortel Networks, Inc. (Bankr Court, D Delaware, 2015 at [113].  
18  In re Nortel Networks, Inc, 669 F 3d128, 143-44 (3d Cic. 2011). 
19 “They are the pawns in the moves being made by the Knights and the Rooks.” Ibid., at [144]. 
20 “A Cross Border Judicial Dilemma — Conflict and Consistency in Insolvency Cases That Span the Globe”, Hon. 
James M. Peck; Banking & Financial Services Law Association, Brisbane, 4 September 2015.  
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 “Exercising discretion and applying the law locally is hard enough [for a judge]. Doing so in an 
international setting “ups the ante” especially when the notional claim amounts exceed $1 trillion as 
they did in Lehman.” 
 
 According to Judge Peck, where judges involved in multistate parallel litigation faithfully perform 
their judicial function, this will inevitably on occasions lead to conflicting decisions.  
 
 Judge Peck was of the view that “such inconsistent results … [are] not necessarily a bad thing, nor are 
such inconsistencies impossible to overcome”.21 His Honour pointed to the parties achieving consensus 
through direct negotiation, mediation and arbitration, declaring: 
 
 “If there is no effective judicial remedy, parties have no option other than to find a way to agree.” 
 
 The authors accept as correct that this reflects the position currently, but do not consider it to be an 
optimal outcome. Both Lehman and Nortel evidenced that negotiations will not always resolve matters in 
a timely fashion. Substantial capital is at risk of being tied up for many years by the international element. 
Indeed, in both cases negotiated outcomes awaited the outcome of the litigation. Secondly, it is legitimate 
to question whether the interests of justice are well served where, because there is no ultimate judicial 
outcome, parties have no alternative but to achieve a negotiated solution. In Nortel, and possibly Lehman, 
significant interest groups were comprised of pension funds. Necessarily, such participants have a shorter 
term perspective than other participants in the negotiation. This disparity in underlying interest presents at 
the very least a serious risk that a negotiated outcome will be more reflective of timing imperatives rather 
than legal merit.  
 
 Our view is that the interests of justice compel the conclusion that solutions do now need to be explored 
to ensure the international element in an insolvency dispute does not unduly delay resolution, or (by virtue 
of that delay, or the risk of that delay) produce sub-optimal negotiated outcomes. 
 
 Various approaches may be taken to avoiding the risk of conflicting judgments on a common issue 
within a cross-border insolvency. Next this paper outlines these approaches and discusses their success or 
otherwise in avoiding conflicting judgments.  
 
 A number of these approaches involve multilateral bodies, which include the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); the World Bank; and the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private International Law (UNIDROIT).22 Professional bodies comprising lawyers, 
accountants and other professions who advise business on insolvency matters have also engaged with the 
issues — for example, the International Bar Association (IBA); INSOL International (INSOL); and the 
International Insolvency Institute (III).  
 
 The various responses to these issues can usefully be understood through classifying the different 
approaches. Some are domestically focussed however most are multilateral in scope initiated by 
organizations as well as by the transnational community of business leaders and owners, financiers and 
professional advisers caught up in a particular business failure.  
 
“Judicial Restraint” — Can the Judiciary Avoid the Risk of Inconsistent Decisions? 
 
 The Maxwell case illustrates one approach aimed at avoiding inconsistent judgments. The approach 
was endorsed by Lord Millett, writing extra-judicially in 1997, who described the approach as the exercise 
__________________ 
21 “A Cross Border Judicial Dilemma — Conflict and Consistency in Insolvency Cases That Span the Globe”, Hon. 
James M. Peck; Banking & Financial Services Law Association, Brisbane, 4 September 2015.  
22  The Institut International pour l’Unification de Droit Privé (International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law) and commonly known as UNIDROIT http://unidroit.org/ was founded in 1926 and is based in Rome. It is 
an independent intergovernmental organization whose purpose is “to study needs and methods for modernising, 
harmonising and co-ordinating private and in particular commercial law as between States and groups of States 
and to formulate uniform law instruments, principles and rules to achieve those objectives”. 
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of “judicial restraint”. He discerned three common themes in the English authorities on cross-border 
insolvency: a need for an international convention and in the meantime, both cooperation between 
insolvency courts in different jurisdictions, and judicial restraint:  
 
 “Pending an international insolvency convention, the basic approach is one of co-operation and 
judicial restraint. These are two sides of the same coin, and can be accommodated under the heading 
of judicial comity23 …  
 
 [In light of Lord Hoffmann’s refusal to grant an anti-suit injunction in the Maxwell Communications 
case, discussed below] … The normal assumption must be that a foreign judge is the person best 
qualified to decide whether the proceedings in his court should be allowed to continue. Comity 
demands a general policy of non-intervention.” 
 
 The Maxwell Communications Corporation plc (MCC) cross-border insolvency perhaps represents 
the high water mark of this approach.24 At the time of its collapse in 1991, the MCC multinational group 
consisted of some 400 public companies intertwined with 400 private companies.25 Assets were located 
across numerous states, such as Israel, Bulgaria, Germany, Kenya and Canada, which represented a broad 
spectrum of legal systems.  
 
 The group’s principal assets were situated in the United States — some USD700 million to USD1 
billion compared to its non-United States’ assets estimated at less than GBP100 million26 — whereas 
England was the holding company’s place of incorporation and the group’s place of central management 
and control. Other significant MCC connections with England were that it traded on the London Stock 
Exchange, kept its corporate books in pounds sterling and owed most of its USD2.4 billion debt to British 
banks and London branches of foreign banks.27  
 
 Two concurrent primary insolvency proceedings were instigated by the MCC Board. On 16 December 
1991, they applied in the United States for a debtor-in-possession administration that provided for a creditor 
moratorium while management structured a Chapter 11 reorganization. On the following day they sought 
an administration order in England, which would provide a similar stay on creditor action and avoid 
wrongful trading liability on the part of the directors. An administration order was granted in England on 
20 December. 
 
 One of the more significant issues that arose was an allegedly voidable transaction with connections 
to both the United States and England. Shortly before the administrators were appointed in England, MCC 
had repaid over USD30 million to Barclays Bank plc (Barclays) from the sale proceeds of an American 
asset. Barclays sought an injunction in England to prevent the administrators from taking recovery action 
__________________ 
23 Peter Millett, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach’ (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 99 at 
103. 
24 It is also a leading example of an approach taken in recent decades to harmonising insolvency systems for the 
benefit of the debtor and its creditors. In the increasingly global economy of the late twentieth century, the 
Maxwell case broke new ground in that an Order and Protocol was approved by the courts in separate jurisdictions 
to case-manage an insolvent international enterprise (or corporate group). Within 16 months a reorganization 
was in place, a relatively expeditious resolution at the time for a case of that size. 
25 Some of this material draws upon R Mason, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law 
and Insolvency Law Meet’ in P Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law: Themes and Perspectives  (Ashgate, 
2008). MCC itself was an English holding company with more than 400 subsidiaries worldwide engaged 
primarily in information services and electronic publishing, language instruction and general and consumer 
publishing: Evan Flaschen & Ronald Silverman, ‘Maxwell Communication Corporation plc: The importance of 
comity and co-operation in resolving international insolvencies’ in E Bruce Leonard & Christopher Besant (eds) 
Current Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency and Reorganisations (Graham & Trotman and International Bar 
Association, London, 1994) at 41. 
26  Barclays Bank plc v Homan [1993] BCLC 680 at 683 [sub nom Re Maxwell Communications Corp plc (No 2) 
[1992] BCC 757]. 
27 Caryn Chittenden, ‘After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time Right for a Multinat ional Insolvency 
Treaty?’ (1993) 28 Wake Forest Law Review 161 at 163. 
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in the United States. They argued that the action should be determined in England in accordance with 
English law (under which a defence was available — something not open to them under American 
avoidance laws). 
 
 The English Court of Appeal28 refused the injunction and upheld the decision of the primary judge (Mr 
Justice Hoffmann as he then was) that, where the foreign proceedings were not vexatious or oppressive, it 
was for the foreign court to decide whether or not it was the appropriate forum.  
 
 When the preference action was instituted in the United States, the Bankruptcy Court29 dismissed the 
proceedings. Subsequently the Second Circuit Court of Appeals30 also chose to defer to the courts and laws 
of England, basing its decision instead on the doctrine of international comity precluding the application of 
the American avoidance law to transfers in which England’s interest had primacy. 
 
 As suggested above, this case represents the high watermark of “judicial restraint”.  
 
 The authors wish clearly to record their view that an entirely unobjectifiable application of domestic 
substantive law, including conflict of laws principles can lead to judges in other cases declining to stay their 
own proceedings. There can, for example, be no criticism of either the English or US Courts in the Lehman 
“flip clause” litigation described above for this concurrent exercise of jurisdiction, given that both Courts 
had well founded bases for the exercise of local jurisdiction, and for the application of the law applicable 
in each jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Similarly in Nortel, the complexity of the relevant group 
insolvency and the respective claims of multiple companies located in different countries rendered the 
assumption of jurisdiction by both Courts entirely proper. Indeed, it was mandated by the Protocol. The 
authors respectfully agree with the following observation made by Judge Peck: 
 
 “The shared goal of finding a consistent, just and workable solution may conflict with the independent 
obligation of the trial judge in each Court to decided disputed questions under governing law and 
procedures. Separate but related insolvency estates necessarily may give rise to irreconcilable separate 
adjudications”.  
 
 While the approach taken on both sides of the Atlantic in Maxwell will provide a solution in some 
circumstances, other international insolvencies will not present the same opportunity. 
 
Uniform Insolvency Laws  
 
 A second approach to avoiding inconsistent judgments is for all states to enact uniform substantive 
insolvency laws. However, this is not likely to be achieved in any comprehensive manner in the foreseeable 
future because each state’s insolvency laws interact in a complex manner with a range of their other laws.31 
This militates against uniform laws as a solution. However, multilateral bodies with an interest in 
international trade and commerce have at least promoted convergence of the different domestic insolvency 
laws.  
 
 Model insolvency laws have been drafted with a view to harmonisation, if not uniformity. UNCITRAL 
produced a Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004)32 which is intended “to be used as a reference by 
__________________ 
28 Barclays Bank plc v Homan [1993] BCLC 680. 
29  Maxwell Communication Corporation plc v Société Generale 170 BR 800 (Bankr SDNY 1994) affirmed 186 BR 
807 (SDNY 1995) and 93 F 3d 1036 (2nd Cir 1996). The Court went on to examine choice of law in respect of 
the avoidance action, holding that English law would apply and, on the basis of comity, decided it should also 
dismiss the proceedings on that ground.  
30  Maxwell Communication Corporation plc v Société Generale 93 F 3d 1036 (2nd Cir 1996). 
31  As Professor Fletcher writes “there is a profound and intimate correlation between insolvency … and the very 
wellsprings of policy and social order from which national law ultimately draws its inspiration ”: Ian F Fletcher, 
Insolvency in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) at 5. 
32  In 2010 and 2013 guides were added on enterprise group insolvency and directors obligations in the period 
approaching insolvency.  
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national authorities and legislative bodies when preparing new laws and regulations or reviewing the 
adequacy of existing laws and regulations”.33 However, UNCITRAL has noted that the rate of adoption of 
their legislative standards has varied significantly. It has stressed the importance of technical cooperation 
and assistance by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, because legislative technical assistance, in particular to 
developing countries, is no less important than the formulation of uniform rules itself.34  
 
 The World Bank produced their own guidelines entitled Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor Rights Systems (2005).35 These Guidelines ‘emphasize contextual integrated solutions and the 
policy choices involved in developing those solutions’.36 Significantly, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank at times require bankruptcy reform in developing countries as a condition of 
loan support, thus promoting the convergence of insolvency law.37  
 
 States within regional economic groupings have also attempted to arrive at uniform insolvency laws 
through insolvency treaties. Although never implemented, the first draft EC Convention on Bankruptcy and 
Related Matters (1970)38 contained draft uniform provisions. It would have required contracting states to 
enact a ‘Uniform Law’ into domestic law, while permitting states to make reservations on their 
incorporation.39  
 
 In 2010, the European Parliament revisited the notion of uniform insolvency laws through its report 
on the Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level.40 In November 2016, the European Commission 
announced a proposed Directive to harmonise laws “on preventative restructuring frameworks, second 
chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures”. It 
does not seek to harmonise “core aspects of formal insolvency procedures such as conditions for opening 
insolvency proceedings, definitions of insolvency or ranking of claims”.41 
 
 The difficulties in achieving universal agreement on substantive provisions are evident in that even 
these principles and guidelines often contain alternative provisions on important matters of policy. Yet even 
where there appears to be a common approach on policy, there are often difficulties in achieving uniform 
enactment and implementation in practice. 
 
 In addition to specific insolvency texts, multilateral bodies are drafting Legislative Guides on related 
commercial topics. UNCITRAL has concluded a number of texts on international trade law issues that have 
the potential to intersect with insolvency laws. UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI on Security Interests42 
closely collaborated with UNCITRAL’s Working Group V (Insolvency) to produce the UNCITRAL 
__________________ 
33  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html .  
34  Report of the UNCITRAL General Assembly A/66/17 (44 th session, 27 June-8 July 2011, New York): 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V11/846/34/PDF/V1184634.pdf?OpenElement. 
35  These were drafted in 2001 and revised in 2005: Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 
(2005) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/FINAL-ICRPrinciples-March2009.pdf. 
36 Gordon Johnson, ‘The World Bank’s Consensus Building Role: Developing Principles for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditor Rights Systems and Related Efforts to Strengthen Capacity’, Paper presented to the INSOL Sixth 
World Congress, London, 2001 at 3. 
37  Hannah Buxbaum, ‘Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance’ (2001-2002) 42 Virginia 
Journal of International Law  931 at 946.  
38  Commission Document 3.327/1/XIV/70-E. 
39  Article 76 (1970 Draft). 
40  European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department: Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs, Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, 2010 at 6 http://www.insol-europe.org/eu-research/. 
41  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3803_en.htm “The proposal ... focuses on the key priorities of 
making sure that effective frameworks for preventive restructuring, insolvency second chance frameworks, as 
well as discharge procedures are available. In addition, it introduces measures to increase the efficiency — and 
in particular reduce the length — of all insolvency procedures. The proposal does not harmonise core aspects of 
formal insolvency procedures such as conditions for opening insolvency proceedings, definitions of insolvency 
or ranking of claims.” 
42  UNCITRAL Working Group VI on Security Interests has drafted a Model Law on Secured Transactions: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security/2016Model_secured.html .  
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Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (2007).43 The aim of this project was to ensure coordination of 
the treatment of security interests in insolvency with the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. 
UNCITRAL cooperated closely with the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.44 It also coordinated with the International Institute on Private International Law 
(UNIDROIT) to avoid overlap with its convention on mobile equipment and intermediated securities.45 
 
 These multilateral efforts provide encouragement that, over time, there will be an increasing 
convergence of insolvency laws. However, this will take time and is unlikely to achieve uniformity. The 
authors’ view is that while such convergence may eventually reduce the incidence of inconsistent 
judgments, it will not provide a sufficient solution. Different policy choices (e.g. the presence or absence 
of ipso facto clause protection) in different states will leave open the opportunity for inconsistent outcomes 
in the future.  
 
Uniform Recognition Laws  
 
 Arguably, States and multilateral organizations have achieved some success in addressing international 
insolvency through adopting (to greater or lesser extent) uniform laws on recognition of insolvency 
proceedings and insolvency representatives. This approach accepts a lack of agreement on fundamental 
issues such as jurisdiction. While there is a consequent likelihood of concurrent insolvency proceedings, it 
also typically focuses on coordination and cooperation between concurrent proceedings. 
 
 A number of States legislate for recognition of and cooperation with foreign insolvency adjudications 
or proceedings. A familiar example is s 426 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), the predecessors for which have 
been influential in common law jurisdictions with an English legal heritage. Significantly, it authorises the 
local court to “apply, in relation to any matters specified in the request, the insolvency law which is 
applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction.”  
 
 Multilateral organizations have also investigated avenues to encourage recognition and enforcement. 
The IBA developed a Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act (1989)46 and in 1996 approved a 
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat that provided some generalised principles to guide harmonising cross-
border insolvencies.47 While courts applied the Concordat in 1997,48 its use was overtaken by an 
UNCITRAL initiative. 
 
__________________ 
43  http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-10English.pdf.  
44
 They collaborated on the chapter on conflict of laws. The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php is an international organization established in the 19th century to work 
towards the progressive unification of private international law. It had no success with its 1925 model bankruptcy 
treaty: Kurt Nadelmann, ‘Bankruptcy Treaties’ (1943-1944) 93 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 58 at 67. 
In recent years it has concentrated on cross-border cooperation in other civil and commercial matters and 
insolvency is only mentioned tangentially in a number of texts.  
45
  UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment  (Cape Town, 2001) and UNIDROIT 
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities  (Geneva, 2009). 
46
  This was a draft model statute for enactment as municipal legislation: Timothy Powers, Rona Mears & John 
Barrett, ‘The Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act’ in Leonard & Besant (eds) Current Issues in 
Cross-Border Insolvency and Reorganisations, Graham & Trotman and International Bar Association, London, 
1994.  
47  Its first principle was that there should be a single administrative forum that would have primary responsibility 
for coordinating all relevant insolvency proceedings. However, it did not prescribe a principal forum or seat for 
the proceeding. It also allowed for concurrent plenary proceedings with coordination, subject in appropriate cases 
to a governance protocol setting out ‘the responsibilities and jurisdiction of each.’ Nielsen A, Sigal M & Wagner 
K, ‘The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies ’ 
(1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 533 at 549. 
48  Everfresh Beverages Inc litigation, see Leonard EB, ‘Committee J’s Initiatives in Cross-border Insolvencies and 
Reorganisations: The Experience of the Everfresh Case’ (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 127.  
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 UNCITRAL has promoted uniform recognition laws through states adopting its Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency (1997). At the time of writing, the Model Law has been adopted in 43 jurisdictions.49 It 
contains uniform recognition laws — and provides a mechanism for cooperation between jurisdictions and 
the coordination of concurrent proceedings. However, when adopting it as part of domestic legislation, a 
State may amend its provisions and so the legislation and the procedures under the Model Law vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction — sometimes in significant ways.  
 
 Finally, in some common law jurisdictions, there are statements to the effect that superior courts may 
rely upon an inherent jurisdiction to recognize and give effect to foreign insolvency adjudications or 
proceedings.50 However in Rubin v Eurofinance SA; New Cap Reinsurance Corp (in liq) v Grant,51 the 
Supreme Court declined to accept there was a sui generis category of insolvency orders or judgments 
subject to its own special rules.52 Further, Lord Collins held that “there is nothing to suggest that [Article 
21 Model Law] applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against third parties.”53 In 
light of this uncertainty UNCITRAL Working Group V is working on a draft Model Law on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgements.54  
 
 Meanwhile at the December 2013 meeting of Working Group V, there was discussion of developing 
an Insolvency Convention, with expressions of support as well as a number of reservations being voiced.55  
 
Cross-border Insolvency Agreements  
 
 The growing use of CBI Agreements is noted as a response to cross-border insolvency issues, and 
these are arguably emerging as customary international commercial law.56 While Article 27 encourages 
court approval of CBI Agreements to coordinate insolvency proceedings, they predate the Model Law as 
exemplified in the Maxwell case and subsequent practice.57 The evolution of the IBA Concordat led to some 
commentators in the late 1990s describing this practice as an example of customary international law for 
dealing with cross-border insolvency.58  
 
 Subsequent developments have borne this out. The practice of parties arriving at ‘in effect’ treaties to 
resolve cross-border insolvency issues and capturing this in CBI Agreements has been accelerated — most 
significantly through the Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-Border Cases 
published by the American Law Institute (ALI) and III in 200159 and 2012;60 the European Communication 
__________________ 
49  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html .  
50  McGrath v Riddell [2008] UKHL 21 at [30] per Lord Hoffman. 
51  [2012] UKSC 46. 
52 [2012] UKSC 46 at [128] Lord Collins stated “A change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments … has all the hallmarks of legislation, and is a matter for the legislature and not for judicial innovation. 
The law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not 
areas of law which have in recent times been left to be developed by judge-made law.” 
53  [2012] UKSC 46 at [143]. 
54  Working papers are to be found on the UNCITRAL website.
 
55  Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) (44 th session, 16-20 December 2013, Vienna): https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V14/001/48/PDF/V1400148.pdf?OpenElement.  
56  Rosalind Mason, ‘Cross-border insolvency and legal transnationalisation’ (2012) 21(2) International Insolvency 
Review 105. 
57  The 1993 Olympia & York Realty Company case (New York and Ontario) — see Peter Millett, ‘Cross-Border 
Insolvency: The Judicial Approach’ (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 99 at 111 and E Bruce Leonard, 
‘The International Scene: The Way Ahead: Protocols in International Insolvency’ (1998) American Bankruptcy 
Institute Journal 191 at 195.  
58  David Culmer, ‘The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Customary International Law: Is It Ripe Yet?’ 
(1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of International Law 563 and Thomas Gaa, ‘Harmonization of International 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is it possible?’ (1993) 27 The International Lawyer 881 at 882. 
59  ALI Transnational Insolvency Project (1993-2000) ‘to provide a non-statutory basis for cooperation in 
international insolvency cases involving two or more of the NAFTA states, consisting of the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico’. http://www.ali.org/doc/Guidelines.pdf. 
60  The objective of the project undertaken by Professor Ian Fletcher and Professor Bob Wessels was to investigate 
whether the essential provisions of the ALI Principles of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (ALI -NAFTA 
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& Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency adopted by INSOL Europe in 2008;61 and the 
UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation of 2009.62  
 
 The UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (2009) contains 
information ‘based upon a description of collected experience and practice and focuses on the use and 
negotiation of cross-border insolvency agreements, providing an analysis of a number of those 
agreements’.63 This highlights the significance of a growing international custom around their use. 
 
 In its survey of CBI Agreements, the Practice Guide refers to a 1908 British decision64 in which the 
court commented that ‘such an agreement is a “proper and common-sense business arrangement to make, 
and one manifestly for the benefit of all parties interested”‘.65 CBI Agreements typically come into effect 
through negotiation between the parties and may be presented to courts for review and approval66 while 
providing for ‘the independence of the courts’ and affirming ‘the principle of comity’.67 They have been 
approved in cases between common law jurisdictions as well as in civil law jurisdictions.68  
 
 The evolution of CBI Agreements may justify classifying the approach as a customary law of 
international commercial transactions (or law merchant).69 This approach does not, however, eliminate the 
risk of inconsistent judgments in parallel litigation. In both Nortel and Lehman, CBI Agreements were in 
place (albeit, in the case of Lehman, without the English estate as a signatory). The existence of those CBI 
Agreements did not prevent the dispute from proceeding in parallel in two states,70 with the consequence 
risk of inconsistent judgments, and the associated delay in resolution and potential for sub-optimal 
negotiated outcomes.  
 
 It is considered that the continuing evolution of CBI Agreements is a positive move in the right 
direction, but not an ultimate solution to the problem. 
 
Uniform Choice of Law Rules 
 
 States have achieved more success in addressing cross-border insolvency issues by adopting a uniform 
approach to choice of law through regional cross-border insolvency treaties or conventions. This has meant 
that, even with member states’ different domestic insolvency laws, a uniform referral to an applicable local 
or foreign law71 should result in the same outcome, regardless of the member state in which the dispute 
arose. Fletcher and Wessels comment that with uniform choice of law rules “parties’ legitimate expectations 
__________________ 
Principles) and the annexed Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-border Cases 
(ALI-NAFTA Guidelines) may, with certain necessary modifications, be acceptable for use by jurisdictions 
across the world.  
61 Bob Wessels, ‘European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Border Insolvency‘ (2007) 4 (4) 
ABI Committee News http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/international/ 
vol4num4/European.html.  
62  http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Practice_Guide_english.pdf.  
63  UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 2009, at 1.  
64  Re P MacFayden & Co [1908] 1 KB 675.  
65  As such, it exemplified a pragmatic approach by the parties to resolving issues where an insolvent debtor had 
carried on business through two companies, one located in England and the other in India. UNCITRAL Practice 
Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 2009, at 23. 
66  They agreements between the relevant insolvency representatives need not be ‘approved’ by courts to be effective 
in practice.  
67  UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 2009, at 32.  
68  For example, the Lehman protocol. Also, see Lucas Daum, “The Future of Cross-border Insolvency Protocols’, 
Leiden Law School November 2009 — Master’s Thesis, Supervisor Professor Bob Wessels; Adjunct Supervisor 
Honourable Justice James Farley QC, Canada. 
69  Rosalind Mason, ‘Cross-border insolvency and legal transnationalisation’ (2012) 21(2) International Insolvency 
Review 105. 
70 Indeed, the Nortel CBI Agreement mandated the parallel proceedings in the event of the failure of the parties to 
reach agreement.  
71 Friedrich Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993  
at 45-6.  
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can be more consistently fulfilled, thereby reducing the levels of uncertainty and instability that have a key 
influence on the assessment of risk by those engaging in international transactions”.72 
 
 The Nordic Convention on Bankruptcy between Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden 
(1933) recognizes the law of the place of insolvency adjudication73 as determining almost all the effects of 
the order in all member states without the need for further formalities.74  
 
 With effect from 2002, the EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR)75 prima facie applies the law of the ‘home 
state’ main proceedings to the effects of the insolvency proceedings throughout the applicable European 
states.76 A recast Regulation77 (EIR Recast) will take effect from 26 June 2017 and, subject to any contrary 
provisions, it likewise applies the insolvency law of the “State of the opening of proceedings” to 
determining the conditions for the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure.78 
Subsequent provisions address applicable law on specific topics such as third parties’ rights in rem; set-off; 
contracts relating to immoveable property; and acts that are detrimental to all the creditors (e.g. avoidance 
provisions).79  
 
 The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) contains a small number of draft 
legislative provisions on applicable law and states: “[b]y specifically addressing, in a transparent and 
predictable manner, issues of applicable law an insolvency law can assist in providing certainty with respect 
to the effects of insolvency proceedings on the rights and claims of parties affected by those proceedings”.80 
 
 In 2012, the ALI and III endorsed the Report, Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for 
Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases,81 to which were annexed Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws 
__________________ 
72  Ian Fletcher and Bob Wessels, “Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in International 
Insolvency Cases” (Report, The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, 30 March 
2012) at 20. 
73  This is based on the Convention allocating jurisdiction to a State whose insolvency laws ( lex concursus) will 
then take immediate effect, subject to the terms of the Convention, in all the member states.   
74 Article 1 specifies recognition of the divesting of the administration of the debtor’s property; the extent of the 
assets and the property therein; the bankrupt’s rights and obligations during the bankruptcy; the administration 
of the bankrupt’s property and transactions in respect thereof; the rights of creditors in respect of the payment of 
their claims; the allocation of the assets; the composition with creditors or other mode of settlement. There is 
also an immediate general stay of creditor action: Michael Bogdan, ‘The Nordic Bankruptcy Convention’ in 
Ziegel JS (ed) Current Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law , Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1994 at 702.  
75  EU Insolvency Regulation (1346/2000) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=  
OJ:L:2000:160:0001:0018:en:PDF.  
76  Article 4(1) (EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings) states the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and 
their effects is prima facie the state where such proceedings were opened. The development of the EIR was 
influenced by the Council of Europe Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (1990). This 
Istanbul Convention which never came into effect had provided that the applicable law in secondary proceedings 
was prima facie to be the state where that insolvency proceeding was opened: Article 19.  
77  Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.141.01.0019.01.ENG. See 
Samantha Bewick, “The European Insolvency Regulation Revisited” (2015) International Insolvency Review 
DOI: 10.1002/iir.1240.  
78  Article 7(1) and 7(2) (EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings Recast).  
79  While Article 7(2) includes the rules relating to “the voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts 
detrimental to the general body of creditors” in the list on the conduct of the insolvency, Article 16 states the law 
of the ‘home state’ law shall not apply if the act is subject to the law of another Member State, which law “does 
not allow any means of challenging that act in the relevant case”.  
80  UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law  (2004) Pt 2, p. 68. Recommendations 30-34 
address the law applicable to the validity and effectiveness of rights and claims, the law applicable in insolvency 
proceedings and exceptions thereto. These were drafted by UNCITRAL in close cooperation with the Hague 
Conference on International Law: Fletcher I F and Wessels B, “Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for 
Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases” (Report, The American Law Institute and the International 
Insolvency Institute, 30 March 2012) p. 202.  
81  http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/36/5897.html. The objective of the project 
undertaken by Professor Ian Fletcher and Professor Bob Wessels was to investigate whether the essential 
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Matters in International Insolvency Cases proposed by the joint reporters, Professor Ian Fletcher and 
Professor Bob Wessels. It states that these Global Rules were “submitted to ALI and III as a useful starting 
point for further debate on a global level”. Noting that they had not been tested against existing treaties or 
conventions, they were proffered instead to:  
 
 “serve as legislative recommendations in general and sometimes in more detailed terms. They may 
also serve as a guide for courts, insolvency practitioners, and creditors in those circumstances where 
applicable law with regard to international insolvency cases fails to deal with a certain point in issue 
or is vague.”82 
 
 The Global Rules provide “a general rule as to the law by which insolvency proceedings and their 
effects are to be governed” followed by a number of rules continuing exceptions to that general rule in 
certain defined situations.83 The reporters specifically endorse three EIR exceptions to the ‘global’ 
application of the lex concursus in respect of third parties’ rights in rem, set-off and detrimental acts.84  
 
 It is to be noted however that the Global Rules rely upon the Global Principles for Co-operation in 
International Insolvency Cases and its Principle 13 allocating “International Jurisdiction” to open an 
insolvency case in respect of a debtor when “the debtor’s centre of main interests is situated within the 
state’s territory”.85 Global Rule 1 on Scope states that the Global Rules “apply to insolvency proceedings 
that are opened in a state which has jurisdiction for that purpose according to Global Principle 13.” 
 
 Thus, in order to achieve a consistent outcome in cross-border insolvencies, a uniform choice of law 
approach is inextricably linked with uniformity in choice of forum, that is, agreement upon the allocation 
of jurisdiction to a primary or other insolvency proceeding.86  
 
 It may also be observed that the choice of law rules identified in the Global Rules do not represent the 
only, or most recent, attempt to identify a set of choice of law rules. Despite differences in approach, there 
is considerable agreement that the law of the COMI should govern most issues. It is, perhaps, the 
identification of the issues that ought be governed by the law of a different jurisdiction that would benefit 
from an attempt to achieve consensus within the international legal community. As such, Professor Charles 
Mooney presents an illuminating alternative approach.87 
 
 If consensus can be achieved regarding the identification of choice of law rules, followed by their 
international adoption, it is suggested that the risk of inconsistent judgments will largely be avoided. Such 
rules, if binding in the relevant states, should produce a unique identification of the law to govern the 
__________________ 
provisions of the ALI Principles of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (ALI-NAFTA Principles) and the 
annexed Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communication in Cross-border Cases (ALI-NAFTA 
Guidelines) may, with certain necessary modifications, be acceptable for use by jurisdictions across the world.  
82 Fletcher I F and Wessels B, “Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in International 
Insolvency Cases” (Report, The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, 30 March 
2012) p. 20. They also state “the main goal [of the Global Rules] is to demonstrate that globally there is a wide 
measure of support for the enactments of rules of this nature, based on the given principle to avoid 
miscommunication, to prevent uncertainty, to provide accurate translation, and to ensure smooth cross-border 
co-operation.” 
83  Fletcher I F and Wessels B, “Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in International 
Insolvency Cases” (Report, The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, 30 March 
2012) p. 201. 
84  That is Articles 5, 6 and 13 (EIR 2000); Articles 8, 9 and 16 (EIR Recast 2015).  
85  Global Principle 13(1). It also provides for international jurisdiction where “the debtor has an establishment 
within that state’s territory” however its effects are limited to the assets within the state in question. Global 
Principle 13(3) defines “center of main interests” (with rebuttable presumptions) and “establishment”.  
86  As the current Working Group V project on facilitating the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise 
groups indicates, this is complicated further for international business enterprises, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
applying to single debtors (e.g. a corporate entity).  
87  Charles Mooney Jr, “Harmonising Choice-of-Law Rules for International Insolvency Cases: Virtual Territoriality, 
Virtual Universalism, and the problem of local interests” (2014) 9 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and 
Commercial Law 129. 
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adjudication of the dispute. However, there are, at least two areas where this conclusion may not necessarily 
follow.  
 
 The first is that if such rules do not also include the selection of a unique forum for the resolution of 
the dispute, there is no guarantee that the dispute, if it advances in parallel in two jurisdictions, will achieve 
the same outcome even though both jurisdictions apply the same substantive law.88 To address this risk, the 
choice of law rules should also include within those rules a binding choice of forum which, in the authors’ 
view, should be the forum whose substantive law is to govern the dispute. 
 
 Secondly, in a group context, of which Nortel provides an illustration, the competing claimants were 
different group companies with different COMIs, adding an additional layer of complexity to the application 
of choice of law rules. Perhaps any identification of choice of law rules should include within those rules 
some principles for similarly determining the selection of governing law in a group dispute context (as well 
as the selection of the forum for determining such a dispute). 
 
Is there a role for an international commercial court? 
 
 The existence of uniform choice of law rules does not eliminate the risk of inconsistency if litigation 
is commenced in two states. The risk of inconsistency will only be avoided where, by reference to the rules, 
one of the courts stays its own proceedings. 
 
 The application by both courts of the same choice of law rules does not avoid the risk of different 
outcomes on choice of law and choice of forum, for a number of reasons. First, the rules are fact dependent, 
and each court will decide the issues on the basis of the evidence placed before that court.89 Secondly, just 
as different judges in a single jurisdiction may come to different conclusions on agreed facts, so too may 
the two judges in the different states come to different decisions despite the agreed facts. 
 
 It might be thought that the risk of conflicting decisions on the threshold issue of applying the choice 
of law rules is small. In a statistical sense, this may well be so. However, at a practical level, it is complexity 
that is perhaps most likely to lead to different decisions on the threshold choice of law and forum issues. It 
is this same complexity that is likely to render it imperative, in a policy sense, that such inconsistency not 
lead to the delayed resolution of the substantive dispute.  
 
 Could there be a role here for an International Commercial Court (ICC)? The threshold observation to 
make is that it is not proposed by the authors that the substantive dispute be resolved by an ICC. It is the 
courts of the state identified by the choice of forum rules that ought resolve the dispute in the authors’ view, 
the forum whose substantive law will govern the dispute. The problem identified in this paper arises where 
there is a dispute as to the identity of that state. It is here where an ICC can be deployed as the independent 
tribunal to authoritatively determine at an early stage this preliminary but fundamental issue. 
 
 A decision of an ICC, comprised of international judges with an insolvency speciality from 
independent jurisdictions, is an option that enables a respected and authoritative outcome to the threshold 
issue. This, in turn, would avoid the prospect of lengthy delays before the substantive litigation can be 
pursued to resolution. By authoritatively selecting a single jurisdiction, it eliminates the risk of inconsistent 
decisions. The solution has the advantage of speed, and the number of presiding judges selected to 
determine the issue could reflect the monetary size of the issue, its legal complexity or its importance. Speed 
could, for example, be enhanced by appointing a 3 or 5 member bench in lieu of an entitlement to appeal.  
 
__________________ 
88  Two judges applying the same law in complex or legally difficult matters frequently reach different conclusions. 
By way of example, of the 9 English judges who were called on to decide the HIH matter — trial judge, three 
Courts of Appeal judges and a five member House of Lords panel — 5 judges held that the English assets should 
be remitted to Australia, whilst 4 judges held that they should not.  
89  A joint hearing may at least remove the risk of inconsistent evidence leading to conflicting decisions.  
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Conclusion  
 
 In summary, the risk of inconsistent judgments from different jurisdictions is a challenging issue to be 
faced by the debtor, creditors and other parties in a cross-border insolvency. It can produce substantial 
delays, and may result in sub-optimal outcomes.  
 
 A number of ways in which this issue may be approached have been outlined, providing examples of 
multilateral efforts in recent decades to explore these approaches in practice. The list comprises uniform 
(or harmonised) insolvency laws, uniform recognition laws, the growing practice around cross-border 
insolvency agreements, and the adoption of uniform choice of law rules (inextricably linked with issues 
around choice of forum).  
 
 The authors consider that the risk of inconsistent decisions is problematic, and that the existing means 
for managing the issue, through “judicial restraint” and multilateral efforts to date, do not provide a 
comprehensive solution. The only way the risk of inconsistent decisions can be avoided is by ensuring there 
are no multi-state proceedings in respect of the same dispute. Considerable academic work has already been 
undertaken exploring the option for a comprehensive set of choice of law principles to select, in relation to 
any dispute with an international element, the law to govern that dispute. The authors’ view is that choice 
of forum, that is the selection of a single forum, is also a critical part of this solution, and that there may be 
merit in those rules including a referral to an ICC to address at an early stage any attempt to advance the 
issue in multiple states. 
 
 The authors raise for consideration whether UNCITRAL WGV should explore the achievement of 
international legal consensus on these issues. 
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Cross-border Insolvency and its Threat to International Trade:  
Proposal for a Comprehensive UNCITRAL solution  
 
Maisie Ooi, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, People’s Republic of China  
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Legal uncertainties that follow from transnational corporate collapses are a major obstacle to the 
advancement of international trade. Participants cannot predict with certainty the insolvency law(s) that 
may be applied, and provide for such eventuality. The problem is particularly acute given deep-seated 
jurisdictional differences in insolvency laws. Attempts at regional and international harmonisation have not 
to-date found completely viable solutions. 
 
 This paper makes the proposition that a viable solution lies in the recognition of the right of companies 
to select and register (at their inception) the applicable insolvency law. Most jurisdictions today recognize 
and give effect to the law selected for the company’s creation and being. The proposal is an extension of 
this to the selection of the law by which the company ‘dies,’ and is supported by the same reasons — it 
provides certainty that is critical to the facilitation of international trade. 
 
 The paper will suggest a convention sponsored by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law or UNCITRAL (hereinafter referred to as the “proposed Convention”) that will make the 
proposal law, with companies having the option of selecting from the national insolvency laws of the 
jurisdiction of incorporation or the company’s centre of main interest (hereinafter referred to as the 
“COMI”) or a proposed UNCITRAL Insolvency Law (hereinafter referred to as the “UNCITRAL 
Insolvency Law”). These will complement and supplement the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997) (hereinafter referred to as the “UNCITRAL Model Law”). Together they should provide 
a viable and comprehensive solution to a seemingly intractable problem that is threatening the advancement 
of international trade. 
 
B. The problem of cross border insolvency 
 
 The difficulty with most insolvencies these days is that they are not contained within one jurisdiction. 
In the distant past where companies had their operations, assets and debts within the jurisdiction where they 
were incorporated, it was completely logical and within the expectations of their creditors that they would 
be wound up by the laws of that jurisdiction. The rule that the law that creates is that which can “uncreate” 
remains the conflicts rule of most jurisdictions today. 
 
 Increasingly however companies operate, have their assets and creditors in several countries beyond 
their jurisdiction of incorporation. Many jurisdictions have responded to this by legislating to confer on 
their courts the right to wind up foreign companies. Potentially proceedings to wind up the company may 
be opened in all the jurisdictions in which the company has some connection.  
 
 Jurisdictions are wont to exercise jurisdiction on increasingly thin connection resulting in proliferation 
of insolvency proceedings. The concern with multiplicity of proceedings has mostly been with larger costs 
and smaller returns, not inevitable but common, and the problem of recognition and enforcement of orders 
by courts that are not of the jurisdiction of incorporation. These have been addressed with considerable 
success by the UNCITRAL Model Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation.1 
 
 There is however another seemingly intractable problem that affects more directly advancements in 
international trade. Multiplicity of proceedings almost invariably means a multiplicity of insolvency laws 
since courts mostly apply the lex fori (law of the forum) for insolvency matters. This stands in the way of 
ex ante predictability for creditors as to the applicable insolvency law that is critical to the pricing of risk, 
and provision against it. The consequence of this is often increased cost of capital for the debtor.  
__________________ 
1  Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings.  
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 That is the problem of conflict of laws that remains to be addressed in a viable way, and which this 
paper seeks to suggest a solution for. 
 
C. Existing instruments dealing with cross border insolvency 
 
 Efforts have been made at international, regional and domestic2 levels to address the cross border 
issues most of which are focused on recognition and cooperation. Amongst them the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation have had the greatest impact. The former is a non-binding 
international initiative by UNCITRAL which allows for free divergence by those adopting it, whilst the 
latter is binding legislation of the EU Member States, with limited divergence permitted. Both implement 
a system of modified universalism.3  
 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law facilitates the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings by 
mandating and encouraging cooperation and coordination to varying degrees depending on whether the 
proceedings are “main” or “non-main”. It does not deal with the conflicts issues of jurisdiction and 
applicable law but is predicated upon jurisdiction to open main insolvency proceedings being with the 
COMI of the company, 4 and non-main proceedings where the company has an establishment.5 It does not, 
whether directly or indirectly, provide for the law applicable to the proceedings.  
 
 The EU Insolvency Regulation legislated for both jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings and the 
law applicable thereto. For the Member States of the European Union, jurisdiction to open main proceedings 
is vested in the courts of the COMI as defined in the recast of 20 May 2015. 6 Secondary proceedings are 
permitted where the debtor possesses an establishment7, restricted to the assets located in those jurisdictions. 
The applicable law is the lex concursus or lex fori, being the insolvency laws of the COMI or the particular 
secondary proceedings as the case maybe. 8 
 
 It may be thought that extending the EU Insolvency Regulation’s treatment of the conflicts issues 
outside of the European Union will resolve the problem for the rest of the world. The following section will 
demonstrate why it will not provide a completely viable solution. 
 
 
__________________ 
2  There are national laws that deal with insolvencies with cross border elements and bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between nations to moderate cross border insolvencies, see Ian Fletcher, Insolvency in Private 
International Law (2nd edn), chapts 5-8. These are specific to the contracting parties and or of limited application 
and are not considered here. 
3  This is not totally uncontroverted. Franken, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis” 92014) 34(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97, at p116 suggested that the Model Law essentially 
offers a cooperative territorial approach to cross border insolvency law. LoPucki, “Universalism Unravels” 
(2005) 79(1) American Bankruptcy Law Journal 143, p. 166 on the other hand suggested that it is a form of 
backdoor universalism. The EU Insolvency Regulation has been said to embody a modified version of 
territorialism: Horst Eidenmuller, “Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in Europe” European 
Business Organization Law Review (2005) 423, at p. 433.  
4  There is a rebuttable presumption that the COMI and place of incorporation are the same, art 16(3).  
5  See for example art 17 (2). 
6  Regulation(EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast). Unless stated to the contrary, references in this paper will be to the provisions under the 
2015 EU Insolvency Regulation recast much of which will come into force on 26 June 2017.  
7  Art 3(2): Courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings against that 
debtor only if it possesses an establishment within the territory of that other Member State. Art 2 defines 
‘establishment’ to mean any place of operations where a debtor carries out or has carried out in the 3-month 
period prior to the request to open main insolvency proceedings a non-transitory economic activity with human 
means and assets. 
8  Art 7(1): Save as otherwise provided in this Regulation, the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their 
effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are opened… See also 
Recital 66. It is commonly thought or assumed that in an insolvency context the choice of law should follow 
from the choice of forum. Se for e.g., Rasmussen, “A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies” 19 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. (1997)1, at p. 33. 
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D. Predictability under the EU Insolvency Regulation 
 
 The EU Insolvency Regulation’s treatment of the applicable insolvency law is deceptively simple. It 
is the law of the jurisdiction where insolvency proceedings, whether main or secondary, have been opened, 
or the lex consursus.9 At first blush the approach is very attractive. The forum of the proceedings should 
have no difficulty identifying the law, or applying it, as it is also the lex fori or the law of the forum. 
 
 The difficulty with legislating for the lex consursus is that the law is only identifiable when the forum 
for insolvency proceedings is established. Whilst the EU Insolvency Regulation points to where these 
should be, they are not always readily identifiable, particularly in advance of the proceedings. This is 
notwithstanding the definition of COMI under the recast.  
 
 The recast has legislated that “The centre of main interests shall be the place where the debtor conducts 
the administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties.”10 Recital 
28 states that special consideration should be given to the perception of creditors.  
 
 Where the debtor has its operations, assets and creditors in a number of jurisdictions it is unclear by 
which creditor(s) assessment ascertainability is to be made. What is ascertainable is often dependant on 
where the creditor is. Many companies these days operate through the internet. The COMI of these 
companies would be inscrutable to third parties. Ironically the qualification intended to enhance 
predictability may potentially make the COMI, and hence the applicable law of the main proceedings less 
predictable. 
 
 As and when secondary proceedings are opened, their laws will substitute for the law of the COMI in 
relation to assets within their territory. Since these secondary proceedings cannot be determined in advance 
creditors would need to inform themselves ex ante of the insolvency laws of every jurisdiction where the 
debtor has an establishment which may potentially be the venue of secondary proceedings in order to price 
the risk. The alternative would be to assess the risk on the basis that they would open secondary proceedings 
in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
 Whilst the EU Insolvency Regulation has gone a long way in regulating cross border insolvencies for 
its Member States, predictability of the applicable law remains problematic, even with the improvements 
of the recast. It does not provide the ideal blueprint for a global solution to a more predictable applicable 
law. 
 
E. Predictability with a choice regime 
 
 Ex ante predictability, it will be demonstrated, is better achieved by allowing companies to select the 
applicable insolvency law. The company designates at its inception the insolvency law that will apply in 
the event it subsequently becomes insolvent. This is the choice by which it is bound, and it is a choice that 
is made public in its constitution (and the registry of its incorporation). The company’s insolvency law, like 
the law of its incorporation, will then be certain and readily ascertainable in advance by those dealing with 
the company.  
 
 The proposal is not as radical as it may appear at first blush to be. Most jurisdictions today recognize 
and give effect to the law selected for the company’s creation and being. The proposal is but an extension 
of that to the selection of the law by which the company ‘dies.’ 
 
__________________ 
9  With limited exceptions for in rem rights and employment contracts. 
10  Article 3(1). These are also the principal elements of COMI suggested by the Revised UNCITRAL Model Law 
Enactment Guide.  
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 There are however greater social implications to the choice of insolvency law than that of 
incorporation. This is why the proposal does not advocate complete freedom of selection (as proponents of 
the free choice regime have mostly suggested)11 but a choice from amongst the following three laws: 
 
1. The insolvency law of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
 
2. The COMI’s insolvency law 
 
3. The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law 
 
 The first and second of these are not controversial options. The jurisdiction of incorporation and COMI 
are widely regarded as the jurisdictions whose insolvency laws should apply. The third provides a neutral 
law specifically tailored to address cross border insolvency issues. It is envisaged that the UNCITRAL 
Insolvency Law will reflect an acceptable balance between the pro-creditor and pro-debtor approaches.  
 
 A more conservative approach would perhaps omit the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law but the writer 
sees value in its inclusion. This will allow companies to choose a better conceived insolvency law tailored 
specifically to deal with cross border insolvencies which may potentially encourage national lawmakers to 
model their insolvency laws after it.  
 
 Conversely it is possible to provide choices of more than the three. For group enterprises this could 
include the insolvency laws of the holding company’s jurisdiction of incorporation or COMI. This will 
enable group companies to align the applicable insolvency regime with the group’s organization structure 
and operations. The choice should nevertheless be made separately for each company within the group.  
 
 The extent of the selection menu can be finalised after consultation to gauge what is acceptable to 
stakeholders. Consideration should also be made for a default choice where none is specified. This, it is 
suggested, should be the insolvency laws of the COMI for EU Member States and that of the jurisdiction 
of incorporation for others. 
 
 The considerations for making these laws available to companies for selection are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
F. Insolvency law of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
 
 The insolvency law of the jurisdiction of incorporation is inherently appropriate to the winding up of 
the insolvent company. The company, being a legal person, is created by the law of its incorporation and it 
is that law that can remove its existence or ‘uncreate’ it.  
 
 There are also reasons why it is a viable choice for ex ante predictability. The jurisdiction of 
incorporation is ascertainable, most importantly, in advance. It is almost always a single jurisdiction and 
consequently selects a single insolvency law. Multiple incorporations and re-incorporations are rare. If the 
jurisdiction of incorporation is selected which subsequently moves to another this is a process normally 
allowed with adequate publicity and consideration of affected creditors. In the case of multiple jurisdictions 
of incorporation (which is very rare), the company will select the one whose insolvency laws will apply. 
 
 The insolvency laws of the place of incorporation is an appropriate law even for Delaware-type 
companies where the company’s assets and business are outside the jurisdiction of incorporation. Strictly 
__________________ 
11  The freedom of choice of insolvency regime is not in itself new. Various models of free choice have been 
suggested by their proponents who have advanced it as a rival principle to universalism and territorialism. The 
free choice approaches vary from complete/unrestrained freedom to write bankruptcy contracts or select 
bankruptcy systems to the choice of forum to choice between having either one or multiple insolve ncy 
proceedings. See for example Rasmussen “A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies” 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
(1997) 1; E Warren, “Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World “ 92 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1994) 336, pp. 385-
386 and Alan Schwartz, “Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed” (1999) Yale Law Journal Vol 109, 343. 
  
236 
the jurisdiction of incorporation alone has the law that is able to wind up the company (as opposed to merely 
liquidating its assets). This is regardless of where the company’s assets and business are. 
 
 It may of course be more efficient for the insolvency proceedings of Delaware-type companies to be 
opened where the assets and business are, as the English court thought in Re Harrods.12 The company, under 
the proposal, has the option to select the COMI’s insolvency law instead or indeed the UNCITRAL 
Insolvency Law. But if it does select the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation there is no reason for 
creditors to complain, having chosen to deal with a company created under those laws.  
 
G. COMI’s insolvency law 
 
 The COMI’s insolvency law should be an available option as the COMI is that vested with jurisdiction 
under the EU Insolvency Regulation, and the UNCITRAL Model Law’s approach is predicated upon that. 
Its omission would effectively mean the exclusion of EU Member States’ participation in the proposed 
Convention. Conversely its inclusion allows EU Member States to participate in the proposed Convention 
beyond the regional legislation and without compromising its policies.  
 
 The proposed Convention’s definition of COMI should be aligned to that under the recast of the EU 
Insolvency Regulation to facilitate participation by EU Member States. Companies that have their COMI 
within the EU are effectively limited in their selection to the insolvency law of the COMI. This can be 
achieved by allowing the ratification of the proposed Convention subject to the condition that it shall apply 
to EU Member States only where the COMI’s insolvency law is selected. Creditors are not prejudiced since 
it is the EU COMI’s insolvency laws that will apply under the EU Insolvency Regulation. 
 
 Whether there should additionally be a right to state a group COMI to supplement group coordinated 
proceedings introduced by the EU Insolvency Regulation recast 13is a matter for further consideration. In 
group enterprises where the operations of the subsidiaries are fully integrated with the holding company’s 
the COMI may well lie with the holding company, but this may not be the case where the entities within 
the group have independent businesses. These matters are not readily ascertainable by third parties, and is 
better left to the group enterprise to determine and declare.14 
 
 The application of the same law to the insolvency of related companies of the group would go some 
way to address the insolvency problem of group enterprises. It will enable proceedings with respect to 
companies belonging to the same group to be conducted under the same set of insolvency laws and rules. 
This is likely to lead to more efficient outcomes where the group’s organizational structure and operations 
are integrated. 
 
H. The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law 
 
 The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law will provide a modern, coherent and comprehensive cross border 
insolvency regime that is well suited to dealing with the consequences and complexities of cross border 
insolvencies. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law would be a good reference for the 
crafting of the Law, with adjustments tailored to address more specifically the cross border issues.  
 
__________________ 
12  when it sent an English company to be wound up in Argentina where it had all its assets and business: Re Harrods 
(Buenos Aires) Ltd [1992] Ch 72 
13  Chapter 5. 
14  Enterprise groups are an increasingly common business vehicle. Since the companies within the group are 
connected in some way, the collapse of one would frequently lead to the insolvency of others within the group, 
and we have witnessed many of these in the last decade. Much of the efforts relating to the treatment of companies 
in insolvency however deal with the single corporate entity, or do not properly distinguish the insolvency of a 
single corporate entity from the insolvency problems of a group enterprise. They do not specify  whether the 
COMI is determined for each company within the group, for the group enterprise as a whole, or the insolvent 
companies within the group. 
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 The company’s choice of this Law would mean that there is no connection whether by assets, 
establishment or law but this is not a problem. Since the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law is not the law of any 
particular jurisdiction it in fact allows the insolvency proceedings to be opened unhindered in the 
jurisdictions where it would be efficient to do so. These may well be those traditionally thought to be the 
jurisdictions of the main and secondary proceedings. 
 
 If the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law proves to be a popular choice this would send positive signals to 
national lawmakers to model their insolvency laws after it. This will lead to greater convergence of 
insolvency laws and their underlying policies. 
 
I. Mechanism and timing for choice 
 
 The choice would be made at incorporation and reflected in the constitution of the company. The 
COMI should be identified if its insolvency law is selected to provide clarity and transparency. The publicly 
declared COMI should satisfy the requirement of the EU Regulation recast that the centre of administration 
be ascertainable by third parties. 
 
 The timing of the choice (at incorporation) when the interests of the company are aligned to those of 
its creditors and investors will ensure that the choice is not made to prejudice them. 15 It also reduces risk 
shifting to involuntary and small or less sophisticated creditors. The risk of manipulative conduct is in any 
event small given the limited choices of applicable insolvency laws. 
 
J. Alteration of choice 
 
 Companies should be bound by their choice of the insolvency law of the jurisdiction of incorporation 
or COMI or the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law. To allow switches from one category to another would be to 
reintroduce uncertainty. Alterations, if they are to be permitted at all, should be limited to changes to the 
company’s jurisdiction of incorporation (e.g. by way of reincorporation of companies and/or mergers and 
amalgamations) and COMI. It follows from this that the selection of the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law 
cannot be changed, nor the law of the COMI or jurisdiction of incorporation without an actual change to 
those places.  
 
 Entrenching choices provide for greater certainty but clearly exceptions can and should be made as 
thought appropriate. Mechanisms will have to be put in place to safeguard against opportunistic changes 
such as changes on the eve of insolvency. It may be that processes involved in re-incorporations already 
provide sufficient protection.  
 
K. Jurisdiction for opening of insolvency proceedings 
 
 The selection of the applicable law brings with it a preference for the jurisdiction of the applicable 
law, and their courts to have conduct of the insolvency proceedings. That would in most part be the most 
efficient. The proposal does not however make this a requirement. Secondary proceedings may be opened 
in jurisdictions where assets are located which are not the jurisdiction whose law is applicable to the 
insolvency proceedings. Where the company (or its group) has assets and businesses in diverse jurisdictions 
secondary proceedings would facilitate a speedier and less costly administration.  
 
 The main proceedings have universal scope, and encompass for purposes of distribution, all the 
debtor’s assets, including those remitted from secondary proceedings. The administration of the secondary 
proceedings is limited to the collection of assets of the debtor within that jurisdiction and to their remittance 
to the liquidator of the main proceedings.  
 
__________________ 
15  Indeed, because they need to attract capital and other sources of funds, they are more likely to make ch oices that 
offer better protection to creditors and investors. The deterrence against companies choosing overly debtor -
protective insolvency laws would be the higher cost of capital and credit.  
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 As the role of the secondary proceedings is limited, arguments that courts are best equipped to apply 
the insolvency laws of their own jurisdiction should not stand in the way of the proposal. The separate 
insolvency proceedings are merely mechanisms for the more convenient collection of assets which are then 
remitted to the liquidator in the main proceedings.16 Having the assets administered separately this way will 
not raise the spectre of inefficient deployment of those assets. 
 
 To achieve a pari passu distribution between all of the debtor’s creditors worldwide it is necessary for 
the pooling of all its assets wherever located and for distribution to be declared out of that pool and by the 
same set of rules.17 This may however result in some creditors losing their preferential status or ranking 
lower because of differences in distribution rules.18 If there is a strong preference for distributive choices 
of local laws, then consideration may be made to make an exception for them so that the liquidators of local 
secondary proceedings can pay off preferential debts before remitting the remaining assets to the 
jurisdiction of the main proceedings.19  
 
 The application of a single insolvency law to the main and secondary proceedings will remove an 
incentive to open proceedings outside of the main to take advantage of another insolvency law. This 
disincentive against forum shopping should consequently reduce the number of secondary proceedings to 
those that would actually facilitate distribution of assets within their jurisdiction.  
 
 The court competent for the main insolvency proceedings should be able to order provisional and 
protective measures under the applicable law covering assets situated anywhere. Whether it should 
additionally be possible for the liquidator to apply for the preservation measures under the law of the 
jurisdictions of the secondary proceedings is a matter for further consideration.  
 
L. Addressing objections to a choice regime 
 
 The free choice regime in all the manifestations suggested by their proponents remains very much in 
the shadows of the more established universalism and territorialism. It has not been seriously considered as 
providing a viable alternative to universalism and territorialism. On the contrary it has been called a radical 
proposal with close to no political implementation chances.20 
 
 Objections to the free choice regime centre on the company choosing a law detrimental to its creditors. 
The company, it is said, is likely to select a law that is pro-debtor to the detriment of all creditors. A variant 
of this objection points to a choice detrimental to tort victims specifically. Tort victims are said to be 
particularly vulnerable as they suffer the risks without the benefits. Since involuntary creditors do not 
choose their debtors the ability to predict the applicable law is not seen to be an advantage. Proponents of 
the free choice regime have responded to these criticisms with suggestions of either special treatment for 
tort victims or excepting them from the chosen law.21 
 
 Restricting choice in the way of the proposal should largely address any risk of manipulative conduct 
whether detrimental to all creditors or just tort victims. As the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation and 
COMI are those most likely to apply in the company’s insolvency the selection of either should not provide 
__________________ 
16  This is essentially a universalism approach.  
17  Which is what the common law envisages to be the function of ancillary proceedings. See Re Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213. 
18  The reverse could also occur. 
19  Efforts aimed at universalist regimes have largely failed because of differences in distribution rules particularly 
if they affect priority rights to taxes. 
20  Horst Eidenmuller, “Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in Europe” European Business 
Organization Law Review (2005) 423, at pp. 433, 441-442. 
21  See Rasmussen, “A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies” 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. (1997)1, at pp. 34-35 
where he made the proposition in relation to the choice of forum that “weak “creditors receive at least the same 
treatment that they would have at their home jurisdiction. See also the arguments against that in Horst 
Eidenmuller, “Free Choice in International Company Insolvency Law in Europe” European Business 
Organization Law Review (2005) 423, at p. 437.  
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an advantage to the debtor. The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law is intended to be neutral in its approach and 
should not tilt the balance either way. 
 
 Special treatment for tort victims whether by way of exception to the applicable law or something else 
is therefore unnecessary. To accord special treatment may conversely give them an advantage that they do 
not currently have. 
 
 The writer’s proposal may in fact reduce manipulative conduct since the company is bound by its 
selection. Currently debtors are able to make eve-of -insolvency manoeuvres to change the applicable law. 
 
M. Proposal implementation 
 
 This paper has set out the basic framework and principal considerations of the writer’s proposal. 
Clearly more than these have to be considered for its actual implementation. Aside from the issues already 
considered, and those flagged for further consideration, there will also be a need to decide inter alia on the 
type of insolvency proceedings to be covered,22 the scope and application of the selected law23 and its 
application to existing companies.24  
 
 It is critical to the proposal’s viability that it be adopted widely. To ensure that the proposal will 
facilitate and not exclude participation of the EU Member States the proposal has included the COMI’s law 
as an option and aligned the COMI to that of the EU COMI as defined in the 2015 recast of the EU 
Insolvency Regulation. There will be a need to comb through the EU Insolvency Regulation and 2015 recast 
thoroughly to identify any potential conflicts that should be dealt with before the proposal is made 
definitive.  
 
 This paper has suggested that the proposal be implemented by a convention sponsored by UNCITRAL. 
The proposal requires complete uniformity of treatment of the conflicts rule and reciprocity amongst 
contracting states, and this is only achievable by a binding instrument. Whilst the UNCITRAL Model Law 
has achieved a high degree of international uniformity in the jurisdictions where it has been implemented 
it has not been complete uniformity.  
 
 Thus far UNCITRAL’s efforts in relation to cross border insolvency have been by non-binding 
instruments in recognition of the fact that nations are unlikely to commit to a binding regime because of 
deeply held divergences in their insolvency laws. The proposal does not require changes to national 
insolvency laws or reflect a preference for any of them. This should increase acceptability of the proposal 
and its implementation by binding instrument since it does not involve resolving differences between them. 
25  
 
__________________ 
22  The UNCITRAL Model Law applies to collective insolvency proceedings whose purpose is the reorganization 
or liquidation of the debtor, and where the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to court control or 
supervision, see art 2(a). The EU Insolvency Regulation’s scope is wider under the recast, covering rescue, 
adjustment of debt, reorganization and liquidation: see art 1. In principle the proposal is capable of the wider 
application but its scope has of course to take into account what is acceptable to most jurisdictions.  
23  Should it govern every aspect of the debtor’s affairs, or should its application be restricted to matters usually 
regulated by insolvency laws such as administration of the assets, priority ranking among creditors, stay of 
enforcement rights, and clawbacks (avoidance)? Should exceptions be made for in rem rights and employment 
contracts, as have been made by the EU Insolvency Regulation? There’s also the related question of whether 
criminal sanctions should be confined to that of the chosen law.  
24  Since the applicable insolvency law is selected at the company’s incorporation this will effectively exclude 
existing companies unless a mechanism for selection is made for them specifically. The writer ’s preference is to 
confine the choice regime to new companies as a choice mid-life will interfere with expectations of creditors and 
investors of the company. Whilst it may well be possible to craft Convention rules to provide against abuses the 
treatment of it will be complex. It is also anticipated that this will give rise to objections on policy grounds that 
will make the proposed Convention less attractive to stakeholders.  
25  There is little prospect of reaching agreement on resolving differences between national insolvency laws. The 
divergences are too extensive and deep-seated. 
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 The proposal recognizes the centrality of cross border cooperation. Liquidators of the main and 
secondary proceedings should observe proper cooperation in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. These could be incorporated into the proposed Convention directly or by 
reference. 
 
 The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law will provide a non-national insolvency law option specifically 
tailored for cross border insolvencies that is modern, coherent and comprehensive, and balanced as to the 
protection of creditor and debtor.26 The text of the UNCITRAL Insolvency Law will be appended to the 
proposed Convention, and companies will be able to select it as their applicable insolvency law.  
 
 The UNCITRAL Insolvency Law may potentially influence the shape and content of national 
insolvency laws. If it is widely selected it will create an incentive for national lawmakers to model their 
insolvency laws after it, or at least some of its rules. This will pave the way to greater convergence in 
insolvency laws and their underlying policies.  
 
 The proposed Convention is not intended to supersede but to complement and supplement existing 
efforts of UNCITRAL and the 2015 recast of the EU Insolvency Regulation. Together they should provide 
a viable and comprehensive solution to the seemingly intractable problem of cross border insolvencies that 
is threatening the advancement of international trade. 
 
 
 
  
__________________ 
26  The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law will provide a reference for the drafting of the 
UNCITRAL Insolvency Law with adjustments to address the consequences of cross border insolvencies.  
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Reflexiones sobre la unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado aplicables a 
los procedimientos de insolvencia transfronteriza 
 
Ángel María Ballesteros Barros, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, Spain; Unión Internacional de 
Abogados  
 
Introducción 
 
1. La codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza refleja una tendencia hacia una 
progresiva armonización a través de la utilización de la técnica metodológica del soft law. Pese a 
que parte de la doctrina discute su valor normativo1, lo cierto es que el grado de flexibilidad que 
aporta el soft law permite alcanzar cierta uniformidad en la regulación de la insolvencia 
transfronteriza, no exenta de limitación debido al particularismo de los Estados y a la ausencia de 
carácter vinculante2. 
 
2. Desde la perspectiva del Derecho internacional privado, el presupuesto origen de este planteamiento 
cabe situarlo en la diversidad y pluralidad de ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales (tanto Derecho 
sustantivo como procesal) aplicables a la institución de la insolvencia, lo cual dificulta la 
elaboración de un “Derecho concursal internacional uniforme”3. No obstante, resulta imposible la 
regulación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado a través del soft law, siendo el tratado 
internacional la técnica metodológica perfecta para el proceso de unificación de las normas 
conflictuales. 
 
3. El objeto del presente estudio es analizar, en primer lugar, cuáles son los antecedentes e hitos más 
importantes en el proceso de codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza y cuál ha 
sido el papel que en este proceso ha desempeñado la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Derecho Mercantil Internacional (en adelante UNCITRAL) en el ámbito universal (cfr. epígrafe I 
infra). El autor propone de lege ferenda la elaboración de instrumentos vinculantes de ámbito 
universal para la unificación de las reglas que resuelvan el conflicto de leyes y de jurisdicción en el 
Derecho concursal internacional (cfr. epígrafe II infra). 
 
I. La codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza: armonización versus unificación. 
 
4. Analizaremos en primer lugar cuáles han sido los antecedentes históricos más importantes en el 
proceso de codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza (cfr. epígrafe A infra) y cuál 
ha sido el papel que en este proceso ha desempeñado UNCITRAL en el ámbito universal (cfr. 
epígrafe B infra). 
 
A) Antecedentes históricos en el proceso de codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza. 
 
5. Con independencia de la previa existencia de algunos tratados bilaterales o multilaterales que ya 
recogían disposiciones sobre la quiebra4, el primer intento de codificación de un texto en el ámbito 
universal en materia de insolvencia transfronteriza tuvo lugar con un proyecto de convención 
__________________ 
1  A. BOUVERESSE, “La portée normative de la soft law”, Revue du marché commun et de l’Union Européenne, 
núm. 588, 2015, pp. 291-298. 
2  J.C. FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, R. ARENAS GARCÍA y P. A. DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, Derecho de los negocios 
internacionales, Iustel, 3ª edición, Madrid, 2011, pp. 62-75. 
3  A. L. CALVO CARAVACA y J. CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ, Derecho concursal internacional, Colex, Madrid, 
2004, pp. 16-17. 
4  El primer tratado multilateral de ámbito regional que recoge normas sobre quiebras es el Tratado de Montevideo 
de Derecho Mercantil Internacional de 1889, posteriormente revisado en 1940. Sobre estos antecedentes, cfr. K. 
NADELMANN, “Bankrupty Treaties”, The University Pennsylvania Law Review , vol. 93, núm. 1, 1944. Cfr. 
traducción al castellano por H. PEREÑA DE MALAGÓN, Biblioteca Jurídica Virtual, Universidad Autónoma 
de Méjico, Tomo 10, núm. 37, 1948, pp. 105-149. 
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internacional de 1894 realizado en el seno de la II Conferencia de La Haya de Derecho internacional 
privado5. 
 
6. El proyecto vuelve a estar incluido en las agendas de la III y IV Conferencias de La Haya de 19006 
y 19047, retomándose de nuevo en los debates de la V Conferencia de La Haya de 1925, en la cual 
se elabora un proyecto de convención sobre la quiebra8. Este proyecto tiene influencia en los 
tratados bilaterales o multilaterales de ese periodo de entreguerras, como reflejan los textos del 
Tratado de Derecho internacional Privado de La Habana de 19289 y del Tratado Nórdico sobre 
quiebras de 7 de noviembre de 193310. 
 
7. En el marco del Consejo de Europa se adoptó el primer tratado multilateral en materia de 
insolvencia transfronteriza con el Convenio de Estambul de 5 de junio de 1990 sobre determinados 
aspectos de la quiebra internacional11. 
 
8. Sin embargo, en las Comunidades Europeas ya habían estado trabajando durante años para elaborar 
un convenio internacional en materia de insolvencia12, habiéndose preparado los Anteproyectos de 
197013, de 198014 y de 198415, que finalmente culminaron con la aprobación del Convenio de 
Bruselas de 23 de noviembre de 1995 relativo a los procedimientos de insolvencia16, acompañado 
del célebre Informe VIRGÓS / SCHMIT17. No obstante, este convenio comunitario nunca llegó a 
entrar en vigor. 
__________________ 
5  Actes de la Deuxième Conférence de La Haye de Droit International Privé , 1894, pp. 146-147. 
6  Actes de la Troisième Conférence de Droit International Privé , 1900, pp. 147-152. 
7  Actes de la Quatrième Conférence de Droit International Privé, 1904, pp. 222-223. 
8  Actes de la Cinquème Conférence de Droit International Privé , 1925, pp. 341-344. Cfr. M. O. HUDSON, “The 
progressive Codification of International Law”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, núm. 4, 1926, 
pp. 655-669; J. KOSTERS, “La Cinquième Conférence de Droit International Privé”, Revue de Droit 
International et de Législation Comparée, 1926, pp. 245-280. 
9  Este Tratado, conocido como Código Bustamante, fue adoptado en el marco de la VI Conferencia Pan-Americana. 
Contiene normas de conflicto relativas a la quiebra. 
10  Firmado entre Dinamarca, Finlandia, Noruega y Suecia. 
11 Sólo fue firmado por Bélgica, Francia, Alemania, Grecia, Italia, Luxemburgo, Turquía y Chipre, éste últi mo país 
el único en ratificarlo. El texto del Convenio de 1990 puede ser consultado en RCDIP, 1993, pp. 121 y ss. Sobre 
su análisis, P. VOLKEN, “L’harmonisation du droit international privé de la faillite”, RCADI, 1991-V, t. 230, pp. 
345-431; y M. OLIVENCIA RUIZ, “La evolución del Derecho de quiebra y el Consejo de Europa”, Liber 
amicorum. Colección de estudios jurídicos en homenaje al Profesor Pérez Montero , Universidad de Oviedo, 
1988, pp. 1047 y ss. 
12  Sobre esta evolución histórica, cfr. P. J. OMAR, “Genesis of the European Initiative in Insolvency Law”, 
International Insolvency Review, 2003, Vol. 12, pp. 147-170. 
13  El Anteproyecto de 1970 se componía de ochenta y dos artículos, dos Anexos y un Protocolo. El texto se puede 
consultar en K. LIPSTEIN (ed.), Harmonisation of Private International Law by the E.E.C ., Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, Londres, 1978, pp. 169 y ss. Sobre una presentación general de su contenido, cf. J.A. 
PASTOR RIDRUEJO, “La faillite en droit international privé”, RCADI, 1971-II, pp. 162 y ss. 
14  El Anteproyecto de 1980 se componía de ochenta y siete artículos, dos Anexos y un Protocolo, y fue publicado 
en el Boletín de las Comunidades Europeas, Suplemento 2/82. Sobre su contenido, cfr. I. F. FLETCHER, 
“Conflict of laws and European Community Law with special reference to the Community Conventions on 
Private International Law. The Draft Convention on Bankruptcy and related matters”, R. H. GRAVESON (ed.), 
Problems in Private International Law, North Holland, Amsterdam, Nueva York, Oxford, 1982, pp. 187-249. 
15  Este Anteproyecto de 1984 fue resultado de una revisión del anterior por un Grupo de trabajo ad hoc denominado 
Convention Faillite, reunido entre abril de 1982 y 29 de junio de 1984. Se introdujeron modificaciones en 
determinados artículos y se eliminó de forma definitiva la Ley Uniforme. El texto se publicó de forma restringida 
en Documento del Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas núm. 8759/84 DRS (CFC), y puede consulta rse en J. 
THIEME, Vorschläge und Gutachten zum Entwurf eines EG-Konkursübereinkommens, Tubinga, J. C. B. Mohr, 
1988, pp. 417 y ss. 
16  Sobre su contenido, cf. M. VIRGÓS SORIANO, “The 1995 European Community Convention on Insolvency 
Proceedings: an Insider’s View”, Forum internationale, núm. 25, Kluwer, La Haya, 1998. 
17  El texto del Convenio y del Informe pueden consultarse en M. VIRGÓS SORIANO y F. J. GARCIMARTÍN 
ALFÉREZ, Derecho procesal civil europeo, McGraw-Hill, Madrid, 1996, pp. 421 y ss., y también en Revista 
Española de Derecho Internacional, 1995, pp. 5050 y ss. 
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9. La comunitarización del Derecho internacional privado tras la entrada en vigor del Tratado de 
Ámsterdam posibilitó la elaboración del Reglamento (CE) nº 1346/2000, de 29 de mayo de 2000, 
sobre procedimientos de insolvencia (en adelante REI), el cual establece normas comunes para los 
procedimientos transfronterizos de insolvencia en los países de la Unión Europea18. 
 
10. El REI ha supuesto la unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado aplicables a los 
procedimientos de insolvencia transfronteriza abiertos en los Estados miembros, al establecer (i) 
criterios comunes para la determinación de los tribunales competentes para la apertura de un 
procedimiento de insolvencia; (ii) reglas para la determinación del ordenamiento aplicable al fondo 
del asunto; (iii) mecanismos de reconocimiento y ejecución de resoluciones judiciales en materia 
de insolvencia; y (iv) reglas de cooperación y coordinación procesal entre procedimientos paralelos 
de insolvencia19. 
 
11. No podemos inferir que el REI instaure un Derecho concursal comunitario uniforme20, pero debido 
a su efecto unificador, el instrumento comunitario incorpora algunas reglas de derecho sustantivo 
uniforme al establecer normas materiales especiales, tales como la presentación de los créditos por 
parte de acreedores de otros países (artículos 39 a 42 REI), sobre igualdad del trato en el pago a los 
acreedores (artículo 20 REI) o reglas para la coordinación de los representantes de la insolvencia 
en caso de procedimientos paralelos (artículo 31 REI)21. 
 
12. El REI ha sido modificado recientemente por el Reglamento (UE) nº 2015/848, de 20 de mayo22, 
que introduce modificaciones significativas en los procedimientos de insolvencia en Unión 
Europea, entre las que destacan la ampliación del ámbito de aplicación material, la introducción de 
reglas adicionales en la determinación de la competencia judicial internacional, se reforman los 
procedimientos secundarios y se incluye por vez primera el tratamiento de la insolvencia de 
sociedades pertenecientes a grupos multinacionales23. 
 
13. Esta tendencia hacia la unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado se observa 
también en otros ámbitos regionales como el Acte uniforme portant organisation des procédures 
collectives d’apurement du passif aprobada en el marco de la OHADA, inspirada en el REI24. 
 
14. Teniendo en cuenta los antecedentes de estos instrumentos, en gran medida elaborados en el marco 
de organizaciones internacionales de ámbito regional, cabe preguntarse el papel que ha desarrollado 
UNCITRAL en la codificación de la insolvencia transfronteriza. 
 
B) La labor de UNCITRAL en el proceso de codificación del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza 
en el ámbito universal. 
 
15. La Resolución 2102 (XX), de 20 de diciembre de 1965, de la Asamblea General de la ONU, que 
ordenó la creación de UNCITRAL25, señalaba en su Preámbulo que “los conflictos y divergencias 
que surgen de las leyes de los diversos Estados en materias relacionadas con el comercio 
internacional constituyen un obstáculo al desarrollo del comercio mundial”. Por ello, la Resolución 
2205 (XXI), de 17 de diciembre de 1966, de la Asamblea General de la ONU señaló que 
__________________ 
18  DOCE L 160 de 30.06.2000, pp. 1-18. Se aplica a los Estados miembros, a excepción de Dinamarca. 
19  F. CORDÓN MORENO, “La unificación del Derecho concursal en el ámbito de la Unión Europea: El Reglamento 
comunitario 1346/2000, de procedimientos de insolvencia”, Unión Europea Aranzadi, Vol. 30, núm. 3, 2003, pp. 
5-14. 
20  Así lo indica el propio Considerando nº 11 del Preámbulo del REI, al expresar que “el presente Reglamento 
acepta el hecho de que, para una amplia serie muy diferenciada de casos de derecho material, no resulta práctico 
un procedimiento único de insolvencia con validez universal para toda la Comunidad”. 
21  J.-L. VALLENS, L’insolvabilité des entreprises en droit comparé, Joly, París, 2011, p. 118. 
22  DO L 141 de 05.06.2015, pp. 19-72. Se aplicará a partir del 26 de junio de 2017.  
23  P.A. DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, “La evolución del régimen europeo sobre procedimientos de insolvencia”, La Ley 
Unión Europea, núm. 8592. 
24  J.-L. VALLENS, L’insolvabilité des entreprises en droit comparé, Joly, París, 2011, p. 138. 
25  Anuario de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional , 1970, vol. 1, p. 19. 
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UNCITRAL nacía con el objetivo de “promover la armonización y unificación progresivas del 
Derecho mercantil internacional”26. 
 
16. Entre las técnicas a utilizar para alcanzar esos fines, el Informe del Secretario General encargado 
por la citada Resolución 2102 (XX) expresaba que se podrían seguir dos técnicas complementarias: 
(i) la elaboración de normas de Derecho internacional privado (normas de conflicto), y (ii) la 
unificación y armonización progresivas de las leyes sustantivas (ley uniforme)27. 
 
17. No obstante la posibilidad de ambos instrumentos, hasta el momento UNCITRAL ha optado por la 
segunda de las opciones y, dentro de ella, por una preferencia del mecanismo de la armonización 
progresiva en detrimento de la unificación. Se ha descartado, por el momento, el uso de la técnica 
de las normas de Derecho internacional privado28. 
 
18. Con base en el objetivo de la armonización, UNCITRAL aprobó el 30 de mayo de 1997 la Ley 
Modelo sobre insolvencia transfronteriza y su Guía de incorporación29, objeto ésta última de una 
reciente actualización30. La Ley Modelo supuso el primer texto de ámbito universal que pretendía 
armonizar las legislaciones nacionales en materia de insolvencia en el tráfico externo31. 
 
19. Esta tendencia a la armonización frente a la unificación se vio confirmada con la elaboración de la 
Guía Legislativa sobre el régimen de la insolvencia, aprobada por UNCITRAL el 25 de junio de 
200432. Este texto de soft law tiene como finalidad informar y contribuir a la labor de reforma de 
los regímenes de la insolvencia sirviendo de texto referencia para las autoridades nacionales. 
 
20. Con posterioridad, UNCITRAL ha aprobado la Guía de prácticas sobre cooperación, comunicación 
y coordinación en procedimientos de insolvencia transfronteriza, con el objetivo de proponer 
__________________ 
26  Documentos Oficiales de la Asamblea General, vigésimo primer periodo de sesiones, Anexos, tema 88 del 
programa, documentos A/6396 y Add. 1 y 2; Anuario de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho 
Mercantil Internacional, 1970, vol. 1, pp. 68-70. 
27  Informe del Secretario General (“Estudio del Profesor Schmitthoff”), incluido en el documento A/6396. Anuario 
de la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas para el Derecho Mercantil Internacional , 1970, vol. 1, pp. 19-47, en 
especial pp. 22-23. 
28  Resulta paradigmática la intervención del representante de China en los trabajos preparatorios de la creación de 
la UNCITRAL: “si los países lograsen establecer reglas uniformes de derecho substantivo, desaparecería el 
interés de las reglas de derecho internacional privado (…) El proceso de codificación del derecho internacional 
privado y el de unificación del derecho privado están ambos destinados a favorecer el comercio internacional, 
siempre que estos dos procesos se desenvuelvan gradualmente y no persigan objetivos incompatibles ”. 
Documentos Oficiales de la Asamblea General, vigésimo periodo de sesiones, Sexta Comisión, 895ª sesión, 
párrafos 13 y 15. 
29  Sobre el contenido de la Ley Modelo, cfr. ESPLUGUES MOTA, C., “The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1997 Cross 
Border Insolvency: an Approach”, DCI, 1998, pp. 657 y ss.; FERNÁNDEZ DE LA GÁNDARA, L.,”La Ley 
Modelo de UNCITRAL: una guía legislativa sobre el régimen de la insolvencia”, Comentarios a la Ley 
Concursal, FERNÁNDEZ DE LA GÁNDARA, L., y SÁNCHEZ ÁLVAREZ, M. Mª (Coord.), Marcial Pons, 
Madrid, 2004, pp. 815 y ss. 
30  Texto aprobado por UNCITRAL en su 973ª sesión celebrada el 18 de julio de 2013. También se ha completado 
con el documento denominado “Ley Modelo sobre insolvencia transfronteriza: la perspectiva judicial”, aprobado 
el 1 de julio de 2011 para ayudar a los jueces en cuestiones que puedan surgir en el contexto de una solicitud de 
reconocimiento presentada con arreglo a la Ley Modelo sobre la Insolvencia Transfronteriza. Este texto ha sido 
actualizado de nuevo en 2013. 
31  En su Preámbulo, la Ley Modelo señala que su finalidad es “establecer mecanismos eficaces para la resolución 
de los casos de insolvencia transfronteriza con miras a promover el logro de (…) a) la cooperación entre los 
tribunales y demás autoridades competentes de este Estado y de los Estados extranjeros que hayan de intervenir 
en casos de insolvencia transfronteriza”. 
32  Sobre el contenido de la Guía Legislativa, cfr. D. MORÁN BOVIO (Coord.), Guía Legislativa de UNCITRAL 
sobre el Régimen de la Insolvencia, La Ley, Monografía 5/2006, Madrid, 2006. La Guía Legislativa sobre el 
régimen de la insolvencia, que tenía en su origen solo dos Partes, ha sido completada posteriormente añadiendo 
la Parte Tercera (Trato otorgable a los grupos de empresas en situaciones de insolvencia), aprobada el 18 de 
julio de 2010, y la Parte Cuarta (Obligaciones de los directores en el período cercano a la insolvencia ) aprobada 
el 18 de julio de 2013. 
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soluciones a los conflictos de jurisdicción y de autoridades que surgen en el tráfico externo en esta 
materia33. 
 
21. En la actualidad, UNCITRAL trabaja en un Proyecto de ley modelo sobre el reconocimiento y la 
ejecución de sentencias relacionadas con casos de insolvencia34, una vez más en uso de la técnica 
del soft law. 
 
22. Este importante desarrollo legislativo por parte de UNCITRAL elaborado a través de la técnica del 
soft law no pretende promover la unificación del Derecho sustantivo en materia de insolvencia, sino 
servir de inspiración al legislador nacional a la hora de regular esta institución en Derecho interno. 
El efecto de las leyes modelos es el de una armonización o unificación indirecta, puesto que las 
disposiciones modelos no serán incluidas en Derecho interno en el caso de que el legislador nacional 
adopte el texto propuesto como modelo, a diferencia del efecto directo de las leyes uniformes35. 
 
23. Cabe plantearse si el uso por UNCITRAL de instrumentos no vinculantes de soft law como la Ley 
Modelo y la Guía Legislativa ha podido tener como consecuencia un menor grado de armonización 
y unificación en el Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza. Lo cierto es que solo una parte 
minoritaria de países ha adoptado el contenido de la Ley Modelo en su legislación, reduciendo aún 
más el efecto de armonización o de unificación indirecta perseguido. Por todo ello, resulta legítimo 
preguntarse si un instrumento internacional de unificación conflictual sería posible en el ámbito 
universal, en lo que se refiere a las reglas de Derecho internacional privado que resuelven el 
conflicto de leyes y de jurisdicción que se plantea. 
 
II. La unificación conflictual en el ámbito universal del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza a 
través de un convenio internacional. 
 
24. Analizaremos en primer lugar cuáles han sido los antecedentes de la presente propuesta de 
unificación conflictual de la insolvencia transfronteriza a través de un convenio internacional (cfr. 
epígrafe A infra) y cuál podría ser su contenido material (cfr. epígrafe B infra). 
 
A) Antecedentes de la propuesta. 
 
25. Para la consecución de los objetivos perseguidos por la Resolución 2205 (XXI), de 17 de diciembre 
de 1966, de la Asamblea General de la ONU (“promover la armonización y unificación progresivas 
del Derecho mercantil internacional”), y coincidiendo con el quincuagésimo aniversario de la 
creación de UNCITRAL, quizás sea llevado el momento para acometer un instrumento vinculante 
de ámbito universal en materia de insolvencia transfronteriza que supere los obstáculos planteados 
por la diversidad de ordenamientos jurídicos nacionales y las limitaciones del uso de la técnica del 
soft law. 
 
26. Se trata de retomar la idea del convenio internacional abordada ya en el curso de los debates que 
precedieron a la aprobación de la Ley Modelo de 1997, en los cuales se planteó la posibilidad de 
__________________ 
33  Aprobada por UNCITRAL el 1 de julio de 2009.  
34 UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.130, debatido en la 47ª sesión celebrada en Nueva York del 26 al 29 de mayo de 
2015; A/CN.9/WP.5/WP.135, debatido en la 48ª sesión celebrada en Viena del 14 al 18 de diciembre de 2015; 
A/CN.9/WP.5/WP.138, debatido en la 49ª sesión celebrada en Nueva York del 2 al 6 de mayo de 2016; y 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.143, debatido en la 50ª sesión celebrada en Viena del 12 al 16 de diciembre de 2016.  
35  M. OLIVENCIA, “Ley y disposiciones legales modelo como instrumentos de armonización y unificación 
internacional del derecho de la insolvencia”, Estudios de derecho mercantil: homenaje al profesor Justino F. 
Duque, Vol. 2, 1998, pp. 1655-1663. Como ha afirmado el Profesor OLIVENCIA, “como técnica de unificación, 
el efecto de las leyes modelo es indirecto, en cuanto que sus disposiciones no se integran en lo s Derechos 
nacionales, a diferencia de lo que sucede con las leyes uniformes. (…) Sólo si los legisladores adoptan como 
modelo el texto propuesto, tendrá éste un efecto indirecto de unificación”; op. cit., pp. 1655-1656. 
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elaborar, no disposiciones modelo, sino una convención internacional36, idea que finalmente fue 
descartada37. 
 
27. De lege ferenda, este autor considera que el convenio internacional supone la técnica legislativa 
más adecuada para la evolución del Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza, en particular en lo 
relativo al reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias38. 
 
28. En esta línea de pensamiento, recientemente podemos destacar algunos avances significativos. En 
el debate sobre el futuro trabajo a realizar por el Grupo V de UNCITRAL, se presentaron diversas 
propuestas en relación con la elaboración de una convención internacional en materia de insolvencia 
transfronteriza39. Tras deliberar sobre estas propuestas, la Comisión de UNCITRAL decidió que el 
trabajo futuro del Grupo de Trabajo V consistiera en que “se diera orientación a los Estados sobre 
la interpretación y aplicación de determinados conceptos de la Ley Modelo de la CNUDMI sobre 
la Insolvencia Transfronteriza relacionados con el centro de los principales intereses y, 
posiblemente, de que se elaborara una ley modelo o disposiciones modelo sobre el régimen de la 
insolvencia en que se regularan determinadas cuestiones de derecho internacional de la 
insolvencia, como la jurisdicción, el acceso a los tribunales extranjeros y el reconocimiento de los 
procedimientos extranjeros, de un modo que no impidiera preparar una convención”40. 
 
29. Fruto de los posteriores debates del Grupo V en el estudio de las disposiciones modelo sobre el 
centro de intereses principales del deudor, se creó un grupo ad hoc de expertos para el estudio de la 
viabilidad de una convención internacional sobre insolvencia transfronteriza41. Sin embargo, por el 
__________________ 
36  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/433, debatido en el 30º período de sesiones del Grupo de Trabajo V celebrado en Viena del 
7 al 28 de octubre de 1996. Se reproduce el párrafo 17:  “No obstante, se presentaron argumentos en pro de un 
proyecto de convención. Se consideró que para regular las cuestiones tra tadas, que se referían esencialmente a 
la cooperación judicial internacional, sería más apropiado que el texto revistiera la forma de una convención, 
en vez de disposiciones legales modelo. Se sostuvo que esas cuestiones requerían un mayor grado de 
uniformidad, que era imposible de lograr con una ley modelo, dado que los Estados, al aplicar una ley modelo, 
eran libres de introducir cambios sustanciales en su texto. También se señaló que en algunos Estados la 
cooperación con autoridades judiciales extranjeras estaba tradicionalmente sujeta a la regla de la reciprocidad. 
Se afirmó asimismo que, mientras que en el caso de las convenciones internacionales era fácil demostrar que se 
había cumplido con la regla de la reciprocidad, con una ley modelo resultaría mucho más difícil de comprobar. 
Además, se sostuvo que en un tema como el de la insolvencia transfronteriza, aunque resultara más difícil 
elaborar una convención que una ley modelo, lo cierto es que la convención sería más fácil de aplicar. ” 
37  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/433, cit. en nota 36, párrafo 20: “el Grupo de Trabajo decidió proseguir y llevar a término 
su labor sobre el proyecto de Disposiciones Legales Modelo, sin perjuicio de la posibilidad de que se formularan 
unas disposiciones convencionales modelo o una convención propiamente dicha sobre cooperación judicial en 
materia de insolvencia transfronteriza, si posteriormente la Comisión así lo decidiera. ” 
38  En el mismo sentido, cfr. G. BAER, “Towards an International Insolvency Convention: Issues, Options and 
Feasibility Considerations”, Business Law International, vol. 17, núm. 1, 2016, pp. 5-25. En palabras de M. 
OLIVENCIA RUIZ, op. cit., p. 1663: “el tratado internacional es la forma más idónea, y por ello prioritaria, 
para regular los temas de reconocimiento y de cooperación, una fuente ante la que ceden las disposiciones 
legales concebidas como modelo (…)”. 
39  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/433, cit. en nota 31, párrafo 20; sobre el origen de esta propuesta cfr. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/XXXVII/CRP.3, presentado por el autor de este estudio en nombre de la Unión Internacional de 
Abogados (UIA) relativa a la elaboración de un tratado internacional sobre insolvencia transfronteriza. En el 
mismo sentido la propuesta de la International Bar Association (IBA) [Documento A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.93/Add.6]. 
Dichas propuestas fueron debatidas por el Grupo de Trabajo V en su 37º período de sesiones (Viena, 9 a 13 de 
noviembre de 2009) (A/CN.9/686, párrs. 127 a 130) y en el 38º período de sesiones (Nueva York, 19 a 23 de 
abril de 2010) (A/CN.9/691, párrs. 99 a 104). Sobre los antecedentes y génesis de estas propuestas, cfr. D. 
MORÁN BOVIO, “UNCITRAL on Insolvency Law: Third Act, First Scene”, World Arbitration & Mediation 
Review, vol. 6, nº 1, pp. 139-159. 
40  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/691, párrafo 104, en relación con la propuesta de los Estados Unidos descrita en 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.93/Add.1, párrafo 8. 
41  UNCITRAL, A/CN.9/798, párrafo 44, deliberado en el 44º período de sesiones celebrado en Viena del 16 al 20 
de diciembre de 2013. Este grupo ad hoc se reunió por primera vez para abordar esta propuesta con ocasión de 
la 45ª sesión del Grupo de Trabajo V celebrada en Nueva York del 21 al 25 de abril de 2014. La última reunión 
ha sido celebrada durante la 49ª sesión del Grupo V celebrada en Nueva York del 2 al 6 de mayo de 2 016. 
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momento, el tema de la convención no ha sido considerado como una prioridad en la agenda de 
trabajo del grupo V42. 
 
30. La tarea de estudiar la viabilidad de elaborar un convenio internacional en materia de insolvencia 
transfronteriza ha cobrado si cabe más relevancia puesto que en la actualidad la Conferencia de la 
Haya de Derecho internacional privado se encuentra en proceso de elaboración de un proyecto de 
convención sobre el reconocimiento y la ejecución de sentencias en materia civil y comercial43. En 
el estado actual del borrador, la insolvencia se encuentra excluida de su ámbito material de 
aplicación44. En nuestra opinión, la exclusión de esta materia de la futura convención internacional 
sobre reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias extranjeras de La Haya evidenciaría aún más la 
ausencia de un instrumento vinculante de ámbito universal sobre los efectos extraterritoriales de los 
procedimientos de insolvencia transfronteriza. 
 
31. En el estado actual de la cuestión, la propuesta que se formula en el presente estudio es la viabilidad 
de un convenio internacional como cauce de unificación de las normas de Derecho internacional 
privado en el ámbito universal. 
 
B) Propuesta lege ferenda: un convenio internacional para la unificación conflictual en materia de 
insolvencia transfronteriza. 
 
32. En el Informe del Secretario General encargado por la citada Resolución 2102 (XX) expresaba que 
se podrían seguir dos técnicas complementarias: (i) la elaboración de normas de Derecho 
internacional privado (normas de conflicto), y (ii) la unificación y armonización progresivas de las 
leyes sustantivas (ley uniforme)45. Pues bien, el convenio internacional objeto de la propuesta se 
encuadraría en la técnica de Derecho internacional privado con el objetivo de unificar las normas 
de conflicto y de jurisdicción aplicables en los procedimientos de insolvencia transfronteriza. 
 
33. Consideramos que el convenio internacional supone la técnica legislativa más adecuada para 
reforzar los objetivos de cooperación, coordinación y asistencia judicial internacional en los 
procedimientos de insolvencia transfronterizos, puesto que es un instrumento vinculante para los 
Estados partes que garantiza la reciprocidad, superando la ausencia de carácter vinculante del soft 
law. Contribuiría a la atribución de efectos extraterritoriales a las resoluciones judiciales 
extranjeras, mejorando los principios de reconocimiento y ejecución de las mismas. 
 
34. En cuanto al contenido del instrumento, este autor ha propuesto ya con anterioridad en UNCITRAL 
que un convenio internacional sobre insolvencia transfronteriza pudiera contener disposiciones 
sobre (i) el acceso de los tribunales a los representantes extranjeros de la insolvencia; (ii) el 
reconocimiento de los procedimientos extranjeros de la insolvencia; (iii) la comunicación, 
coordinación y cooperación entre los representantes de la insolvencia y los tribunales; (iv) la 
competencia judicial internacional para la apertura de los procedimientos de insolvencia; y (v) 
reglas sobre ley aplicable46. 
__________________ 
42  UNCITRAL, A/71/17, párrafo 247, Informe de UNCITRAL, deliberado en la 49ª sesión celebrada del 25 de junio 
al 15 de julio 2016. Se reproduce el párrafo 247: “la Comisión señaló que un grupo especial de composición 
abierta, integrado por interesados, podría seguir estudiando oficiosamente la viabilidad de elaborar una 
convención sobre cuestiones de insolvencia de carácter internacional teniendo en cuenta una lista de cuestiones 
preparada y distribuida por la Secretaría. Sin embargo, observando que el Grupo de Trabajo V ya tenía un 
programa de actividades muy nutrido y que la Secretaría quizás tuviera poco tiempo y recursos para realizar 
esa labor oficiosa, la Comisión acordó que esa labor solo se llevara a cabo en la forma y en el momento e n que 
la Secretaría pudiera hacerlo.” 
43  Cfr. Preliminary Draft convention aprobado por la Comisión Especial celebrada del 16 al 24 de febrero de 2017. 
Publicado online [https://assets.hcch.net/docs/48e64d28-fc33-4927-b323-4e2fa6a10ab2.pdf] 
44  El artículo 2.2, letra e), del proyecto de convención está actualmente redactado como sigue: “This Convention 
shall not apply to the following matters: (…) e) insolvency, composition, resolution of financial institutions, and 
analogous matters.” 
45  Cfr. Nota 27 supra, Informe del Secretario General (“Estudio del Profesor Schmitthoff”). 
46  Á.Mª BALLESTEROS BARROS, “Propuesta de convenio internacional sobre insolvencia transfronteriza”, 
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35. En aras de favorecer la existencia de un consenso mayoritario, las materias enumeradas como (i), 
(ii) y (iii) podrían ser consideradas como prioritarias; las materias enumeradas como (iv) y (v) 
podrían ser objeto de negociaciones paralelas susceptibles de encuadrarse en Protocolos separados. 
 
36. Estas materias fueron consideradas como susceptibles de ser incorporadas a un posible convenio 
internacional por parte de la Secretaría de UNCITRAL47. Otros autores han sugerido ampliar el 
contenido de la propuesta a materias como el establecimiento de un tribunal internacional para la 
resolución de disputas en materia de insolvencia48 o los planes de reestructuración y acuerdos de 
refinanciación49. 
 
37. A la hora de redactar el convenio, el contenido de la Ley Modelo, de la Guía Legislativa y los demás 
textos elaborados por UNCITRAL en esta materia servirían de inspiración, puesto que constituyen 
un paradigma de normativa sobre insolvencia transfronteriza. En concreto, el Proyecto de ley 
modelo sobre el reconocimiento y la ejecución de sentencias relacionadas con casos de insolvencia, 
en curso de elaboración en la actualidad, supone un importante texto de referencia, por cuanto 
aborda el tratamiento de la extraterritorialidad de las resoluciones judiciales en materia de 
insolvencia, lo cual es uno de los principios clásicos del Derecho internacional privado. 
 
Reflexión final 
 
38. La elaboración de un instrumento vinculante como el convenio internacional propuesto supone un 
reto que contribuiría sin duda alguna a la modernización y unificación de las normas que rigen el 
Derecho de la insolvencia transfronteriza, justificando con ello los objetivos perseguidos desde la 
creación de UNCITRAL y contribuyendo al éxito de la importante labor que esta organización 
internacional ha demostrado durante los cincuenta años de existencia que ahora felizmente 
conmemoramos. 
 
__________________ 
Fourth International Insolvency Law Colloquium, UNCITRAL, celebrada en Viena del 16 al 18 de diciembre de 
2013. 
47  UNCITRAL, documento difundido por la Secretaría de manera informal a los Delegados y Observadores 
internacionales con motivo de la reunión del grupo ad hoc durante la 49ª sesión celebrada en Nueva York del 2 
al 6 de mayo de 2016. Estas materias relacionadas en la propuesta son las siguientes (original en inglés): (a) 
Granting foreign insolvency representatives access to courts; (b) Recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings 
(with the effect of granting the foreign proceeding the rights of a national proceeding or triggering a secondary 
proceeding); (c) Cooperation and communication between insolvency representatives and courts; (d) Direct 
competence (for commencement of proceedings, whether main or non-main); e) Applicable law; (f) Multinational 
enterprise groups; and (g) Recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. 
48  G. BAER, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 
49  B. WESSELS, Judicial Coordination of Cross-border Insolvency Cases, Kluwer, Deventer, 2008, p. 45: “Such a 
convention should act as an aid for judges to navigate in uncharted waters, should ensure that all stakeholders 
in a restructuring or insolvency have the information they need to make informed decisions and should adopt 
procedural safeguards to ensure the integrity of all judgments given.” Postura mantenida en su entrada en el 
Leiden Law Blog de fecha 24 de mayo de 2016 (http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/towards-a-worldwide-
international-insolvency-convention). 
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The Certainty of Choice of Law Rules in the Uncertain World of International Bank Insolvency 
 
Chindar Teo, Queensland University of Technology, Australia 
 
“You cannot solve a problem from the same consciousness that created it.  
You must learn to see the world anew.” — Albert Einstein 
 
 The current initiative by the UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency) in respect of an international 
convention in international insolvency presents the significant opportunity to address the harmonization of 
choice of law rules in cross-border bank insolvency cases. The current study of an international convention 
in international insolvency law presents the chance to conceptualize an approach that can greatly assist 
other global leaders by addressing the choice of law issues in the cross-border insolvency of large, complex 
financial institutions. In a post-Brexit climate, the cross-border insolvency of large, complex financial 
institutions creates new complex choice of law and jurisdictional issues including the law applicable in 
insolvency proceedings. As the international insolvency law in the European Union (EU) progresses in the 
harmonization of its laws,1 the dichotomy has emerged with the exit of the United Kingdom (UK) in respect 
of choice of law issues in international bank insolvency. When national interests override international 
objectives, the conflicts consistently remain problematic, with little potential for the creation of solutions. 
These conflicts have exposed the need for harmonized choice of law rules to resolve the multi-jurisdictional 
complexities in international bank insolvency. Whenever another State intervenes between the relationship 
of territory and jurisdiction, the result will be a loss of legal certainty.2 The exit of the UK from the EU 
deepens the complexity of perplex jurisdictional questions. Although these issues have been discussed in 
past cross-border insolvency cases, the implications of Brexit will affect the terms of recognition of 
judgements in complex cross-border bank insolvency matters. For example, as the European Insolvency 
Regulation is no longer applicable to the UK post-Brexit, banks that open insolvency proceedings in the 
UK risk competing insolvency proceedings being commenced in other jurisdictions with no reliance on the 
primacy of the UK proceedings.3 The multiple openings of competing insolvency proceedings post-Brexit 
premised on the need to seize its assets in each of the jurisdictions where these are located creates new 
complex choice of law issues. This proposal will focus on the critical analysis of the uncertainty of the 
international insolvency architecture post-Brexit in respect of international bank insolvency and the 
significant contribution that UNCITRAL can make towards the certainty of substantive choice of law rules 
in international bank insolvency. 
 
The Objectives of the Research Proposal 
 
 The objective of this research proposal is to contribute towards the innovation of international 
insolvency in respect of achieving solutions to choice of law issues in international bank insolvency. The 
greater precision and uniformity of solutions would reduce the uncertainty caused by variations between 
the choice of law rules deployed by different legal systems.4 As full convergence of insolvency laws is 
currently not realistic, improving problems related to choice of law in the context of cross-border insolvency 
is an outstanding task.5 Conflicts between common law and civil law systems and within their competing 
legal systems also indicate that there is a need to harmonize choice of law rules between national insolvency 
regimes. The differences in substantive law between national regimes occur because of the economic 
structure of the market, the underlying policies of the legal systems, the order of private law, and the 
__________________ 
1  European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventive 
Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency 
and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU (2016/0359 (COD)), 17.   
2  Matthias Herdegen, Principles of International Economic Law , (Oxford University Press, London), 2013, 91.  
3  Hogan Lovells, The Brexit Effect: the Legal Implications Behind the Headlines’ (2016), 10 
<https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/brexit-effect-note-the-legal-implications-behind-the-
headlines>.  
4  Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law: National and International Approaches (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2005), 508. 
5  Ibid., 508. 
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protected interests in the system of insolvency law.6 These conflicts have exposed the need for standard 
international rules7 to govern choice of law issues in international bank insolvency. The debates over 
traditional legal doctrine and new policy present a significant opportunity to reconsider solutions to choice 
of law issues in international bank insolvency underlying the EU and the UK post-Brexit.  
 
 The proposal acknowledges the importance of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency as a source of reference by national authorities and legislative bodies when preparing new laws 
and regulations or reviewing the existing adequacy of existing laws and regulations.8 The proposal further 
acknowledges that reconciling international insolvency regimes between common and civil law systems is 
a key objective of insolvency law. Although the UNCITRAL Model Law has not led to harmonization 
across common and civil law systems, the proposal aims to make a significant contribution towards the 
harmonization across common and civil legal systems, the further harmonization of choice of law rules,9 as 
well as to the innovation of substantive choice of law rules in international bank insolvency. The proposal 
addresses the opportunity that is presented to UNCITRAL to formulate substantive choice of law rules in 
international bank insolvency within its study of an international convention. Ultimately, the contribution 
of UNCITRAL in seizing this opportunity would result in greater legal certainty in international insolvency 
law and procedures towards uniformity with international implications. 
 
The Current State of Affairs  
 
 In March 2017, the official exit of the UK from the EU is intended to be marked by the instigation of 
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.10 When the UK officially leaves the EU, this creates the potential lacuna in 
respect of choice of law issues concerning automatic recognition of cross-border insolvency proceedings, 
the law applicable and governing jurisdiction in complex international bank insolvency cases. In the 
absence of a common recognition framework, alternative agreements or treaties, the UK will return to its 
pre-2002 conflicts position without an international framework addressing the cross-border recognition 
post-Brexit.11 The UK Government has confirmed that on the day of the exit of the UK, EU law will (in the 
absence of specific agreement) cease to apply.12 As a consequence, EU law will no longer be given primacy, 
__________________ 
6  Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law (Kluwer Law International, 2nd ed, 2006), 5.  
7  Michael H. Krimminger, ‘The Resolution of Cross-border Banks: Issues for Deposit Insurers and Proposals for 
Co-operation’, (2008) 4(4) Journal of Financial Stability 376, 379.  
8  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, (25 
June 2004).  
9  Charles. W Mooney, Jr., ‘Harmonizing Choice of Law Rules for International Insolvency Cases: Virtual 
Territoriality, Virtual Universalism, and the Problem of Local Interests’, 9(1) (2014) Brooklyn Journal of 
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 120.  
10  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
of the Treaty on European Union, signed on December 13, 2007, Official Journal of the European Union 2007/C 
306/01, (entered into force on December 1, 2009), Article 50. See also United Kingdom Department for Exiting 
the European Union, ‘The United Kingdom’s Exit From and New Partnership with the European Union White 
Paper’ (February 2017), 65 which states that, ‘As set out in Article 50, the Treaties of the EU will cease to apply 
to the UK when the withdrawal agreement enters into force, or failing that, two years from the day we submit 
our notification, unless there is a unanimous agreement with the other 27 Member States to extend the process’; 
Vaughne Miller et al, ‘Brexit: How Does the Article 50 Process Work?’, (Briefing Paper No. 7551, House of 
Commons Library, Parliament of United Kingdom, 2016); Paul Bowers et al, ‘Brexit: Some Legal and 
Constitutional Issues and Alternatives to EU Membership’ (Briefing Paper No. 07214, House of Commons 
Library, Parliament of United Kingdom, 2016); United Kingdom Department for Exiting the European Union, 
‘A Statement from the Secretary of State for Department for Exiting the European Union on the process of 
invoking Article 50 (7 November 2016), Gov.UK, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/process-for-
invoking-article-50-ministerial-statement-7-november>. 
11  Hogan Lovells, above n3, 7; Jack S. Caird, ‘Brexit: Legislating for the Great Repeal Bill’, (Briefing Paper No. 
7793, House of Commons Library, Parliament of United Kingdom, 2016), 52 where it stat es that: ‘The UK 
Government has since stated that one of the aims of the Great Repeal Bill is to end the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) over the UK. It will no longer be obligatory for post -Brexit courts in 
the UK to abide by the rulings of the CJEU. Once the European Communities Act (1972) is repealed, the courts 
in the United Kingdom will no longer be under the obligation to give effect to EU law over and above domestic 
law’.  
12  United Kingdom Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Government announces end of European 
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and legal provisions on the statute book which originated will be afforded the same status as other provisions 
of domestic law.13 In the path forward, recognition by EU Member States of English insolvency proceedings 
will revert back to principles of comity or local law provisions; in particular, whether relevant Member 
States have implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law.14 Although the philosophy of the European 
Commission has greatly emphasized and required a new approach to the recognition of judgments in 
English private international law,15 the focus of private international law whereby jurisdiction and private 
international law rules dominate has been to the detriment of choice of law rules.16 As most recent 
legislation in respect of private international law has been concerned with recognition, the Law Commission 
recommendations and Hague Conventions on choice of law issues have, generally, not been legislated in 
statute to the disadvantage of the governing law.17 The emergence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
has also reduced the likelihood that cases will be heard in England which requires application of choice of 
law rules to determine the governing law.18  
 
The Certainty of Choice of Law Issues in International Bank Insolvency post-Brexit  
 
 In the past, a major characteristic of conflict of laws was that states developed individualistic solutions 
to resolve the diverse problems caused by various sovereign states.19 In effect, this had the consequence of 
creating numerous systems of conflicts of laws and the ensuing choice of law issues20 which exacerbates 
the legal uncertainty of international bank insolvency post-Brexit. In the present EU legal framework, the 
choice of law to govern the insolvency procedure is decided in part on the allocation of a jurisdiction, and 
also, on the private international law rules inherent in the legal systems of the Member States.21 While these 
rules decide the primacy of rules where there is conflict and the extent to which other systems of rules will 
be recognized,22 this choice of law system will no longer include the UK’s jurisdictional paradigm post-
Brexit. It is the law of the jurisdiction where proceedings are opened that will govern many of the 
substantive issues during proceedings. However, the regulatory framework of international insolvency law 
has not been analysed against traditional conflict of laws thinking.23 In deferring to foreign courts and their 
proceedings, the recognition of foreign judgements and application of foreign law may not be workable if 
the domestic court does not recognize or permit the enforcement of the foreign judgement or law, if the 
application of foreign law creates conflicts, and if national interests override international concerns.24 In the 
case of Rubin v Eurofinance,25 the court stated that there was no expectation of reciprocity from other 
__________________ 
Communities Act’ (2 October 2016), Gov.UK, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-announces-
end-of-european-communities-act>. The Great Repeal Bill will repeal the European Communities Act (1972) and 
‘convert existing law into domestic law, while allowing Parliament to amend, repeal, or improve any law after 
appropriate scrutiny and debate’. 
13  Caird, above n 11 whereby it states that, ‘A related question concerns the approach of the UK’s courts to 
interpreting domestic laws based on EU law after Brexit day. Currently domestic courts will often look behind a 
provision of domestic law to the relevant EU provision, for example a Directive, to assist their interpretation and 
application of the law. It is not known to what extent this will continue after Brexit. ’  
14  Weil, Gotshal and Manges, ‘Brexit: Implications for the Restructuring and Insolvency Market’, (2016), 1, 
<http://www.weil.com/~/media/brexit/pdf/brexit-implications-for-the-restructuring-and-insolvency-mark.pdf>. 
15  Rhona G. Schuz, ‘Conflicts between Choice of Law Rules and Recognition of Judgement Rule with Particular 
Reference to Cases involving Determination of Status’, (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2014), 58.  
16  Ibid., 55.  
17  Ibid., 59.  
18  Ibid.  
19  Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law (Kluwer Law International, 2007), 836.  
20  Michael J. Whincorp & Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws  (Dartmouth Publishing Ltd, 
2001), 188. See also Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Business Law and Regulation, Brooklyn 
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countries and no UK case or statutory law as such; being in the provenance of legislature.26 While a common 
law system often claims for itself a universal role,27 this is based on the preservation of the fundamental 
unity of its national laws by insisting that they be followed in other jurisdictions. The majority opinion of 
Rubin represents a deliberate decision to favour traditionalist common law over the policy objectives of 
modified universalism.28 The persuasive precedent of the case illustrates that courts worldwide can maintain 
parochial authority while eschewing cooperative measures by foreign courts. The inadvertent consequence 
is that other courts facing conflict of laws issues in an insolvency context will view the case as a prominent 
guide to the interpretation of the Model Law.29 In a post-Brexit climate, the distinct territorialist policies are 
at the forefront of cross-border insolvency jurisprudence.30 Furthermore, when the UK is no longer bound 
by the Insolvency Regulation, conflicts with the UK will fall outside its scope of application. When the UK 
leaves the EU, so too will its adherence to the Insolvency Regulation and the laws applicable to the 
recognition of insolvency proceedings and foreign judgements. The consequences of the treatment of UK 
insolvency proceedings in the courts of the remaining Member States (and the treatment of EU insolvency 
proceedings in the UK courts) remain unclear.31 The applicable insolvency law is to be determined 
according to the national rules of cross-border insolvency law;32 the variations of which render the outcome 
uncertain. The international insolvency architecture to resolve conflicts that arise from choice of law issues 
creates no mechanism for balancing the international and domestic considerations nor arriving at a choice 
between them.33  
 
 On a national level, the choice-of-law codification in the EU has provided comprehensive and uniform 
systems of carefully drafted and workable rules. However, when the UK leaves the EU, the European 
choice-of-law codification must co-exist with competing choice-of-law regimes on multiple levels.34 The 
new paradigm post-Brexit necessitates codifications from several levels to be applied in parallel which 
creates difficulties if they are not sufficiently coordinated in multi-jurisdictional international bank 
insolvency. The lack of synchronisation can instigate the confusion and uncertainty which the codification 
intended to mitigate at the first instance.35 The necessity to address the fundamental juridical nature, 
classification and private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law issues in the private 
international law regime of the EU and the UK is greater than ever. When international structural order is 
compromised in the unilateral private law enforcement of jurisdiction and choice of law agreements,36 
national sovereignty gives rise to conflicts between national regimes and sovereign legal orders.37 The 
__________________ 
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possibility of ‘regime collision’ through interference with the jurisdiction, judgments38 and choice of law 
apparatus of foreign courts creates the complex multilateral problems of international bank insolvency. The 
nature of international bank insolvency magnifies the cross-border conflicts when the regime collision 
between the domestic rules of the EU and the UK occur post-Brexit. This undermines the certainty of 
international bank insolvency post-Brexit and gives rise to significant choice of law issues. 
 
 At present, when a conflict arises between the laws of the UK and the EU, the Insolvency Regulation 
takes precedence39 to decide the recognition of main and secondary insolvency proceedings. However, in a 
post-Brexit climate, the automatic recognition of main and secondary proceedings provided by the 
Regulation may not be possible when the administration orders by the English courts may no longer be 
recognized in the EU.40 The automatic recognition and relief provided by the Credit Institutions Winding-
Up Directive41 would also cease to extend its recognition to the UK.42 As EU directives prevail only if and 
to the extent that there is applicability, the Credit Institutions Winding-Up Directive will cease to extend 
recognition to the UK post-Brexit.43 The single entity approach under the Directive would cease to exist in 
the absence of an agreement to the contrary.44 When an international bank is incorporated within the EU 
with a legitimate argument as to its COMI, there is potentially the greater risk of conflict of jurisdiction and 
a denial of recognition of the UK court’s judgement.45 In the Member States in which the regulations are 
applicable, they do not constitute a choice-of-law regime.46 If the international bank is incorporated within 
the EU and with no COMI establishment in the UK, there is also the greater risk that those proceedings 
would not be recognized by that EU Member State.47 Once the advantage of automatic recognition ceases 
to apply, the extent that the Model Law has been adopted by the Member State requires significant 
consideration. In this instance, the level of assistance under the Model Law becomes much more restrictive 
than the automatic recognition regime available under the Insolvency Regulation.48 There would not only 
be no automatic recognition of EU Member State insolvency proceedings in the UK, but the UK courts 
could exercise judicial discretion to commence insolvency proceedings. The dichotomy of the UK and the 
EU post-Brexit means that the opening of main insolvency proceedings in respect to all foreign group 
companies of an international bank will be granted recognition in one jurisdiction. International banks with 
complex operational structures and various foreign group companies would face great uncertainty in the 
recognition of the opening of foreign main proceedings and the law applicable to govern those proceedings.  
 
 The contest for jurisdiction when dealing with the insolvencies of a group with non-European member 
companies becomes exacerbated49 in international bank insolvency with jurisdictional claims that conflict 
__________________ 
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with the EU. In the absence of choice of law rules, there is no guarantee that the domestic rules of different 
jurisdictions with various jurisdictional claims would provide for consistency of outcome, thus resulting in 
inconsistencies and uncertainty among the nations involved post-Brexit.  
 
 The choice of law regime within the EU consists of systemic complexity and incoherence on both a 
theoretical and practical level.50 The jurisprudence of the EU would impose new limitations in terms of the 
law applicable in the courts of the UK post-Brexit. Since the Insolvency Regulation would no longer be 
applicable in the UK, national law with substantive differences, disparate underlying policies and various 
protected interests in the systems of insolvency law51 would be relied on. There will be ensuing uncertainty 
not only as to the applicable law but also, as to whether the strong protection of third parties’ rights in rem 
and set-off rights can be maintained.52 There would no longer be a judicial obligation to apply EU 
jurisprudence by the UK nor would the judgements of the EU Court of Justice directly bind the UK. When 
the applicable insolvency law is to be determined according to the national rules of cross-border insolvency 
law, the reliance instigates great uncertainty in the recognition and enforcement of insolvency proceedings 
and judgements within individual EU Member States whose rules conflict with the UK and vice-versa. The 
ensuing inconsistent decisions and conflicting judgements in cases of multi-jurisdictional international bank 
insolvency would have no legal certainty. The institutional differences and disparities between insolvency 
laws will ensue in new conflicts in respect of the substantive law to govern the distribution of proceeds, the 
ranking of claims, and the subsidiary rights remaining after the end of insolvency proceedings in 
international bank insolvency. The existence of institutional differences in the overall legal system of the 
country may impact on formal insolvency law and compound the disparities between insolvency laws in 
particular jurisdictions.53 There is the opportunity for conflicts of substantive law in the legal nature of acts 
detrimental to creditors’ interest which may be declared void, voidable or unenforceable at the instance of 
the presiding court.54 The struggle in deciding the outcome of these issues without choice of law rules 
complicates the determination of the law applicable. While the Insolvency Regulation intended to have 
effect without conflict between domestic rules,55 the non-member State status of the UK results in greater 
reliance on domestic rules of jurisdiction. These domestic rules decide the primacy of rules when there is 
conflict, and the extent that other systems of rules will have recognition and be given effect within the host 
jurisdiction.56 The uncertainty of outcomes affects the extent that the systems of common law rules will be 
recognized by the EU and given effect if the host jurisdiction of the international bank is located in the UK. 
As a consequence, the determination of the law applicable in a choice of law process is no longer subject 
to reciprocity, and must involve a multilateral consideration of the appropriateness of the law applicable.57  
 
 Finally, the implications of Brexit would include that the mandatory duties of communication and 
cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts are without a legal basis.58 The main pillar of the 
EU insolvency framework lies in the recast EU Insolvency Regulation (EIR)59 which focuses on the 
principle of coordination and communication between the insolvency office holders appointed in the 
insolvency proceedings. The reliance of the insolvency office-holder on the domestic law of conflicting 
jurisdictions in which recognition is sought would result in disparity and different outcomes, and instigate 
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greater impediments to the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and judgements. The new choice 
of law issues in international bank insolvency post-Brexit give rise to several impediments, in particular 
those concerning the coordination between multiple jurisdictions and the inadequate protection of 
creditors60 when there is no longer automatic recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and 
judgements. In the Insolvency Regulation, international insolvency proceedings can be effectively 
conducted only if the States concerned recognize the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of the opening 
of the proceedings, the powers of their liquidators and the effects of their judgements. The extensive 
grounds of jurisdiction that result in overlapping and conflicting proceedings are inseparable from the 
traditional legal context of cross-border insolvency.61 However, the cross-border insolvency provisions that 
may be applicable post-Brexit would not necessarily assist in the case of cross-border bank insolvency with 
the opening of multiple concurrent proceedings in the EU and the UK.62 The English cross-border 
insolvency provisions (including the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 which adopts the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, s426 Insolvency Act and the common law recognition rules) would not necessarily 
be of assistance in the case of multiple openings of insolvency proceedings of an international bank with 
conflicts of jurisdiction in the EU and the UK.63 As a consequence, there would be dependence on domestic 
insolvency laws of the jurisdictions in question which would, most likely, result in an incongruent approach. 
The recent banking crisis in Europe has highlighted the significant obstacles in the current regime when 
effective cooperation and coordination among national regimes has not occurred. The uncertainty and 
instability has been and continues to be problematic in international bank insolvency cases where choice of 
law issues persist in national insolvency regimes. The innovation and harmonization of substantive choice 
of law rules would contribute to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings, the 
predictability of the internal market, and foster greater confidence in the insolvency systems of the EU and 
UK. The various conflicts abovementioned have exposed the need for standard international rules64 to 
resolve choice of law issues in international bank insolvency.  
 
The Contribution of UNCITRAL to Choice of Law Rules in International Bank Insolvency  
 
 The current study of an international convention in international insolvency presents the opportunity 
to conceptualize an approach that can greatly assist other global leaders by addressing the choice of law 
issues in the cross-border insolvency of large, complex financial institutions. The concept of an international 
convention in international insolvency by UNCITRAL provides the ideal platform for the formulation of 
detailed and predictable substantive choice of law rules.65 Although the Model Law envisages situations 
where proceedings may cause conflicts in concurrent proceedings between foreign jurisdictions, the choice 
of law issues are left open.66 When the national law may apply its own laws or otherwise foreign laws that 
concede to territorial elements, this is likely to lead to more cross-border insolvency litigation whereby 
questions of choice of law in insolvency will become more frequent67 post-Brexit. Indeed, ‘a treaty-based 
approach may have a serious gap in its coverage if it does not deal by its terms with the issue of how 
insolvencies arising from jurisdictions outside the particular region in question should be addressed to the 
extent that such foreign insolvencies intersect with insolvencies in the region itself.’68 This critical issue is 
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highly relevant to the EU and UK in the absence of substantive choice of law rules to resolve the inevitable 
multi-jurisdictional international bank insolvency conflicts post-Brexit.  
 
 The absence of choice of law rules in international bank insolvency is, arguably, most prevalent in 
times of financial and banking crises. When there is worldwide uncertainty as to the answers to complex 
choice of law issues, the principle of pari passu remains an elusive ideal because of the limitations of the 
law. The certainty of choice of law rules in international bank insolvency is fundamental in resolving the 
inevitable jurisdictional conflicts of law issues that will arise between the EU and the UK post-Brexit, and 
in times of crises. The choice of law problems that has been created by private international law69 principles 
has been ineffective in resolving the multi-jurisdictional conflicts70 in cross-border bank insolvencies. In 
international bank insolvency, the bank’s branches and subsidiaries cross various jurisdictions with assets 
abroad, including claims against companies in various jurisdictions, and also insolvent subsidiaries whereby 
sovereign states are confronted with a collective action dilemma.71 In the determination of the law 
applicable in international bank insolvency post-Brexit, the paradigm of co-operation breaks with the ‘all 
or nothing’ attitude prevalent under traditional approaches underlying international insolvency.72 As a 
multinational bank operates as an integrated global unit,73 the conflicts have created additional problems 
which are due to the lack of harmonisation of conflicts rules.74 This lack of harmonization may create 
difficulties in the enforcement of legal rights and obligations, conflicting judgements and inconsistent 
decisions. The risk of inconsistent judgments that inevitably arise from a failure to address international 
problems in a single forum or with a central, main proceeding75 is inevitable in the absence of substantive 
choice of law rules. In Re Maxwell Communication Corporation,76 the issue of which law was applicable 
to a bankruptcy preference instigated extensive litigation in the US and England. However, ‘a clear choice 
of law rule incorporated into the state’s insolvency system could have avoided the expense and delay of 
litigation’.77 In consideration of this, it may be argued that specific solutions depend on the ‘convergence 
of national laws, adoption of an international substantive rule, or adoption of an international choice-of-
law, choice-of-forum rule.’78 At present, the incoherency in international insolvencies destroys asset value, 
whereby there is no uniformity for the most equitable and efficient treatment of creditors.79  
 
 The contribution that UNCITRAL can make in addressing and formulating substantive choice of law 
rules in international bank insolvency assists its’ aims in firstly, the harmonization and modernization of 
insolvency law and, secondly, the promotion of cooperation and coordination in cross-border insolvency 
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International Insolvency Architecture (Part II)’ (2013) 7(1) Insolvency and Restructuring International  7; 
Gregory Baer, ‘Towards an International Convention: Issues, Options and Feasibility Considerations’, (2016) 
17(1) Business Law International 5, 8. 
69
 Michael J. Whincorp & Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in the Conflict of Laws  (Dartmouth Publishing Ltd, 
2001), 188.  
70
 Ibid. 
71
 David Darrell Evanoff & George G. Kaufman (eds), Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank 
Insolvencies, (World Scientific Publishing Co. Pty Ltd, 2005), 314.  
72
 Israel, above n61, 91. 
73
 Eva H.G. Hupkes, ‘The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the United 
States and Canada’, (Kluwer Law International, 2000), 14.  
74
 Talian Einhom ‘American vs European Private International Law- The Case for a Model Conflict of Laws Act 
(MCLA)’, in Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law, (Eleven International Publishing, 2010), 
34.  
75
 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum’, 
65 (1991) American Bankruptcy Law Journal 457. 
76
 Re Maxwell Communication Corporation plc (No 2) [1992] BCC 757].  
77  Re Maxwell Communication Corporation plc (No 2) [1992] BCC 757] at [392].  
78  Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’, 98 (2000) Michigan Law Review 2276, 
2318. See also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘Universalism and Choice of Law’, 23 (2005) Penn State International 
Law Review 625; Charles. W Mooney, Jr., ‘Harmonizing Choice of Law Rules for International Insolvency Cases: 
Virtual Territoriality, Virtual Universalism, and the Problem of Local Interests’, 9(1) (2014) Brooklyn Journal of 
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 120.  
79  Elizabeth K. Somers, ‘The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act’, (2011) 6(4) American University 
International Law Review 677, 701-2.  
  
257 
proceedings.80 The international insolvency architecture allows the change from the jurisdictional-selecting 
approach of the conflict of law81 to a substantive choice of law approach. Within the new paradigm, the 
existence of choice of law rules in international bank insolvency can reside to ensure greater legal certainty, 
resolution of multi-jurisdictional conflicts and procedural fairness. The economic underpinning of 
insolvency has resulted in national sovereignty and strong resistance in order to prevent national sovereignty 
from being undermined. This adverse consequence of the jurisdiction being able to select rules tends to 
benefit certain interests to the detriment of others.82 In recent times, traditional views of sovereignty have 
given way to a growing consensus on the need for comity.83 However, the concept of comity is of little 
guidance to decide the law applicable in choice of law decisions.84 The need for reform in insolvency law 
to ‘assist sovereignty-sensitive states to acclimate to the extraterritorial reach of foreign laws’85 is 
imperative in resolving choice of law conflicts in international bank insolvency post-Brexit. While there 
has been some support in the Working Group for treating choice of law as a separate topic, it was generally 
agreed that it should be approached, at least in the immediate future, by reference to those aspects of choice 
of law necessary to address enterprise group insolvency and directors’ obligations.86 The architectural 
development of choice of law by UNCITRAL presents the significant opportunity to assist other global 
leaders by addressing substantive choice of law rules in international bank insolvency as a future mandate. 
In international insolvency, international legal rules are in place today that were seemingly not possible ten 
years ago, and would have been unimaginable ten years before that.87 The work of UNCITRAL forms a 
strong foundation upon which new insolvency law topics can be developed.88 The form and function of 
UNCITRAL, its’ composition, and its’ concept of an international convention is best equipped to 
accomplish the certainty of choice of law rules in international bank insolvency when the time comes. The 
contribution of UNCITRAL to future work in respect of this and subsequent choice of law rules will 
significantly contribute to a wider harmonization and modernization of insolvency law, achieve a greater 
degree of harmony within national systems’ conflict of laws, and ensure considerable certainty in the future 
world of multi-jurisdictional insolvencies. The contribution of UNCITRAL to address substantive choice 
of law rules in international bank insolvency would have a profound and far-reaching impact on 
jurisdictions around the world and on the international economy.  
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Session 7 — Reform of investor-state dispute settlement 
 
 
The Paradox of International Investment Law: Trivializing the Development Objective 
Underlying International Investment Agreements in Investor-State Dispute Settlement  
 
Dominic Npoanlari Dagbanja, University of Western Australia Law School, Perth, Australia 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 The paradox of international investment law is the contradiction very much real and alive in 
international investment treaty law and arbitration. International investment agreements (IIAs) and 
arbitration are justified in terms of their supposed role in promoting the development of the host states 
through foreign investment attraction. Nevertheless, investor-state arbitration defines the concept of 
investment and adopts an approach to the settlement of investment disputes in terms which take out or 
trivialize the development objective underlying the IIA regime. In other words, the paradox of international 
investment law is about its opposite and contradictory features. This is revealed in particular in investment 
treaty arbitration, namely the fact that the very development reason that is used to justify the investment 
treaty regime is treated peripherally, in fact, as irrelevant in defining the concept of investment and in 
deciding the issue whether an investment should enjoy protection under an IIA if it does not make 
contribution to the development of the host state. This is the paradox with which this article is concerned.1 
Should contribution to development be treated as relevant in the definition of the concept of investment in 
investor-state dispute settlement? Should an investor lose the rights of protection under an IIA if its covered 
investment does not make a contribution to the development of the host state? I argue that in theory and in 
practice states enter into investment treaties to promote their development and not just to protect investment 
as an end in itself. Thus, there is the need for a sustainable investment dispute settlement; that is resolving 
investment disputes in manner that guarantee investors the enjoyment of rights under the applicable IIAs 
without compromising states’ development interest in entering into the IIA. The continued existence and 
relevance of the IIA regime depends on its ability to balance and sustain the protection of the competing 
interests that underlie its construction. The IIA regime cannot be sustainable if the protection of one its 
competing interests becomes the primary occupation of investor-state arbitration to the neglect of other 
equally embedded interests.  
 
 The IIAs are premised on at least two disputed2 related rationales. The first conventional supposition 
is that foreign investment leads to development and that IIAs are necessary to protect and thereby attract 
foreign investment.3 Based on this premise and other reasons, most countries have liberalised or 
strengthened their legal regimes for the promotion and protection of foreign investment and international 
law on foreign investment has been preoccupied with the treatment to be accorded to foreign investment 
__________________ 
  I am very grateful to Professor Jane Kelsey for her detailed comments and feedback which contributed 
significantly to improve the quality of this article.  
1  My thinking here was influenced by Hans Morgenthau, “What Is the National Interest of the United States?” 
(1952) 282 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 1; and Martin Loughlin and 
Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
2
  M Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment  (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015) at 81-86.  
3
  For the rationales of the IIA regime see: Sornarajah, Resistance and Change ibid., p. 81, 107-108; M Sornarajah, 
The International Law on Foreign Investment (3edn Cambridge University Press, 2010) 82-88; Andrew T 
Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ 
(1997) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639; Jeswald W Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 
(Oxford University Press, 2010); Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and 
Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2010); Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of 
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) and Reinisch August (ed), Standards of Investment 
Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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and associated private property rights.4 The strengthening of the legal regime for foreign investment at the 
international level is reflected in the growth of IIAs which reached 3,304 by the end of 2015.5  
 
 The stated premise of the first IIA, reached between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, was the states’ 
conviction that it was likely to promote investment, encourage private industrial and financial enterprise 
and increase the prosperity of both states.6 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID Convention)7 expresses the idea that there was a need for international cooperation and 
private international investment for the attainment of economic development. The IIAs, it is claimed, can 
attract foreign investment by establishing standards of investment protection such as fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection and security, national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, repatriation of 
investment returns and prohibition against direct and indirect expropriation.8  
 
 A second argument is that host states’ judicial systems cannot provide adequate protection for foreign 
investors. Therefore, to ensure that these standards of investment protection are ‘effectively’ enforced, IIAs 
make provision for investment arbitration to settle investment disputes between states and foreign 
investors.9 By the end of 2015, the number of investor-state dispute settlement claims reached 696 with 107 
states as respondents.10  
 
 In spite of the fact that developing states enter into IIAs to attract foreign investment for 
development11, investment tribunals are divided as to whether an investment’s contribution to development 
is an element in the definition of the concept of investment. They are consequently not agreed on whether 
an investment should be entitled to protection under an IIA if it does not make any contribution to the 
development of the host state. As Dr Diane Desierto stated12:  
 
 [T]he concept of development figures in two highly polemical questions that have become a staple in 
contemporary investment arbitral disputes. The first question asks whether development should be 
treated as an essential element or criterion (rather than simply a descriptive feature) to establish the 
existence of an “investment” to which the international investment agreement (IIA) would apply … 
The second question inquires if the state’s regulatory prerogative to pursue development objectives 
__________________ 
4
  Dominic N Dagbanja, “The Investment Treaty Regime and Development Policy in Ghana: Analysis in 
Constitutionalism and General International Law” in Andrea K Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law and Policy 2014-2015 (Oxford University Press 2016) 405.  
5
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016: Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges (United Nations Publication, 
2016) xii and 104. 
6
 Pakistan and Federal Republic of Germany Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments , signed at 
Bonn, on 25 November 1959.  
7
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States  entry into force 
on 14 October 1966.  
8
For the history behind the IIA regime and the justification for this regime see Sornarajah, Resistance and Change 
in the International Law on Foreign Investment at 78-135; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern “The ABS-Shawcross Draft 
Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: Comments on the Round Table” (1961) 10 Journal of Public 
Law 100. 
9  Christopher Dugan et al, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008); and Dodge, William 
S, “Investment Treaties between Developed States: The Dilemma of Dispute Resolution” in Rogers, Catherine 
A, and Alford, Roger P (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press: New York, 2009) 
165; M Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, See above note 3, 136-190; ; M Sornarajah, “Evolution or Revolution 
in International Investment Arbitration” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty 
Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 631; M Sornarajah, The Settlement of 
Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 
10  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016, See note 5 above.  
11  Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, See note 3 above; Sornarajah, Law on Foreign Investment, See note 3 above; 
Salacuse, Law of Investment Treaties, See note 3 above; and Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties, See note 3 
above.  
12  Diane A. Desierto, ‘Deciding International Investment Agreement Applicability: The Development Argument in 
Investment’ in Freya Baetebs (ed), Investment Law within International Law: Integrationist Perspectives  
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 240, 240-241.  
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form part of subject matter that can be deemed excluded from the applicability of an IIA … [T]hese 
questions speak to a much broader problématique about the extent of applicability of an IIA to an 
investor-state dispute when the host state has to contend with challenging adverse development 
situations arising during the life of an investment. 
 
 Professor Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah articulated a similar point: 13 
 
 It is not far-fetched to argue that there is an ideological schism that dominates the debate on the 
definition of investment. Those who seek to confine the jurisdiction of tribunals would seek to define 
consent of states as being confined to investments that clearly promote economic development, 
whereas the expansionists would not like to see jurisdiction limited in this manner. The explanation of 
the rift between these two views does not turn only on the interpretation of words, but on the imputation 
of policy objectives. 
 
 This article contributes to a new way of assessing whether an investment’s contribution to 
development should be taken into consideration in defining the concept of investment and whether a lack 
of such contribution should deny an investment legal protection based on textual rather than historical and 
policy analysis. The article reviews various international texts and conventions on investment and trade to 
ascertain the extent to which development is an objective in those treaties and the role that such an objective 
might play in commercial and investment disputes settlement.  
 
 Based on purposive interpretation and analysis, I argue that the substantive obligation to protect an 
investment is an economic exchange or offer for the contribution an investment will make to development 
(consideration) for the host states. Therefore, contribution to development or lack of it must be taken into 
consideration in defining an investment and in deciding whether the investment should be entitled to 
protection. I point out the centrality of development as one of the purposes for the construction of the IIA 
regime and the need for that purpose to be factored into investment disputes settlement. I make a purposive 
case for sustainable investment disputes settlement: an approach to dispute resolution that takes into account 
the rights of private business and commercial parties to the dispute without compromising any of the 
purposes of the governing legal text and the autonomy of states to regulate generally to promote 
development.  
 
 
II. Development as Objective of International Investment Agreements  
 
 A case can only be made for the development objective to be factored into investor-state dispute 
settlement if it is shown that objective is central and inherent part of the investment treaty regime. This 
section does that.  
 
 Liberal economic theory justifies free trade and investment in terms of development.14 According to 
Professor Sornarajah:15 
 
 Independently of the structuring of the theory of internationalization of foreign investment contracts 
through the inclusion of appropriate clauses that increase external contacts of the contracts, policy 
grounds have been developed to justify the theory of internationalization. The policy grounds are 
founded in clearly classical economic views that foreign investment brings unmitigated blessings to a 
developing country, and that flows of such investment should be promoted through legal protection 
given through international law … 
 
__________________ 
13 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, See note 3 above, p. 162.  
14 Sornarajah, Resistance and Change, See note 3 above, 19-31; Jane Kelsey, The Fire Economy: New Zealand’s 
Reckoning (Bridget William Books, 2015), 121-149; Jane Kelsey, Reclaiming the Future: New Zealand the 
Global Economy (Bridget Williams Books, 2000), p. 200.  
15  Resistance at 107-108.  
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 The justifications concentrate on the benefits of foreign investment. The benefits brought by foreign 
investment include technical assistance, transfer of new technology, the building of infrastructure 
and new employment for local personnel. Such flows would not take place if there was instability 
in the legal regime that covered the foreign investment. The considerable financial risks involved 
in making investments in sectors like petroleum required that there should be security for such 
investments. Security and stability are essential because of the long duration of the contract. Since 
the laws of the host state were inherently unstable, it was necessary to rectify this situation by 
constructing stable rules that promoted contractual stability. These are long-standing justifications 
for the protection of foreign investment through internationalization.  
 
 Global policymakers and many trade and investment scholars share this view that there is a relationship 
between foreign investment and development. The basic proposition on why there is the need for friendly 
policies and laws on foreign investment has been summed up by Kofi Annan, former United Nations 
Secretary-General in the following words: “[w]ith its enormous potential to create jobs, raise productivity, 
enhance exports and transfer technology, foreign direct investment is a vital factor in the long-term 
economic development”16 of developing countries. Annan also stated that outward investment offers 
additional avenues for developing countries to link up to global markets and production systems. These 
investments, if managed properly, according to Annan, could help firms to access markets, natural 
resources, foreign capital, technology or various intangible assets that are essential to their competitiveness 
that may not be readily available in their home countries.17  
 
 Professor Terutomo Ozawa argues that while an outward-orientation alone is not a sufficient condition 
for rapid development, it does create a climate favourable for the transfer by transnational corporations, and 
the absorption by local enterprises of modern managerial, production and marketing technologies which 
are the sine qua non of industrial modernization.18 In the opinion of Ozawa, any developing country serious 
about raising living standards “must open its economy so as to avail itself of opportunities to trade, interact 
with and learn from the already advanced.”19 This is because the advanced countries are not only “the rich 
reservoirs of industrial technology, information and experiences which the followers can tap,”20 “[t]hey also 
provide the promising export markets from which the less developed can earn precious hard currencies.”21 
Thus, as summed up by Professor Sornarajah, the “premise on which investment treaties are made is that 
foreign investment leads to economic development and that foreign investment treaties lead to greater flows 
of foreign investment.”22 However, in theory and practice this is not so.23 Professor Ozawa’s claim as to 
technology transfer arising from trade and investment is quite exaggerated to the extent that international 
agreements (such as Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014) restrict or limit technology transfer.24 
 
 There are many reasons for the development of IIAs and arbitration.25 However, from an interpretive 
perspective there cannot be a better source to explain the objectives of IIAs than their texts. The preambles, 
__________________ 
16  Kofi Annan, “Foreword” in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National 
and International Perspectives (United Nations, 2003) iii.  
17  Ibid.  
18  Terutomo Ozawa, “Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Development” (1992) 1 Transnational 
Corporations 27. 
19  Ibid., 27. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Sornarajah, Law on Foreign Investment, See above note 3, p. 229.  
23  M Sornarajah and Leo Trakman, “A Polemic: The Cases for and Against Investment Liberalization” in Leon A 
Trakman and Nicola W Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 499, p. 504. 
24  Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0316&from=EN>.  
25  Sornarajah, resistance 78-135 and 136-190; Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty 
Law and Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment 
Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital Cambridge University Press, 2013); Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 445; Kojo 
Yelpaala “Fundamentalism in public health and safety in bilateral investment treaties [Part I]” (2008) 3(1) Asian 
Journal of WTO and International Health Law and Policy 242 at 249; and Dominic N Dagbanja, “The Limitation 
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and to a limited extent, the substantive provisions of investment and trade agreements justify trade and 
investment regimes in terms of development. This is reflected in treaties entered into not only between 
developing countries and developed countries, but also within and among developed countries and within 
and among developing countries themselves. For example, Ghana is a party to a number of investment 
treaties with United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, China and Malaysia, among others. The preambles 
to these investment treaties state that they are intended to create favourable conditions for foreign 
investment because of its role in development. Strengthening cooperation between private enterprises of 
the contracting parties is also an important objective of Ghana’s investment treaty framework..  
 
 The objective of the Ghana-United Kingdom investment treaty26 was “to create favourable conditions 
for greater investments”.27 The states parties assumed that the “encouragement and reciprocal protection 
under international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual 
business initiative and will increase prosperity”.28 The Ghana-Netherlands investment treaty29 was meant 
“to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship”30 between the two countries and “to extend and intensify 
the economic relations between them particularly with respect to investments”.31 An agreement upon the 
treatment to be accorded to foreign investments was considered necessary to stimulate the flow of capital 
and technology for development.  
 
 The Ghana-Malaysia investment treaty32 was intended “to expand and strengthen economic and 
industrial cooperation on a long term basis, and in particular, to create favourable conditions for 
investments.”33 The parties recognized the need to protect investments “to stimulate the flow of investments 
and individual business initiative with a view to promoting … economic prosperity”.34 The Ghana-China 
investment treaty35 expressed the parties’ desire “to encourage, protect and create favourable conditions for 
investment”,36 “based on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit and 
for the purpose of the development of economic cooperation between both States.”37  
 
 The stated objective of all these investment treaties in providing the legal basis for the protection of 
foreign investment is explicitly linked to development cooperation, economic development, increased 
prosperity and stimulation of the flow of capital and technology. Therefore, the search for development is 
an objective of Ghana and its contracting parties’ investment treaties as is with other developing countries. 
The investment treaties never pretend to present the protection of foreign investment as an end in itself. The 
articulation of development as an objective of foreign investment promotion and protection necessitates the 
integration of development concerns into the enforcement of investment treaties.38  
 
__________________ 
on Sovereign Regulatory Autonomy and Internationalization of Investment Protection by Treaty: An African 
Perspective” (2015) 60(1) Journal of African Law 1. 
26 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Republic of Ghana for the Promotion and Protection of Investments  (signed 22 March1989, 
entered into force 25 October 1991 (“Ghana-United Kingdom Investment Treat”). 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid.  
29  Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Ghana (signed 31 March 1989, entered into force 1 July 1991 (“Ghana-Netherlands 
investment Treaty”).  
30  Ibid., preamble.  
31  Ibid. 
32  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (signed on 8 November 1996, entered into force18 April 1997 (“Ghana-Malaysia 
Investment Treaty”).  
33  Ibid., preamble.  
34  Ibid., preamble.  
35  Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Ghana Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments  (signed 12 October 1989, entered into force on  
22 November 1991(“Ghana-China Investment Treaty).  
36  Ibid., preamble. 
37  Ibid.  
38  Dagbanja, Investment Treaty Regime and Development Policy, See above not 4, 419-429.  
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 The parties to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation39 put development at the 
centre stage of trade promotion and protection when they stated in the very first paragraph of the preamble 
to the Agreement that the contracting parties’: 
 
 relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing 
for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for 
doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development. 
 
 The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures reflects the members’ desire “to promote 
the expansion and progressive liberalisation of world trade and to facilitate investment across international 
frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading partners,” taking into account the particular 
“trade, development and financial needs” of developing countries.40 The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPPA) is a comprehensive regional agreement (among Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam) that is aimed 
at promoting “economic integration to liberalise trade and investment, bring economic growth and social 
benefits, create new opportunities for workers and businesses, contribute to raising living standards, benefit 
consumers, reduce poverty and promote sustainable growth.”41 Very significantly the investment chapter in 
Article 9.16 recognizes the rights of member stated to adopt, maintain or enforce measures to protect the 
environment and human health. 
 
 In relation to the objectives of international trade rules, Peter Van den Bosche and Werner Zdouc argue 
that “international trade can make a significant contribution to economic development and prosperity in 
developed as well as developing countries.”42 In their opinion, international trade rules “are necessary” 
because “as a result of the greatly increased levels of trade in goods and services, the protection and 
promotion of important social values such as public health, a sustainable environment, consumer safety, 
cultural identity and minimum labour standards is no longer a purely national matter.”43 I argue then that 
where the objective of attaining development is intimately and inherently embedded in these IIAs and trade 
agreements, a state that is party to them should be able to say a particular investment or commercial activity 
is not entitled to claim legal protection under the applicable treaty if the investment or commercial activity 
will not contribute to the development of the host state. This is because by these agreements reviewed 
herein, a business undertaken or transaction should only qualify as investment if it will make contribution 
to the development of the host. Indeed, by these agreements it is contribution to development from the 
perspective of the state that has entered into the investment treaties that is one of the primary criteria that 
constitute investment because that objective is one of the underlying reason states entered into these 
investment treaties.  
 
 
III. The Contribution of Investment to Development and Investor-State Disputes Settlement  
 
 This section is primarily concerned with investigating the importance that investment treaty arbitration 
attaches to development in settling investor-state disputes. The point made in this section is that, since states 
enter into investment agreements to promote a number of objectives including development yet 
development is not central in investment arbitral decision-making, states need to reconsider whether 
__________________ 
39  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation , Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf> 
40  Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf.  
41  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Pages/ 
official-documents.aspx. 
42  Peter Van den Bosche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of World Trade Organization (3edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 30. 
43  Ibid., p. 33 (emphasis original).  
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investment treaties and investment arbitration are the appropriate mechanisms to advance their development 
goals.  
 
A. Contribution of Investment to Development as a Non-essential Element of Investment 
 
 The majority of known arbitral decisions hold the view that an investment does not need to contribute 
to the development of a host state before it can enjoy an investment treaty protection and that a state may 
not invoke an investment’s lack of contribution to development as a defence for breach of an IIA.  
 
 In Société Générale v Dominican Republic44 the investor argued that the Dominican Republic had 
expropriated its investments in an electricity distributer because the country failed to allow for electricity 
rate increases and to control rampant electricity theft. This claim was based on a bilateral investment 
agreement between the Dominican Republic and France.45 The Dominican Republic objected to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It argued that Société Générale had not made an investment that could be protected 
by the investment treaty because there was no contribution to the Republic’s development as the preamble 
to the treaty envisaged. The preamble stated that the promotion and protection of investment between the 
two countries would stimulate the transfers of capital and technology “in the interest of their economic 
development.”  
 
 The Tribunal constituted under the UNCITRAL Rules46 held that to the extent that the shares, 
concessions under contract and claims and rights to any benefit having an economic value were involved 
in the dispute, they all qualified for protection independently of the manner in which they each contributed 
to stimulating the transfer of capital and technology. According to the Tribunal, the transfer of capital and 
technology was the “overall objective but not a specific requirement for each individual form of investment, 
which would be in any event most difficult to establish on a case-by-case basis.”47 The fact that the preamble 
set out the general objective of economic relationship between the two countries did not detract from the 
fact that every form of investment listed in the investment treaty qualified for protection whether it 
contributed to development or not.48 The Tribunal’s position denies the development objective of the IIA 
as revealed in its text.  
 
 In finding that the investor had made an investment, the Tribunal held that the principal objective of 
the transaction was the potential profitability of the investment in the hope that the electricity sector in the 
Dominican Republic would become financially viable since the investors were involved financial services 
and investment funds.49 Finally, the Tribunal held that the “issue of specific contribution made to the local 
economy by a transaction of this kind might not be as easy to identify … but this of course does not 
disqualify financial investments from protection”50 under the treaty. In relation to the role of a preamble to 
determining substantive rights, the Tribunal held that a preamble sets out the general purposes and 
objectives of the Treaty but “cannot add substantive requirements to the provisions of the Treaty.”51 The 
Tribunal reasoned that preambles become necessary only “when the ordinary meaning of the text cannot be 
clearly established by the pertinent provisions themselves, which is not the case here”52 because the 
applicable IIA defined investment non-exhaustively in the sense that it did not restrict the scope of 
application of the concept.53 The position of the Tribunal as to when preambles become necessary is quite 
inaccurate and misleading. As I establish below, treaties are to be interpreted to promote their objects. Thus 
__________________ 
44  Société Générale v. Dominican Republic, LCIA Case No UN 7927, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Award on 
Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction 19 September 2008.  
45  Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Dominican Republic on 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment  signed on 14 January 1999 and entry into force on  
23 January 2003. 
46  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 2010. 
47  Société Générale v. Dominican Republic, See above note 44, at [33]. 
48  Ibid.  
49  Ibid., at [34]. 
50  Ibid., at [35].  
51  Ibid., at [31]. 
52  Ibid., at [31].  
53  Ibid., at [32].  
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to the extent that a treat’s object is stated in its preamble the substantive terms of the treaty must be 
interpreted in reference to the object as contained in the preamble. So preambles always be necessary to 
refer to so long as they contain the objects of the applicable treaties.  
 
 In Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v Algeria,54 the investor won a contract for the construction 
of a dam to provide drinking water for the city of Algiers. The regulatory institutions claimed they wanted 
to change the method of construction and suspended the contract. The contract was subsequently terminated 
a few years later because little progress was being made on the job. The investors alleged breach of the full 
protection and security provision of the investment treaty between Algeria and Italy55 and sought damages 
flowing from cancellation of the contract. Algeria argued that the contract did not meet the definition of 
“investment” within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. According to Algeria, the claimant 
made no capital, material, or industrial contribution for the establishment of the worksite, which 
investments would have become the property of the state after completion of the contract. The Tribunal 
held that in deciding whether a contract is an investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention, “it is not necessary that the investment contribute more specifically to the host country’s 
economic development, something that is difficult to ascertain”56  
 
 Other cases hold a similar position as those above as to the relevance of contribution to development 
in investor-state dispute settlement. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v Slovak Republic57 holds the view 
that the concept of investment should be interpreted broadly because the drafters of the ICSID Convention 
did not impose any restrictions on its meaning. The Preamble to the ICSID Convention declares that the 
contracting states have taken into consideration the need for international cooperation for ‘economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein’. It could be inferred, therefore, that 
an international transaction which “contributes to cooperation designed to promote the economic 
development of a Contracting State may be deemed to be an investment as that term is understood in the 
Convention.”58 However, the case also suggests that the parties’ consent to the jurisdiction of ICSID is very 
important in determining a tribunal’s jurisdiction, irrespective of whether or not a specific investment 
project made a contribution to a host country’s development.59 
 
 The Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka tribunal ultimately decided that a two-fold test was to be applied 
in determining whether it had the competence to consider the merits of the claim: whether the dispute arose 
out of an investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention and, if so, whether the dispute related to 
an investment as defined in the state parties’ consent to ICSID’s arbitration and in their reference to the 
bilateral investment agreement60 and the pertinent definitions contained in the agreement.61 In effect, the 
contribution of the loan, which was the subject matter of the dispute, to Slovak Republic’s development 
was irrelevant in determining whether the transaction constituted an investment or not.  
 
 A couple of other recent cases demonstrates that contribution to development is not central in 
investment treaty arbitration. In Electrabel SA v Republic of Hungary,62 the Tribunal while identifying profit 
and return as necessary and integral elements of an “investment” held that although “the economic 
development of the host State is one of the objectives of the ICSID Convention and a desirable consequence 
__________________ 
54  Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/03/08, Award (10 January 2005).  
55  Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between Algeria and Italy , entry into on 
26 force November 1993. 
56  Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v. Algeria, supra note 81, at [13)(iv)]. 
57  Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka AS v Slovak Republic , ICSID Case No ARB/97/4, (Decision of the Tribunal on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, at [64].  
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid., at [66].  
60  Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic Regarding 
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments  signed on 23 November 1992, entered into force on 
January 1993. 
61  Ceskoslovenska v Slovak Republic, See note 57 above, at [68]. 
62  Electrabel SA v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law 
and Liability (30 November 2012).  
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of the investment … it is not necessarily an element of an investment.”63 Similarly, the Tribunal stated in 
Saba Fakes v Turkey64 that it was not convinced:65 
 
 … that a contribution to the host State’s economic development constitutes a criterion of an 
investment within the framework of the ICSID Convention. Those tribunals that have considered this 
element as a separate requirement for the definition of an investment … have mainly relied on the 
preamble to the ICSID Convention to support their conclusions. The present Tribunal observes that 
while the preamble refers to the ‘need for international cooperation for economic development,’ it 
would be excessive to attribute to this reference a meaning and function that is not obviously apparent 
from its wording. In the Tribunal’s opinion, while the economic development of a host State is one of 
the proclaimed objectives of the ICSID Convention, this objective is not in and of itself an independent 
criterion for the definition of an investment. The promotion and protection of investments in host 
States is expected to contribute to their economic development. Such development is an expected 
consequence, not a separate requirement, of the investment projects carried out by a number of 
investors in the aggregate. Taken in isolation, certain individual investments might be useful to the 
State and to the investor itself; certain might not. Certain investments expected to be fruitful may turn 
out to be economic disasters. They do not fall, for that reason alone, outside the ambit of the concept 
of investment. 
 
 The above thus treat an investment’s contribution to development as an irrelevant contribution in 
defining investment. Such a position is untenable because investment tribunals have an obligation to 
interpret a treaty in light of it objectives, which includes the development objective. The substantive terms 
of IIAs must be interpretive to advance the purposes of treaties in which they are contained. From the point 
of the view of the state, the expected outcome of an investment is the development of the host state because 
that expected outcome is one of the reasons the states entered into the IIA at the minimum as textually 
revealed in preambles. Thus, while a business transaction might ordinarily and normally qualify as an 
investment without the presence of and need for the expected outcome, for purposes of and within the 
context of an IIA such a business transaction does not qualify as an investment if the expected outcome 
cannot be realised or is not present. In such a situation, the state’s obligation to protect which was 
undertaken because of that expected outcome should not be enforceable against the state. Furthermore, even 
if it does not qualify and is not treated as a constituent element of the concept of investment, an investment 
should not be entitled to protection to the extent that that contribution to development is clearly stated as 
an objective of the applicable IIA and it is manifest that the IIA was entered into for that the realisation of 
that objective besides any others that may be ascertainable from the IIA.  
 
B. Contribution to Development as an Essential Element of Investment 
 
 There are other cases that hold the contrary view that the contribution of an investment to the 
development is an element of the concept of investment and should be taken into consideration in making 
decision whether such an investment is entitled to legal protection under the applicable treaty. A case in 
point is Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela66 in which Fedax alleged that Venezuela did not pay the principal 
sum owing under six promissory notes it had purchased as investment, regular interest on five of such 
promissory notes, and penal interest from the dates of maturity on all six promissory notes. The claim was 
brought under an investment treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela 
which guaranteed investments fair and equitable treatment; no impairment, arbitrary or discriminatory 
treatment; full physical protection and treatment; and national treatment.67 Venezuela argued there was no 
investment because there was no contribution to the country’s development. The Tribunal stated that for a 
project undertaken by an investor to qualify as an investment, “it must be for a certain duration, a certain 
__________________ 
63  Ibid., at [5.43].  
64  Saba Fakes v Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, at 97 (emphasis added). 
65  Ibid., at [97]. 
66  Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on Objection to 
Jurisdiction (11 July 1997). 
67 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Venezuela entered into force 1 November 1993 art 3.  
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regularity of profit and return, an assumption of risk, a substantial commitment made by the investor and 
the project must be significant for the host state’s development.”68 The Tribunal held that the transaction 
was an investment because it met the criteria of investment that required “a significant relationship between 
the transaction and the development of the host State.”69 However, the Tribunal did not establish that the 
promissory notes actually contributed to Venezuela’s development. This suggests that Tribunals might just 
make whimsical or conclusory statements about the significance of a business project’s contribution to 
development in defining investment for the purposes of establishing their jurisdiction in the particular case 
without proving in specific terms how the alleged investment has really contributed to development. 
 
 In Salini Costruttori SpA & Italstrade SpA v. Morocco,70 the Tribunal considered whether a public 
works contract constituted an investment and thus gave rise to its jurisdiction. The Tribunal held that in 
light of the preamble to the ICSID Convention, “one may add the contribution to the economic development 
of the host state to the investment as an additional condition”71 to the elements required for a transaction to 
qualify as an investment such as the duration of performance of the contract and participation in the risks 
of the transaction.72 The Tribunal concluded that since the contracts involved an infrastructure project, its 
contribution to the economic development of the Moroccan State could not be questioned because the 
highway project was going to serve the public interest and moreover the companies involved were going to 
provide Morocco with know-how in relation to the work to be accomplished.73 Again, in Patrick Mitchell 
v Democratic Republic of the Congo it was stated that:74 
 
 the existence of a contribution to the economic development of the host State as an essential — 
although not sufficient — characteristic or unquestionable criterion of the investment, does not mean 
that this contribution must always be sizable or successful; and, of course, ICSID tribunals do not 
have to evaluate the real contribution of the operation in question. It suffices for the operation to 
contribute in one way or another to the economic development of the host State, and this concept of 
economic development is, in any event, extremely broad but also variable depending on the case. 
 
 Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo,75 Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v 
The Government of Malaysia,76 Alex Genin Eastern Credit Ltd Inc v The Republic of Estonia,77 Pantechniki 
S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania,78 Amoco Asia Corporation v Republic 
of Indonesia79 and Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine80 also recognized contribution to the economic 
__________________ 
68  Fedax v Venezuela, See above note 66, at [43]. 
69  Ibid.  
70  Salini Costruttori SpA & Italstrade SpA v. Morocco , ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction  
(23 July 2001).  
71  Ibid., at [52]. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid., at [57]. 
74  Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo , Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Award, 1 November 2006. at [33] (emphasis added). Among the cases Malaysian Historical 
Salvors Sdn, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, 17 May 2007, at [143] seem 
to have made a bold departure by holding that there was the need for a transaction to make substantial 
contribution to the host country’s development to qualify as an investment. This decision was subsequently 
annulled Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Decision on an 
Application for Annulment paras. 61 and 80 (16 April 2009).  
75  Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of the Award, 1 November 2006, paras. [27-41]. 
76  Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v The Government of Malaysia , ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Award, 17 
May 2007. However, Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v The Government of Malaysia , ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 April 2009, paras. [56-61] found the same contract 
to be an investment without reference to the need for contribution to development.  
77  Alex Genin Eastern Credit Ltd Inc v The Republic of Estonia , Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, 25 June 2001, at [348].  
78  Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers (Greece) v. The Republic of Albania , ICSID Case No ARB/07/21, 
Award, 30 July 2009, at [81-82]. 
79  Amoco Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia , ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Liability,25 September 1983, at [23].  
80  Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/O6/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability,  
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development of the host country as a characteristic of investment for the purpose of deciding if an 
investment is entitled to protection.  
 
 In effect, some of foregoing cases are authorities for the legal proposition that contribution to a host 
country’s development is not a mandatory element for the concept of investment and that the legal 
obligation to protect an investment may subsist even if an investment does not make contribution to 
development. Therefore, tribunals are not under any obligation to make a finding that a particular 
investment has to contribute to a host country’s development. It is sufficient for the purpose of determining 
whether a transaction constitutes an investment and is entitled to investment treaty protection if the 
transaction is important, significant or has the potential to contribute to the host country’s development. A 
finding that a transaction has actually contributed to a country’s development is not relevant in determining 
whether the transaction constitutes an investment. Such an approach raises the question as to what the 
consideration or quid pro quo is for states in return for the legal protections they have to accord foreign 
investors. This is important to consider given that the legal obligation to protect foreign investment may 
lead to state liability to pay damages to the investor for breach of the legal protection.  
 
 Most, if not all, investment treaties, specify their purposes in their preambles. Yet, Société Générale81 
suggests that the goals or purposes of IIAs are of less interpretive importance than the actual terms of the 
IIAs when it comes to enforcing the rights of the parties to the IIAs. This means that the development 
objective of IIAs must be subordinated to the interest of the investor to make profits, which is not textually 
revealed in IIAs. Such an approach delinks the legal obligation to protect an investment from a fundamental 
reason states assume that treaty obligation to protect the investment. It follows, as stated in Malaysian 
Historical Salvors v Malaysia, that “a purely commercial entity, intended only for the enrichment of its 
owners and not connected with the economic development of the host State, is entitled to bring before 
ICSID a dispute concerning an investment in the host State.”82 In effect, some investment tribunals have 
completely and effectively minimised the relevance of development in international investment law and 
arbitration. The above cases and others challenging measures adopted by Argentina in response to economic 
and financial crisis83 suggest that investment protection by treaty may, in some cases, come to stand in the 
way of development rather than promoting it.  
 
 
IV. Centralising Contribution to Development in Investment Treaty Interpretation  
 
 The objective of development is embedded in the investment treaty regime’s preambles thereby 
making an investment’s contribution to development a constituent, and I argue, essential and necessary 
element of an investment. That development objective must inform the interpretation and enforcement of 
the substantive terms of investment treaties. From a textual perspective, unless the preamble or provision 
of an investment treaty shows in clear and unambiguous terms that its primary and sole purpose is the 
protection of foreign investment as an end, it will be out of context of the treaty to interpret it in disregard 
of its development implications if the treaty’s preamble or provision states that it is aimed at attracting 
foreign investment for development. The issue here is not whether preambles prevail over substantive 
provisions in law but whether preambles contain purposes that the substantive terms of investment treaties 
must be interpreted to advance. This distinction is often not made in the literature.84 Such a distinction is 
important because it allows for the existence of a treaty’s objective in its preamble to be recognized and 
admitted, and the substantive terms interpreted in light of that objective. A failure to make the distinction is 
partly responsible for dismissive attitude of tribunals towards preambles and the concomitant expansive 
__________________ 
14 January 2010 paras. [272-273]. 
81  Société Générale v Dominican Republic, See above note 44.  
82  Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, BHD v Malaysia , ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Decision on an Application for 
Annulment, 6 April 2009, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen at [21]  
83  Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008; LG & E 
Energy Corporation v Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No ARB 02/1, 3 October 2006;  Enron 
Corporation v Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007.  
84  Dagbanja Investment Treaties and Development Policy, See note 4 above, p. 453.  
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and unqualified interpretation of the substantives of IIA in order to provide absolute protection for the 
investor.  
 
 The imperative to interpret investment treaties in accordance with the objectives contained in their 
preambles, and not just in terms of their substantive standards of investment of protection, is consistent 
with Article 31(1) and (2) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, wherein it is stated: 
 
 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
 The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes. 
 
 In his seminal book, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Francis Bennion defined purposive 
construction or interpretation as “one which gives effect to the legislative purpose.”85 From this purposive 
and contextual approach to treaty interpretation86, the concept of investment has to be interpreted in the 
context in which those terms are used and in light of the object and purpose of that treaty unless the 
definition of the concept in the IIA expressly excludes certain elements. The context of a treaty includes its 
preamble and substantive terms. Therefore, so long as textually the attraction of investment for the 
attainment of development is stated as an objective of and reason for bringing the particular investment 
treaty into being, a business activity or transaction can only constitute an investment if it will make such 
contribution to the development of the host state, although in a different other context it might constitute an 
investment without having to make any form of contribution. This appears to be the position taken by the 
Tribunal in Saluka Investments v Czech Republic,87 which discerned the purpose of the agreement from its 
title and preamble88 as recognizing that an agreement “upon the treatment to be accorded to such 
investments will stimulate the flow of capital and technology and the economic development of the 
Contracting Parties and that fair and equitable treatment is desirable” to that effect. In interpreting these 
provisions, the Tribunal stated that:89 
 
 This is a more subtle and balanced statement of the Treaty’s aims than is sometimes appreciated. The 
protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a necessary element 
alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the 
parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a balanced approach to the interpretation of the 
Treaty’s substantive provisions for the protection of investments, since an interpretation which 
exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States 
from admitting foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying 
the parties’ mutual economic relations. 
 
 The challenge is how to define what contribution to the development of the host state. It might be 
argued that the concept of ‘development’ is amorphous and very broad since it can contain many elements. 
This situation can make it difficult for investment tribunals to define and measure development and the 
contribution of an investment to the development of the host state. Salini Costruttori SpA & Italstrade SpA 
v. Morocco90 said so. However, investment promotion and protection by treaty is premised on the 
__________________ 
85  Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code (5edn, LexisNexis, 2008) at 944. See also 
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 151 at 272; and Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 165.  
86  Readings on treaties and their interpretation include: Richard K Gardiner,  Treaty Interpretation (2edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon, 1986); Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. 2edn, Manchester University Press, 1984); Maarten Bos, ‘Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation” 
(1980a) 27(1) Netherlands International Law Review 3; and Maarten Bos, ‘Theory and Practice of Treaty 
Interpretation” (1980b) 27(1) Netherlands International Law Review 135.  
87  Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic , Partial Award, 17 March 2006.  
88  Ibid., [299].  
89  Ibid., [300].  
90  Salini Costruttori SpA & Italstrade SpA v. Morocco , See note 70 above.  
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conventional wisdom that it creates jobs, raises productivity and enhances exports and leads to transfer 
technology.91 According to those who support investment protection by treaty, inward investment offers an 
additional avenue for developing countries to link up to global markets and production systems. These 
investments could help firms to access markets, natural resources, foreign capital, technology, or various 
intangible assets that are essential to their competitiveness that may not be readily available in their home 
countries.92 In summary, these include the stated benefits of the legal commitment to protect foreign 
investment. These stated benefits can form the starting point for a tribunal with the aid of counsel to 
determine whether the investment at stake has made or can make contribution to the host state’s 
development. If a state alleges that an investment has made no contribution to its development or could not 
have been expected to have made any contribution to its development at the time of the admission of the 
investment and not entitled to protection, the burden is on the state to prove its case.93 That the concept of 
development is difficult to define is no excuse for a tribunal to refuse to make a determination whether an 
investment has made a contribution to the development of the host state. For as state in Article 42(2) of the 
ICSID Convention a tribunal “may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the ground of silence or obscurity 
of the law” (whether IIA or other source of law). 
 
 Thus, in making an assessment of an investment’s contribution to the development of the host state, 
account should be taken of what foreign investment is said to be capable of bringing to the host state, 
namely, transfer technology or know-how to the host state, employment, enhancement of the Gross 
Domestic Product of the host country, and the overall impact of the investment on the host state’s 
development.94 I adopt the perspective advanced by Dr Omar García-Bolívar, that: 95 
 
 If an investment is contrary to the public interest, has not generated any knowledge transfer to the host 
State, has not enhanced the economy or its productivity, has not increased the standards of living of 
the host country or the labour conditions, it almost certainly has not made a contribution to the 
economic development of that country… [T]hat investment should be denied protection.  
 
 In particular, the ICSID arbitral system which was established to resolve investment disputes must 
resolve those disputes taking into consideration the overall objectives of its applicable convention, which 
objectives are not limited to promoting profiting making alone.96 For the contracting parties to ICSID 
Convention, international cooperation was seen as needed for economic development. Development 
cooperation is enhanced by private international investment. The substantive obligations states assume to 
promote and protect foreign investment are aimed at attaining that development. So it would be hard to 
convincingly argue that this Convention is aimed at investment protection as an end itself and that 
development is completely irrelevant in its scheme of things.  
 
 Furthermore, where a treaty incorporates sustainable development and public interests objectives into 
its terms, tribunals must respect and uphold those objectives just as they would do in the case of those aimed 
at protecting private property interests. For example, an investment and trade agreement such as the TPPA 
substantively recognizes and guarantees the right of states parties to regulate in the public interest such 
protecting the environment and health which must be taken into consideration in interpreting it. Article 9.16 
of the investment chapter states:  
 
 Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing 
any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that 
__________________ 
91  Annan, See note 16 above.  
92  Ibid. 
93  Rahim Moloo,’ Evidentiary Issues Arising in an Investment Arbitration’ in Chiara Giorgetti (ed), Litigating 
International Investment Disputes: A Practitioner’s Guide (Brill Nijhoff 2014) 287.  
94  Omar E García-Bolívar, ‘Economic development at the core of the International Investment Regime’ in Chester 
Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration  (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 586, p. 603. 
95  Ibid., p. 595.  
96  See Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2edn, Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other 
regulatory objectives. 
 
 Apart from textual considerations, it can also be argued from a contract law perspective, that legal 
obligation to protect an investment is an offer97 in return for the benefit that the state expects to receive from 
the investment made by the investor. If an investor knowing very well that investment treaty was intended 
to attract the investment to enhance the development of the host country proceeds to make the investment, 
then it expressly or impliedly and necessarily agrees that the investment it will make will contribute to the 
development of the host state. In such case the investor can only enjoy legal protection under the investment 
treaty if its investment will contribute to the development of the host state. The benefit or expected outcome 
of the investment to the host state, not the investment itself, is the consideration for the offer to protect 
made by the state.98 Thus, investment treaty law and arbitration cannot be sustained in such a case if its 
practical implementation is lopsided, where it focuses solely on the offer by imposing damages or penalties 
on the state for failing to fulfil the legal obligation to protect without considering whether the investor has 
fulfilled its part of the bargain by making an investment that brings benefits to the host state.99  
 
 The benefits, consideration, could be in the form of technology and know-how, employment of local 
people, provision of goods and services that serve the national interest and other benefits. The benefits of 
an investment could also be assessed in terms of the impact of the investment on the environment and 
natural resources (including quality of water) and labour rights of the local people.100 If an investment 
impacts negatively on the environment and natural resources in a manner that neutralizes any other benefits 
it brings, the rights available for the investor should correspondingly be reassessed and re-evaluated. These 
matters are important and should be regarded in investor-state disputes settlement. There is the need for 
sustainable investment disputes settlement. Sustainable investment disputes settlement arises where the 
interests of both the investor and the state under the applicable investment treaty are treated as mutually 
supportive of the continued existence and relevance of the very treaty regime that establishes the respective 
rights and interests and its disputes settlement mechanisms.101  
 
 In summary, the following premises underlie this article: 
 
1. One of the reasons states (at least developing countries) enter into IIAs is to attract investment 
that will contribute to their development and not necessarily to attract and protect foreign 
investment as ends in and of themselves. 
2. Treaties, including IIAs, are to be interpreted in context and in light of their object and purpose. 
3. Unless expressly excluded as not being a constituent element of the concept of investment in 
IIA, contribution to development should be treated as essential element of investment to the 
extent that an IIA stipulates it as an objective for the making and coming into being of the IIA.  
4. Given that IIAs are to be interpreted in light of their object and purpose, even if not capable of 
being treated as an essential element of investment the resolution of the issue whether or not an 
investment should be entitled to protection for want of contribution to the development of the 
host state should be dependent on whether such contribution can manifestly be said to be an 
objective of the IIA.  
__________________ 
97  See Richard Craswell, “Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance” (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 481 
98  See J. Cumberbatch, “Of Bargains, Gifts and Extortion: An Essay on the Function of Consideration in the Law 
of Contract” (1990) 19(3) 19 Anglo-American Law Review 239; K O Shatwell, “The Doctrine of Consideration 
in the Modem Law” (1953-4) 1 Sydney Law Review 789; John Swan, “Consideration and the Reasons for 
Enforcing contracts” (1976) 15 University of Western Ontario Law Review 83.  
99  Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual Framework and Options for 
the Way Forward (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, July 2015), 
<http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Investment-Schill-FINAL.pdf> at 4 and 6 
100 Sornarah, Resistance and Change, See above note 3, p.163.  
101 See Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future  (1987) available at 
http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm. 
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5. If an investment’s contribution to development is an essential element of the concept of 
investment or is an objective of an IIA, the investment should not be entitled to protection under 
the IIA if it does not make such contribution.  
6. Where an IIA has competing objectives, investment tribunals must resolve investment disputes 
sustainably. They must not be predisposed to make decisions in favour of one of the disputing 
parties or one of the competing interests. Investment tribunals must objectively take all the 
competing interests into consideration and make decisions in light of the facts and evidence. In 
this regard, as risk is an inherent part of investment, tribunals must not seek to protect investment 
against each and every risk, including risks inherent in justified regulation. The legitimate rights 
of investors must be protected without compromising the rights of states to regulate now or in 
future in to promote development.  
 
 
V. Modernising International Investment Agreements to Promote Development  
 
 The reason investment tribunals hold that an investment’s contribution to development is not a 
constituent or essential element of an investment is substantive imbalance in the terms of IIAs. Whereas 
investment treaties impose substantive standards of investment protection on states, similar obligations are 
not imposed on investors. The reason for such lack of corresponding obligations appears to be the orthodox 
view that foreign investment leads to development and everything must be done to secure protection for the 
investor.  
 
 In this regard, there is the need to modernise the IIA regime in at least four aspects. First of all, there 
is the need to be explicit in the substantive terms of IIAs about the role that investment activity must play 
to the development of the host state if such investment is to enjoy legal protection under the applicable IIA. 
While recent IIAs (such as TPPA Articles 9.8 and 9.16) tend to make exceptions for public interest 
regulation such as environmental protection, labour rights and limiting the scope of expropriation standard, 
those exceptions are commonly qualified in terms that limit their potency to practically give states the scope 
they need to regulate in the public interest. Thus, the contribution of an investment to development must be 
stated as a positive obligation that investors must observe. Investors must have an express obligation to 
ensure that their investment operations contribute to the development of the host state.  
 
 Secondly, the concept of investment must be defined in IIAs in terms that expressly include 
contribution to development as a constituent element. This will remove doubt as to the status of this criterion 
in identifying the elements of an investment.  
 
 Thirdly, there is the need for specific indices of what constitutes contribution of an investment to 
development to be contained in schedules to IIAs or to be developed as separate guidelines. Those indices 
will serve as a reference point for a tribunal that is faced with an argument that an investment is not entitled 
to protection for want of contribution to development.  
 
 Fourthly, the objectives of IIAs need to be stated in clearer and precise terms. The IIAs cannot replace 
rules of international law on international and diplomatic relations and cooperation. So they must just deal 
with the business and the specific state interests they seek to promote and nothing more. Thus if their 
objectives are to secure legal protection for investments to guarantee investor profits and returns in return 
for the contribution the investments will make to the development of the host state that must be precisely 
and unambiguously stated as their objectives. The terms of the IIA must mandate tribunals to interpret the 
IIAs to advance these objectives.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
 In theory and in practice states enter into investment treaties to promote their investment and not just 
to protect investment as an end in itself. This is very well settled and is empirically reflected in the 
preambles to investment treaties, and most recently in their substantive terms as contained in chapter 9 of 
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TPPA. In light of the fact that states conclude investment treaties to protect foreign investment in order to 
promote their development by ensuring that foreign investors are protected from non-commercial risks 
associated with regulation in particular:102 
 
 [I]t becomes important that to consider in the interpretation of IIAs the intention of the States when 
entering into those agreements. In some cases, that interpretation is relatively straightforward as the 
IIA itself identifies the intentions of the State Parties, and sets out the object and purpose of the 
agreement. But in other instances, the States’ intentions are not expressly stated. Where this is the 
case, it is suggested that the approach adopted by the arbitrators should be one of looking at all the 
surrounding circumstances, not only at the preamble and preparatory work, but also at the raison d’être 
of the States themselves as well as the reasons for entering into the agreement — in order words the 
promotion of the welfare and development of communities within the host State.  
 
 The development objective can no longer be treated as peripheral in investor-state dispute settlement: 
it is a central part of the investment treaty regime and must be treated as such. The investment treaty regime 
as reflected in recent backlash against the regime103 cannot be sustained unless competing objectives under 
the regime are all adequately respected and upheld. This means there is the need for a sustainable investment 
disputes settlement approach to handling investment disputes: development is and must be treated as 
necessary for the attainment of the objective to provide a secure environment investment under the 
applicable investment treaty. The objective to provide a secure legal environment for investment to flourish 
and gain profits must be pursued in a manner that does not compromise the overall development objective 
for which a state has undertaken the obligation to protect the investment. The development objective should 
prevail over the need to guarantee an investment secure protection and vice versa depending on the facts 
and circumstances of the case. It cannot be that the investor’s interests must always have its way and at all 
cost as has been the case. The statement of development an objective of investment treaties should also 
condition the nature and scope of the investors’ responsibility in terms of ensuring that their investments 
contribute to the development of the host state. This is the only way a balance of rights and corresponding 
obligations between investors and their host states can be attained.104 
 
  
__________________ 
102 Garćia-Bolívar, See above note 94, 588 and 589-590.  
103 Michael Waibel et al (eds), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law 
International, 2010); Suzanne A Spears, “Making Way for the Public Interest in International Investment 
Agreements” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds) Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 271 Suzanne A Spears, “The Quest for Policy Space in a New 
Generation of International Investment Agreements” (2005) 13(4), Journal of International Economic Law 1037; 
and Asha Kaushal, “Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash against the Foreign 
Investment Regime” (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 491.  
104 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania , ICSID CASE NO. ARB/05/22, Award. 24 July 
2008, at [380].  
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UNCITRAL and the Possibility of Returning to the Multilateral Regulation of Foreign 
Investments 
 
Maria A. Gwynn, Princeton University, United States of America; University of Oxford, United 
Kingdom※ 
 
 In the historical development of the international investment framework, there have been some 
multilateral attempts to regulate foreign investments. From the 1950s to the 1970s the United Nations (UN), 
was the first multilateral forum used to regulate foreign investments. It was a platform for countries to reach 
decisions about the rules by consensus. As a result, there were numerous UN General Assembly resolutions 
concerning rules of foreign investment. UN General Assembly resolutions have the legal value of being de 
lege ferenda, meaning that states should strive to practice in accordance with what the resolutions 
recommend, they are, however, not binding. In matters pertaining to the establishment of an international 
investment framework, countries instead engaged in bilateral negotiations, in attempts to agree on different 
rules. Most countries signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which contained different provisions than 
the ones contained in the UN resolutions. Most of these treaties were signed in the 1990s, though the 
signings did not end then. On the other hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO), once established, was 
also used as a multilateral forum to bring about regulation of investment rules. Investment regulations were 
proposed at the 1996, 1999, 2001 and the 2003 WTO Ministerial conferences. In a similar vein to what had 
occurred at the UN, however, the agreements were not reached at the multilateral level and more investment 
treaties continued to be signed at a bilateral level.1 As a result, the current framework was formed, for the 
most part, bilaterally. However, some current developments, in which the work of UNCITRAL played a 
crucial role, suggest yet again a return to the multilateral level to amend the current international framework. 
The question is, then, why are countries returning to the multilateral forum to amend or improve the existing 
rules?  
 
 In this paper, I will argue that criticisms against the bilaterally established international investment 
framework have once again prompted actors to return to a discussion of foreign investment rules at the 
multilateral level. This results in a forum shifting that can be explained by international relations theories 
relating to modified structural approaches and contested multilateralism. 
 
 Since the criticism arise mainly from the enforcement of investor-state dispute settlement clauses in 
investment treaties, in the first section, I shall discuss the different arbitration institutions and rules in 
investor-state dispute settlement clauses. In the second section, I shall discuss how the inclusion of 
transparency provisions in investor-state disputes settlement has opened up the possibility for returning to 
a multilateral forum for amending or improving the foreign investment rules. In the third and last section, I 
shall explain this phenomenon of forum shifting, from the bilateral to the multilateral, by using the 
theoretical lenses of modified structural approaches and contested multilateralism. 
 
1. International Arbitration Rules in Investor-State Disputes.  
 
 For settling investor-state disputes, most International Investment Agreements (IIAs) feature 
international arbitration as a mechanism to settle such disputes. One of the main international arbitration 
institutions for settling investor-state disputes has been the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID was established in 1965 with the “Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States” (the ICSID Convention), and it is one 
of the five agencies of the World Bank. ICSID is a specialized institution created for the sole purpose of 
settling investment disputes.2 
__________________ 
※  I would like to thank the Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellowship Programme for funding this research, and 
Robert O. Keohane for reading a previous version of this paper and giving very helpful comments.  
1  Gwynn, M.A. Power in the International Investment Framework  Palgrave Macmillan. 2016. Chapter 3 and 6. 
2  See the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
Introduction; Parra, A. The History of ICSID Oxford University Press. 2012; Schreuer, C., Malintoppi,  
L., Reinisch A, Sinclair, A. ‘The ICSID Convention: A Commentary’ 2nd Ed. Cambridge University Press. 2009. 
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 As of January 2017, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism of IIAs has been used in 756 
cases.3 The disputes have been mainly submitted to ICSID, and thus the ICSID rules for arbitration were 
used. However, the data also shows that ICSID is followed by a great number of investor-state disputes that 
have been submitted for international arbitration in which the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules are used.4 (See Table 1) 
 
Table 1. Arbitration rules in investor-state disputes pursuant to IIAs 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Applicable Arbitration Rules. 
 
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established in 1966 
by United Nations Resolution No. 2205. Its mandate was “to further the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade”.5 The Commission was charged to do this by, inter alia, 
“establishing and maintaining a close collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development.”6 The resolution also stated that the Commission shall “bear in mind the interests of all 
peoples, and particularly those of developing countries, in the extensive development of international 
trade.”7 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were adopted in 1976, but these rules were mainly created for 
commercial arbitration.  
 
 In IIAs, once a dispute arises, the dispute settlement clause will establish the dispute settlement 
mechanism to be followed. In some treaties the parties are given a choice of which arbitration rules to use. 
__________________ 
3  UNCTAD World Investment Report 2016 reported 696 cases as of January 2016. This number has increased to 
756 in 2017 for known cases that have used arbitral rules. The number is higher if the cases with no data available 
are considered. UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub.  
4  In the total of investor-state disputes cases, 390 are ICSID cases, 212 UNCITRAL, 85 other rules, 9 unknown. 
The other rules include those of CRCICA (Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration), ICC 
(International Chamber of Commerce), ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), 
ICSID AF (ICSID Additional Facility), LCIA (London Court of International Arbitration), MCCI (Moscow 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry), PCA (Permanent Court of Arbitration), SCC (Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce). See UNCTAD Investment Dispute Settlement database. 
5  UN Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966; See also “Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL”, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html. 
6  UN Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966; See also “Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL”, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html; The first attempt to regulate investment at a 
multilateral level was at the UN. Developing countries were questioning the Bretton Woods system because they 
claimed it benefited only those who created them. Due to such an uprising of developing countries ’ demands, the 
United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was created in 1964 to support developing 
countries. See Gwynn, M.A. Power in the International Investment Framework Chapter 2. Palgrave Macmillan. 
2016. 
7  UN Resolution 2205(XXI) of 17 December 1966; See also “Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL”, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html. 
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 States that have ratified the ICSID Convention automatically give consent to its jurisdiction; but if the 
treaties allow, the parties can consent to submit the dispute to international arbitration using the UNCITRAL 
rules instead.8 ICSID is still used more, but it is interesting to note that although UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules were not created for the sole purpose of settling investment disputes, and yet over the years, their 
general use in investor-state disputes substantially increased. (See Table 2) 
 
Table 2. Use of Arbitration Rules in Investor-State Disputes 
 
 
 One explanation for the use of UNCITRAL arbitration rules in investor-state disputes is the attractive 
flexibility that the rules give to the parties for conducting arbitration.9 The UNCITRAL Arbitration rules 
are like guidelines for the parties, who, for example, can freely choose the place of arbitration and can even 
modify the rules if both parties agree. In contrast, ICSID arbitration rules, being institutional rules, are more 
rigid in those regards.  
 
 However, although the latter might be the colloquial explanation for the increased use of UNCITRAL 
rules in investor-state disputes, there is room for considering another view. I shall argue that the increase of 
the use of UNCITRAL rules in investor-state disputes might be connected to the institutional response to 
the criticisms regarding the enforcement of the IIAs rules. Parties’ perception on how effective the 
institutional response to such criticism is affects their preference over the use of the particular institutions’ 
rules. To illustrate this point, I will discuss the response regarding demands for transparency in investor-
state disputes. 
 
__________________ 
8  In investor-states disputes, the United States, for example, has had 16 investment disputes up to February 2017 
and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have been used in 11 of these disputes. In South America, Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela have terminated the ICSID Convention, so since 2010, disputes against Bolivia and Ecuador have 
used the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but against Venezuela the ICSID rules continued to be used. Though it 
might seem that this situation is due to the termination of the ICSID Convention and some of their BITs, the 
sunset clauses mean that the provisions will stay in force for many years after the termination of the treaty. As 
the Venezuela case shows, even after it terminated the ICSID Convention, cases are still submitted there. In 
general, the data show the percentage increase of the use of UNCITRAL rules in certain years. See also UNCTAD 
Press Release ‘Number of international investment disputes mushroomed in 2012’. Figure 2. 
UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2013/007 Geneva, Switzerland, (10 April 2013). Available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=120 Accessed July 24 2016.  
9  See Franchini, J. ‘International Arbitration Under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Contractual Provision for 
Improvement’ Fordham Law Review. Vol 62. 1994; Caron, D and Caplan, L The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: 
A Commentary Oxford University Press. 2013. 
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2. Increased Transparency Rules in Investor-State Disputes and the Role of UNCITRAL 
  
 Some disputes submitted by foreign investors against a host state to international arbitration were due 
to the regulations of the host state. In some cases, arbitral awards settling those cases had the consequence 
of restricting the host state’s ability to regulate. For this reason, respondent states started to criticize the 
international investment framework for allowing this.10 As the awareness of the public interest in these 
disputes grew, many NGOs likewise complained, alongside some bodies of the European Union. These 
actors also became aware of their alienation from such controversies.11  
 
 Arbitrations conducted at ICSID used to only allow for public notices of the disputes and permitted 
the parties to publish the awards upon their initiative. As a consequence of the criticism, ICSID addressed 
the concerns about lack of transparency and modified its arbitration rules in 2006. Since then, it made its 
hearings public and allowed for the possibility of submitting amicus curiae reports.12 Every other stage of 
the process, however, remained confidential. The limited scope of these amendments may have been the 
reason that actors within the framework began to seek actions from the other relevant forum in investor-
state disputes. 
 
 In 2007, UNCITRAL’s Working Group on Arbitration and Conciliation noted that further work on the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules should take into account investor-state arbitration.13 Urging for the need to 
enhance transparency in investor arbitrations, in April 2008 the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement, declaring that ‘where human rights and other public 
interests are concerned, transparency should be a governing principle…’.14 Only two months later, in June 
2008, Canada requested UNCITRAL to give the Working Group a mandate to improve the institution’s 
functionality in that area. It was mentioned in the request that “failing to promptly include, at the earliest 
possible opportunity, provisions allowing for enhanced transparency will give the impression that the 
United Nations approves of a lack of transparency in investor-state arbitration. Such an effective 
endorsement of secrecy in investor-state arbitration would be contrary to the fundamental principles of good 
governance and human rights upon which the United Nations is founded.”15 In this timeframe, 2007-2009, 
the use of UNCTIRAL rules in investor-state disputes increased considerably (See Table 2). The fact that 
after those years it decreased again can be explained by the many cases against Venezuela whose BITs do 
not include UNCITRAL as a choice in the dispute settlement clause,16 or for the number of cases deriving 
__________________ 
10  For example, Argentina complained strongly after the cases regarding their financial regulation during the 
financial crisis of 2001. In 2008, Brazil gave a statement saying that it would not ratify BITs because of the cost 
to their sovereignty. Around the same time, Bolivia started terminating its BITs, and it also terminated the ICSID 
Convention in 2007. So did Ecuador; it terminated some of its BITs and the ICSID Convention in 2009. In 2012, 
Venezuela also terminated the ICSID Convention. In the same year, Argentina submitted a draft of law to the 
Congress to terminate the ICSID Convention. Both Australia, in 2011, and Uruguay, in 2014, made public 
statements complaining about the settlement mechanism of BITs after being sued for regulations in the area of  
public health; Gwynn, M.A. Power in the International Investment Framework. Chapter 6; See also Australia’s 
Response to the Notice of Arbitration. 2011. Available at https://www.ag.gov.au/Internationalrelations/ 
InternationalLaw/Documents/Australias%20Response%20to%20the%20Notice%20of%20Arbitration%2021%2
0December%202011.pdf Last accessed July 26, 2016. 
11  See for example the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
http://www.iisd.org/topic/investment ; and Greenpeace Netherlands, https://www.ttip-leaks.org/. For statements 
of the European Parliament see European Parliament resolution of 6 April 2011 on the future European 
international investment policy (2010/2203(INI)).  
12  ICSID Arbitration Rules. Chapter IV. Rule 32 (2) and Rule 37 (2). 
13  Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its fortieth session, U.N. 
Doc. A/62/17 (Part I), at ¶ 175 (23 July 2007).  
14  Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights: Advance 
Edited Version, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5, at ¶ 37 (7 April 
2008) available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/8session/A-HRC-8-5.doc.  
15  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law forty first session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/662 (12 June 
2008) p. 7. 
16  Gwynn, M.A. Power in the International Investment Framework . Chapter 4. 
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from the Energy Charter, in which, although UNCITRAL rules are a choice for the parties, it has the 
restriction of using them only with a sole arbitrator and not in an arbitration tribunal.17  
 
 The need for transparency in investor-state arbitrations continued to be pledged by other actors. In 
2010, the European Union also contemplated transparency provisions as part of their international 
investment policy.18 
 
 The consensus on transparency in matters that concern public interest is almost universal; transparency 
in investor-state arbitrations has been no exception.19 This is why the adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency by the majority of countries was straightforward. In 2013, the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration were adopted by the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 68/109 and came into force on April 1, 2014. As compared to what ICSID had done to 
accommodate transparency provisions, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency are of a much broader scope 
because the rules allow for the whole arbitration process to be made public from the moment that the 
respondent state gets notified of the dispute.20  
 
 Since its adoption, every arbitration conducted henceforth under UNCITRAL Rules must observe the 
transparency regulations. The transparency rules also establish the creation of a repository, creating a 
registry of the disputes, all of which becomes available to the public. This information includes the names 
of the disputing parties, the economic sector involved, the treaty under which the claim is being made, the 
notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim of defence and every 
other statement or written submission, the exhibits, expert and witness reports, non-disputing party 
submissions (amicus curiae), transcripts of hearings, orders, decisions and awards.21  
 
 However, the UNCITRAL rules on transparency contain an exception to the rules of transparency. 
This exception pertains to confidential or protected information, such as confidential business information, 
information that is protected from being made available to the public under the treaty or under the law of 
the respondent state or any law or rules determined by the arbitration tribunal, or when the disclosure is 
considered to be contrary to essential security interests of the state.22 This exception will continue to please 
those who see the attractiveness of these rules in their flexibility because the parties can decide how to 
conduct the process and what to leave out as confidential.  
 
 The relevance of the UNICTRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration is 
that they are a key stone for the amendment of the framework rules. Their establishment was pursued by 
actors facing the challenge to overcome some of the criticism against the enforcement mechanism of the 
international investment framework. 
 
 Due to this, other developments at the multilateral level unfolded. The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency entered into force in 2014, but most of the existing investment treaties are dated much earlier. 
Finding a way for the new UNCITRAL rules to have a retroactive effect was the next challenge. The 
problem was solved by using international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a 
later treaty can modify previous treaties if states agree to it.23 
 
__________________ 
17  UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub. Investment disputes.  
18  Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Towards a comprehensive European international 
investment policy’ Brussels, 7 July 2010. 
19  See a contrary opinion in European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration ‘A response to the criticism 
against ISDS’ May 2015. Accessible at http://efila.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/EFILA_in_response_to_the-
criticism_of_ISDS_final_draft.pdf.  
20  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. 
21  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, Article 2 and 3. 
22  UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, Article 7. 
23  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 30: a successive treaty creating new obligations.  
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 In December 2014, only 8 months after the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency entered into force, the 
Mauritius Convention or United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 69/116. The Mauritius convention provides 
for the transparency rules to be applied retroactively to all existing BITs. It will come into force when 
countries ratify it. So far, the convention has been signed by 17 countries; the first country to ratify it was 
Mauritius.24 The United States Trade Representative Office has stated that “The United States is committed 
to ensuring the highest levels of transparency in all investor-state proceedings.”25 The European 
Commission has also approved ‘pushing’ for transparency in investor state disputes by recommending the 
signing of the Mauritius Convention to the European Council.26 
 
 Although some scepticism might remain on whether the latter approach will work, as the toll for such 
a convention to come into force is each state’s ratification of the convention, the path pursued by the 
convention is relevant to the scholarship on the continuing development of the international investment 
framework. The Mauritius Convention was used as a meta-treaty to modify all previously-existing 
investment treaties so as to include transparency rules. This is the first step towards returning to 
multilateralism in the area of international investments.  
 
 The leap towards a consensual discussion of improving foreign investment rules at the multilateral 
level would be much greater if other criticized rules that exist in IIAs could also be amended in a way 
similar to the inclusion of the transparency rules in the framework.  
 
 And indeed, in May 2016, this exactly was proposed. The UNCITRAL Secretariat submitted to the 
Commission a proposition for further research to amend the topic of investor-state dispute settlement in a 
similar way as the transparency rules were adopted through the Mauritius Convention, i.e. to use the 
Mauritius Convention as a model for other conventions or as a complement to modify other rules. The 
proposition considers the establishment of a permanent dispute-settlement body to replace or complement 
investor-state provisions in existing and future treaties as well as the possibility of considering an appeal 
mechanism.27 
 
 Although the proposition limits itself to revising the investor-state dispute settlement, if accepted, this 
would nevertheless be a huge stepping stone towards the return to the multilateralization of investment 
rules. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties allows for amending the existing investment treaties 
by successive treaties, as it was with the Mauritius Convention28, but the Vienna Convention also allows 
for the modification of existing treaties.29 Either way, the final course of action to agree and to implement 
these conventions, will remain in the hands of each state. So the awareness of these developments is 
important, as well as the theoretical explanations of them that are discussed in the next section.  
 
3. Theoretical background for the Forum Shifting 
 
 The efforts to include transparency provisions in the international investment framework at the 
multilateral level, the Mauritius Convention, and the proposition to further research other provisions of the 
investment framework, suggest a return to the multilateral level to amend the current international 
__________________ 
24  Status United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014). 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html  
Accessed November 25,2016. 
25  The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement. Official Blog of the United States Trade Representative. March. 
2014. Available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-
State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors Accessed July 25, 2016. 
26  European Commission (EC) Press Release ‘European Commission pushes for full transparency for ISDS in 
current investment treaties’ Brussels, 29 January 2015. 
27  Settlement of commercial disputes: presentation of a research paper on the Mauritius Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration as a possible model for further reforms of investor-state 
dispute settlement. Submitted by the Secretariat on 24 May 2016 for the Commission on International Trade Law 
Forty-ninth session New York, 27 June-15 July 2016. A/CN.9/890. 
28  Art 30 Vienna Convention. 
29  Chapter IV Vienna Convention. 
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investment framework. These developments show a phenomenon of forum shifting from the bilateral yet 
again to the multilateral.  
 
 The discipline of international relations provides theories that describe why actors in the international 
system behave in particular ways. When states and actors of the international system interact with each 
other, they do so through relationships with one another. Although these particular relationships are 
important, one must also consider the structural contexts in which these relationships take place. Institutions 
are structures that are part of these contexts, and their role can be evidenced in the ways that such institutions 
can constrain but also enable actors’ behaviour. This is a modified approach to concepts of structural power 
in international relations.30 By a similar token, there is also the conception of contested multilateralism put 
forward by Morse and Keohane (2014) that states that “contemporary multilateralism is characterized by 
competing coalitions and shifting institutional arrangements, informal as well as formal.”31 They claim that 
“[f]requently, multilateral institutions are challenged through the use of other multilateral institutions, either 
without resort to unilateralism or bilateralism or in conjunction with those strategies.”32 The value of these 
theories as lenses for the international investment framework lies in their usefulness to understand the latest 
developments indicating forum shifting, in this case, the state’s recourse to discuss amendments of foreign 
investment rules at the multilateral level.  
 
 As discussed in section 1, there are two main arbitral rules involved in the enforcement of the 
international investment framework, the institutions from which derive, therefore, deserve some 
consideration. ICSID, one of the five agencies of the World Bank, and the UN, through its bodies like 
UNCTAD and UNCITRAL. ICSID was created by a multilateral convention as a specialized institution for 
settling investor-state disputes. As Table 1 shows, ICSID has been the key enforcer of the rules of the 
international investment framework and has issued many arbitral awards. But, as pointed out by Shihata 
(1986): “Similarly to the World Bank, to which it is tightly connected….ICSID should be considered as an 
instrument of international policy to promote investments and economic development.”33 On the other hand, 
the UN bodies, UNCITRAL, and also UNCTAD, were created to aid developing countries. Just this formal 
veil might influence the preference of the majority of actors in the framework, the developing states, 
towards sympathizing with one institution rather than the other.  
 
 However, the institutional response to the criticisms of the framework provides an explanation for why 
a forum shift developed. The criticisms regarding the lack of transparency forced ICSID to change its rules 
in 2006, but the changes were minimal and so the criticisms remained. Furthermore, even though ICSID 
settles disputes between states and investors, nationals of other states, the members of the ICSID 
Convention are only states. This poses a difficulty for other actors that became relevant to the international 
investment framework, such as the European Union. The European Union, since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
signed in 2009, gained more ` `actorness’’ in the international investment framework. Since then agreements 
on foreign direct investments are under the supervision of the European Commission.34 The difficulty for a 
supranational organization as the EU is that ICSID only accepts states and considers what the parties agreed 
__________________ 
30  Power analysed herein keeps the parsimony of structural realism. Susan Strange spelled out a concept of 
structural power were structures are sources of power, but she dismissed institutions and international regimes. 
Thus, this is a modified approach that considers institutions and international law as structures as well, 
understanding a concept of power that includes relationships and structures within the concept. For further 
reading see Strange, S. States and Markets Pinter Publishers Limited. London. 1988; Krasner, S ‘Structural 
causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’ in International Regimes Edited Stephen 
Krasner Cornell University Press 1983; Keohane, R ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’ 
in Neorealism and its critics. Edited by Robert O. Keohane New York: Columbia University Press 1986; Gwynn, 
M.A. “Structural Power in International Relations and International Law” GLF Working Paper-forthcoming. 
31  Morse, J. and Keohane, R. “Contested multilateralism” Rev Int Organ 9:385-412. 2014 
32  Morse, J. and Keohane, R. “Contested multilateralism” Rev Int Organ 9:385-412. 2014. p.386 
33  Shihata, I. Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA , ICSID 
Review—Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-15. 1986. p. 6. Author’s translation of the Spanish 
original. 
34  Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 3. See also European Union (EU) Regulation 
No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between member states and third countries.  
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upon in the treaty. This difficulty has been reflected in practice with cases in which the participation of the 
EU was limited.35  
 
 The lack of a broader scope of the transparency rules implemented by ICSID rules was not enough to 
mitigate the criticism towards the enforcement of investment treaties. An example can be seen in the 
reaction of some South American countries which started terminating their convention with ICSID because 
they blamed the institution for unintended sovereignty costs in the form of restriction to regulate.36 Coupled 
to this was the discontent of relevant actors with their limited participation in the disputes submitted to 
ICSID. In 2013, the European Commission stated: “We also have the possibility to influence the multilateral 
context, for example through the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
— where we have created new rules on transparency that will apply beyond the EU’s own investment 
agreements.”37 Furthermore, the European Commission, in a draft text for the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) which was under negotiation with the United States, proposed the creation 
of a new Investment Court system.38 
 
 The new UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration are very broad 
in scope so as to make the whole arbitration process transparent. UNCITRAL also prepared a draft so that 
the transparency rules may be applied retroactively; this was later approved at the UN General Assembly 
as the Mauritius Convention. These actions overcome some of the criticism of the different actors involved 
in the international investment framework, and using these rules in investment disputes does not limit the 
participation of actors like the EU, either as a party or in the application of their legislation.  
 
 A modified structural approach describes that institutions may enable actors to change the rules 
peacefully but the choice of states on a particular forum, or in this case to choose another forum to contest 
the existing rules or to further amendments, might be connected to the actors’ dissatisfaction with the partial 
amendments to the rules or limited access to use the main institutional facilities. This is how the institutional 
contestation arises. As described by the theoretical background, “the phenomenon of contested 
multilateralism occurs when states and/or non-state actors either shift their focus from one existing 
institution to another or create an alternative multilateral institution to compete with existing ones.”39 Actors 
that faced difficulties with not being accommodated at one of the institutions in the investment framework 
shifted their efforts to another relevant institution. Institutions, when considered as structures that enable 
actors’ behaviour, provide power to these actors to affect outcomes. These actions are reflected in scenarios 
of contested multilateralism which describes the shift from the bilateral establishment of rules to the 
discussion of improving the foreign investment rules at a multilateral level, as the case of the transparency 
provisions in the dispute settlement mechanism has shown. Furthermore, it also describes the situation of 
countries agreeing to modify the rest of the criticized rules of the international investment framework at a 
multilateral forum like the UN.40 The aforementioned developments have indirectly made the UN once 
again an attractive forum for regulating investment rules. 
 
 
__________________ 
35  In cases between two European countries, request to apply EU legislation was denied (Eastern Sugar BV 
(Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic (SCC no. 088/2004), and participation of the EU was only allowed through 
third party amicus curiae submissions (Electrabel SA v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19).  
36  Although the enforcement problem was connected to the rules and not the institution, some of these countries 
blamed ICSID for the sovereignty costs in the form of restriction to regulate. See Brazil ’s position in Peterson, 
L. and Simoes e Silva, A. Investment Arbitration Reporter 1 (9) 2008; Ecuador’s allegation of sovereignty costs 
in Interview by Mena Erazo, Paul. BBC News report. September 16, 2010; Venezuela’s statement in Digital news 
reported by Agencia Venezolana de Noticias (AVN) on January 15, 2012; Argentina’s request of termination of 
the ICSID Convention in Argentina’s Draft of Law. File No. 1311-D-2012. H. Camara de Diputados de la Nacion. 
March 21, 2012; See also Vandevelde, K. “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” University 
of California at Davis Journal of International Law and Policy.Vol.12. 2005-2006. 
37  EC. Fact Sheet. ‘Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements’ Executive 
Summary. November 2013. 
38  European Commission draft text for the TTIP, Investment, Chapter II, section 3.  
39 Morse, J. and Keohane, R. “Contested multilateralism” Rev Int Organ 9:385-412. 2014. p.387. Emphasis added.  
40  By agreeing to a convention similar to the Mauritius convention, or using the latter as a complement. 
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Figure 1. Institutional Power and Contested Multilateralism in the area of International Investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The public interest matters in the area of international investments. Rules should encompass the 
interests of all actors in the international investment framework. These include states but also some key 
non-state actors, investors and also NGOs, civil society and regional economic integration organizations. 
Such an inclusion would likely result in the agreement of provisions or rules that are balanced for all actors, 
which in turn would allow for more sustainable development. 
 
 Different multilateral institutions might provide the platform for this task, but the choice of which 
institution to use might fall on the one that allows all actors’ interests to be considered. UNCITRAL’s work 
on the Transparency Rules and the Mauritius Convention has proven that UNCITRAL is a suitable 
organization to prepare the work for such a great challenge as the amendment or improvement of existing 
regulation of foreign investment.41 The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency also give access to the non-
state actors affected by the investment treaties. 
 
 Therefore, having the United Nations as the forum for the discussions about improving the rules of the 
current international investment framework by a meta-treaty is a promising step forward towards achieving 
balanced rules in this area. At the multilateral level, actors’ asymmetries get diminished far more than at a 
bilateral setting. It is not a coincidence that the foreign investment rules developed at the multilateral level 
(UN) in the 1950s to 1970s favoured the developing countries’ interests. This does not mean that it will be 
a detriment for other countries. Establishing rules that protect the public welfare are the goal and are in the 
interest of all countries. Furthermore, the inclusiveness provided by a multilateral setting allows countries 
which are not aware of certain matters to become aware of an issue that might matter to them, just by 
listening to the different issues that are being raised by other countries at such a forum. 
 
 The establishment of rules at such fora might take longer and be more difficult, but the deficiencies of 
the current international investment framework have proven the problems that can derive from agreeing to 
something just because it is faster and more convenient. This is comparable to the effect of acquiring a 
cheap product that turns out to be of bad quality and inevitably does not last long. Further work to improve 
the current international investment framework lies in states’ increase awareness of the advantages of a 
multilateral forum. It promises more success in overcoming the existing deficiencies, because actors at such 
a forum can reach an agreement on rules that are balanced because the rules reflect the interests of all parties 
at stake in the framework. 
  
__________________ 
41  See the advantages of the participation in UNCITRAL’s work and its decision reached by consensus in Nicholas, 
C. ‘Negotiations and the Development of International Standards in Public Procurement: Let the  Best Team Win?’ 
7(1) Trade Law and Development 64. 2015. p.76-79.  
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Session 8 — International framework on arbitration: where are the needs? 
 
 
Opening Oceania: Reforming International Arbitration Regimes Across the Pacific Islands  
 
Colin Ballantine 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Across the Pacific Ocean lie a number of small island nations that can broadly be categorised into 
three ethno-cultural sub-regions: Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Together, these sub-regions form 
‘Oceania’, and include the independent nations of Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States 
of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
Several non-independent territories are also located in the region, including American Samoa, the Cook 
Islands, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Niue, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna.  
 
 The region contains some of the fastest-growing economies in the world.1 However, foreign 
investment is critical in order for the region to sustain its economic potential. Additional capital and 
expertise from foreign investors can fund new industries and expand existing ones, lift infrastructure and 
productivity, and establish employment opportunities. With almost one third of exclusive economic zones 
globally,2 there are significant opportunities in the region for the exploration and use of marine resources, 
including energy production from water and wind, and deep seabed mining.  
 
 Foreign investment in Oceania is inhibited by laws in the region that lack clarity and are poorly 
enforced.3 One solution to this is to develop the practice of international arbitration, which allows foreign 
investors to resolve private disputes before foreign arbitrators, under foreign laws, instead of before local 
judges, under local laws.4 Most regions around the world have developed international arbitration regimes, 
but Oceania is an exception. In order to attract foreign investment, countries in Oceania should therefore 
enact updated legislation for international arbitration. 
 
 There is a lack of discourse on the applicability of international arbitration to Oceania. By analysing 
how international arbitration can facilitate greater cross-border trade with Oceania, this paper seeks to fill 
a void in discourse, and serve as a platform for necessary international arbitration reforms within the region. 
 
2. Obstacles to Foreign Investment in Oceania  
 
I. Inadequacy of dispute resolution 
 
 A successful dispute resolution system is necessary in order to facilitate cross-border trade, as it assures 
foreign investors that contractual rights and obligations will be upheld.5 If such rights and obligations are 
not upheld, foreign investors will invest into other countries where they will be upheld, or will import their 
__________________ 
1 For example, Nauru’s gross domestic product is forecast to expand by 15.0% in 2017. See: Asian Development 
Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2016 Update: Meeting the Low-Carbon Growth Challenge, (Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, 2016).  
2 Henrike Seidel and Padma N. Lal, Economic value of the Pacific Ocean to the Pacific Island Countries and 
Territories, (Switzerland: IUCN Oceania, 2010).  
3 Anita Jowitt, “The Future of Law in the South Pacific,” Journal of South Pacific Law 12, no. 1 (2008), 45 and 
47. 
4 Queen Mary University of London, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in 
International Arbitration, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2015).  
5 Chief Justice Robert French AC, “International Commercial Dispute Resolution and the Place of Judicial Power,” 
(Speech, International Commercial Law and Arbitration Conference, Law Courts Building, Sydney, August 22, 
2013). 
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own labour and resources to manage the greater risks of a country lacking fair and balanced dispute 
resolution.6 
 
 Oceania does not currently have a dispute resolution framework in place that encourages foreign 
investment. 
 
(a) Litigation in Oceania 
 
 Many countries in Oceania face issues with corruption and rule of law.7 For example, Papua New 
Guinea’s Attorney-General, a Supreme Court judge and the Prime Minister’s lawyer were all charged with 
corruption and fraud in 2016.8 This creates a perception that claims heard by local courts may not always 
be treated fairly. 
 
(b) Litigation in an overseas jurisdiction 
 
 Given the limited number of reciprocal enforcement agreements in place for foreign court judgments, 
a judgment of a foreign court may not be enforceable in Oceania. If a losing party under a foreign court 
judgment only had assets which were located in Oceania, this would render the foreign court judgment 
effectively worthless. 
 
(c) International arbitration 
 
 Some countries in Oceania have not yet enacted arbitration legislation.9 Many other countries in the 
region have not reformed their arbitration legislation for several decades.10 As a result, many widely adopted 
reforms which have improved the practice of international arbitration in other regions are not yet available 
in Oceania. 
 
(d) Others 
 
 Other forms of alternative dispute resolution do not always produce final and binding outcomes.11 In 
particular, mediation lacks the safety net of an institutional structure, with control over its outcome being 
held by the parties. This does not satisfy desire of foreign investors for certainty and predictability.12 
 
 
II. Lack of law reform 
 
 Foreign investors prefer to invest in countries that maintain efficient and modern laws, instead of 
outdated laws that are poorly understood. For example, jurisdictions that regularly reform their laws on 
international arbitration, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, are among the top recipients of foreign 
investment globally.13 
__________________ 
6 Asian Development Bank, Reforming Pacific Contract Law (2009 report), (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 
2009), 17. 
7 Peter Larmour and Manuhuia Barcham, National Integrity Systems: Pacific Islands  (2004 report), (Victoria, 
Australia: Transparency International, 2004), 5.  
8 “PNG’s Attorney-General Ano Pala arrested by country’s fraud squad over misuse of funds.” ABC News. Apr. 
12, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-12/png-justice-minister-ano-pala-arrested/7320984. 
9 For example, as of December 2016, the Marshall Islands and Tonga have no arbitration law. 
10 Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance Report: Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better 
Investment Climate in the South Pacific (2016 report), (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2016), 2.  
11 Kim M. Rooney, “Conciliation and Mediation of International Commercial Disputes in Asia and UNCITRAL’s 
Working Group on the International Enforcement of Settlement Agreements,” Asian Dispute Review 2016, no. 4 
(2016), 196. 
12 Amanda Perry, “An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment? Some Theory and Reality ,” 
American University International Law Review  15, no. 6, (2000), 1628.  
13 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015 (2015 report), (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2015), 5.  
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 Oceania has a long history of colonialism, the legacy of which is demonstrable in the laws that govern 
the region today.14 Many laws that were introduced pre-independence were saved post-independence, to 
plug any gaps until they could be replaced by locally enacted laws. However, locally enacted laws have 
often been slow to emerge in the region. For example, the current arbitration law of Papua New Guinea was 
passed in 1951.15 
 
 A law reform agency could assist in modernising Oceania’s colonial-era laws. Such reform would 
make the region more attractive to foreign investment. However, according to Peter McFarlane and 
Chaitanya Lakshman, “there is little commitment to law reform by South Pacific states.”16 Many countries 
in Oceania only have inactive or informal law reform agencies, due to limited expertise and low financial 
resources.17 
 
 Law reform instigated by international organizations has also been limited. Such organizations have 
taken a generalist approach, pursuing reforms in a multitude of areas, including governing business 
operations (company law), closure (bankruptcy law), transactions (contract law) and dispute resolution.18 
However, certain reforms have been prioritised over others, given limited resources. As a result, although 
reforms have been achieved in certain areas,19 reforms in many other areas, like international arbitration, 
have not.20 
 
 
III. Prevalence of customary law 
 
 Customary laws include traditional social, religious and economic values and understandings carried 
on by an identifiable community.21 Such laws are recognized by many jurisdictions in Oceania as a source 
of law.22 In certain jurisdictions in the region, customary law also holds a higher status than common law 
and equity.23 
 
 Courts in Oceania have applied customary law often.24 For example, a court in Tonga has implied 
customary terms into an employment contract such that, because of established customs within local 
workplaces, it is now permissible for a replacement worker to work the shift of another worker who is 
unavailable.25 Customs have also been cited in decisions on whether an agreement has been concluded,26 
and misrepresentation.27 
 
__________________ 
14 For further context, see: Jennifer Corrin Care, “Contract law — The South Pacific: customary and introduced 
law,” Amicas Curae, no. 23 (2000), 26. 
15 Arbitration Act 1951 (PNG). 
16 Peter MacFarlane and Chaitanya Lakshman, “Law reform in the South Pacific,” Journal of South Pacific Law, 
9, no. 1 (2005). 
17 Ibid. 
18 For example, the Asian Development Bank’s Pacific Private Sector Development Initiative, which is analysed 
below. 
19 For example, see: Asian Development Bank, Pacific Private Sector Development Initiative: Progress Report  
(2013-2014 report), (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2014).  
20 Technical Assistance Report: Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the 
South Pacific (see footnote 10 above), 1. 
21 Bob Hughes and Peter MacFarlane, “The Application of Custom in South Pacific Contract Law and as a Basis 
for an Estoppel,” Journal of Contract Law 20, no. 1 (2004), 36. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Jennifer Corrin Care, “Cultures in Conflict: the Role of the Common Law in the South Pacific,” Journal of South 
Pacific Law 6, no.2 (2002). 
24 Desley Horton, “International Commercial Arbitration in Pacific Island States,” (Speech, Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, London, United Kingdom, May 20, 2016).  
25 Vaioleti v Cross and The Commodities Board [1990] Tonga LR 108.  
26 “International Commercial Arbitration in Pacific Island States” (see footnote 24 above). 
27 John To’Ofilu v Oimae, Unreported, High Court, Solomon Islands, CAC 5/96, 19 June 1997.  
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 As there is not yet a uniform code on the applicability of customary law to contracts in Oceania,28 the 
existence of customary law introduces an element of unpredictability for foreign investors operating in the 
region. 
 
 
IV. Limited local legal profession 
 
 There is a shortage of lawyers in Oceania. For example, it was suggested in 2011 that there was just 
one lawyer for every 13,616 people in the Solomon Islands, in comparison to one lawyer for every 351 
people in Australia.29 It has also been reported that some islands in the region, such as Kiritimati, have no 
resident legal professionals at all.30 The cost of legal services in Oceania is therefore higher than it is in 
other regions.31 This restricts foreign investment, as foreign investors are attracted to countries that offer 
low transaction costs.32 
 
 The quality of legal services in the region is also inhibitive for foreign investment. As Carolyn Penfold 
notes, “many South Pacific countries experience considerable difficulty with unethical and unprofessional 
behaviour within the legal system.”33 With “inadequate supervision and support structures” and “poor pay 
and conditions,”34 foreign investors may question the ability of local lawyers to advocate complex points 
of law.  
 
 The capacity of the region to develop a larger and higher quality legal profession is prohibited by a 
lack of locally-based tertiary-level institutions,35 and institutions to supervise, support and discipline legal 
professionals.36 
 
3. International Arbitration to Facilitate Foreign Investment in Oceania  
 
 International arbitration could address a number of the concerns of foreign investors doing business in 
Oceania, such as: 
 
(a) Quality of local legal system 
 
 In international arbitration, foreign arbitrators and counsel are largely permitted to oversee a dispute 
in place of local judges and counsel. This allows foreign investors to manage risks of corruption and 
inadequate supervision within Oceania’s legal profession. Foreign arbitrators and counsel may also offer 
industry-specific expertise, which would otherwise be unavailable in the region. 
 
__________________ 
28
 Many countries in the region have not yet introduced a code of contract law, despite the possibility that it could 
work to address the applicability of customary law to particular contracts. See: “Contract law — The South 
Pacific: customary and introduced law,” (see footnote 14 above), 30. 
29 South Pacific Lawyers’ Association, Needs Evaluation Survey for South Pacific Lawyer Associations (2011 
report), (Canberra: South Pacific Lawyers’ Association, 2011). 
30 “Justice delayed, justice denied on Pacific’s remote Kiritimati.” Reuters. Apr. 26, 2016. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pacific-justice-idUSKCN0XN2VN. 
31 Reforming Pacific Contract Law (see footnote 6 above), 17. 
32 “An Ideal Legal System for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment? Some Theory and Reality” (see footnote 12 
above), 1630. 
33 Carolyn Penfold, “Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism in a South Pacific Context,” Legal Education 
Review 23, no. 1 (2013), 19. 
34 Ibid., 22. 
35 For many countries in Oceania, the only accessible tertiary-level institution is The University of The South 
Pacific, which is jointly owned by the governments of 12 member countries. See: “About the University.” The 
University of The South Pacific. Date unknown. http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id=usp_introduction.  
36 “Teaching Legal Ethics and Professionalism in a South Pacific Context” (see footnote 33 above), 15. 
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(b) Prevalence of colonial-era and customary laws 
 
 International arbitration largely allows parties to select their own procedural rules and substantive law, 
to govern their disputes. For example, parties could agree to have a dispute seated in Singapore, but 
determined for the most part, in accordance with Hong Kong law. This reduces the risk of inefficient 
colonial-era or unpredictable customary laws applying to a dispute in a jurisdiction in Oceania. 
 
(c) Unenforceability of foreign court judgments 
 
 Most countries have acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).37 Under the New York Convention, countries must recognize and 
enforce arbitral awards made in other contracting countries. This addresses the limited number of reciprocal 
enforcement agreements in place in Oceania for foreign court judgments. 
 
 However, many of these benefits of international arbitration are not available in Oceania. This is 
because some jurisdictions in the region have not yet enacted arbitration legislation,38 while many others 
have not updated their arbitration legislation for several decades. Accession to the New York Convention 
has also been limited (though the New York Convention has been extended to some non-independent 
Oceanic territories).39 
 
I. Legislative frameworks 
 
 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has developed a model 
law to govern the practice of international arbitration (Model Law).40 The Model Law has successfully been 
enacted by states in its full form, and therefore requires a low level of scrutiny by law-making bodies. 
 
 By enacting the Model Law and other reforms, countries in Oceania will address many shortcomings 
in their current arbitration legislation, including: 
 
(a) Jurisdiction 
 
 The Model Law provides for a tentative competence of arbitral tribunals to decide on their own 
jurisdiction, either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits.41 Answering a preliminary 
question such as “is there an agreement to arbitrate this dispute,” may consume as many resources as 
resolving the underlying dispute itself.42 Therefore, shifting such questions from judges to arbitrators can 
improve the efficiency of a legal system.43 This would be useful in Oceania, where it has been suggested 
that more than 10,000 court judgments are waiting to be delivered in Papua New Guinea, and that some 
disputes are still before Vanuatu’s courts that were filed prior to 2001.44 
 
(b) Procedure 
 
 Due to the limited number of legal professionals in Oceania, industry specialists such as engineers 
have often been appointed to act as arbitrators, regardless of whether they are familiar with common 
__________________ 
37 “Contracting States.” New York Arbitration Convention . Date unknown. 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries.  
38 Mele Tupou, “Setting the Scene,” (Speech, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, London, United 
Kingdom, May 19, 2016). 
39 “Status of signatories.” SICE. Date unknown. http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/comarb/uncitral/nysig_e.asp.  
40 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with Amendments as Adopted in 2006 
(Vienna, United Nations, 2006). 
41 Ibid., art 16. 
42 Amokura Kawharu, “Arbitral jurisdiction” New Zealand Universities Law Review 23 no 2 (2008), 239.  
43 Gary B. Born, “International Arbitration Agreements and Competence-Competence,” in International 
Commercial Arbitration (Second Edition) (London: Kluwer Law International, 2014), 1074-1075. 
44 “International Commercial Arbitration in Pacific Island States,” (see footnote 24 above). 
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practices in arbitral procedure.45 Importing articles 10 to 24 of the Model Law would address this. These 
articles act as a safeguard for instances where parties cannot agree between themselves as to arbitral 
procedure, including as to the form of oral hearings and written submissions. 
 
(c) Interim relief  
 
 The current arbitration laws of Oceania make limited reference to interim relief. Although Samoa’s 
arbitration law does make provision for arbitrators to render an interim award, it does not define what this 
is.46 In contrast, the Model Law provides for both a court-ordered interim measures regime in support of 
arbitration, as well as for an arbitral tribunal-ordered interim measures regime.47 By enacting the Model 
Law, countries in Oceania would give arbitrators explicit powers to preserve the status quo, prevent 
prejudice to the arbitral process, preserve assets and evidence, and make preliminary orders.48  
 
(d) Interest 
 
 In early common law legal provisions, arbitrators possessed limited authority to award interest on 
arbitral awards.49 Many jurisdictions have since amended their laws to include express powers for 
arbitrators to award simple or compound interest in respect of any period up to payment under an arbitral 
award.50 However, Oceanic jurisdictions have not. This was identified in a recent Papua New Guinean case, 
where Kandakasi J expressed that Papua New Guinea should “take steps to review and introduce reforms 
to our Arbitration Act”.51 By enacting a rate and timeframe within which arbitrators can award interest, 
countries in Oceania will encourage compliance with arbitral awards. 
 
(e) Court intervention 
 
 Arbitration laws in Oceania do not provide for the same degree of certainty as that of Model Law 
jurisdictions. For example, if a party in Samoa alleges fraud, a court is immediately granted authority to 
determine the dispute in place of the arbitral tribunal.52 Parties in the region can also challenge arbitral 
awards merely for arbitrator ‘misconduct’ and without any time limits. 53 In contrast, the Model Law sets 
out an exhaustive list of high-threshold situations which warrant recourse to a court to set aside an arbitral 
award.54 It also sets a strict time limit within which such applications must be made.55 By enacting the 
Model Law, countries in Oceania would therefore improve the certainty and finality of arbitral awards. 
 
 
II. Institutional support 
 
 In developed jurisdictions, institutional bodies support the development of foreign investment. In 
Oceania, there are only a limited number of such institutions that are active. 
 
(a) Arbitral institutions 
 
 The most accessible arbitral institutions for parties operating in Oceania are the Australian Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA), based in Sydney, Australia, and the Arbitrators’ and 
__________________ 
45 For example, Samoa National Provident Fund v Apia Construction and Engineering Ltd [2008] WSSC 1, 102 
and 113. 
46 Arbitration Act 1976 (Samoa), s 6 and Sch 1. 
47 UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 40 above), arts 17 and 17J.  
48 Ibid., arts 17A-17H. 
49 Evaluation Consult (New Zealand) Ltd v Independent State of Papua New Guinea [2016] PGNC 50, 3. 
50 See, for example: International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) (Singapore), s 12(4).  
51 [2016] PGNC 50 (see footnote 49 above), 38. 
52 Horton, “International Commercial Arbitration in Pacific Island States,” (London, UK, 2016). 
53 See, for example: Arbitration Act 1976 (Samoa), s 13.  
54 UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 40 above), art 34(2).  
55 UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 40 above), art 34(3).  
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Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand (AMINZ), based in Wellington, New Zealand. ACICA has heard 
disputes involving parties from Fiji and Papua New Guinea.56 It has also administered mediator training 
courses in Fiji.57 Other than these activities, information on the presence of arbitral institutions in the region 
is limited. 
 
(b) Pacific Private Sector Development Initiative 
 
 The Asian Development Bank’s Pacific Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI), based out of 
Sydney, Australia, promotes commercial law reform in Oceania. Although dispute resolution is part of 
PSDI’s mandate, PSDI has had limited success in overseeing arbitration-related developments in Oceania: 
the only reference to arbitration in its ‘Progress Report’ for 2014-2015 was in respect of an Arbitration Bill 
for Tonga, which it referred to as still being on hold,58 as it was in its 2013-2014 report. 
 
(c) Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the South Pacific 
 
 In 2016, the Asian Development Bank established an arbitration-specific project, called Promotion of 
International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the South Pacific (Project).59 The Project 
will assist countries in Oceania with acceding to the New York Convention and enacting arbitration laws 
that implement the New York Convention.60 The initial target nations of the Project are Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea and Tonga.61 Further expansion of the Project will depend on additional funding. 
 
(d) Pacific Judicial Development Programme  
 
 The Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP) was established to strengthen the rule of law in 
Oceania through judicial training programmes.62 Court users in the region have noted an improvement in 
the standard of judicial conduct, as a result of PJDP’s activities.63 This is a positive development, as the 
growth of international arbitration depends on the quality of the judiciary overseeing it.64 Although PJDP 
has not focused on international arbitration specifically, a series of recent court decisions from the region 
support the view that courts in Oceania are becoming increasingly pro-arbitration.65 
 
(e) South Pacific Seminars 
 
 UNCITRAL’s Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific has also been active in the region. It hosted a 
‘South Pacific Seminar’ in Papua New Guinea in 2015 and 2016. These seminars have included sessions in 
respect of the New York Convention and the Model Law.66 UNCITRAL’s efforts have been effective to 
__________________ 
56 Deborah Tomkinson and Margaux Barhoum. “Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration.” In 
Arbitration World (Fifth Edition), edited by Karyl Nairn QC and Patrick Heneghan. (London: Thomson Reuters, 
2015). 
57 “Mediator Training — Fiji.” Australian Disputes Centre. Date unknown. 
https://disputescentre.com.au/events/mediation-training-fiji/. 
58 Asian Development Bank, Pacific Private Sector Development Initiative: Progress Report  (2014-2015 report), 
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2015), 73. 
59 “Regional: Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the South Pacific. ” 
Asian Development Bank. Date unknown. https://www.adb.org/projects/50114-001/main. 
60 Technical Assistance Report: Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the 
South Pacific (see footnote 10 above). 
61 Ibid., 5. 
62 “Pacific Judicial Development Programme — About Us.” Federal Court of Australia. Date unknown. 
http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/pjdp/about-us. 
63 “Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as amended in 2006.” United Nations Commission on International Trade Law . Date unknown. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/MLARB-explanatoryNote20-9-07.pdf. 
64 Chief Justice Allsop, “Australia — a vital commercial hub in the Asia Pacific region: the importance of and 
challenges for Australian commercial courts and arbitral institutions,” (Speech, Melbourne, Feb. 25 2015). 
65 For example, see: SNPF v Westerlund Construction Joint Venture [2016] WSSC 26. 
66 “2015 UNCITRAL South Pacific Seminar — Programme.” UNCITRAL Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific. 
Date unknown. http://www.uncitral.org/images/RCAP/Image.1439368216598.jpg.  
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some degree, with Papua New Guinea announcing its intention to move forward with accession to the New 
York Convention at the 2016 seminar.67  
 
4. Proposals for International Arbitration Reform in Oceania  
 
I. Legislative frameworks 
 
 In order to become a more acceptable place for the practice of international arbitration, countries in 
Oceania must first accede to the New York Convention, as most countries around the world have done. This 
requires the deposit of a notice of accession with the New York Convention’s Secretariat.68 New arbitration 
legislation based on the Model Law should then be enacted by these countries, to implement the New York 
Convention.  
 
 The Model Law is universally recognized as representing the best practice in international arbitration. 
UNCITRAL’s formal Explanatory Note to the Model Law comments on the substance of the Model Law 
as follows: 
 
 “The Model Law” … “covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement to the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award and reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles 
and important issues of international arbitration practice. It is acceptable to States of all regions and 
the different legal or economic systems of the world. Since its adoption by UNCITRAL, the Model 
Law has come to represent the accepted international legislative standard for a modern arbitration law 
and a significant number of jurisdictions have enacted arbitration legislation based on the Model 
Law.”69 
 
 In order to optimise the positive perception that the adoption of the Model Law will have on countries 
in Oceania, the Model Law should be enacted without significant change. However, further reforms to assist 
the region in becoming an acceptable place for international arbitration should also be considered, 
including: 
 
(a) Arbitrability 
 
 Under the New York Convention, arbitration agreements must deal with a “subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration.”70 However, some jurisdictions have recently removed restrictions on what types 
of disputes can be arbitrated.71 Countries in Oceania may wish to do the same in respect of certain types of 
insurance, intellectual property and shareholder disputes. Trust arbitration may also be relevant to the 
region, given that countries like Samoa have developed offshore financial centres.72 
 
(b) Arbitrator and counsel appointments 
 
 Countries in Oceania should eliminate visa requirements for arbitrators and requirements as to 
arbitrators’ backgrounds. These measures would uphold the principle of party autonomy, by providing 
__________________ 
67 Technical Assistance Report: Promotion of International Arbitration Reform for Better Investment Climate in the 
South Pacific (see footnote 10 above), 3. 
68 Gary B. Born, “Integration and international dispute resolution in Small States — Keynote Speech,” (Speech, 
London, May 19 2016).  
69 “Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration as amended in 2006” (see footnote 63 above). 
70 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York: United Nations, 1958), 
art 2(1). 
71 For example, Hong Kong has recently introduced amendments to its arbitration legislation, clarifying that 
disputes over intellectual property rights can be resolved by way of arbitration. See: “Hong Kong confirms IP 
rights are arbitrable.” Herbert Smith Freehills. Dec. 7, 2016. http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2016/12/07/hong-
kong-confirms-ip-rights-are-arbitrable/. 
72 “Overview of Samoa.” Samoa International Finance Authority . Date unknown. 
http://sifa.ws/index.php/aboutus/overview_of_samoa/. 
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parties with a wide scope to select the arbitrator that they feel is best determined to hear a dispute. 
Restrictions on rights of audience in arbitration-related court proceedings should also be relaxed. This is 
because a larger pool of counsel to select from would reduce transaction costs for foreign investors. 
 
(c) Arb-Med 
 
 Arb-Med is a procedure where an arbitral tribunal assumes the role of a mediator or conciliator in 
order to facilitate settlement of the dispute referred to arbitration. It has become increasingly popular in 
Asian jurisdictions,73 and should therefore be facilitated in Oceania too. Without statutory recognition of an 
Arb-Med process, there is currently a risk that enforcement of an international arbitral award made in 
Oceania following a failed Arb-Med procedure would be refused.  
 
(d) Confidentiality 
 
 As confidentiality does not feature in a number of arbitration laws within Oceania,74 arbitration-related 
court proceedings may become published. This goes against the expectations that parties have for an arbitral 
process to be confidential. Countries in Oceania should therefore address this issue, with public interest in 
any arbitration-related court proceedings being provided for by limited or redacted publications, or 
publication in full only in exceptional cases. 
 
(e) Indemnity costs 
 
 Countries in Oceania should introduce a default cost rule in respect of arbitration-related court 
proceedings. In such a framework, debtors who unsuccessfully apply to stay arbitrations or set aside an 
arbitral award would be required to pay the costs of the arbitration-related court proceedings on an 
indemnity basis.75 This would improve the certainty and finality of arbitral awards, by deterring the use of 
court-based guerrilla tactics to challenge such awards. 
 
(f) Third party funding 
 
 Some jurisdictions have abolished the common law torts of champerty and maintenance, and now 
permit the use of third party funding in international arbitration. In light of the limited resources of local 
parties in the region, countries in Oceania may wish to consider similar reforms. Such reforms may need to 
be accompanied by detailed regulations in respect of conflicts of interest, disclosure and eligibility 
requirements for funders. 
 
 
II. Institutional support 
 
 Besides legislative reform, there are a number of other ways in which governments in Oceania can 
encourage the development of international arbitration and facilitate greater foreign investment, including: 
 
(a). Arbitral institutions 
 
 Most users of international arbitration prefer institutional rather than ad hoc arbitration.76 This is 
because arbitral institutions articulate arbitral proceedings comprehensively from start to finish and are 
better suited to cater for contingencies.77 No international arbitral institution is based in Oceania. Oceanic 
__________________ 
73 Albert Monichino, “The Future of International Arbitration in Australia,” Victoria University Law and Justice 
Journal 5, no. 1 (2015), part G. 
74 For example, see: Arbitration Act 1976 (Samoa). 
75 “The Future of International Arbitration in Australia” (see footnote 73 above), part H.  
76
 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration  (see footnote 
4 above), 17. 
77
 “International Arbitration: Which institution?” Ashurst. Jan. 3, 2017. https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-
insights/legal-updates/qg-international-arbitration-which-institution/. 
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governments should therefore support nearby institutions such as ACICA in establishing sub-commissions 
across the region. This could involve subsidised premises or tax incentives. 
 
(b) Supranational court 
 
 A supranational court vested with compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction on certain matters could help 
to create a more unified pool of locally rendered arbitration-related jurisprudence. There would be 
administrative difficulties in the establishment of such a court, but the concept is not without precedent. For 
example, the Caribbean Court of Justice — a supranational entity — has itself delivered binding decisions 
in respect of the enforcement of arbitral awards.78 
 
(c) Taskforce 
 
 A regional taskforce of arbitration practitioners should be created, in order to address the lack of law 
reform agencies in Oceania. Through annual conferences or symposia, such a taskforce would be well 
placed to hold governments to account on the progress of arbitration reforms. The taskforce could also 
consider opportunities for Oceania to develop arbitration-specific expertise in particular industries, like 
deep sea mining. 
 
(d) University course 
 
 As of December 2016, the most widespread university in Oceania only teaches “Foreign Trade and 
Investment Law,” but not any dedicated course on international arbitration.79 There are a large number of 
arbitration practitioners in Australia and New Zealand who could establish and teach such a course. This 
would create a pool of bicultural and bilingual lawyers capable of promoting the benefits of international 
arbitration to local businesses, in a culturally appropriate manner. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate how international arbitration can assist Oceania in 
attracting foreign investment. If countries in the region accede to the New York Convention and enact the 
Model Law, Oceania will offer foreign investors a dispute resolution system with greater enforceability, 
finality and neutrality. This will address the perceived risks of investing into the region, including the 
prevalence of colonial-era and customary laws, and the unenforceability of foreign court judgments. 
 
 There are economic benefits for Oceania in becoming an acceptable place for the practice of 
international arbitration. It will promote more travel to, and business in, the region. This will generate 
revenue for the region’s airlines, hotels and other service providers. The increased number of arbitral and 
related court proceedings may also create opportunities for the local legal profession. Therefore, countries 
across the region should prioritise international arbitration reform. 
 
 In order to meet the challenges of such reform, a greater degree of co-ordination is needed. ACICA, 
AMINZ, the Asian Development Bank and UNCITRAL must work more closely with each other and local 
stakeholders. The use of a unified taskforce, as proposed by this paper, would expedite such co-ordination. 
By the opening of the 24th ICCA Congress in Sydney in April 2018, it is hoped that regional arbitration-
related reform will have commenced, ‘Opening Oceania’ to the world. 
 
  
__________________ 
78
 Winston Anderson, “Keynote Panel — International B2B Dispute Resolution” (Speech, Wilmer Cutler Pickering 
Hale and Dorr LLP, London, United Kingdom, May 20, 2016).  
79
 “Course Finder: Faculty of Arts, Law & Education — School of Law.” The University of South Pacific. Date 
unknown. http://sols3.usp.ac.fj/cfinder/pcrsedb.pl.  
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Renegotiation of Indian Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
An Analysis from a Development Perspective 
 
Rosmy Joan, National Law University, Jodhpur, Rajasthan, India 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Sustainable development refers to State’s effort to achieve progress (development) in a way that can 
be maintained over the long term (sustainable).1 The most popular definition defines sustainable 
development as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”.2 The Brundtland Report observes that, “Sustainable 
development is not a fixed state of harmony, but rather a process of change in which the exploitation of 
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional 
change are made consistent with future as well as present needs”.3 Therefore economic development, social 
well-being and environmental protection are the key pillars of sustainable development.4 The concept of 
sustainable development did not focus on limiting economic activity but rather on re directing development 
in order to ensure the potential for long term sustained yields.5 In this background foreign investments are 
very important in developing economies for implementing the sustainable development agenda. Various 
initiatives at the international level stressed on the importance of foreign investments in achieving 
sustainable development.6  
 
 Foreign investments help to raise Gross Domestic Product (GDP), bring employment options and new 
technologies, and alleviate poverty. So there are reasons for developing countries to support foreign 
investments. At the same time it is equally important for a developing State to have policy flexibility and 
incentives for sustainability. John Ruggie referred this as the “governance gaps created by globalization- 
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their 
adverse consequences”.7 In order to reconcile these diverse interests, to engage the one so as to promote the 
other, sustainable development law and policy can and should be developed and implemented within 
investment regimes. 
 
 The treaty-based investment law regime is based on the most powerful system of international 
adjudication in modern history.8 Arbitrators have shown pro investment stance and acquired power through 
expansive legal interpretations and the economic size of the awards.9 Not coincidentally, there is growing 
apprehension about the regime and pressure for reform.10 The increasing facility with which new directions 
__________________ 
1  Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Andrew Newcombe, An Integrated Agenda for Sustainable Development in 
International Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 102 (Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011).  
2  World Commission Environment and Development, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: Our Common Future, UN Doc A/42/427 (1987). 
3  Id. at overview ¶ 30. 
4  See MARIE CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW PRINCIPLES, 
PRACTICES & PROSPECTS 2-3 (2004). 
5  MARKUS W. GEHRING & MARIE CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER (EDS) SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD TRADE 
LAW (2005). 
6  See generally Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Report of the UNCED, U.N. GAOR, 46 th 
Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N Doc A/Conf.151/6/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 at ¶ 2.23; UN World Summit for 
Sustainable Development: Plan of Implementation, World Summit for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.199/L.1 (Johannesburg, South Africa 2002), Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002) ¶ 4.  
7  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Entities UN doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 1, 2008) at 3.  
8  Gus Van Harten, A Critique of Investment Treaties, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES CRTICAL 
ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 41 (Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, eds., 2016).  
9  YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996). 
10  Id. 
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of litigation are thought up and supported by arbitrators will add to the need for States to rethink the system 
of investment arbitration.11 Addressing this issue would require a comparison of the initial and the revised 
treaties’ design and a systematic coding of their substantive provisions on various dimensions. This paper 
attempts to understand the present Indian international investment regime from a development perspective. 
 
 
II. The Background of International Investment Agreements Reform  
 
 In the last one decade, India’s investment landscape has considerably changed. Foreign investment 
flows to India have also increased manifold from US$393 million in 1992-93 to $26192 million in the 
financial year 2011-12.12 Increase in the number of IIAs coupled with increase in foreign investment flows 
has increased the interaction between different layers of governments, at the Centre and state levels, with 
foreign corporations belonging to one of the IIA partner countries of India and hence the possibility of a 
conflict due to the exercise of India’s regulatory power.13 
 
 In fact, this past decade, treaty-based foreign investor arbitrations against host States have tripled, from 
just over 200 in 2005 to 668 in 2015,14 marring the corresponding global surge in foreign direct investment 
from US$11 trillion to US$26 trillion.15 The growing number of investor claims against sovereign States 
challenging a wide array of public policy decisions and regulatory measures has evoked deep concerns 
about the potential costs associated with such treaties.16 To spot difficulties that could lead to investment 
disputes and allow for timely correction, governments are mapping and monitoring possible obstacles. They 
are also promoting an improved environment for IIAs in general by including more precise language and 
more specific exceptions in agreements to better reflect policy.17  
 
 No aspect of BIT practice has been more informative to governments than investor-state dispute 
settlement.18 International treaties, like some domestic law, contain substantial ambiguities that are only 
clarified over time as the rules are implemented and enforced.19 Rulings made by dispute settlement bodies 
interpret ambiguous or contested substantive provisions and thereby clarify their meaning and 
consequences.20 Anne Van Aaken refers to the “learning effect” of BIT arbitration, which has caused states 
to approach them more cautiously.21 Governments renegotiate when they have learned something new about 
the state of the world22 or when the state of the world has actually changed.23 Revising the Model BIT, India 
__________________ 
11  See Article 1 (1) (d) of the Canada China Treaty 2014. 
12  See Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, FDI in 
IndiaStatisticsavailableathttp://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2012/india_FDI_January2012.p
df. 
13  Prabash Ranjan, Renegotiating India’s Investment Agreements A Policy Perspective, MADHAYM BRIEFING PAPER 
7 (August 2012).  
14  Investment Dispute Settlement Negotiator, http://invest- mentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS. 
15  World Investment Report, Reforming International Investment Governance, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (2015). 
16  Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded 
Rational Learning, 65 (2) WORLD POLITICS 273-313 at 274 (2013). 
17  Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties Over Time: Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a 
Changing World (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2015/02, 2015) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7rhd8sq7h-en. 
18  STEPHAN W SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2009). 
19  Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B Edelman, Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and 
Society Tradition, 21 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 903-41 (1996).  
20  Judith Goldstein & Richard H Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. 
Trade Politics. 71 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 257-282 (2008). 
21  Anne Van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory 
Analysis, 12 (2) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 507-538 at 532 (2009). 
22  As a reaction to the decision in Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, the United States introduced a clause in 
some subsequent investment treaty negotiations aiming specifically at excluding the application of MFN 
Clauses to investor state dispute settlement. See Article 10.4 (2) footnote 1, Draft of the Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement (Jan. 28, 2004).  
23  Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate International Agreements? The Case 
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addresses issues related to overly broad interpretations of certain provisions by arbitral tribunals, to 
adequately reflect and take into account India’s socio-economic policy realities. 
 
 
III. ISDS Claims Against India 
 
 This part discusses the major ISDS claims against India and analyses the reasons why India lost in 
White Industries and Antrix Devas. 
 
(a) White Industries 
 
 In 1989, Coal India contracted White Industries Australia to supply mining machinery and develop a 
coalmine. Once the mine was in operation, a dispute arose between the two entities. In 1999, White 
Industries sought recourse from the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, and as there was a 
delay in the enforcement White Industries turned to the bilateral investment treaty between Australia and 
India.  
 
 Unfortunately for White Industries, there is nothing in the Australia-India BIT, which directly deals 
with the delays in the court system. White Industries found something suitable in the BIT between India 
and Kuwait under MFN, where India is required to maintain a favourable environment for Kuwaiti investors 
in India. The tribunal concluded that White Industries’ rights under the ICC award were part of White 
Industries’ original investment. This was because the ICC award crystallized the parties’ rights and 
obligations under the contract. White Industries’ rights under the award were therefore covered by the 
protection in the BIT and granted White Industries an award of over A$4 million with interest, and related 
court fees. 
 
(b) Antrix Devas 
 
 In 2005, the Indian Space Research Organization’s (ISRO) commercial arm Antrix Corporation 
entered into an agreement24 with Devas Multimedia to lease out satellite spectrum that Devas could use to 
provide high-quality telephony and Internet services. In 2011 however, a leaked draft audit report noted that 
there were potentially a number of irregularities in the agreement including conflict of interest, favouritism, 
financial mismanagement and non-compliance of standard operating procedures.25 Then the deal was 
scrapped and the official reasons given for scrapping the deal was the force majeure event, and in this case 
it was the government acting in its sovereign capacity, deeming that the S-band spectrum needed to be used 
for national purposes and thus could not be leased out to Devas.26 The second arbitration was filed by the 
company’s investors, which include Columbia Capital and Telecom Ventures under the Indo-Mauritius 
Bilateral Investment Treaty. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that the government’s actions in 2011 
amounted to expropriation and that in annulling the ISRO-Devas contract, the country has breached treaty 
commitments to accord fair and equitable treatment to Devas’s foreign investors.27 The first arbitration 
outcome, which was conducted by ICC, saw the Indian government receiving a fine of nearly $672 million 
for unilaterally terminating the contract with Devas. The second, delivered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration makes it liable to pay financial compensation”, with a minimum expected penalty of $1 billion.28 
__________________ 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Nov. 15, 2013) (Submission to University of Maryland).  
24  “The deal involved Antrix committing to manufacturing and launching two ISRO satellites and then leasing 
nearly 70 MHz of S-band satellite spectrum to Devas for a period of 12 years. In return, Devas committed 
to paying upfront fees of a little over $30 million”. 
25  See the Report at 
http://www.cag.gov.in/sites/default/files/audit_report_files/Union_Compliance_Scientic_Department_Multime
dia_Broadcasting_Service_4_2012.pdf. 
26  Anuj Srivas, Explained: Why Does The Ghost Of Antrix-Devas Continue? THE WIRE, July 27, 2016 at 
http://thewire.in/54291/india-isro-arbitration-antrix-devas/. 
27  See Anuj Srivas, India Loses Big in Arbitration Case Over Antrix-Devas Controversy, THE WIRE, July 26, 2016 
at http://thewire.in/53993/india-loses-big-in-abritration-case-over-Antrix-Devas-Controversy/. 
28  Prabash Ranjan, Antrix-Devas: A BIT of Protectionism, THE WIRE, Aug. 9, 2016 at http://thewire.in/57586/antrix-
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 This annulment of the contract also resulted in another claim made under India-Germany BIT by 
Deutshe Telekom, the German telecom giant who invested $100 million in Devas. This case is ongoing.29 
 
(c) Other Claims 
 
 In June 2016, Cairn Energy, the Edinburgh-based oil firm, filed an arbitration claim under the previous 
India-UK BIT seeking $5.6 billion in compensation from the Indian government for raising a retrospective 
tax demand of $1.6 billion in 2014.30 
 
 Vodafone under the India-Netherlands BIT has made a similar claim. Vodafone, already disputing a 
US$3 billion tax claim by the Indian Government, held that India’s plan to retrospectively open tax cases 
was a breach of the country’s BIT obligations and a denial of justice.31  
 
 Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited has sued India under the India- Mauritius BIT claiming $ 1400 
million in damages for the Supreme Court ordering the cancellation of the 2G licenses.32 
 
 A closer look at India’s experience explains its move to redraft principal provisions in its model BIT 
text. India’s worry is that the 89 international investment agreements it has signed render it highly 
vulnerable to expensive litigation,33 in which disputants can often have, an unfair advantage. This is because 
India’s agreements are based on age-old model text, which is no longer in keeping with today’s realities.34 
 
 
IV. The Indian Model BIT 2015: A Developmental Analysis 
 
 States need to ensure that private investor interests do not prevail over legitimate public concerns. At 
the same time host countries must ensure sufficient regulatory flexibility in their IIAs to pursue their 
domestic policy agendas. One means of achieving balance is to ensure that development concerns are 
adequately addressed throughout the agreement. Further adding investor responsibility provisions directly 
as part of IIAs is also important.35 Therefore this part engages a developmental analysis of the Model BIT 
2015. 
 
(a) Sustainable Development 
 
 In the preamble, the Model BIT 2015 seeks to align the objectives of investment with sustainable 
development and inclusive growth of the parties. Further the Model BIT ensures that investments are in 
compliance with local laws and enhance their contribution to inclusive growth and sustainable 
development.36 The terms “inclusive growth” and “sustainable development” are signs of “new generation” 
investment policies and the new Model BIT 2015 is a positive step to achieve sustainable development in 
India’s investment treaty relations. 
__________________ 
devas-a-bit-of-protectionism/. 
29  Id. 
30  Ben Giaretta and Akshay Kishore, The Changing Landscape of Investment Treaty Protection in India, 
International Arbitration, April 2015.  
31  Premila Nazareth Satyanand, Once BITten, Forever Shy: Explaining India’s Rethink of Its Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Provisions, 16 (1) AIB INSIGHTS 17 (2015). 
32  Prabash Ranjan, Antrix-Devas: A BIT of Protectionism, THE WIRE, Aug. 9, 2016 at http://thewire.in/57586/antrix-
devas-a-bit-of-protectionism/. 
33  Kavaljit Singh, India And Bilateral Investment Treaties — Are They Worth It? FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 2015. 
34  See generally James Nedumpara, Imagining Space in India’s Trade and Investment Agreements (São Paulo Law 
School of Fundação Getulio Vargas — FGV DIREITO SP Research Paper Series — Legal Studies Paper no. 
113, 2014); Mihaela Papa, Emerging Powers in International Dispute Settlement: From Legal Capacity Building 
to a Level Playing Field, 3 (3) J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2012). 
35  Anna Joubin-Bret, Marie-Estelle Rey & Jorg Weber, International Investment Law and Development , in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 24-25 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W 
Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011). 
36  See Article 8. 
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(b) Definition of Investment 
 
 The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and the applicability of the investment treaty are largely based 
on the definition of “investment”. Defining investment is not merely a legal issue but also involves policy 
considerations, as the way in which investment is understood reflects the system as a whole. In determining 
whether an activity is eligible for investment protection development considerations are inevitable.37 
 
 The 2003 Model was following a broad asset based definition of investment and the majority of Indian 
bilateral investment treaties incorporated the same except the India-Mexico one.38 An open-ended definition 
of investment persuaded the tribunal in White Industries to conclude that a contract to provide own working 
capital, equipment and technical know-how and assumed financial risks for cost escalation and other 
penalties for inadequate performance, fell with the terms “right[s] to money or to any performance having 
a financial value”.39 On the other hand the 2015 Model provides a narrow definition of “investment”. To 
claim protection under the new model BIT, an investor will have to have “real and substantial business 
operations” in India.40 The narrow definition of investment is not an attempt to regulate foreign investments. 
A simple reading may make people think that the enterprise-based definition may be an attempt to regulate 
the foreign investment. A reading further clarifies the objective as bringing equilibrium between the 
investment treaties and the regulatory power of the host States.41 
 
 In the same line the narrow definition of government refers only the actions of central government.42 
Many of the IIA cases stem from conflicts with subnational bodies.43 A procedural problem that often arises 
is that different bodies may give different signals in relation to an investment project, one giving favourable 
expectations to the concerned parties while the other indicates otherwise.44 The narrow definition of 
government may bring sustainability regarding these issues. 
 
(c) Most Favoured Nation (Omitted) 
 
 A very broad application of MFN provisions is very common in the Indian BITs.45 In many cases MFN 
allowed the investor to “cherry-pick” more favourable provisions from third-country BITs without being 
bound to any less favourable conditions contained in those treaties.46 The technique is a departure from 
existing international law.47  
 
 The use of provisions of another unconnected treaty goes well beyond the construction of consent that 
is involved when jurisdiction is claimed on the basis of an investment treaty. It seeks to link the consent in 
an entirely unrelated treaty to the foreign investor when there is no logical chain that connects the two 
__________________ 
37  Marek Jezewski, Development Considerations in Defining Investment , in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD 
INVESTMENT LAW 215 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011).  
38  Prabhash Ranjan, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties — A Changing Landscape, 29 ICSID REVIEW 2 — 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL, 420, 419-450 (2014). 
39  See White Industries Arbitration Award ¶ 7.4.10. 
40  “It must have made a long- term commitment to India in terms of capital, employees and transfer of know-how, 
and cannot just be holding Indian assets”.  
41  Prabhash Ranjan, A BIT of an Overreaction, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Apr. 4, 2015. 
42  “In some respects, the actions of state governments are covered by the BIT, but not those of local governments ”.  
43  See generally Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award of 30 August 2000, 5 ICSID Reports (2002) 209; Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award of 29 May 2003, 43 ILM (2004) 133.  
44  See generally MTD v. Chile; Maffezini v. Spain. 
45  See Biswajit Dhar, Reji Joseph, T C James, India’s Bilateral Investment Agreements: Time to Review , XLVII 
(52), ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, http://www.epw.in/special-articles/indias-bilateral-investment- 
agreements.html. 
46  See generally Siemens v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, August 3, 2004, ¶ 32-110; Emilio Augustin 
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7; White Industries Australia Ltd. v. Republic of India, 
UNCITRAL; AAPL v. Srilanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3; Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL, 31 May 
2002. 
47  Impregilo SpA v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, Concurring and dissenting opinion of 
prof. Brigitte Stern, 21 June 2011.  
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treaties. Studies show that the wording of the treaties does not have such effect.48 The wording of many 
MFN clauses did not suggest that they applied to dispute settlement and while interpreting MFN particular 
care should nevertheless be exercised in ascertaining the intentions of the parties with regard to an 
arbitration agreement which is to be reached by incorporation by reference in an MFN clause.49 Broad 
interpretations will result in treaty shopping which is highly undesirable since the goal of investment treaty 
law is to foster sustainable economic relationships between States. 
 
(d) Fair and Equitable Treatment (Omitted) 
 
 The absence of a clear explanation of what is fair and what is equitable has led to a great variety of 
claims against host State regulations. It also raises fears that FET provision in IIAs threatens policy space 
and progress that has been made in promoting sustainable development. Such fears are intensified by the 
lack of legal certainty with respect to the application of fair and equitable treatment and the concrete scope 
of the standards sub elements such as fair procedure, non-discrimination, protection of investor’s legitimate 
expectations, transparency and proportionality.50 There is also a possibility that any attempt to reform 
policies, which affect foreign investors interests could be argued as undermining the stability of law and 
business, leading to its being ruled incompatible with IIAs. Interpretations that overemphasize stability may 
be inconsistent with the promotion of sustainable development.51  
 
 FET is omitted in the Model BIT 2015; however, the duty to afford due process and the protection is 
granted against manifestly abusive treatment or targeted discrimination on manifestly unjust grounds or 
denial of justice in any judicial or administrative proceedings.52 
 
(e) Investor and Home State Obligations 
 
 The Model BIT indicates a change in course on the part of the Government. After delineating India’s 
duty to protect investors and their investments, India’s model text also places responsibilities on both 
investors and their home States to ensure responsible corporate conduct and inclusive and sustainable 
growth in its territory.53 The Model BIT requires foreign investors to contribute to the development of the 
host State and to operate by recognizing the rights, traditions and customs of local communities in order to 
obtain treaty benefits. Investors are also required to make long-term commitments, hire local employees, 
avoid corruption, be transparent about financial transactions and governance mechanisms, and comply with 
host State taxation policies. Signatory home States are required to act against investors found to be violating 
Indian laws.54 Host countries could initiate counterclaims in international arbitration for any violations of 
obligations on foreign investors. This is a mechanism to promote sustainable development using IIAs. It is 
accepted that host States could bring sustainability through direct regulations and investor obligations.55 
 
 
 
__________________ 
48  See generally Julie Maupin, MFN Based Jurisdiction In Investor State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope For A 
Consistent Approach? 14 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 157 (2011); Zachary Douglas, The MFN 
Clause In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off The Rails , 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 97 (2011).  
49  See generally Telenor v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15; Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24; 
Berschader v. Russia, SCC Case No. 080/2004. 
50  Roland Klager, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Sustainable Development , in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 237 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 
2011). 
51  Kate Miles, Sustainable Development, National Treatment & Like Circumstances in Investment Law , in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 261 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W 
Gehring & Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011). 
52  See Article 3. 
53 Kavaljit Singh, Decoding India’s New Model BIT, Madhyam 2015. 
54  Premila Nazareth Satyanand, Once BITten, Forever Shy: Explaining India’s Rethink of Its Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Provisions , 16 (1) AIB INSIGHTS 17 (2015). 
55  Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Philip Alston, ed., 2005).  
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(f) Exhaustion of Local Remedies Requirement  
 
 Modern investment treaties habitually grant investors the right to bring a claim against the host State 
directly before an international arbitral tribunal. The direct standing of foreign investors in investment law 
is thus mainly motivated by the ineffectiveness of the traditional system of diplomatic protection, which 
not only requires the exhaustion of all local remedies,56 but more importantly is a discretionary right of a 
State only.57 The direct access to arbitration on the contrary provides a guarantee for the investor to have 
access to an effective international remedy58 while at the same time offering an interesting investor friendly 
environment for the host State.59 
 
 Customarily, conflicts between individuals and a State in the exercise of its sovereign authority can be 
brought only before the domestic courts of that State, since the application of State immunity would prevent 
the submission of such claims to the domestic courts of the individual’s home State. The direct access to 
arbitration is by no means intended to be a generalized claims procedure to deal with any type of dispute 
between host State and the foreign investor. States grants the access of foreign investors to arbitration only 
through the explicit consent, as is the case in general international law.60 Access to investment treaty 
arbitration may be restricted by the consent of the State.61 States, when expressing consent to direct 
investment arbitration, may condition their consent and for example require foreign investors to exhaust 
local remedies, either generally or for a limited time period.62 The obvious intention behind these measures 
is that a good faith effort at solving the dispute through domestic means should first have been attempted 
before recourse to international means of settlement. But claimants have often ignored these prescriptions, 
and the practice of tribunals has been to condone the failure to have recourse to negotiations for the specified 
period, usually on the ground that such negotiations are not mandatory.63 
 
 The grant of substantive rights to foreign investors is fundamentally different from the access to 
investment arbitration. The mere fact that contemporary investment treaties contain standards of treatment 
that create right to investment protection does not in and of itself create a right to initiate a claim for alleged 
breaches of these rights directly against the host State.64 The exhaustion of local remedies requirement is 
an admissibility requirement for the exercise of the State’s right to diplomatic protection; it does not affect 
the existence of the right of States to initiate claims as such.65 Since the objective of these treaties is not the 
__________________ 
56  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Report on the Work of Its 58 th Session 
(1 May- 9 June and 3 July- 11 August, 2006) General Assembly Official Records, 61 st Session, Supplement No 
10, UN Doc A/61/10, 2006, p. 26. 
57  See generally Mavrommatis Palestine Concession (“The state of the individual’s nationality is not acting in the 
rights of the individual, but is acting in its own rights, namely the right to see the law respected for its nationals”); 
Barcelona traction (“The individual has no right of diplomatic protection and is dependent on the political 
discretion of the government”). 
58  “It is claimed that investment treaties replace domestic law and courts with a fair, independent, and neutral 
process of adjudication to resolve investor-state disputes and that the system therefore advances the rule of law”. 
59  See contra Gus Van Harten, A Critique of Investment Treaties, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 
CRTICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 41 (Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, eds., 2016) (Harrten criticizes 
investment treaty arbitration on the following grounds (i) only private investors are given the right to be heard; 
(ii) institutional safeguards of independence are lacking; (iii) decision making on public law matters by private 
arbitrators who are typically technocrats, intent on promoting the arbitration industry in competition with its 
alternatives; and (iv) no security of tenure for arbitrators which is one of the core safeguards of ad judicative 
independence in public law). 
60  Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for 
Lack of Consent, 2 July 2013. See the dissenting opinion of arbitrator Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ¶ 5.  
61  ICJ, Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Djibouti v. France, ICJ reports 2008, 177 at 
203 ¶ 60. 
62  RUDOLF DOLZER AND CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 214-26 (2008). 
63  See generally Belgium v. Senegal Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, ICJ Judgment 
General List No 144 (2012); Samuel Worthsone, Jurisdiction, Admissibility And Preconditions to Arbitration,  27 
ICSID REVIEW 255 (2012). 
64  See Impregilo SpA v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/17, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 
of Prof. Brigitte Stern, 21 June 2011 ¶ 53.  
65  See generally Articles 26 and 27 of ICSID Convention.  
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settlement of private disputes between foreign investors and host States, but rather to strengthen economic 
relations, promote foreign investment and the general development of State’s economies, investor access 
to investment treaty arbitration needs to be seen as an element in achieving these objectives. Direct access 
to international arbitration causes detrimental impact on the development of rule of law as it creates 
disincentives for the domestic legal system to develop.66 
 
 There is a need to revive the exhaustion of remedies rule and state a category of non-arbitrable disputes 
with greater precision.67 The respondent State must be put in a position to redress the wrongdoings of its 
judiciary. In other words, it cannot be held liable unless the system as a whole has been tested and the initial 
delict remained uncorrected.68 Local courts first requirements have often been deemed to constitute merely 
waiting periods, which do not pose an obstacle to the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal.69 Exhaustion 
of local remedies can be considered a concession to the sovereign independence of the host State, which 
should be presumed capable of rendering justice through its own courts.70 The requirement would put 
pressure on national courts to adjudicate quickly and efficiently.71 Furthermore due process might be 
adhered to if national courts know that their decision might come before an international tribunal.72 This 
would also allow for preliminary injunctions on the domestic plane. Further the victims cannot approach 
the international arbitration tribunal against the foreign investor for violation of their human rights. 
Providing effective domestic remedies in cases where actual violations have occurred could bring in 
sustainability.73  
 
 From the point of view of the investor, the investor-State arbitration mechanism appears biased against 
small and medium-size investors.74 The additional burden of exhausting local remedies can deter such firms 
from pursuing arbitration.75  
 
 The most likely and most efficient way forward is a combination of the national and international 
levels in the use of remedies. This combination allows primary remedies to be sought and also they take 
care of the need to settle cases quickly.76 The Model BIT recognizes the fundamental principle of exhaustion 
of local remedies.77 The model merely strengthens the rule by making it mandatory for the investor to 
litigate the claim before domestic courts for a minimum period of five years.78 If investment arbitrations 
were proceedings whereby the investor were acting on behalf of the home State, it appears logical that the 
State parties to the treaties would insist upon the exhaustion of local remedies.79  
__________________ 
66  See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Governance, 25 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON (2005) 107 at 108. 
67  See Desert Line v. Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17. 
68  See Jan de Nul v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13. 
69  See Wintershall v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 ¶ 74, 115. 
70  See C AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2004). 
71  See Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact Of International Investment Treaties On Domestic Administrative Law , 37 NYU 
JILP 953, 970 (2005). 
72  See R H Mnookin & L A Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L J 
950 (1979). 
73  John Ruggie, State Responsibility to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations 
Core Human Rights Treaties (2007). 
74  Srividya Jandhyala & Robert J. Weiner, Institutions Sans Frontières: International Agreements and Foreign 
Investment, 45 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 649-669 (2014). 
75  Srividya Jandhyala, Bringing the state back in: India’s 2015 model BIT, Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 154, 
August 17, 2015. 
76  See Jacomijn J Van Haersolte- Van Hof & Anne K Hoffmann, The Relationship Between International Tribunals 
And Domestic Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 962, 1000 (Peter 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008). 
77  It is significant to note that the principle of exhaustion of local remedies exists in other branches of international 
law such as in human rights treaties. 
78  Saurabh Garg, Ishita G. Tripathy and Sudhanshu Roy, The Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Continuity 
and Change, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 69 
(Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, eds., 2016).  
79  See Jacomijn J Van Haersolte- Van Hof & Anne K Hoffmann, The Relationship Between International Tribunals 
And Domestic Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 962, 1000 (Peter 
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(g) Other Observations 
 
 India is taking a more protectionist stand under the new Model BIT by providing for excluded areas.80 
Further, an arbitration tribunal is not given powers to re-examine any judicial decisions. It also contains 
expansive provisions to make the ISDS more transparent and accountable as good governance initiatives.81 
To ensure arbitrators are impartial and free of any conflict of interest, detailed disclosure norms and codes 
of conduct for arbitrators have been introduced. Retaining the ISDS system demonstrates a continued 
commitment to settle disputes in accordance with international law. Attempts have been made to strike a 
balance between the costs and benefits of ISDS. From an Indian perspective, investments treaties are not 
just instruments of investor protection, but also a valid tool promoting sustainable development goals, 
ensuring transparency in corporate dealings and preventing unethical business practices.82  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Having a strong and predictable ISDS management framework brings sustainability in providing a 
more effective response to investment disputes, and may even serve as a deterrent to claims as investors 
assess the option of international investment arbitration.83 Uniform rules of investment protection saves 
transaction costs in the drafting of BITs,84 stabilizes the economy, reduces international conflicts and 
provides legal security to investors as well. The use of model treaties did not only serve the purpose of 
facilitating the negotiations about the content of a BIT and thus of reducing the drafting and negotiation 
costs. It also aimed at ensuring a certain level of uniformity with respect to the standards governing the 
investment relations between the home State and varying host States and to make more credible 
commitments with respect to foreign investors.85 The current reforms in BIT including on most disputed 
provisions in International Investment Arbitrations would create more stable investment regime and 
minimize misuse of ISDS mechanism.86 Reforming the regime is a gradual process, and the Model BIT is 
obviously an important step to integrate sustainable development concerns in the investment treaty system.  
 
 Though the reform is in a positive direction, there are many issues yet to be clarified. For bringing 
clarity and sustainability in international investment agreements UNCITRAL could take initiatives to help 
the developing economies especially for doing a sustainable impact assessment of the international 
investment agreements. Transparency may be given special attention to ensure that interests of everyone 
are effectively taken care of for sustainable development in international investment relations.  
 
  
__________________ 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).  
80  The Government has reserved the right to take action protecting public health, safety or the environment, without 
contravening foreign investors’ rights. Further suggested that the following (among other matters) are also not 
covered: intellectual property rights; contracts with the Government; court judgments and arbitral awards; and 
taxation. See the Model BIT 2015. 
81  See generally UN World Summit for Sustainable Development: Plan of Implementation, World Summit for 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/L.1 (Johannesburg, South Africa 2002), Plan of 
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002) ¶ 4; 
Principle 6, New Delhi Declaration on the Principles of International Law Related to Sustainable Development 
(London: ILA, 2002); Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, 
Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.198/11 (22 March 
2002) Ch.1, Resolution 1, annex (2002) ¶ 21.  
82  UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Taking Stock of IIA Reform, Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Geneva, 
16 March 2016). 
83  Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties Over Time: Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a 
Changing World (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2015/02, 2015) available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7rhd8sq7h-en. 
84  Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem? 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 
79-80 (2003). 
85  Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law 91 (2009).  
86  UNCTAD Expert Meeting on Taking Stock of IIA Reform, Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Geneva, 
16 March 2016).  
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Judicial Response to International Commercial Arbitration with Specific Reference to Venue of 
Arbitration: Need for Protection of Investors’ Interest 
 
Leena Moudgil, Faculty of Law, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, GGSIPU, Delhi, India 
 
 “I realized that the true function of a lawyer is to unite the parties involved in a dispute. The lesson was so 
indelibly burnt into me that the large part of my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was 
occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing, there by not even money 
and certainly not my soul.”  
Mahatma Gandhi1 
 
 In 1991, India decided for liberalization and globalization by providing its investors a market oriented 
economy. There was unprecedented growth that resulted in a surge in trade and investments.2 It is believed 
that there is a close nexus between trade and development.3 One of the inevitable consequences of these 
commercial activities is, of course, the growth of cross border disputes involving multinational corporations 
and sovereign states.4 In international trade and commerce, parties come from different states having 
different legal and cultural background. So in order to avoid legal disputes, their every commercial activity 
is preceded by a contract fixing the obligations of the parties.5  
 
 The Indian judiciary is determined to keep a close watch on the practice of international arbitration in 
the country and perform its role of a guardian to promote and encourage speedy, neutral, effective arbitration 
proceedings and enforcement of award in the country. India is all set to take on the world arbitration market 
with its best foot forward.6 Since, national court of one party is foreign court to other party; it is preferred 
to have acceptance of arbitration as the most favourable method for resolving cross-border commercial 
disputes.7 Arbitration provides a mechanism or process to the contracting parties by which disagreements 
are submitted to the arbitral tribunal which are appointed and trusted by the parties.8 International 
Commercial Arbitration is termed as ‘international’ not because sovereign nations participate, but because 
the parties, the facts, or the legal effects of the dispute extend beyond a single jurisdiction.9 Courts should 
be cautious of intervening during a foreign arbitration proceeding is that the benefits in efficiency, cost, 
confidentiality, and reduced complexity of the arbitration process diminish.10 In order, to protect the foreign 
investors the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after 1996 Act) provides for international 
perspective, based on UNCITRAL Model Law, 1985. This Act is later amended in 2015.  
 
 The author looks into:  
 
- development of international arbitration in India, in New York and Geneva Convention, and in 
UNCITRAL rules; 
__________________ 
  The author is thankful to Mr. Madhur Moudgil, Associate-QA, Sapient for helping in proof reading the article. 
1  Pallab Das, Arbitration : An Alternate To Litigation THE LIBERTATEM MAGAZINE (Dec. 27, 2016) 
http://mylibertatem.com/arbitration-an-alternate-to-litigation-2/.  
2  Harisankar KS Contemporary International Arbitration In Asia: A Stock Take IJAL III(1) retrieved from 
http://www.ijal.in/sites/default/files/IJAL%20Volume%203_Issue%201_Harisankar%20KS.pdf .  
3  R. Usharani, Recent Trends in International Commercial Arbitration , 2007(5) KAR.LJ 33-39 
4  Harisankar KS, supra note 2. 
5  Sabyasachi Chatterjee, Law applicable to International Commercial Arbitration , 2004(4) JSLC 109-116. 
6  Yogesh Pratap Singh, Nachiketa Mittal, Making Indian Arbitration Popular, THE STATESMAN, (December 29, 
2016) retrieved from http://www.thestatesman.com/features/making-indian-arbitration-popular-
1482974325.html.  
7  MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
8  Neeraj Tiwari, Critical issues in International Commercial Arbitration , 2012(4) Arb. LR 18-24(JS).  
9  Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration , 34 ICLQ 747, 1985 (referred from 
Jeevan Krishna, Law of Choice in International Commercial Arbitration, 20(1&2) Academy Law Review 61-78). 
10  Sandeep S. Sood, Finding Harmony with Uncitral Model Law: Contemporary Issues in International 
Commercial Arbitration in India after the Arbitration And Conciliation Act of 1996 available at 
http://works.bepress.com/sandeep_sood/2/.  
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- Judicial Response to International Commercial Arbitration;  
- Problems faced by the parties and how far are the interest of parties secured. 
 
Development of International Arbitration in India  
 
 International Commercial Arbitration, which is a sprout of arbitration11, has evolved as private 
transnational system of dispute resolution comprising of bilateral treaties, multilateral conventions, national 
arbitration laws, and norms of arbitral institutions. In India, three Acts that governed the law of Arbitration 
are: 
 
- The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, which gave effect to the Geneva Convention;  
- The Arbitration Act, 1940, which dealt with domestic awards,  
- The Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 which gave effect to the New York 
Convention of 1958. 
 
 After Independence, the mandate under Article 51, Constitution of India, 1950 provides that “the State 
shall encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration”. The 1996 Act is drafted in line with the 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. It has been adopted by United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1985 to establish a unified legal framework for the fair and 
efficient settlement of disputes arising in international commercial relations. The Act seeks not only to 
consolidate but also to unify Indian law both on domestic and international arbitration.12 The Act is divided 
in four parts: Part I deals with domestic arbitration including International Commercial Arbitration 
conducted in India, Part II deals with enforcement of foreign awards governed under New York and Geneva 
Convention, Part III and IV deals with conciliation and supplementary rules. The paper will focus on Part I 
and II.  
 
 Also, Indian Council of Arbitration was established in 1965. It keeps contact with important arbitral 
associations, experts and distinguished persons of different countries. The Council collects information 
about rules of Indian and foreign arbitral institutions and circulates the journal worldwide. It also organizes 
a program for the exchange of panels with other arbitral institutions.13 
 
International Commercial Arbitration in India  
 
 Section 2(1)(f) defines “international commercial arbitration” as an arbitration relating to disputes 
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial under the law in 
force in India and where at least one of the parties is—  
 
 (i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India; or  
 
 (ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India; or  
 
 (iii) an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any 
country other than India; or  
 
 (iv) the Government of a foreign country. 
 
__________________ 
11  P.T. Kamala Priya and S. Karpaga Priya, International Commercial Arbitration — A New Dimension (Mad.LJ 
Vol. 203 13). 
12  A. Jayagovind, International Commercial Arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (IJIL 1997 
VOL. 37 658-672). 
13  Ernest J. Cohn & Martin Domke (et.al) Handbook Of Institutional Arbitration (North Holland Publishing 
Company Amsterdam 1977 pg.99). 
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 This definition develops consonance with Model Law14. Article 1 (3) broadens the notion of 
internationality and covers cases where the place of arbitration, the place of contract performance, or the 
place of the subject-matter of the dispute is situated outside the State where the parties have their place of 
business, or cases where the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one country.15 UNCITRAL focus upon place of business, whereas 1996 Act 
is about nationality. 
 
 Also, in 1996 Act the word ‘commercial’ covers legal relations whether contractual or not. 
UNCITRAL defines ‘commercial’ and both take similar approaches but are slightly divergent in 
practicality.16 This empowers the Court to broaden or narrow the definition. In civil law countries, business 
and commercial have different meanings but not in other countries.17 The territorial criterion is of 
considerable practical importance in Articles 11, 13, 14, 16, 27 and 34 which entrust State courts at the 
place of arbitration with functions of supervision and assistance to arbitration.18  
 
New York Convention  
 
 New York Convention, also known as the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
is one of the most important and successful United Nations treaties in the area of international trade law.19 
Till date 156 States are signatory to this Convention.20 Its application requires firstly, one of the party must 
be from signatory country; secondly transaction is ‘commercial’ in nature. The word ‘commercial’ is 
defined in Model Law21 but not in New York and Geneva Convention. It is left to national courts to define 
it.22 
 
 Also, to see whether the prospective forum recognizes and enforces awards rendered at the place of 
arbitration. The jurisdiction of court to refer to arbitration arises when it is seized of an action unless 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.23 The party must recognize where 
the defaulting party has the assets in different countries and to go for ‘forum shopping’. It requires 
understanding of other factors also like adherence of that country to this Convention or attitude of Courts 
or the law of that State. 
 
 New York Convention does not provide any time limit for refusal to recognition and enforcement. 
However, Part I, 1996 Act provides three months period to set aside the award and further, thirty days 
maximum on sufficient cause only.24 
 
__________________ 
14  Article 1 (3), Model Law defines an arbitration is international if:  
 (a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places o f 
business in different States; or 
 (b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their places of business:  
 (i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, arbitration agreement; 
 (ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of commercial relationship is to be performed or the 
place with which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected; or  
 (c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of arbitration agreement relates to more than one 
country. 
15  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006, 
UNITED NATIONS, Vienna, 2008. 
16  Harsh Sethi and Arpan Kr Gupta International Commercial Arbitration & it Indian Perspective (Universal Law 
Publishing, New Delhi pg. 20 2011).  
17  Nigel Blackaby and Constatine Partasides (et.al), Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration Oxford 
University Press 14 2015. 
18  UNCITRAL, 1985. 
19  http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/2016_Guide_on_the_Convention.pdf.  
20  www.newyorkconvention/countries as on January 6,2017 
21  Srishti Jha, Implications of the Term ‘Commercial’ in International Commercial Arbitration (2001) 40 CLA 36. 
22  Julian D M Lew QC and Loukas A Minstelis (et.al) Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters 
Kluwer 2007 Ist edn. Indian reprint 55).  
23  Article II(3). 
24  Section 34. 
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 In New York Convention, recognition and enforcement are used interchangeably and interlinked but 
not in Geneva Convention. ‘Recognition’ is to demand remedy on previous arbitral proceedings, whereas, 
‘enforcement’ means to recognize legal force and effect the award and to ensure that it is carried out by 
using such legal sanctions.25  
It deals with challenges made on foreign awards.26 It is developed to provide uniformity in recognition and 
enforcement. UNCITRAL is closely modelled on this Convention, though similar points are included for 
recognition and enforcement27 but are differently interpreted in Courts.28 
 
 New York Convention gives discretion to the judges to decline the enforcement of foreign award on 
grounds, such as award has been set aside in the country where it made whether the cause of annulment is 
also recognized by the law of the enforcement forum or not.29 Article V (1) (e) allows court to exercise 
jurisdiction on enforcement but it cannot set aside the award; whereas, domestic award can be set aside. 
 
Geneva Convention  
 
 Geneva Convention, 1927 requires that both or all the parties must belong to two different signatory 
states.30Article II provides exhaustive list of refusal and obliges courts to enforce foreign awards unless it 
is proven that they comport at least one of the limited number of refusal.31 As there is limited applicability 
of the Convention and understandable reluctance of judges to enforce awards that have been rejected in 
their countries of origin, the practical rule is to give due consideration to the Arbitration laws of the 
contracting parties.32  
 
 The Convention will be called foreign award whenever it is ‘commercial’ under 1996 Act and both the 
parties are from signatory states. However, the Convention will not be applicable in cases the award is made 
in India.33 Also, this convention is replaced by New York Convention when both the States are signatory to 
both the Conventions.34 
 
UNCITRAL 1985 
 
 According to Model Law 1985, place of arbitration is the place of contract performance, or the place 
of the subject-matter of the dispute is situated outside the State where the parties have their place of 
business, or cases where the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration 
agreement relates to more than one country. The applicable law and the applicable procedure have different 
meanings; the former implies the law chosen to regulate the contract and the latter is the law in the 
arbitration agreement.35  
 
- Article 1 recognizes extensively the freedom of the parties to submit a dispute to the legal regime 
established pursuant to the Model Law. 
- Article 19 and 28 provides about applicable law 
- Article 15 and 33 discusses rules of procedure. 
 
__________________ 
25  See Nigel Blackaby, supra note 17. 
26  Union of India Vs. Reliance Industries Limited (2015(10) SCALE149). 
27  Article 36, UNCITRAL Model Law and Article V, New York Convention.  
28  See Nigel Blackaby, supra note 17. 
29  Ronald Bernstein, Handbook of Arbitration Practice (Sweet & Maxwell with The Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators, London 1993 446). 
30  C. R. DATTA, LAW RELATING TO COMMERCIAL & DOMESTIC ARBITRATION (1st ed., Wadhwa & Co’, 
Nagpur., 2008). 
31  See the contra view to Article II in Ronald Bernstein (supra note 29), (an award does not become defective 
because it has been rendered defective by their court itself).  
32  See Ronald Bernstein, supra note 29. 
33 See C. R. Datta, supra note 30. 
34  Renusagar Power Co’ Ltd. v. General Electric Co’, AIR 1994 SC 860. 
35  MINABERE TOM- GEORGE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (38 Sheriden Book Co. 
New Delhi 1996). 
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64th Session, UNCITRAL, 2016 
 
 The Commission36 agreed to clarify that the “determination of the place” of arbitration had legal 
consequences37. Also, it should include that it will lead to determination of the court competent with respect 
to the arbitral proceedings.  
 
 The Commission also suggested that it is the need of the hour for the parties and arbitral tribunal to 
expand their knowledge and familiarize themselves with not only the “law” on arbitration and any other 
relevant procedural law but also “practice” and “enforcement” law that did not receive support.38 
 
 In para. 31, it is agreed that the parties and the arbitral tribunal should consider that holding all hearings 
outside of the place of arbitration might have an impact at the stage of judicial review, setting aside or 
enforcement of the arbitral award in certain jurisdictions.39 
 
Choice of Place  
 
 There is a freedom of choice in the law governing international arbitration.40 When the contract is 
governed by the law of place then contract is subject to the jurisdiction; When the parties choose arbitral 
institution then their rules will apply; When the parties choose national arbitration law of a place of then 
applicable law and procedural law will be of arbitration of that place; When the parties choose venue for 
arbitration then arbitration is subject to law of arbitration of that place (lex loci arbitri).41 The geographical 
location is of great importance and affects more mundane matters including logical functioning in 
arbitration.42  
 
 When express agreement doesn’t exist, presumption is that the parties intend the curial law (procedural 
law or lex fori)43 to be the law of the ‘seat of arbitration’.44 The ‘proper law’ implies law by which parties 
intended to be governed and when intention is not express or implied or inferred from circumstances then 
law with which there is closest and most real connection.45  
 
Importance of Seat  
 
 The seat of arbitration (also called place of arbitration) refers to the legal rather than physical location 
of the arbitration, whereas ‘venue’ is where the hearing physically takes place.46  
 
 While choosing the place, the parties must understand the consonance between “seat of arbitration” 
and the “Forum where arbitration is sought” and look at: 
 
__________________ 
36  Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-fourth session (New York, 1-
5 February 2016), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Forty-ninth session, New York, 27 
June-15 July 2016, General Assembly, United Nations.  
37  Para. 28, UNCITRAL. 
38  Third sentence of paragraph 28. 
39  Forty-eighth session of the Commission (A/70/17, para. 41)  
40  Sabyasachi, supra note 5. 
41  See MINABERE TOM- GEORGE, supra note 35, at 39. 
42  Gary B. Born International Commercial Arbitration in the United States (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 
Deventer 1994 71). However, contra view in L.M. Sharma, International Commercial Arbitration (1994(3) Comp. 
LJ J-56) that provides if an arbitration agreement is to be classified as domestic agreement only on the basis of 
arbitration taking place in India then many foreign parties would hesitate to choose India as venue.  
43  It includes procedural powers and duties, procedure for evidence and manner of reference.  
44  Sabyasachi, supra note 5. 
45  DICEY AND MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1161 11thed. vol. II Sweet & Maxwell 2012) (referred from 
SABYASCHI, supra note 5). Also, see Rodney D. Ryder Contracts, The Choice of Law and International 
Commercial Arbitration 2 COMP L.J. J-10 (1999); Jeevan Krishna, Law of Choice in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 20(1&2) ACADEMY LAW REVIEW 61-78. 
46  Clayton Utz A Guide to International Arbitration 2nd edn. https://www.claytonutz.com/ArticleDocuments/ 
178/Clayton-Utz-Guide-to-International-Arbitration-2012.pdf.aspx?Embed=Y.  
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- whether there are any reciprocal treaties or conventions; 
- if there are no reciprocal treaties or conventions, then earlier decisions on enforcement of the court are 
seen;  
- if the unsuccessful party is a State or State entity the laws of that country in relation to State 
immunity.47 
 
 Section 28 (1)(b), 1996 Act in international arbitration provides:  
 
- the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of law designated by the 
parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute;  
- any designation by the parties of the law or legal system of a given country shall be construed, unless 
otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that country and not to its conflict 
of laws rules;  
- failing any designation of the law under section 28(1)(a) by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply 
the rules of law it considers to be appropriate given all the circumstances surrounding the dispute.  
 
Judicial Response  
 
 The Supreme Court of India has adopted path-breaking rulings that bespeak the judicial independence 
courts enjoy in India to freely interpret the law in keeping with international standards and future of global 
trade.48 The choice of the place of arbitration is important, keeping in view, the serious consequences of the 
arbitration process and it is important that parties consider this issue seriously. The factors to consider when 
choosing the place of arbitration are (1) the law that the parties wish to have governing the arbitration; (2) 
the application of the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law; (3) restrictions on appeal 
and nationality; (4) language; (5) practical considerations; (6) jurisdiction-specific issues. 49  
 
 In international commercial arbitration, the judicial perspective is touching new heights each day like 
the ‘venue of arbitration’. In 1992, in the case of National Thermal Power Corporation v. Singer Co.50 the 
arbitration clause provided that in case of foreign contractor, the arbitration shall be conducted by three 
arbitrators, two by parties themselves and third by the President of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
Paris. ICC rules of conciliation and arbitration shall apply. The place shall be as determined by the 
arbitrators. The question in issue was whether the mere fact that the venue chosen by the ICC Court for the 
conduct of the arbitration proceeding was London excludes the operation of the Act which dealt with 
domestic awards i.e. the Act of 1940. In a significant sentence, the Court went on to hold:  
 
 “Notwithstanding that award was a foreign award, since the substantive law of the contract was Indian 
law and since the arbitration clause was part of the contract, the arbitration clause would be 
governed…the jurisdiction exercisable by the English courts and the applicability of the laws of that 
country in procedural matters must be viewed as concurrent and consistent with the jurisdiction of the 
competent Indian courts and the operation of Indian laws in all matters concerning arbitration insofar 
as the main contract as well as that which is contained in the arbitration clause are governed by the 
laws of India.” 
 
 In the case of Sumitomo Heavy Industries Limited vs. ONGC Limited51 the Court observed that the 
party autonomy being the brooding and guiding spirit in arbitration, the parties are free to agree on 
application of three different laws governing their entire contract-(1) proper law of contract, (2) proper law 
of arbitration agreement and (3) proper law of the conduct of arbitration, which is popularly and in legal 
parlance known as curial law. Where the contract is governed by Indian law and the seat of the arbitration 
__________________ 
47 HARSH SETHI, supra note 16, at 258. 
48  Yogesh Pratap, supra note 6. 
49  Houthoff Buruma, International Commercial Arbitration : An Introduction (January 7, 2017) 
http://www.houthoff.com/uploads/tx_hhpublications/International_Commercial_Arbitration_2013.pdf . 
50  (1992) 3 SCC 551. 
51  1998) 1 SCC 305. 
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is elsewhere, wherein arbitrability of the dispute is established, procedural law of the country of seat of 
arbitration governs the conduct of the arbitration proceedings till the award is delivered. 
 
 In 2002, in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and Anr.52, an application was made under section 
9, 1996 Act to safeguard the assets of the Indian company in case a foreign award was to be executed in 
India against it. The Court revived the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction by holding “even where 
arbitrations are held outside India, unless the parties agree to exclude the application of Part-I of the 
Arbitration Act, 1996, either expressly or by necessary implication, the courts in India will exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction with the court in the country in which the foreign award was made”.53 
 
 Here, the lacunae in legislative provisions, section 254 does not have exceptions of application of 
Articles 8,9, 35 and 36, justified the implementation of Model Law. 55 Also, the aim of this Act led the Court 
to give preference to intention of parties than to law of any country. However, it had adverse impact on 
foreign direct investment and insist of coverage of legal risk. It makes transactions commercially 
impractical. Consequently, the Supreme Court decisions are disincentives to any long-term investment 
transaction and to entrepreneurial cooperation.56 
 
 In 2005, Shin- Etsu Chemicals Co’ Ltd. vs. Akash Optifibres Ltd.57 the Court held that proper of arbitral 
agreement is the substantive law governing the contract because it has the closest and most real connection 
with the transaction.  
 
 In 2008, Venture Global Engineering vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.58 the Supreme Court held 
that foreign award would also be considered as domestic award and the challenge procedure under Section 
34, 1996 Act is allowed. This led to a situation where the foreign award could be challenged in the country 
in which it is made; it could also be challenged under Part-I of 1996 Act in India; and could be refused to 
be recognized and enforced in Section 48 contained in Part II of 1996 Act. This case is divergent from the 
basic scheme of Act and has brought uncertainty in the mind of parties. This case is overruled. 
 
 In Dozco India Pvt. Ltd vs. DOOSAN Infracore Company Ltd 59 the governing laws of the Contract 
were the laws of South Korea and in arbitration matters, all disputes arising in connection with the 
agreement, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Seoul, Korea or such other place as the parties may agree 
in writing, pursuant to the Rules of the Agreement then in force of the ICC. The Court held that there is no 
application of Part-I, 1996 Act. 
 
 In Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssang Yong Engg. and Construction Co. Ltd.60 the distinction between 
the “proper law” of the contract and the “curial law” determines the law which will the govern the 
arbitration. The proper law is the law which governs the agreement itself. In the absence of any other 
stipulation in the arbitration, it will be the law governing the contract which would also be the law applicable 
__________________ 
52  (2002) 4 SCC 105. 
53 Paragraph 32 of Bhatia case(2002).  
54  Section 2(2) reads, “this part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India.”  
55 Nidhi Gupta, Enforcement of Foreign Awards under The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : A Review of 
the Supreme Court Judgment in Venture Global Engineering Case 257 49(2) IJIL 2009. 
56 Karan Singh Tyagi, A second look at international arbitration, THE HINDU 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-second-look-at-international-arbitration/article2735659.ece as on 
December 22, 2011. 
57  (2005) 7 SCC 234. 
58  (2008) 4 SCC 190. Here, the contract is between venture global and satyam computers that they will be governed 
by laws of Michigan (state in USA), here the principal office is also established, and in case of impossibility to 
resolve then the matter will be as per LCIA. The LCIA passed an award on which Satyam computer filed for 
recognition and enforcement in US. Venture filed cross petition and objected its violation in India. Later, matter 
came before courts in India.  
59  (2011) 6 SCC 179. similar judgment is delivered in Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., (2011) 6 
SCC 161 where the parties agreed that the arbitration agreement would be governed by the laws of England, 
while the seat of arbitration was at Kuala Lumpur, and the governing law of the contract was Indian law. 
60  (2011) 9 SCC 735. 
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to the Arbitral Tribunal itself. The curial law regulates the procedure to be adopted in conducting the 
arbitration would be the SIAC Rules.  
 
 In 2012, Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.61 the parties agreed that 
i) disputes arising out of the Contract between the parties are to be resolved by arbitration under the ICC 
Rules; ii) the seat of arbitration is Paris; iii) the substantive law to be applied in the arbitration shall be 
English Law (Article 22). The matter is earlier referred to two judge bench which disagreed with Bhatia 
case, so case is heard by Constitutional bench. The Court held that Part-I will not apply to international 
arbitration outside India. Also, ‘seat theory’ is developed to decide the applicable law of arbitration and 
have power to annul the award. The Court stated that the seat of arbitration as the ‘centre of gravity’ of an 
arbitration particularly to determine jurisdiction of courts in relation to that arbitration. “Where the parties 
have failed to choose the law governing the arbitration proceedings, those proceedings must be considered, 
at any rate prima facie, as being governed by the law of the country in which the arbitration is held, on the 
ground that it is the country most closely connected with the proceedings”. Also, Interim measures under 
Section 9 cannot be granted in arbitrations taking place outside India.  
 
 If an international arbitration takes place, irrespective of the seat, and the subject matter of that 
arbitration would otherwise be within the jurisdiction of an Indian Court, such Indian Court would have 
‘supervisory jurisdiction’. Therefore, if “the closest connection” of the arbitration is with India, and if the 
Indian Courts would normally have jurisdiction over the dispute, the Indian Courts will play a supervisory 
role in the arbitration. 
 
 This case has prospective effect that is agreements after 6.9.2012 which resulted in no application in 
the present times. The ‘seat theory’ influences the law that will govern arbitration; decides which court will 
have supervisory power and determines the nationality of award.62 Also, non-convention awards are not 
covered.63 
 
 In 2014, Enercon India Ltd vs. Enercon GmbH64 the parties agreed to have “seat” of arbitration in 
India and London to be the “venue” to hold the proceedings of arbitration. Law governing the Contract, 
arbitration agreement and Curial law are Indian laws. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that even 
though the venue of proceedings is London, it cannot be presumed that the parties have intended the seat to 
be London. Venue is often different from the seat of arbitration and should not be confused because of 
convenient geographical location. The hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the 
parties, but this would not bring about a change in the seat of the arbitration.  
 
 If the “seat” of arbitration is in India; the 1996 Act being the curial law, recourse to Indian Courts as 
per Part I of the 1996 Act, including Section 9 is available to the parties. The “seat” of arbitration thus, 
would be the country whose law is chosen as the curial law by the parties.65 Applying the “closest and 
intimate connection test” to arbitration, parties had agreed for arbitration proceedings under 1996 Act.  
 
 In the case of Union of India (UOI) vs. Reliance Industries Limited(Reliance) and Ors.66 there is a 
contract of Production Sharing between Reliance, UOI, Enron Oil and Gas India Limited and the ONGC. 
In 2005, Enron Oil and Gas India Limited are substituted with BG Exploration and Production India 
Limited. In 2010, disputes arose between the Union of India and Reliance. The arbitrators are appointed.67 
In 2011, the UOI, Reliance Industries and BG Exploration and Production India, agreed to change the seat 
__________________ 
61  (2012) 9 SCC 552. 
62  JULIAN, supra note 22, at 172. 
63  Sumbhav Nagory and Ananya Kapoor International Commercial Arbitration — A Crititque of Balco V. Kaiser 
Aluminium, (2013) 1 MLJ 92. 
64  (2014) 5 SCC 1.  
65  Shivam Goel, International Commercial Arbitration — India (January 4, 2017) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585435. 
66  2015(10) SCALE149. 
67 The Union of India appointed Mr. Peter Leaver, QC as Arbitrator and Reliance Industries appointed Justice B.P. 
Jeevan Reddy as Arbitrator and Mr. Christopher Lau SC was appointed as Chairman of the Tribunal. 
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of arbitration to London, England and a final partial consent award was made and duly signed by the parties 
to this effect. In 2012, the tribunal passed an award. UOI filed a petition before Delhi High Court to set 
aside the arbitral award under Section 34, which was allowed. However, the Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment in 2014.68 In the meantime, in 2014 special leave petition was filed before the High Court and 
has been dismissed. The petition was made under Section 1469. The Supreme Court observed that the proper 
law of the contract is Indian law and proper law of the arbitration agreement is the law of England. In order, 
to understand whether parties intended to exclude jurisdiction of India can be understood from the 
arbitration agreement and referred Bhatia case, 2002. The court also noted that BALCO case because of 
prospective application cannot be referred.  
 
 Secondly, the ‘doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction’ cannot be allowed as the ‘juridical seat’ of the 
arbitration is at London and that the arbitration agreement is governed by English law. Allowing this 
doctrine to prevail, will result in concurrent jurisdiction at two places is incorrect. The Supreme Court 
dismissed the petition and held, 
 
 “Where such arbitration is held in India, the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and parties 
are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by the derogable provisions of Part I. In cases of 
international commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the 
parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or 
rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or excluded 
by that law or rules will not apply.” 
 
 The ground of ‘public policy’ cannot be applied as jurisdiction before English Court is open. In Singer 
case (1992) the Court did not give effect to the difference between substantive law of contract and the law 
that governed the arbitration on basis of section 9, Foreign Awards (Recognition And Enforcement) Act, 
196170. This later led to omission of the word in section 9(b), 1961 while enacting Section 51, 1996 Act71. 
Also, concurrent jurisdiction was done away with. 
 
 In 2013, Court paved a way for referring non-signatories to an arbitration agreement to settle disputes 
through arbitration in the case of Chloro Controls (I) P. Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. & Ors.72 
in the expression ‘person claiming through or under’ as provided under Section 45 of the Arbitration Act 
would mean and include multiple and multi-party agreements. This judgment will have far-reaching 
positive effect especially in the cases of international commercial arbitrations involving composite 
transactions and multiple parties. In the case of World Sport Group (Mauritius) Ltd. vs MSM Satellite 
(Singapore) Pte. Ltd.73 the Supreme Court has eased the arbitrability of cases involving allegations of fraud 
for referring such matters and parties to foreign seated arbitrations to meet legal requirements. 
 
 In Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd.74 the Court observed that the law governing the substantive 
contract; the law governing the agreement to arbitrate and the performance of that agreement; the law 
governing the conduct of the arbitration.  
 
__________________ 
68  Reliance Industries Limited and Anr. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603.  
69  Section 14 is on Failure or impossibility to act.  
70  Nothing in this Act shall-(a)prejudice any rights which any person would have had of enforcing in India of any 
award or of availing himself in India of any award if this Act had not been passed; or (b)  apply to any award 
made on an arbitration agreement governed by the law of India. Retrieved from 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/882364/ as on December 26,2016. 
71  51. Saving. — Nothing in this Chapter shall prejudice any rights, which any person would have had of 
enforcing in India of any award or of availing himself in India of any award if this Chapter had not been 
enacted. 
72  2013(1)SCC641. 
73  (2014)11SCC639. 
74  AIR2015SC1504. 
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 In the case of ROHM and HAAS Electronic Materials Holding UK Limited vs. R.B. Business 
Promotions Pvt. Ltd.75 contract provided the arbitration agreement to be governed by Indian Law and seat 
of arbitration is mentioned as U.K. However, before the commencement of the arbitration proceeding, the 
parties agree that though the physical seat of arbitration is in U.K., for all purposes the seat of arbitration 
shall be deemed to be India and the arbitral proceedings shall be conducted under the curial law of India. 
In this situation, though all the conditions under section 44 were satisfied the award by the arbitrator cannot 
be said to be a foreign award. 
 
 In 2016, Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc76. the Court held 
that Part I applies only to arbitration held in India. This case cover the residue of BALCO, 2012 and 
discusses the agreement by parties to be governed by the prevailing law of India and in case of Arbitration, 
the English Law shall apply (article 22). The Court held that the proper law of contract is Indian law. 
Looking at article 17 noted it is solely on arbitration. Therefore, the intention of the parties to apply English 
Law to the arbitration agreement also and not limit it to the conduct of the arbitration is fairly clear from 
Article 22. 
 
Conclusion and Suggestions  
 
 In international arbitration, the vigilant attitude of parties while choosing seat of arbitration and law to 
be made applicable to said arbitration is the utmost requirement. In foreign seated arbitration governed by 
foreign law, there is implied exclusion of Sections 9, 27 and 37, 1996 Act. When a foreign seated 
international arbitration is governed by Indian law, Part I will apply. 
 
- Problem of conflicting awards as each award stands on its own and there is no binding effect. 
- Preference to International Law.  
- International Arbitration to be delocalised. It is completely separated from the law of the place of 
arbitration for enforcement purposes like sports arbitration. Also, it is not extra-legal arbitration. 
However, drawbacks like threat to fairness; no supervisory intervention of courts; limiting scope of 
public policy.77 It cannot operate in legal vacuum.78  
- Setting up a common legal system for international arbitration. 
- Minimising the supervisory role played by different nations. 
- More application of general principles of law (lex mercatoria) 
- Need to develop rules for arbitration awards rendered in a non-convention country as it might not be 
enforceable in other countries. 
  
__________________ 
75  222(2015)DLT224. 
76  2016(2)SCALE60. 
77  Suharsh Sinha Issues of Arbitrabillity in International Commercial Arbitration : The Present Position (2007(4) 
Arb.L.R. J 9-16). 
78  JULIAN, supra note 22, at 67. 
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Session 9 — New frontiers in dispute settlement 
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I. Introduction 
 
1. This paper examines the subject of bilateral and multilateral arbitration treaties (or “BATs”) and 
outlines the benefits that such treaties would provide to States and commercial parties. As discussed below, 
BATs would establish arbitration as a default mechanism to resolve international commercial disputes 
between businesses that are located in the States party to the BAT.  
 
2. BATs are a topic of increasing and substantial interest. Proponents of BATs argue that these treaties 
offer significant benefits to international businesses by providing access to more efficient, expert, and 
enforceable dispute resolution mechanisms, applying neutral and fair procedures. In doing so, BATs 
facilitate international trade and commerce, particularly involving small and medium-sized enterprises, 
while also providing enhanced access to justice. Several States have indicated interest in BATs, and the 
concept has generated considerable professional interest in legal and business communities, particularly in 
recent years. 
 
3. This paper considers how the study of BATs would tie into the work of UNCITRAL and the benefits 
that such a study would bring both to UNCITRAL and the larger international community.1 By supporting 
a study of BATs, UNCITRAL could ultimately develop a model instrument that forms a precedent for States 
that wish to conclude BATs with each other. Such a model BAT would stand on the shoulders of some of 
UNCITRAL’s most successful accomplishments — the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (or “Model Law”) and the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (or “New York Convention”), the promotion of 
which is an integral part of UNCITRAL’s work.2 
 
4. Part II of this paper explains how the current shortfalls in international dispute resolution increase 
barriers to trade and foreign direct investment (“FDI”) and the role BATs can play to mitigate these 
concerns. Part III explores the deficiencies in contemporary international dispute resolution and the benefits 
of BATs through the lens of two traditionally disadvantaged groups — developing small States and small 
and medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”). Part IV draws attention to further areas of research on BATs that 
UNCITRAL could explore. Part V provides some concluding observations.  
__________________ 
1  The authors have previously published on the novel concept of a BAT. Mr. Born has proposed a Draft Model 
BAT and Draft Commentary on a Model BAT that have been made available for public comment. See Draft 
Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Draft -Model-BAT.pdf 
(last accessed on 29 November 2016); Draft Commentary on Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Explanatory-Note-
Draft-Model-Bilateral-Arbitration-Treaty.pdf (last accessed on 29 November 2016); see also Gary Born, “BITs, 
BATs and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution” in Young Arbitration Review (2011), 6-14. Dr. 
Butler has examined the potential of such a BAT, specifically for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in New 
Zealand. See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 
2014, 186-221. 
2  See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, New York Arbitration Convention, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/uncitral (last accessed on 29 November 2016). 
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5. Attached to this paper is a draft model BAT (Annex A), together with an explanatory commentary that 
discusses each article of the draft model BAT (Annex B).3 
 
 
II. BATS, Barriers to Trade and International Dispute Resolution 
 
A. Deficiencies in International Dispute Resolution as Barriers to Trade 
 
6. Current mechanisms for resolving international disputes have not kept pace with the cross-border 
dimension of 21st-century commerce. Doing business globally therefore faces the risks and uncertainties of 
inconsistent or conflicting national laws; biased, inefficient, inexperienced, or otherwise unsuitable 
decision-makers; inconsistent dispute resolution proceedings; and severe obstacles to the enforcement of 
judgments.  
 
7. More specifically, current risks in international dispute resolution include: 
 
 a. Lack of Neutrality: Many international commercial disputes are, by default, resolved by 
litigation in national courts. However, commercial parties frequently doubt that national courts, particularly 
the courts of the jurisdiction of their counter-party, will render an unbiased and competent decision.4 In 
many instances, well-documented concerns about corruption and the integrity of national courts further 
erode confidence in cross-border litigation.5 
 
 b. Lack of Experience and Expertise: International commercial disputes are often complex. Many 
such disputes arise in specialized sectors, with complex business customs and technical issues (e.g., oil and 
gas disputes; insurance and reinsurance disputes; commodities transactions; M&A disputes). Very few, if 
any, national courts can consistently provide the specialized expertise appropriate for such disputes. 
Moreover, even disputes with simple factual matrixes become complex when a foreign law must be applied. 
Some national courts are well-versed in resolving cross-border disputes, but many are not. Particularly in 
emerging markets, courts may have limited experience in resolving cross-border disputes or may generally 
lack experienced commercial judges. 
 
 c. Risk of Parallel or Multiple Litigation: In practice, cross-border disputes often lead to litigation 
in multiple fora6 — the place of performance, the jurisdiction of the counter-party, the enterprises’ own 
national courts and jurisdictions where the counter-party has assets for enforcement — with each 
proceeding potentially involving multiple appellate levels. The complexity of handling multiple 
proceedings is compounded by the inevitable risk of conflicting decisions.  
 
 d. Cost and Time to Resolve Disputes: The very real risk of multiple parallel proceedings in cross-
border disputes also leads to prohibitive costs and delays. Parties often have to “layer” counsel, first 
engaging local counsel and then appointing foreign counsel in each of the various relevant jurisdictions.7 
__________________ 
3  The draft Model BAT and accompanying commentary are also available online at 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Draft -Model-BAT.pdf 
and https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Explanatory -Note-
Draft-Model-Bilateral-Arbitration-Treaty.pdf respectively. 
4  See Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration , 16th edition, OUP 
2015, at para. 1.99 et seq.; Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kröll, Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2003, at para. 1-13. 
5  See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems  (2007), at 
p. xxi (“Corruption is undermining justice in many parts of the world, denying victims and the accused the 
basic human right to a fair and impartial trial.”). 
6  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 199. 
7  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 202 et seq. 
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Moreover, enforcement of judgments often requires multiple sets of lawyers in different jurisdictions. In 
many cases, litigation is slow, with proceedings taking many years to conclude before being subject to even 
lengthier delays for appellate review, and further delays for enforcement. 
 
 e. Obstacles to Enforceability of Judgments and Forum Selection Provisions: Different 
jurisdictions apply different rules (often uncertain national rules) when enforcing foreign judgments and 
forum selection clauses. Assuming the parties obtain a judgment from a national court, it is often difficult 
or impossible for the judgment to be enforced abroad, in particular in jurisdictions where the defendant has 
assets.8 While there are frameworks for the enforcement of judgments between certain countries, there is as 
yet no comprehensive mechanism that ensures recognition of a State court’s judgment in most other 
countries.9 Even where enforcement is possible, the process is invariably slow. 
 
 f. Uncertainty and Unpredictability: The factors outlined above introduce a significant degree of 
uncertainty and unpredictability, which in turn has a chilling effect on international business. These risks 
drive up the costs of international commerce and may prevent many potential participants from expanding 
internationally.  
 
8. In sum, international dispute resolution today, with the default of national court litigation, is 
unsatisfactory, leading to less trade and economic growth globally.10 The current system also produces 
significant obstacles to the neutral and objective resolution of claims by private businesses, resulting in 
serious unfairness in some cases. 
 
B. Bilateral Arbitration Treaties — Reducing Barriers to Trade and Promoting FDI 
 
9. Various efforts have been undertaken to mitigate the legal risks and uncertainties of cross-border trade 
and investment, including (i) the wide-spread ratification of international commercial and investment 
arbitration treaties (notably, the New York Convention and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”)); (ii) the development of 
institutional arbitration (including through the promotion of institutional arbitration rules, like the 
UNCITRAL Rules); and (iii) the negotiation of treaties for the recognition of foreign judgments (like the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“Hague Convention”)).  
 
10. Virtually all these efforts however assume that international businesses will conclude agreements (pre 
or post-dispute) to resolve disagreements. The New York Convention, the ICSID Convention and the Hague 
Convention all require either a valid agreement to arbitrate or a forum selection agreement. Absent such 
agreement, the default means of cross-border dispute resolution remains litigation in (multiple) national 
courts, with all the deficiencies detailed above. BATs were conceived as an innovative way of mitigating 
these deficiencies and the unique risks and uncertainties that impede international trade and investment.  
 
11. A BAT is a treaty between two States that provides for (i) international commercial disputes (ii) 
between commercial enterprises based in the two State parties to the treaty (iii) to be finally resolved by 
arbitration.11 Commercial parties would be free to opt-out of the BAT regime by (i) selecting another form 
or forum for dispute resolution (such as mediation or litigation) or (ii) modifying the arbitration procedure 
provided for under the BAT (including the applicable arbitration rules).12  
__________________ 
8  See James Fawcett and Janeen M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law , 14th 
edition, OUP 2008, at p. 514 et seq. 
9  See James Fawcett and Janeen M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law , 14th 
edition, OUP 2008, at p. 514 et seq. The possible adoption of the Hague Convention might, over time, reduce 
these risks, but this will be a long-term process with uncertain results. At present, the European Union, Singapore, 
and Mexico have ratified the agreement but widespread ratification does not seem likely in the near to mid-term. 
10  European Commission, European contract law in business-to-business transactions: Summary (2011); World 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2012 (2012) — both studies found that 
international litigation poses a significant trade barrier for SMEs and businesses in general.  
11  Draft Model BAT, Article 2. 
12  Draft Model BAT, Article 5.  
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12. BATs therefore change the default system of cross-border commercial dispute resolution from national 
court litigation to international arbitration. In doing so, BATs build on the experience of the New York 
Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law, and international arbitral institutions, to provide a more expert, 
efficient, and enforceable means of dispute resolution. 
 
13. In practice: If States A and B conclude a BAT, international commercial disputes between enterprises 
based in States A and B would be resolved by arbitration as provided for in the BAT, unless the commercial 
parties have agreed to a different mechanism. If a business based in State A attempted to bring a dispute 
against a business based in State B to a national court in State A or State B, that court would have to refer 
the parties to arbitration.13 Courts in either State also would have to recognize and enforce any awards made 
by arbitral tribunals under the BAT.14 Consequently, from the points of view of States A and B and 
businesses based in these States, the complex and often archaic system of international civil procedure and 
jurisdiction would be replaced with a modern, efficient and straight-forward mechanism of treaty-based 
commercial arbitration. 
 
14. States would negotiate the terms of their BATs on a bilateral basis, taking into account their particular 
needs and the requirements of the relationship with the other treaty State. Individual BATs may take 
different shades in areas including the scope of their application, the default seat and arbitral process, 
whether mediation and negotiation should be required prior to arbitration, the degree of transparency and 
the terms of judicial intervention and enforcement. It can for example be expected that most States would 
choose to exclude consumer disputes, employment disputes, disputes over matrimonial, domestic and 
inheritance matters and other similar categories of non-commercial disputes from the scope of their BATs. 
States could also exclude types of commercial disputes, e.g. ones involving certain environmental, quasi-
criminal or bankruptcy related issues. In the interest of legal certainty, it would be desirable for any BAT to 
clearly delineate the limited categories of disputes not covered, so that it can otherwise function as a “catch-
all” dispute resolution mechanism between the contracting States. 
 
15. While States can (and undoubtedly will) give their individual touch to the BATs they enter into, such 
freedom comes at a cost. Enterprises engaged in international commerce seldom do business with 
counterparties in just one other State. Their commercial relationships will therefore be governed by not only 
one, but many of the BATs entered into by their home State. If these BATs are too different from each other, 
transaction costs will increase and the full potential of efficiency, simplicity, and fairness inherent in the 
idea of BATs will not be fully realized. It is therefore desirable for BATs to be built on a common foundation: 
a Model BAT that provides a sensible and unitary framework that States can, to the extent necessary, fine-
tune to their individual needs.  
 
16. Although proposed in the form of a bilateral treaty, the concept of a BAT can be modified into a 
multilateral arbitration treaty (a “MAT”) between a number of States, for instance, in a geographic region 
(e.g., ASEAN or the Pacific Islands). The dispute resolution provisions of a BAT or MAT could also form 
part of a larger free trade agreement (“FTA”), much like the investment chapter of FTAs. 
 
17. The success of UNCITRAL’s creations, such as the Model Law, demonstrate that such models provide 
a good compromise: States retain the ability to shape the model to their individual needs by making careful 
adjustments, but these individual implementations will retain sufficient commonality. This provides 
considerable international legal certainty and allows businesses to operate with confidence outside of their 
home jurisdictions — without the need to familiarize themselves with a multitude of entirely different legal 
frameworks. 
 
18. Thus with BATs, instead of fearing the potential bias of national courts, parties can trust in neutral 
decision-makers of their choice.15 Instead of being limited by the experience and resources of a specific set 
__________________ 
13  Parallel to the functioning of Article II of the New York Convention. 
14  Taking into account the well-established limitations to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that 
would be modelled after Article III, IV and V of the New York Convention.  
15  See Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 
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of national courts, parties can freely choose legal experts appropriate to their dispute.16 Instead of having to 
conduct multiple proceedings, parties can focus even multi-dimensional disputes in one arbitration.17 
Instead of spending money on numerous different national counsel and several appellate layers, arbitration 
provides a cost-efficient one-shot solution to quickly and efficiently resolve commercial disputes.18 Instead 
of a judgment that might be worthless wherever the losing party has assets, the claimant will have a widely 
enforceable arbitral award potentially under the New York Convention or similar instruments.19  
 
19. BATs in effect capitalize on all the advantages of arbitration that have today made it the preferred 
choice of dispute resolution for international trade20 — neutrality, efficiency, expertise, finality, and 
enforceability. By reducing the risks of cross-border dispute resolution, BATs mitigate a significant barrier 
to trade and will encourage more businesses to engage in FDI and international trade. As one commentary 
notes, “[a] BAT would — by directing the resolution of disputes to arbitration — serve to give [MSMEs] 
greater access to justice in the international space than is available under the status quo.”21 
 
20. That said, the authors do not posit that arbitration is perfect — no dispute resolution mechanism can 
and will ever be. The vibrant discussions within UNCITRAL Working Group II on Arbitration and 
Conciliation / Dispute Settlement demonstrate that the law and practice of arbitration is constantly evolving 
— simultaneously underscoring the need for these improvements. But when it comes to resolving 
international commercial disputes, arbitration is — by a wide margin — the most expert, most fair, most 
efficient, and most neutral form of cross-border dispute resolution.  
 
 
III. Bilateral Arbitration Treaties Through the Lens of Developing Small States and SMEs 
 
21. While the pitfalls of international dispute resolution today affect all market participants in international 
commerce, some players are better able to compensate for these inherent deficiencies than others. Larger 
States have more resources available to maintain an effective judiciary. Large businesses have the 
knowledge and resources to avoid international litigation by individually tailoring arbitration agreements. 
In contrast, developing small States and SMEs are less equipped to address the pitfalls of the current default 
system, amplifying existing power-asymmetries by putting developing small States and SMEs at a 
disadvantage. The following sections explore these points and highlight how BATs could alleviate some of 
these concerns.  
 
A. Developing Small States Moving from International Litigation to BATs  
 
22. Although there are different definitions of what constitutes a small State,22 small States, in particular 
those that are developing, face similar sets of challenges including remoteness and insularity, susceptibility 
__________________ 
Kluwer Law International 1999, at p. 1; Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration, 16th edition, OUP 2015, at para. 1.99 et seq. 
16  See Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2003, at para. 1-25; Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern and 
Hunter on International Arbitration, 16th edition, OUP 2015, at para. 1.71 et seq. 
17  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 199. 
18  See Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2003, at para. 1-28, 1-30; Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern 
and Hunter on International Arbitration, 16th edition, OUP 2015, at para. 1.125. 
19  See Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kröll, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2003, at para. 1-21; Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern and 
Hunter on International Arbitration, 16th edition, OUP 2015, at para. 1.102. 
20  2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration (Queen Mary 
University, 2015), at p. 5. 
21  Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 189. 
22  See Matthias Maass, “The elusive definition of the small state” in International Politics (2009) 46, 65-83, at p. 
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to natural disasters, limited institutional capacity, limited diversification, reliance on external trade and 
investment, the need to access external capital and poverty.23 When it comes to international commercial 
dispute resolution these challenges include a lack of human (legal) resources,24 a lack of financial resources 
to invest in the legal sector and a developing judiciary.  
 
23. Furthermore, many developing small States lack treaty arrangements on the enforcement of their 
judgments abroad or the domestic enforcement of foreign judgments (indeed, this is not a problem unique 
to developing small States, although developed States are better placed and resourced to negotiate such 
arrangements). As a result, foreign investors face a real risk of substantial delays and ineffective justice in 
case of a dispute. These factors make such States riskier for business, inhibiting trade and the inflow of 
FDI. In a number of related ways, default arbitration under a BAT is capable of alleviating some of these 
pressures.  
 
24. First, from the perspective of businesses operating out of or into developing small States, expert 
arbitration replaces less experienced courts. Currently, parties might choose a neutral third-party country’s 
court to resolve their international disputes as an alternative to local courts.25 This is particularly 
unsatisfactory for developing small States and their businesses. For instance, a judge in Singapore is 
unlikely to be familiar with the commercial realities of the fisheries business between Vanuatu and Fiji. 
Arbitrators are chosen for their individual expertise.26 By providing arbitration as a default mechanism, 
more disputes can be handled by individuals hand-picked for their familiarity with the relevant region and 
business sector. Disputes will be handled at a reduced cost in a more expert and efficient fashion. 
 
25. Second, BATs provide businesses with greater certainty in the enforceability of decisions under the 
New York Convention. Developing small States can therefore assure investors that they will see the fruits 
of their litigation which will not be rendered a mere paper victory.  
 
26. Third, from the perspective of the State, the expenses of maintaining the judiciary will be reduced by 
relieving docket congestion. National courts can focus on resolving domestic disputes and strengthening 
the local rule of law. They can also reduce the need to expend resources on resolving complex international 
disputes that involve the application of foreign law. At the same time, BATs would provide local lawyers, 
and indirectly courts, with alternative models of dispute resolution, ultimately enhancing the quality and 
efficiency of local litigation.  
 
27. Fourth, BATs could be used to enhance capacity building for the local legal community. The ability to 
select arbitrators is an essential component of arbitration27 that should not be restrained by BATs; indeed, 
one of the advantages of default arbitration will be that parties can source counsel and arbitrators globally. 
Nonetheless, States can consider crafting their BATs to provide for local arbitral institutions and/or local 
arbitrations (by setting the nationality of arbitrators to be appointed). Capacity building can occur on a 
regional basis, where small States with a common cultural and legal heritage can jointly develop a regional 
capacity for the enhanced resolution of commercial disputes. 
 
28. This coincides with the desire of parties to choose decision-makers familiar with the cultural nuances 
of the parties and the place of performance of the agreement. Such local capacity building will also 
__________________ 
65. Criteria for smallness include quantitative measures such as GDP, income per capita and population as well 
as qualitative measures rooted in geography, economics and politics — these are often relational, i.e. measured 
not in isolation but by a context-dependent reference frame and by how a State fits into the global system.  
23  See Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat / World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, Small States — 
Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy (2000), at p. 5.  
24  See Lino Briguglio, “Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities” in World Development 
(1995) Vol. 23, No. 9, 1615-1632, at p. 1617. 
25  See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2014, at p. 75. 
26  See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2014, at p. 80 et seq. 
27  See Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration , 
Kluwer Law International 1999, at p. 451 et seq. 
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contribute to on-going efforts of the international arbitration community to expand, diversify and become 
more representative.28  
 
29. In sum, BATs possess great potential to contribute to the growth of developing small States by making 
them a more attractive destination to do business. A commitment to international arbitration would assure 
foreign businesses and investors that their disputes would be resolved fairly and efficiently, and any 
outcome will be enforceable.  
 
30. No empirical research has at present been done on practically implementing BATs in developing small 
States. However, the time is ripe for serious discussion on how these instruments should be shaped for 
developing small States to achieve better leverage in international trade. Inclusive supranational 
institutions, such as UNCITRAL, are in a prime position to encourage and provide a forum for developing 
small States to voice their needs in the drafting of a universal Model BAT and to conduct objective research 
on these needs. 
 
B. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Moving from International Litigation to BATs 
 
31. As with small States, there is no international consensus on the definition of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs). In New Zealand, for example, SMEs are defined as businesses employing fewer than 
100 persons.29 For the European Union, SMEs are defined as enterprises employing fewer than 250 persons 
and having an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not 
exceeding EUR 43 million.30 In the United States, SMEs are often defined as businesses with fewer than 
500 employees.31 Again, these definitional challenges do not detract from the fact that many SMEs face 
similar trading challenges vis-à-vis international dispute resolution. 
 
32. SMEs form a substantial part of the domestic economic fabric, yet they are drastically under-
represented in international trade. In the context of the United States, for instance, “[m]ost firms are small. 
By head count, fully 98 percent of all US exporters are small and medium-sized businesses […], but only 
4 percent of the entire population of US SMEs export to global markets. Collectively, these firms accounted 
for 34 percent of US exports of goods and services in 2012.”32 Similarly, 75 percent of New Zealand firms 
have never generated overseas income.33 
 
33. According to one study, “[l]imited experience in expanding overseas is the most common barrier to 
small businesses wanting to export. The most cited barriers revolve around the unfamiliarity of operating 
in a different country.”34 Studies have found that SMEs are often concerned about access to justice when it 
comes to international litigation.35 Many SMEs are thus unable to engage in beneficial trade and realize 
their full potential.36 
__________________ 
28  See Susan D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias Lehmann, Anne van Aaken, “International Arbitration: 
Demographics, Precision and Justice”, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, 
Challenges, ICCA Congress Series, Volume 18, Kluwer Law International 2015, at p. 116 et seq. 
29  See Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (New Zealand), The Small Business Sector Report (2014), 
at p. 10. 
30  Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, 2003/361. 
31  See U.S. International Trade Commission, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Overview of Participation in 
U.S. Exports (2010), at 1-3. 
32  Carolin Freund, Gary Clide Hufbauer, Euijin Jung, “Enhancing Export Opportunities for Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises”, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 16-7, June 2016, at p. 2. 
33  “The Small Business Sector Report”, Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (New Zealand), 2014, at 
p. 8. 
34  See Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (New Zealand), The Small Business Sector Report (2014), 
at p. 8. 
35  Compare: European Commission, European contract law in business-to-business transactions: Summary (2011), 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2012 (2012). 
36  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 188. 
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34. Large corporations typically have in-house legal counsel, in addition to engaging external law firms.37 
These entities are therefore able to manage international commercial disputes that span multiple 
jurisdictions and have the financial resources to see such disputes through to the end. Furthermore, large 
corporations also have the resources to design, draft and negotiate tailor-made arbitration agreements. 
Nonetheless, given the nature of many commercial sectors, these resources are often not used by major 
corporations — which fail to include dispute resolution provisions (or valid dispute resolution provisions) 
in their international commercial contracts. 
 
35. In contrast, SMEs typically lack internal legal teams and have limited resources to expend on external 
local counsel, let alone in multiple jurisdictions. With limited resources and legal staff, the cost of legally 
pursuing or defending against claims in foreign courts is also often prohibitively high for SMEs.38  
 
36. Furthermore, tailor-making dispute resolution clauses is impractical for most SMEs. Designing 
contracts takes time, knowledge, experience and resources. Designing effective arbitration agreements can 
be a failure-prone process — if a dispute over the validity of an arbitration agreement ensues, the dispute 
might end up in court after all.39 It is also not uncommon for SMEs to conclude oral contracts instead of a 
formal document. Where written agreements exist, SMEs may be averse to use legalistic language that 
foreshadows potential disputes; personal relationships are often valued over the certainty of written terms.40  
 
37. Default arbitration under a BAT could alleviate many of these concerns for SMEs and level the playing 
field between larger and smaller corporations. As arbitration would be the default, there would be no cost 
for SMEs in setting up a dispute resolution mechanism — neither for drafting an arbitration agreement nor 
as part of a bargain when attempting to include a favourable dispute resolution clause in an agreement. A 
BAT might also provide optional or mandatory means of alternative dispute resolution (e.g. negotiation, 
conciliation, mediation) prior to arbitration, giving SMEs the opportunity to solve their dispute informally.41 
 
38. A first step to better understand the potential of BATs for SMEs has been taken by the New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research (“NZIER”). In 2016, NZIER conducted a study “Evaluating the proposed 
Bilateral Arbitration Treaty” to assess the practical impact of adopting BATs on New Zealand’s SMEs.42 
The study resulted in a “…broadly positive [response] by the firms in that 66.7% … preferred arbitration 
to litigation. The unsure results (30.8%) are symptomatic of the preference for negotiation over litigation 
or arbitration. Therefore, there is confidence in arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method.”43  
 
39. The study also concluded that “[t]he answers do seem to suggest that a BAT and the proposed benefits 
could function in [New Zealand].”44 Yet, the study highlighted that “…it appears that the greatest barrier to 
the successful implementation of a BAT in New Zealand is the inexperience firms have with arbitration. 
__________________ 
37  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 197. 
38  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
186-221, at p. 197. 
39  See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2014, at p. 763 et seq. 
40  See in regard to how SMEs contract: Hanneke van Oeveren, “It hurts my head to think about it” SMEs and the 
Legal Framework for International Commercial Contracts , 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2791321 (last accessed 16 Dec 2016). Compare in regard 
to the costs for UK small business to engage in dispute resolution domestically: Federation of Small Business 
(UK), Tied Up- Unravelling the Dispute Resolution Process for Small Firms  (November 2016), at p. 13 et seq. 
41  See Article 2(a) of the Draft Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, which contains a requirement to negotiate in 
good faith. 
42  See New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), Evaluating the proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 
25 February 2016, at p. 1, 4, see also Georgia Whelan “Could a BAT fly? An Evaluation of the Proposed Bilateral 
Arbitration Treaty in the New Zealand Context, 2017 Victoria University Law Review [forthcoming].  
43  New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), Evaluating the proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 25 
February 2016, at p. 6. 
44  New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), Evaluating the proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 25 
February 2016, at p. 7. 
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The respondents were wary of the implications of a BAT to their businesses. This is evi[de]nced by 70.5% 
believing that there would be at least a little cost to their firm.”45 
 
40. The NZIER study highlights the potential of BATs for SMEs. It underscores a fundamental positive 
attitude towards commercial arbitration as well as the need for national legislators to thoroughly prepare 
their business community to the effects of a BAT prior to its implementation. Similar studies in various 
other parts of the world would allow a more accurate assessment of the attitudes and expectations of SMEs 
towards BATs, and the ability of BATs to enhance international trade and commerce. 
 
 
IV. UNCITRAL, the Promulgation of a Model BAT and Issues for Further Consideration 
 
41. As observers noted during the 25-year anniversary of the UNCITRAL Model Law, UNCITRAL is 
“concerned with whether national laws are getting in the way of doing business effectively or where an 
absence of laws is creating uncertainty.”46 As shown above, the current default system of international 
commercial dispute resolution relies on disparate national procedures with few unifying international 
mechanisms, creating substantial impediments to effective and efficient international commerce. 
 
42. UNCITRAL is the flagbearer of fostering international trade and investment through, among other 
things, the harmonization and modernization of the law of dispute resolution. The Model Law together with 
the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have been described as the principal 
pillars in the global system of arbitral justice.47 The work of experts from more than fifty countries and 
numerous international organizations, these instruments represent consensus on international best 
practices.48 Their success has exceeded expectations.49 
 
43. Developing a Model BAT would be a natural evolution of UNCITRAL’s previous efforts. UNCITRAL 
instruments “are negotiated through an international process involving a variety of participants, including 
member States of UNCITRAL, non-member States, and invited intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations,” leading to wide acceptance and “solutions appropriate to different legal traditions and to 
countries at different stages of economic development.”50 No other institution offers a comparable process 
and it would be ideal for a Model BAT to be designed on this basis.  
 
44. Certainly, a BAT is innovative and breaks the mold of the current system of international dispute 
resolution. But, as the discussion in this paper demonstrates, it is not a change of direction to what exists 
today. Rather, it is a continuation of a successful path that UNCITRAL has pursued since its inception. It is 
natural that such an innovation will at first be met with scepticism, but it ought not to be forgotten that the 
New York Convention would have been of equal novelty 100 years ago. A BAT might at first glance seem 
new and unorthodox, yet, it promises similar benefits to the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
 
__________________ 
45  New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), Evaluating the proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 25 
February 2016, at p. 5. 
46  Timothy Lemay and Corinne Montineri, “Review of the Model Law’s Implementation after Twenty-Five Years”, 
in Fréderic Bachand, Fabien Gélinas (eds.), The UNCITRAL Model Law After 25 Years: Global Perspectives on 
International Commercial Arbitration (2013), JurisNet, at p. 3. 
47  See Timothy Lemay and Corinne Montineri, “Review of the Model Law’s Implementation after Twenty-Five 
Years”, in Fréderic Bachand, Fabien Gélinas (eds.), The UNCITRAL Model Law After 25 Years: Global 
Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration  (2013), JurisNet, at p. 4. 
48  See Timothy Lemay and Corinne Montineri, “Review of the Model Law’s Implementation after Twenty-Five 
Years”, in Fréderic Bachand, Fabien Gélinas (eds.), The UNCITRAL Model Law After 25 Years: Global 
Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration  (2013), JurisNet, at p. 5. 
49  See Timothy Lemay and Corinne Montineri, “Review of the Model Law’s Implementation after Twenty-Five 
Years”, in Fréderic Bachand, Fabien Gélinas (eds.), The UNCITRAL Model Law After 25 Years: Global 
Perspectives on International Commercial Arbitration  (2013), JurisNet, at p. 4. 
50  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), A Guide to UNCITRAL (2013), at p. 1. 
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45. Paying some heed to potential sceptics, the following part of this paper will outline the likely 
objections to BATs, highlight why these “buts” to the idea of BATs are unconvincing and provide a blueprint 
for areas of research that could be further explored by a broader community of academics, practitioners, 
and governments within UNCITRAL, with the aim of developing a Model BAT. 
 
A. Consent 
 
46. The most obvious objection to BATs crystallizes on notions of party autonomy and consent. Arbitration 
is deeply rooted in party autonomy51 and arbitration is routinely said to be based on the consent of the 
parties involved.52  
 
47. First, a BAT is in no way inconsistent with notions of party autonomy. As discussed above, the BATs’ 
arbitration mechanism is a default mechanism, which parties are free to contract out of. This can be 
accomplished by agreeing to alternative forms of dispute resolution (e.g., a forum selection clause or a 
provision for a particular form of institutional (or ad hoc) arbitration). Alternatively, as with the Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods, parties could simply opt out of the BAT-provisions entirely, without 
specifying any alternative form of consensual dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
48. In this sense, a BAT does not compromise party autonomy. Commercial parties remain free to contract 
for whatever form of dispute resolution they desire (or to simply opt out of the BAT). The BAT merely 
changes the default form of dispute resolution if parties do not exercise their autonomy. 
 
49. Second, it is true that a BAT results in arbitration without the historic form of consent to arbitration, 
but this is not a basis for objection to the BAT’s dispute resolution mechanism: the benefits of arbitration 
also exist where arbitration is used as a default means of dispute resolution, absent party consent, for 
international commercial disputes. Moreover, there is a substantial argument that the BAT arbitration 
mechanism is more consistent, not less consistent, with commercial parties’ expectations than the current 
default means of resolving international disputes. 
 
50. The traditional view is arbitration is founded on consent: “[w]ithout an arbitration agreement there can 
be no arbitration.”53 In commercial contexts, this arbitration agreement typically takes the form of 
contractual provision in a negotiated (and written) commercial contract between two (or more) companies. 
On the face of it, arbitration under a BAT operates without express party consent and therefore appears to 
run afoul of party autonomy. This might be seen as a radical departure from the status quo: a party that has 
not chosen arbitration — might not have even considered the possibility of arbitrating future disputes — 
will be compelled to arbitrate nonetheless. 
 
51. However, a closer analysis demonstrates these concerns are misplaced. Although international 
arbitration has historically been based on contractual arbitration agreements, its benefits can be realized 
even in the absence of a traditional arbitration agreement. In particular, the benefits of efficiency, expertise, 
even-handedness and enforceability that result from international arbitration apply equally to arbitration 
pursuant to a BAT. 
 
52. Put differently, international arbitration pursuant to a BAT provides a better default means of dispute 
resolution — even absent party consent — than the existing default system of cross-border litigation in 
national courts. Arbitration is used in other contexts (such as bilateral investment treaties54 and many 
domestic contexts involving mandatory arbitration regimes55) without the requirement for party consent, 
__________________ 
51  See Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration, OUP 2012, at para. 2.04 et seq. 
52  See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International 2014, at p. 229. 
53  Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee, J. Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-
Pacific Perspective, Cambridge University Press 2011, at p. 21. 
54  See Rudolph Dolzer and Christopher Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd edition, OUP 
2012, at p. 7.  
55  See e.g. Queensland Gas Pipeline Access Act, s. 15(1) (providing for mandatory arbitration). See also California 
Civil Procedure Code, §1141.10 and New South Wales Supreme Court Act 1970, s. 76B (providing for court 
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and there is no reason that arbitration could not be used effectively in the context of international 
commercial disputes. 
 
53. Moreover, BATs arguably align more closely with the intentions of commercial parties than the current 
system of international dispute resolution. If one asks international businesspeople how their commercial 
disputes should be resolved, they would no doubt say that they would want a resolution that is expert, 
efficient, even-handed and enforceable. This is the very premise of a BAT. 
 
54. Once States enter into BATs, they could (and indeed should) take steps to ensure that the businesses 
located in their territory are aware of the BAT’s provisions and mechanisms. This would include outreach 
through chambers of commerce, trade and bar associations, public informational programs and the like. As 
such, by choosing not to opt-out of BATs parties are arguably indicating their consent (and satisfaction) 
with the default regime in BATs. This argument is only strengthened over time as parties become more 
aware of BATs and the arbitral process provided therein. 
 
55. The issue of consent is ripe for further research and would provide a good starting point for 
UNCITRAL to commence its study on BATs. UNCITRAL could look to the work of various arbitral 
institutions in recent years that have had to address the question of party consent in increasingly attenuated 
ways when developing new procedural techniques such as the consolidation and joinder of parties, the role 
of non-disputing parties and the tribunal’s powers in relation to third party funders.  
 
B. Access to Justice 
 
56. Another obvious counter-argument to BATs relates to “access to justice.” One might point to violations 
of constitutional guarantees that stem from BATs (e.g. the due process clause or right to a jury trial in the 
US Constitution56 or Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the “ECHR”)). However, this concern ignores the difference between access to courts — by no 
means a guarantee — and the more fundamental right of access to justice. Access to independent courts is 
a more compelling point in the domestic context.  
 
57. In this international context, default arbitration under BATs arguably provides better access to effective 
justice than the current system of international litigation.57 As the European Court of Human Rights noted 
in Bellet v France: “For the right of access to be effective, an individual must have a clear, practical 
opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights.”58 In light of the many shortcomings 
of international litigation59 — parallel proceedings, lengthy procedures at a high cost and often 
unenforceable judgments — access to national courts is not a suitable realization of access to justice for 
international disputes. Neutral, efficient, objective, expert and fair arbitration under a BAT, on the other 
hand, is a realistic avenue to effective justice. 
 
C. Arbitral Procedure 
 
58. Finally, one might wonder what the arbitral procedure under a Model BAT would entail. Some of the 
specifics a Model BAT might address are the scope of its application, the seat of arbitration, the arbitral 
process, whether to include pre-arbitration steps such as mandatory mediation and negotiation, rules on 
__________________ 
ordered arbitration). 
56  See The Constitution of the United States, Article III and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
57  See Petra Butler and Campbell Herbert, “Access to Justice vs Access to Justice for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The Case for a Bilateral Arbitration Treaty”, New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol. 26, 2014, 
at p. 195 et seq. for an analysis of New Zealand law.  
58  ECtHR, Bellet v France, Application no. 23805/94, 4 December 1995, at para. 36; compare also Äärelä and 
Näkkäläjärivi v Finland (24 Oct 2001) Comm. No. 779/1997 (Human Rights Committee) in regard to Art 2 
ICCPR. 
59  See above.  
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confidentiality or transparency and on judicial intervention and enforcement of awards rendered under the 
BAT.60 
 
59. One of the authors has previously suggested that a Model BAT could adopt the revised 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as the basis for conducting arbitrations under the BAT. The UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules are a neutral and modern set of arbitration rules61 that provide default solutions for all 
key issues that arise when conducting an arbitration. In fact, it is already common practice to conduct 
international commercial arbitrations based on nothing more than reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules — no arbitral seat, no appointing authority, no additional procedural rules, and no choice of 
substantive law is necessary to successfully resolve such disputes. 
 
60. Drafters will have to comprehensively assess the reasons for and against of including more detailed 
rules in a Model BAT. On the one hand, States might have strong interests such as certainty to include more 
detailed provisions on how arbitration should be conducted under their BAT. On the other hand, more 
detailed rules will detract from the universal appeal of a Model BAT and diminish its harmonizing effect 
on international commercial law. 
 
61. One area that warrants particular attention when considering a Model BAT is the conflict between 
confidentiality and transparency. Confidentiality is not inherent in arbitration but it is common for parties 
to agree on confidentiality in their arbitration agreement or by their choice of arbitral rules.62 Some States 
might want to provide for default transparency in the BATs they conclude. Possible reasons for this include 
the continued development of a body of accessible law, as well as a general interest in transparency.63 
UNCITRAL could explore how to balance these competing interests in a Model BAT, for instance, by 
providing for the publication of certain categories of awards relevant to the development of the law, and 
even then in a redacted fashion, or by providing incentives to parties that agree to the publication of their 
awards, such as subsidized tribunal fees. 
 
D. Other Issues  
 
62. Apart from the issues raised above, BATs raise various other points of academic and practical interest 
that are worth exploring. To name a few: Will States be comfortable with the extent to which default 
arbitration will result in the privatization of international legal decision making? Are BATs consistent with 
constitutional principles of separation of powers? What is the perspective of economic analysis of law on 
the proposal of BATs? Can empirical studies further illuminate the economic benefits and costs of BATs, 
especially for currently disadvantaged market participants such as developing small States and SMEs?64 
What lessons can be drawn from behavioural economics to design default arbitration as an opt-out 
mechanism? How would a BAT intersect with existing instruments of arbitration law, including national 
arbitration laws and the New York Convention?  
 
63. The authors hope that through a study of BATs there will be a robust discussion of such issues, both 
within the institutional setting of UNCITRAL and beyond.  
__________________ 
60  See Draft Commentary on Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/News/Documents/Explanatory-Note-
Draft-Model-Bilateral-Arbitration-Treaty.pdf (last accessed on 29 November 2016); see in regard to New 
Zealand: Georgia Whelan “Could a BAT fly? An Evaluation of the Proposed Bilateral Arbitration Treaty in the 
New Zealand Context, 2017 Victoria University Law Review [forthcoming].  
61  See Matthew Skinner, Sam Luttrell, Tom Levi, “The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010”, in 7 Asian Int’l Arb. 
J. 76, 76-96 (2011), at p. 95. 
62  See Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration , 16th edition, OUP 
2015, at para. 2.161. 
63  See for example the debate on transparency in ISDS and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (or “Mauritius Convention”). 
64  For instance, Victoria University of Wellington and the New Zealand Institute for Economic Research have 
jointly commenced such empirical research on BATs, including to identify the benefits BATs offer SMEs. 
UNCITRAL may wish to collaborate with these and other institutions on the empirical aspects of implementing 
BATs. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
64. The current default system of international commercial litigation does not meet the needs of 
contemporary cross-border trade and investment. Bilateral arbitration treaties are a solution that would 
enable more efficient, more expert, more neutral, more objective, and more fair dispute resolution. BATs 
would make these benefits available to more market participants, including small States and States with 
developing economies, as well as SMEs. As a result, BATs would enhance international trade and 
investment, access to justice and the rule of law in international commercial settings. 
  
  
327 
Session 11 — Implementing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
 
 
How ‘International’ Is International Commercial Law? 
Key Findings of UK Research1 
 
Mary Wallace, University of East Anglia School of Law, United Kingdom  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The primary aim of the research work was to establish whether a particular culture has developed 
within the selected groups, in response to international instruments of commercial harmonisation and if so, 
what had informed this approach.  
 
 From the research undertaken, it is apparent that the approach of all has been characterised by 
competing tensions between ‘the national’ and ‘the international’ and between the shared ideal of 
international instruments and the application of national laws. Moreover, the tensions evident in one 
institution or group have also been found to influence the approach to international instruments of others. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that each has a distinct and individual culture; rather there are inter-related 
cultures which have been informed by the complex inter-relationship between the different institutions and 
groups.  
 
2. The Universities 
 
 Within university Law Schools, despite subjects being variously described as ‘International Trade 
Law’ or ‘International Commercial Law’, it is English sales law which is generally taught at undergraduate 
level as the applicable law for international sales.  
 
 This at first appeared to be a consequence of the Practitioners’ Regulating Authorities setting the six 
‘foundation subjects’ as prerequisites for a Qualifying Law Degree; but on closer inspection there remains 
scope for universities to offer international content within undergraduate commercial law subjects, at least 
within the LLB Degree Programme. Despite this, only 15% of universities include detailed study of 
international conventions which have not been incorporated into English law, and whilst a further 45% of 
law schools include a brief introduction to rules such as Incoterms, it means 40% of universities in England 
and Wales do not include any international content within commercial subjects at undergraduate level. This 
means that many graduates enter commercial practice with knowledge solely of English law. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is some tension between ‘national’ and ‘international’ within law schools, as some 
80% offer LLM Courses in ‘International Commercial Law’ (including some law schools who do not offer 
any commercial law at undergraduate level). This tends to suggest that universities have developed a culture 
which treats international commercial law as a postgraduate academic subject rather than as a potentially 
applicable law for cross border transactions. This culture appears to be strongly influenced by financial 
considerations as postgraduate courses with international content attract high fee paying foreign students. 
It should also be noted that postgraduate law studies are outside the reach of the practitioner regulating 
authorities and therefore the law schools are able to wholly set their own curriculums. 
 
3. The Practitioners 
 
 The University culture that has developed is also supported and reinforced by Practitioners and their 
firms. It was found that commercial firms are willing to accept trainees with little or no knowledge of 
__________________ 
1  This paper presents the key findings from a thesis submitted in respect of the Degree Doctor of Philosophy at 
University of East Anglia School of Law in 2012 entitled ‘Instruments of International Commercial 
Harmonisation in England and Wales: How ‘International’ is International Commercial Law?’ The complete 
thesis is available at https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/47955/1/WALLACE-Ph_D_THESIS_FINAL.pdf. 
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commercial law beyond a simple ‘awareness’ and certainly no knowledge of international commercial laws. 
Consequently, there is no vocational need for students entering commercial practices to have any concept 
of international commercial instruments and this must impact on the culture and attitudes that these 
individuals develop towards such instruments going forward. 
 
 Given that 90% of commercial cases handled by London law firms involve an international party2, it 
was not surprising that 92% of the international law practitioners responding to the research questionnaire 
had advised on international commercial rules or practices, such as Incoterms or UCP600 and regularly 
incorporated them into contracts. However, when it came to whether a practitioner would recommend a 
convention such as the CISG where it would be applicable to the situation, the approach was somewhat 
different. Although 34% had been asked to advise on the CISG nearly half of these practitioners stated they 
would not recommend clients incorporate this convention into sales contracts, and some routinely 
recommended the CISG should be expressly excluded. The questionnaire responses also highlighted some 
misunderstandings held by practitioners as to the CISG’s applicability and/or provisions — with some 
stating ‘the CISG was not law’ or that the CISG ‘must be ratified in the place of actual performance’ in 
order to be applicable.  
 
 There was a general perception amongst the practitioners surveyed that English law is adequate for 
cross border transactions and therefore there was no need for international conventions. In fact, the 
superiority of English law was given by practitioners as a reason to recommend the CISG’s exclusion from 
contracts, as English law was “the accepted basis for international sales contracts, given it has an established 
reputation for legal certainty, fairness and transparency”3. 
 
 Arguably, it is the reputation of English law which brings commercial cases to the courts and arbitral 
tribunals in London, even when the parties have no connection with the UK4, so the Practitioners’ approach 
is also based on the fact that English law is not only a governing law but has also effectively developed into 
an industry — an industry which Practitioners are keen to protect. 
 
4. Government/Parliament  
 
 Government and Parliament are also keen to promote and protect this legal industry, given the revenue 
it generates, and it is this sense of protectionism which appears to be at the crux of the culture that has 
developed within Parliament and Government towards international commercial conventions.  
 
 This culture of protectionism is evident from the complex justification process for ratifying 
commercial conventions. English constitutional law requires an Act of Parliament to incorporate a 
convention into English law but the research has shown that international private law is not high on 
Parliament’s legislative priority list. This is clearly reflected in the fact that international commercial 
conventions and protocols have in the main required Private Members’ Bills for their introduction rather 
than being introduced into Parliament as a Public Bill. Furthermore, enabling legislation to pass 
international commercial conventions and protocols into English law has always had to compete against 
the social issues and economic policies of the day, so lack of parliamentary time is often cited as a reason 
for a convention’s non-ratification5. However, it is interesting to note that during the research, Parliamentary 
time had been allocated to bills as diverse as ‘Keeping Primates as Pets’, ‘Caravan Sites’, ‘Food Waste’ and 
‘Snow Clearance’ — so as Sir Roy Goode as commented some years ago, the excuse of lack of 
Parliamentary time “wears a little thin after 20 years”6. 
__________________ 
2  Ministry of Justice & UK Trade and Investment, ‘Plan for Growth: Promoting the UK’s Legal Service Sector’ 
(2011). 
3  Quote from questionnaire response. 
4  See for e.g. James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd  [1978] AC 141 (HL) per 
Dilhorne LJ at 162. 
5  See Sally Moss, ‘Why the United Kingdom has not Ratified the CISG’ 25 J.L. & Com. 483 2005-2006, p. 483. 
6  R.M. Goode, ‘Insularity or Leadership: The Role of the United Kingdom in the Harmonisation of English Law ’ 
(2001) 50 Int’l. & Comp. L. Q. 756. 
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 Moreover, in other areas of law, such as human rights or public international law, laws have become 
internationalised in the UK almost without question, but it is apparent from the research that Parliament has 
a sense of reluctance for legislating on international private law matters and that tensions exist between 
making laws and protecting freedom of contract. For instance, it took some 42 years from 1882 to 1924 
before Parliament, as a result of an international convention, placed uniform bills of lading on the statute 
books, and even then, Parliament still showed signs of being averse to legislative interference with the 
contractual autonomy between merchants and carriers.  
 
 These factors may account for the culture of reluctance that has developed within these institutions to 
enacting the requisite legislation to bring international conventions such as the CISG into domestic law, as 
these would arguably compete against ‘the English legal industry’.  
 
5. The Judiciary 
 
 However, even when international conventions have been ratified there are still competing tensions 
between ‘international’ and ‘national’ laws when they come to be interpreted in the courts of England and 
Wales. Outwardly, there appears to be an ‘international’ view, with various judges emphasising the need for 
conventions to be “construed on broad principles of general acceptation” and not “rigidly controlled by 
domestic precedents of antecedent date” 7; and other landmark cases have sanctioned the use of the travaux 
préparatoires8 and the French text9 of the Convention when interpreting convention provisions.  
 
 But the research has shown that such international sources have only been followed to the extent that 
it is possible to do so without impacting on the principles and concepts inherent in English law; and although 
there has been some uniformity with the decisions of other contracting states, it has usually been in cases 
where foreign judgments coincide with or are used in support of the approach taken by the English judiciary.  
 
 This approach has arguably allowed the judiciary to effectively develop its own method of interpreting 
international commercial conventions and whilst this approach has allowed the judiciary to minimise the 
effects of international commercial law, it has perhaps tended to place conditions on the overall objective 
of international conventions, being uniformity.  
 
6. The Traders  
 
 Finally, in the case of the traders, the group that international commercial instruments were developed 
to assist, the research showed that whilst most were familiar with rules and practices such as Incoterms and 
the UCP; in respect of international conventions, their approach was largely one of ignorance.  
 
 96% of the traders responding to the research questionnaire did not know of the CISG’s existence as 
an alternative to English law and during follow-up interviews, the majority stated that the international 
contract provisions of the CISG were ‘a good idea’. Moreover, 15% stated that, had they been aware of the 
CISG, they may have voluntarily contracted on its terms, as they had experienced difficulties establishing 
international sales contracts with new buyers in new markets areas, due to differences in legal regimes.  
 
 Most of the traders stated during interviews that they relied on information on cross-border sales 
contracts supplied by legal advisers, freight forwarders and government international trade websites, and 
this again demonstrates again how cultures that have developed towards international commercial 
instruments in one particular institution or group influence and inform the approach of others. The approach 
of Practitioners would suggest that it would be English law that would be recommended if legal advice was 
sought by a trader and the ‘International Commercial Contracts’ section within the government’s 
international trade website contains only information on Incoterms — there is no information on other 
potentially applicable sale of goods laws such as the CISG. 
__________________ 
7  Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo Mango & Co Ltd [1932] AC 328 (HL) per Lord MacMillan at 350.  
8  Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 (HL). 
9  James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd  [1978] AC 141 (HL). 
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 Consequently, in the cross-pollination of approaches some of the international commercial 
conventions, which were developed to overcome specific impediments to international trade, are not being 
used by the very merchants they were intended to benefit and in some cases traders are not even aware of 
their existence. That is not to assume that traders would necessarily use international conventions by choice 
even if they were aware of them, as such use would perhaps also necessitate overcoming the culture that 
the traders appeared to have to contracts in general — whether offer and acceptance match perfectly is less 
of a problem for instance, than how and when delivery will be effected until such matters are in dispute. 
This then raises the issue as to whether international commercial instruments are developed for the needs 
of traders or for the legal needs of practitioners, and whether the ‘needs’ of the two institutions are ever 
resolved by one instrument, but this is beyond the scope of this particular research.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 The insular approach that the institutions and organizations studied have developed in relation to 
international commercial law, conflicts with the global image that each strives to portray. For example, 
Government departments10 promote and support international trade as a major contributor to the economy; 
most universities in England and Wales promote their international perspective and there has been a growth 
in the number of large co-called ‘international’ law firms (both those indigenous to the UK and US law 
firms establishing London offices) — to the extent, that a senior partner in Clifford Chance stated that he 
did not feel bound so much by the ethics or rules of conduct of the Law Society of England and Wales, but 
by international codes which more clearly affect their transnational and international business11. 
Consequently, although there may be a fear of international commercial instruments it is perhaps not caused 
by an overriding fear of globalisation as such. 
 
 However, there is clear evidence within the institutions and groups studied, that a distinct culture has 
developed towards international commercial instruments. At its basis is the tension between ‘international’ 
and ‘national’ law; and an apparent need to protect English law. Moreover, there is an overriding sense that 
international instruments are used as a means of better fitting English law to cross-border transactions; 
rather than applying such conventions as an alternative to or in preference to English law. So rather than 
international commercial law there is, in essence ‘internationalised’ national law. 
 
 In order to minimise the reliance solely on domestic law there must be changes in the culture that has 
developed towards international commercial conventions. For this to happen, two potential solutions can 
be identified. Firstly, law schools need to ensure that international alternatives to English law are included 
within undergraduate commercial law subjects, as introducing the CISG, for example, to the next generation 
of practitioners is perhaps a better approach than trying to alter long-held perceptions that national is best. 
 
 Secondly, rather than conventions which require government ratification and legislation to formally 
enact them into national law, perhaps the way forward is the development of recommended international 
rules or practices by the trading sector to overcome specific issues in cross border trade. It is perhaps not a 
coincidence that the groups studied were more familiar with rules such as Incoterms and the UCP, whilst 
many were unaware of the international conventions, so more analysis needs to be undertaken as to the type 
of international instruments that are used to harmonise commercial law.  
 
 Thus, rules and practices developed by the international trade sector, would be approved and used by 
the international trade sector without requiring government or parliamentary intervention, and in doing so 
a new lex mercatoria may emerge. This could potentially enable more effective and greater harmonisation 
of commercial laws and may also help overcome the cultures that have developed in respect of the existing 
international commercial instruments. 
 
  
__________________ 
10  Such as UK Trade & Investment (UKTI).  
11  Avrom Sherr, ‘Globalization and the English Judiciary’ (2001) p.8-9; Available at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/259/. 
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How Do You Mean It, CISG? 
Applying The CISG More “21st Century”-Way 
 
Judit Glavanits, Széchenyi István University, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Hungary  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The purpose of the CISG (United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods) 
is to provide a modern, uniform and fair regime for contracts for the international sale of goods. Thus, the 
CISG contributes significantly introducing certainty in commercial exchanges and decreasing transaction 
costs. At the time of writing this study1, 85 contracting states are involved in this unification, including the 
most important trading partners of the world: USA, China, Japan, Russia, Germany, Australia. Although, 
some important countries are missing: from the EU Great-Britain, Portugal and Malta did not join the 
Convention so far, India and many African countries are also not on the list of contracting states.  
 
 The drafters of the CISG took special care in avoiding the use of legal concepts typical of a given legal 
tradition, and this method results from a deliberate choice to ensure that the Convention would promote 
harmonization of substantive law by the largest number of States, regardless of their legal tradition2. 
Schwenzer points out that the CISG achieved a symbiosis of common law and continental law, which will 
once more furnish jurists involved with sales law with the uniform language that is needed to pose questions 
and provide solutions3. As Flechtner says, the goal of the drafters was to create uniformity in the rules for 
international sales, in order to supplant the complex and difficult-to-predict system that subjected 
international sales to the varying provisions of national sales laws4. 
 
 During the formation and adoption of the CISG, Hungary was striving to play an active role in the 
unification of law right from the early sixties. Hungarian legal scholars and academics, based upon a 
century-old sophisticated legal culture, were never willing to accept the idea and reality of a divided world 
and their country’s isolation behind what was called the Iron Curtain5. This was all the same by the other 
countries of the so-called “Visegrad-Four Countries” (V4)6, and as a proof of this, these countries joined 
the CISG among the first ones. The Convention entered into force on 1st January 1988 in Hungary, in the 
Czechoslovakia on 1st April 1991, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic succeeded to the convention 
as of 1st January 1993. In Poland it came into force on 1st June 1996, so at least the Polish legal system is 
having more than 20 years of experience so far. These countries share almost the same (or at least very 
similar) legal tradition, as all based on the German law. It is not a surprise, that these counties are facing 
similar problems with the interpretation of the CISG articles7. With this I only want to sign that the 
difficulties occur in the Hungarian practice are not unique in this area. In spite of the time far enough for 
getting the experience, one may feel that in practice the CISG is not favoured for the contracting parties. 
__________________ 
1  Manuscript closed on 4th January 2017.  
2  UN: UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, New York, 2012 (hereafter: Digest 2012). ix. p.  
3  Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 6.  
4  Harry M. Flechtner: The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, 
Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1) Journal of Law and Commerce, 
1998/17. 187-217. 187.p.  
5  J. Martonyi: Introduction. In: Thirty-five Years of Uniform Sales Law: Trends and Perspectives Proceedings of 
the High Level Panel held during the Forty-eighth Session of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law Vienna, 6 July 2015. United Nations, New York, 2015.  
6  The Visegrad Group (also known as the “Visegrad Four” or simply “V4”) contains of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which group reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region 
to work together in a number of fields of common interest within the all -European integration.  
7  I base this statement on the similar researches made in these countries during 2015, and were presented in Zagreb, 
on the international conference “35 Years of CISG — Present Experiences and Future Challenges” 1st December 
2015.  
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According to the statistics of the UNCITRAL, in the CLOUT database there are only few cases reported 
from this area, although the contracting states are among the first ones to ratify the Convention.  
 
 
II. Empirical research on the jurisdiction of the CISG in Hungary 
 
 In 2015 with a questionnaire sent directly to the most significant international law firms, to the 
Hungarian National Chamber of Attorneys and to the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Chamber of Attorneys 
the process of drafting and entering of international sales contracts has been examined. Altogether 20 
questionnaires were sent directly to major law firms, and through the Chambers approximately 150 
attorneys has been asked to answer. As a result, 35 documents arrived until 31st August, 2015 from the 
whole country, among this 12 were the result of the directly requested offices, and 23 through the Chambers’ 
request. At the same time, a parallel research has started in the judicial field. This way 150 questionnaires 
were sent directly to the Courts in Hungary, and parallel the National Office of the Judiciary sent the 
questionnaire via email to the heads of the Courts. From July to December of 2015, 49 questionnaires 
arrived with appraisable content. As the arbitration in commercial disputes is traditionally dealt by the 
Arbitration Tribunal attached to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, resident in Budapest, 
I also sent the questionnaire to the judges working here, and got only 1 answer back, but this one has clearly 
showed the difference between the state court’s routine and the arbitration experiences. During 2015 and 
2016 the judgements and arbitration awards from Hungary has been overviewed to get a wide insight of the 
practice of application of the CISG. 
 
 One result of the research was that many times CISG is an “accidental” part of the sales contract, as 
many contracts contains the clause that in case of any debates between the parties the Hungarian law should 
be applied, which — naturally — contains the CISG. In this case the parties are not necessarily aware of 
the fact that an international treaty has been incorporated into their contractual relation. 
 
 While an exclusion can have proper legal reasons based on well-considered facts and interests, it is 
reported in the international literature, that is often rather a “habit”8. The questionnaire also included a part 
on exclusion of certain legal regimes in the contracts, and the major law firms (dealing with more than 10 
international sales contracts in a year) reported to exclude CISG from the following reasons.  
 
Figure 1. 
Reasons of excluding the CISG 
“Do you used to exclude the use of certain 
state’s law or any other legal orders or 
conventions for the disputes?” 
Reasoning or comment on exclusion 
“I exclude CISG for the request of the client” Comment: “Fundamentally I have positive 
experiences. The Convention is easy to use for a 
continental lawyer, the Hungarian and foreign 
language (basically German) commentary 
literature is useful help. But at the same time 
during the civil procedure nor the judges nor the 
clients realize the need for applying the 
regulations of CISG, they have to be noticed on 
this fact during the process.”  
“I exclude CISG.” Reasoning: “In case of international sales 
contract in many concrete cases it is favourable 
__________________ 
8  For the United States’ practice see: Martin F. Koehler: Survey regarding the relevance of the United Nations 
Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in legal practice and the exclusion of its application 
(October 2006). Available: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler.html (as on 4th January 2017). A 
perfect international comparison is available by Lisa Spagnolo: Green Eggs and Ham: The CISG, Path 
Dependence, and the Behavioural Economics of Lawyer’s Choices of Law in International Sales Contracts. 
Journal of Private International Law, 2010/2. pp. 417-464.  
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for the seller using only the Hungarian law. 
Without direct excluding of the Vienna 
Convention it must be applied, and as the 
Convention do not govern all relevant field, in 
disputes this doubles the applicable laws what 
may lead to a confusion in the judgement”. 
Comment: “The main problem of the Convention 
is the lack of uniform application which is the 
result of the phenomena that the national courts 
interpret the Convention based on national 
laws.” 
“I exclude CISG almost all the time” Reasoning: “The Convention is not accepted in 
the international practice for many reasons, 
almost every time the applicability is excluded” 
“I exclude CISG” Reasoning: “The application of the CISG is 
internationally rare” 
“If the client is the seller, I exclude CISG” Reasoning: “The Hungarian civil law is more in 
favour of the seller in particular situations.” 
“The clients expressing the will for excluding the 
CISG” 
Comment: “Despite of the fact that the 
Convention’ regulations are clear, the Courts 
have inconsistent practice of interpretation, or 
simply do not use the Convention tough it is 
mandatory in the process.”  
 
 As we can see some of the legal representatives feel that there is no uniform or consistent interpretation 
of the CISG in Hungary, or even sometimes knowledge of the CISG and its mandatory application for 
international sales contracts. The research also identified the phenomena of being totally unaware of the 
presence of the CISG among the judicial board. Among the 49 answers coming from judges who are dealing 
with at least 1 case a year on international commercial law, 32 (which means 65,3% of the answerers) has 
never met the CISG during his/her practice! This result is shocking. It is even more that, if we take into 
consideration the fact that (living in the 21st century) hundreds of cases are available in full or in forms of 
abstracts on the internet. Here I would like to highlight the efforts of UNCITRAL9 and Pace Law School10 
on publishing as much cases as possible, but we can also mention several national compilations on national 
case law11. So the basic problem is for sure not the accessibility of scientific materials, we should search 
the answer elsewhere.  
 
 Lisa Spagnoli summarizes among the CISG-familiarity issues that it is a combination of three elements 
determining the learning costs of a lawyer in a particular jurisdiction: (1) educational coverage and 
imperative (2) extent of dispute work exposure and (3) whether the domestic law has been influenced by 
the CISG. Let’s see the case of Hungary: for (1): we can say that the CISG is a mandatory course under the 
subject of “Private International Law” in every law school of the country. In this aspect, Hungary has got 
some hope for the future. Bur for element (2) we are facing a lack of frequent dispute work: only one 
commentary with relevant case law cited has been published on the CISG in 200612, and ever since only 
one or two scholars13 are writing sometimes on the subject of international sales law. As for element (3) of 
__________________ 
9  Especially the CLOUT collection, which is well-designed, easy to use platform.  
10  A unique collection of case law and scientific articles are also available. I believe that this site 
(http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisg) is the role model for every institution working on international commercial 
law issues. 
11  E.g.: CISG France, founded by Prof. Claude WItz (www.cisg.fr), and CISG Slovakia, a database created by the 
Department of International Law and European Law at the Faculty of Law of the Trnava University in cooperation 
with Institute of International Commercial Law at the Pace University School of Law. (www.cisg.sk). 
12  Sándor, Tamás-Vékás, Lajos: Nemzetközi adásvétel. HVG ORAC, Budapest, 2006.  
13  Mostly Sarolta Szabó is publishing researches, her best known book is: Szabó, Sarolta: A Bécsi Vételi 
Egyezmény, mint nemzetközi lingua franca — az egységes értelmezés és alkalmazás újabb irányai és eredményei. 
Pázmány Press, Budapest, 2014., and the author of this research is try hard to promote the CISG.  
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Spagnoli we have to see that the Hungarian civil law has its roots in the Roman law, and during its formation 
basically influenced by the German and Austrian legal tradition, namely by the BGB and the ABGB. It is 
also agreed, that Italian and French legal influence also can be detected in our private law.14 We also have 
to consider when examining the international influence on the Hungarian civil law that the EU’s mandatory 
regulations on the field of international private law has also formed the codification process15 started in the 
late 1990’s, and ended in a new Hungarian Civil Code. When examining the similarities and differences in 
regulation the sales contract in the CISG and the Hungarian Civil Code we have to make difference in the 
case law before and after the new Hungarian Civil Code, Act V of 2013, came into force on 15th March, 
2014. The Commentary on the new Hungarian Civil Code has referred to the CISG as follows: “Despite of 
the straightening of sales contract as a fundamental contract type the regulation cannot be unified on it as 
Hungary is contracting party of the CISG. In cases where the CISG is applicable, the Hungarian Civil Code 
must be set aside. Although the Civil Code aspired to implement the effective regulations of the CISG, it 
could not be the goal to introduce regulations perfectly fitting to international sales law to be applied for 
national sales contracts. The duplicity stays: Hungarian Civil Code for national sales contracts, and the 
Convention as autonomous law for international sales contracts”16 According to the codifiers upper note, 
the regulation is expressly divided from the international influence of the CISG. This way, we can say 
Hungary failed the third criteria of Spagnoli as well.  
 
 
III. Language obstacles of uniform interpretation 
 
 I made an analysis on the CLOUT database setting the language issues in front. The CISG has been 
made on 6 official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, and among these the 
English, the German and the Spanish are spoken more frequently on international field of commerce. If we 
collect the countries from which the most referred cases came from, we see an interesting picture in 
comparison with the law-level language speaking counties like the V4. 
 
Figure 2. 
Number of cases in the CLOUT by countries and languages17 
 
Official language Country Number of cases on 
CLOUT 
 
German 
Germany 218 
Austria 63 
Switzerland 100 
 
 
English 
USA 121 
Canada 161 
Great-Britain and Northern Ireland (not 
even contracting parties of the CISG) 
16 
Australia 50 
French France 75 
Spanish Spain 126 
 
/other than the official 
languages of the CISG/ 
Hungary 15 
Poland 26 
Check Republic 3 
Slovakia 2 
 
 The fact that the Convention is also available in Spanish, as one of the six official United Nations 
languages, facilitates interpretation of the Convention even for Latin American countries, in the majority of 
__________________ 
14  Ádám Boóc: Észrevételek az új Polgári Törvénykönyv tervezetéhez nemzetközi magánjogi szempontból. In: 
Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, 2008/3., pp. 3-8. 3.p.  
15  Gábor Palásti: Közrendi, imperatív, kógens és diszpozitív szabályok. In. Magyar Jog, 2006/2. pp. 65-77.  
16  Osztovits, András (szerk): A Polgári Törvénykönyv magyarázata. Vol. II. 1702.p.  
17  As published on the UNCITRAL website on 4th January, 2017.  
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which the language is Spanish, and helps to create a uniform case law, which will not be enjoyed by those 
countries of the Americas that have not yet adopted the Convention18.  
 
 I would like to highlight German and English because one other reason, which is the available 
scientific literature. Most of the materials written on CISG and its jurisprudence or interpretation is basically 
in English or German19. Here we have arrived to the next level of obstacles: the lack of knowledge of the 
relevant case law. Although in the previous point I highlighted that the internet makes hundreds of cases 
available, but most of these cases are published or available in English, so the language issues occur here: 
not only should a lawyer/judge/arbitrator be familiar with another language, but he/she must be familiar 
with another language’s legal terminology. And here we have reached the point of the disadvantage of the 
different legal cultures. As Harry M. Flechtner is analysing in one of his work, the legal instruments are not 
easy to translate20, and even more difficult between different legal traditional backgrounds. Should we 
blame our judges when their failing this challenge? I do not think so. According to the official statistical 
report of the Hungarian National Office for the Judiciary in county Győr-Moson-Sopron under the 19 judges 
dealing with civil law 4866 cases has been started in 2015, which means (proposing an equal working 
pressure on them) every single judge has seen 256 cases in a year, more than 21 new cases in a month. And 
they have reported in 2015 that in a year they meet 1-5 international commercial cases. Is it a surprise that 
they do not have the time (and/or the motivation) the follow the international case law on CISG, or read the 
relevant international legal literature?  
 
 Among the language issues we should mention, that in Hungary nobody can get a diploma (not even 
a bachelor’s degree) without at least one foreign language exam (both oral and written) with medium level. 
In Hungary the most frequently spoken languages are German and English (how lucky, we could believe 
according to the literature of the CISG…). To sum up: all of our judges in Hungary have — at least an 
official paper on — language knowledge, so theoretically this should not be an obstacle for reaching the 
relevant literature. Theoretically. 
 
 
IV. Measures to make for a more uniform interpretation and better understanding of the CISG 
 
 If we are looking at the court decisions from the V4 countries (not taking into consideration the 
arbitration courts, which are different in many aspects), most of them simply do not cite any international 
case law, nor international literature while applying the CISG in a case. This leads to the sad fact, that 
Article 7 (1)’s mandatory rule of autonomous and international interpretation of the Convention will remain 
a mere principle. According to the upper mentioned empirical survey among the reasons of lack of 
knowledge on international case law the Hungarian judges mentioned the absence of domestic (i.e. 
Hungarian language) literature on the subject. We should admit that it is not an application condition for a 
domestic judge to be perfect English- or German-speaking (or reading) one, so it is not obvious to require 
from a judge being up-to-date with the international case law. However, we should find a resolution for this 
issue. As a good example, in the Netherlands there is a helping guide for the judges, so called “Procureur-
Generaal”. The Procureur-Generaal or his deputies the Advocaten-Generaal (Advocates General) deliver 
an advisory opinion (Conclusie) in all civil cases decided by the judge of the case. These advisory opinions 
play an important role in the development of the case law by the judges.21 I see this solution as a best 
__________________ 
18  Ana Elizabeth Villalta Vizcarra: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. In: 
Thirty-five Years of Uniform Sales Law: Trends and Perspectives Proceedings of the High Level Panel held 
during the Forty-eighth Session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Vienna, 6 July 
2015. United Nations, New York, 2015. 29-38.p. p.35. 
19  Without being biased, I would like to set the Schlechtriem & Schwenzer commentary as a perfect example of the 
two dominant languages of scientific literature. This well-known and repeatedly updated commentary is 
published also on these two languages. See the German version: Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Kommentar zum 
Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht. Verlag C.H. Beck, München — Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, Basel, 6. edition, 
2013.  
20  Harry M. Flechtner: The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, 
Reservations and other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1). Journal of Law and Commerce 
1998/17. pp. 187-217. 
21  Sonja A. Kruisinga, The Impact of Uniform Law in National Law: Limits and Possibilities — CISG and Its 
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practice for national judiciary system, which should be highly recommended for contracting states. In the 
Hungarian system we can see a kind of version of this institution in the position of “high consultant of the 
Curia”, but this position only exists on the highest level of the judicial system. But cases occur first on the 
lower levels, so a solution can be to introduce these positions to lower courts as well.  
 
 The Széchenyi István University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences got a 10-month-funding from 
the Ministry of Justice of Hungary to start building a national database of the CISG cases — in Hungarian. 
This is the first time that an institution has a goal of collecting and translating (at least a part of) the existing 
case law on international sales. Part of the project is to publish relevant scientific literature in Hungarian as 
well. While creating this database the role model is the Pace Law School Institute of International 
Commercial Law and its method of dealing with the different issues of international commerce22. We 
believe that with publishing the relevant case law in Hungarian would enable the judicial staff to be more 
aware of the relevant interpretation issues.  
 
 Another key element to enhance the autonomous interpretation of the CISG is the legal education. 
When facing with the problem of the application of the CISG in the United States, several scholars got to 
the same point: if we want to be more familiar with the Convention, we should start with the education23. 
Dodge states, that teaching the CISG for USA students is fun, “because the CISG is different from both the 
common law and the UCC, and those differences provide wonderful opportunities to question the rules of 
contract law that we have grown so used to”24. But finding an ideal balance for international law subjects 
are not easy. Fatima Akkadaf raised the next question in 2001, which is still opened: “If international law 
is imperative, how do we ensure that students receive it?” She suggested to start including international and 
comparative law on the American bar examinations25. Although she declared this as a utopia for the United 
States, I deeply believe that this must be a reality for the contracting state’s law schools — not for the bar 
exams, but for the bachelor and master courses as well. How do we expect the proper use of the mandatory 
international conventions if we do not teach them properly for graduating lawyers? In this field I also 
believe that the UNCITRAL itself has got steps to take: for making the CISG more user-friendly, it has to 
be promoted for teachers, lecturers at the law schools as well. In my opinion it would be great to have 
teaching materials for CISG, and these materials can be a result of an international cooperation between 
scholars interested in international sales law. As a lecturer for more than 10 years now, I am sure that many 
of my colleagues has his/her own “best practice” for make this subject and the Convention more familiar 
with the students — so why not share the experience with each other? The Faculty in Győr is making the 
first step: we will publish our ways of teaching including teaching materials on the CISG in Hungarian, and 
plan to do the same in English for ERASMUS students. 
 
 We are also facing the problem of generational challenges. Not only we have to present our work and 
make it available in Hungarian: we have to do it on the “21st century way”. Student of today’s law schools 
are seeking for a different kind of education: less front presentations and lectures and more group work, 
more “learning-by-doing”, so the new teaching materials must fit to their new ways of learning as well26. 
__________________ 
Incidence in Dutch Law, vol. 13.2 Electronic Journal Of Comparative Law, (May 2009), p. 7, 
<http://www.ejcl.org/132/art132-2.pdf>. The institution is mentioned by the national report on CISG by Viola 
Heutger: National report of the Netherlands. International Conference “35 Years of CISG — Present Experiences 
and Future Challenges”, Manuscript, 2015. p. 10-11.  
22  See it here: http://iicl.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisg (as on 4th January 2017). 
23  see e.g. Kina Grbic: Putting the CISG Where It Belongs: in the Uniform Commercial Code. Touro Law Review, 
2012/29. pp. 173-203. or William S. Dodge: Teaching the CISG in Contracts, Journal of Legal Education, 2000/1. 
Vol. 50. pp. 72-94.  
24  Dodge op.cit. p. 94.  
25  Fatima Akaddaf: Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?, Pace International Law 
Review, 2001/1. (Vol. 13.) p. 4.  
26  There are so many literature on the „y-generation”, and on „z-generation” and their special needs and preferences, 
here I only mention refer to an interesting research on Gen-Z’s expectations on higher education: Barnes & Noble 
College: Getting to Know Gen Z — Exploring Middle and High Schoolers’ Expectations for Higher Education. 
Available here: http://next.bncollege.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Gen-Z-Research-Report-Final.pdf (as on 
4th January, 2017). 
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 The expectations of the new generations include “educational technology” available, so creating online 
educational tools are one step towards getting more young law students (future lawyers) to get to know the 
CISG better.  
 
 According to the Tao Te King “a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”. The Széchenyi 
István Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of Public and Private International Law is making 
this first step these days. We truly believe that promoting the CISG has to start with the legal education, and 
efforts must be made to translate the international case law to Hungarian language to make it available for 
practicing lawyers and judges. The goal of unanimous and international interpretation of the CISG in 
Hungary (and I think in many countries) will remain a dream unless we fulfil at least two criteria of Lisa 
Spagnoli: educational coverage and extension of dispute work exposure.  
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The Adoption of the CISG in Iran: Practical Difficulties in Implementing the CISG 
 
Mona Ahadi, University of Durham School of Law, United Kingdom* 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods has been ratified by 
84 states1 that account for a significant proportion of world trade. Despite the declaration in the Preamble 
about contributing to the achievement of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and promoting the 
development of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, a disproportionate number 
of developing countries, including Iran, have not ratified it.  
 
 The Iranian Civil Code, the main source of the law of contract, was first prepared in 1928 and then 
completed in 1935-36.2 This code has remained untouched for 80 years. During that time the volume, 
complexity and international character of commercial transactions have changed and the Iranian Civil Code 
is no longer suitable for modern international trade. The language of the Code and its terms are not suitable 
for international sales in the sense that there are elements of ambiguity and uncertainty in the provisions of 
the Iranian Civil Code. On top of that, the fact that it is not a well-established and well-known body of law 
might discourage Iran’s trading partners from adhering to the Iranian Civil Code. This could put Iranian 
commercial traders in a disadvantageous position at the time of choice of applicable law during contract 
drafting. While each contractual party typically wishes to apply its national law, this may lead to choosing 
the law of Iran’s trading partner (owing to the unpopularity of the Iranian Civil Code and/or unfamiliarity 
with it). In that case, if a dispute should arise, additional research at significant cost would be necessary to 
ascertain the actual content of the law chosen.3 That is where the adoption of the CISG might be beneficial 
to Iran. The CISG, which is a more modern document developed in the light of the international character 
and complexity of current trade practices, responds better to international commerce. Therefore, it could be 
used by Iran to embark on updating its own domestic law of sale.  
 
2. Fieldwork Summary in Iran  
 
 In 2011/2012, the writer conducted a survey in Iran. The aim of the fieldwork was to conduct 
unstructured interviews with leading figures in business, law and Government in Iran with regard to the 
area of international trade. The goal was to determine: (i) whether they are familiar with the CISG; (ii) 
whether they support/oppose its introduction, with reasons why; and (iii) whether there are any other 
insights/observations on the potential difficulties of implementation.  
 
 The writer issued 60 documents and received only nine responses. The small number of responses 
means it is important to be cautious in interpreting results. However, three tentative conclusions can be 
drawn:  
 
 
I. Lack of Awareness  
 
 Although it is arguable that the low level of response might reflect the technical nature of the subject, 
the lack of awareness of and familiarity with the CISG could be considered as one of the major factors 
potentially hindering accession. The implications of this lack of awareness are discussed below.  
__________________ 
* This paper is an adaptation of her thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in School of Law, 
University of Durham in September 2013 entitled ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: Should Developing Nations Such As Iran Adopt the CISG?’. 
1  As of 29 December 2015, UNCITRAL reported that 84 states have adopted the CISG.  ’CISG: Table of 
Contracting States’ <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html> accessed 7 March 2017. 
2  Hamid Bahrami-Ahmadi, ‘A Historical Overview on the Development of Civil Code.’ (Available in Persian.) 
<http://www.isu.ac.ir/publication/research-quarterly/research-quarterly_24/Research- Quarterly_2402.htm> 
accessed 7 March 2017.  
3  ‘CISG-Brazil interview with UNCITRAL Legal Officer Luca Castellani’ (April 2010).  
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 This is supported by interviews/questionnaires. One example is the ‘Mega Motor Company,’ whose 
managing director admitted his unfamiliarity with the CISG. It is worth mentioning that, with the exception 
of three that came from academia or the legal community, other endorsements for accession came from 
organizations whose level of familiarity with the CISG was either low or non-existent. In other words, 
despite unfamiliarity, they were not opposing accession to the CISG.  
 
 
II. Direct Opposition  
 
 With the exception of one vote against, the majority were in favour of adoption. However, the 
opposition is significant because, although it did not focus on trade issues, for instance on the fact that it is 
not yet evident whether the CISG would promote trade or reduce legal business (as in the UK), it focused 
instead on the secular nature of the CISG. A highly influential organization that was against ratification was 
the Trade Promotion Organisation of Iran, which is a subset of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries 
and Mines. Their main objection was the incompatibility of the CISG with Islamic jurisprudence.  
 
 From this point of view it is not incorrect to oppose adoption of the CISG, on the grounds that the 
Convention specifies provisions with regard to interest that seem to be incompatible with Islamic and 
Iranian law.4 For example, Article 84 of the CISG states that in the event that the seller is bound to refund 
the price, he must pay interest on it from the date the price was paid. Also, under CISG Article 78, it is clear 
that interest must be paid to the aggrieved party.  
 
 But this does not in fact introduce a radical change, since Iranian law recognizes late payment 
compensation (Articles 515(2) and 522 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code 1379 (2000)), which is very 
similar to the notion of interest.5 Moreover, when an action is brought outside Iran, Iranian authorities do 
request interest in their dealings and litigation arbitration proceedings with foreign corporations.6  
 
 Hence it could be very difficult politically to promote access to the CISG in Iran. Those who prefer 
secular law may feel that it is unwise to promote the Convention, as it may invite closer scrutiny of the 
Civil Code. It is only speculation, but it may explain the low rate of return of the questionnaires.  
 
 
III. There Is Some Support for the CISG  
 
 Several respondents stated their willingness to adhere to the CISG, but one went a step further and 
explained that Iran’s accession to the New York Convention (1958 United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) on 15 October 20017 implies that accession to 
the CISG is feasible. Those respondents who were very familiar with the CISG and in favour of accession 
put forward their arguments as follows:  
 
1. Iran’s accession to the Convention would appear to have benefits for Iran at an international level. 
It is believed that it would promote Iran’s international trade and be beneficial for its economic 
growth and development. Iran’s trading partners would be able to predict the governing law of 
__________________ 
4  ‘LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Report of the First Committee. ’ 
<http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/1stcommittee/summaries78,84.html> accessed 7 March 2017. Egyptian 
Delegate proposed ‘it would be advisable to provide for reservations which would permit any country, 
particularly those where the concept of interest was incompatible with their religion, to apply the relevant clauses  
in a different manner.’ ‘LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary Records of 
Meetings of the First Committee, 34th 
meeting.’ <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting34.html> accessed 7 March 2017. . 
5  H Safai, M Adel, M Kazemi, and A Mirzanejad, The Law of International Sale of Goods — A Comparative Study 
(2nd edn, University of Tehran Press 2008) 446. (Available in Persian.) . 
6  Sayed Hassan Amin, ‘Banking and Finance Based On Islamic Principles — Law and Practice in Modern Iran’ 
(1989) 9 Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly 1. . 
7 The New York Convention came into force on 13 January 2002.  
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the contract. This governing law, which is familiar to them and derived from international 
customs and trade usages, would enable them to enter into contracts with Iran with a higher 
degree of certainty, which would in turn lead to the building of stronger relations.  
 
2. Accession to the Convention would not mean that our own national law would be neglected or 
abandoned. Since the Convention governs only international sales contracts between parties 
whose places of business are in two different countries, the Iranian Civil Code would still govern 
contracts of sales made nationally.  
 
3. A comparative study of the CISG and the Iranian Civil Code does not suggest any radical 
departure from our Civil Code.  
 
3. Future Action  
 
 The three points made above suggest the following areas of action:  
 
I. Awareness  
 
 There is clearly a great need for further awareness. The outcome of this survey shows that there is a 
lack of familiarity with and awareness of the CISG within the business community in particular. The 
problems this brings include not only a lack of support for the CISG but also the likelihood that the transition 
to the CISG would be more difficult. Although the writer in her thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in 2013/148 has discussed that the CISG is preferable in many ways to the Civil Code, and 
that there are not that many incompatibilities between the two legal systems, many of the benefits would 
not be obtained if the legal and business community lacked the knowledge to take advantage of the CISG. 
Moreover, there is a risk that their lack of knowledge might increase the cost of doing business rather than 
reduce it, as the CISG is intended to do.  
 
 The CISG allows contracting parties to opt out of its provisions and choose the application of a 
different body of law. The source of this autonomy is contained in Article 6 of the Convention, which 
permits signatories to ‘opt out’ of the Convention in its entirety or to derogate from or vary the effect of 
any of its principles. The reasoning behind this was that parties could always opt out of the provisions they 
wanted to avoid, and this is very useful, in particular for persuading sceptics to adopt the CISG. For 
example, in Iran those contracting parties that did not wish to apply the provisions on interest could declare 
that such provisions did not apply to their contract. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that, in taking 
advantage of Article 6, the legal profession fails to apply the CISG in cases where it could be very useful.9 
The statistics show that the rate of opt-out by lawyers in the US stands somewhere in the region of 55% to 
71%. The figures for Germany, Switzerland, Austria and China are 45%, 41%, 55% and around 37% 
respectively.10 But the question is, why do the lawyers opt out of the CISG? But, though the answer to this 
could be much extended, one of the main reasons is, again, lack of awareness and knowledge of the CISG. 
For instance, in the US, although it is a signatory state to the CISG, some 44% of lawyers are not at all 
familiar with the Convention.11  
 
 So how does one compensate for this lack of awareness? It seems that the most important resources 
through which one can raise awareness are law schools and the publication of scholarly writings, 
commentaries and court decisions in specialised and general law reviews. Time, cost and effort are indeed 
required at the start to become familiar with the CISG, but, given the position of Iran in the international 
community, such expenditure would seem to be of vital importance. It is then up to the legal and business 
communities to make their desire to ratify the CISG clear to the Government.  
__________________ 
8 Mona Ahadi, ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Should 
Developing Nations Such As Iran Adopt the CISG?’ (PhD thesis, University of Durham 2013). 
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/16/1/Completed_Thesis.MA.pdf?DDD19+> accessed 7 March 2017.  
9 Bruno Zeller, ‘The CISG — Getting off the Fence’ (2000) 74(9) The Law Institute Journal 73.  
10  Lisa Spagnolo, ‘A Glimpse through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the CISG (Kaleidoscope Part I) ’ 
(2009) Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 135, 140.  
11  Ibid.  
  
342 
 There is also an issue with the transition from the Civil Code to the CISG, but this should not create 
serious difficulties, as education would focus on ensuring that lawyers and professionals were comfortable 
with the CISG and could see its advantages. The writer acknowledges that there are some valid objections 
to the CISG that are related not to its usefulness but to its compatibility with Islamic principles. Therefore, 
this issue will need to be addressed separately.  
 
 
II. Concern Over Anti-Islamic Elements  
 
 The one vote against ratification registered during the writer’s fieldwork came from the Trade 
Promotion Organisation of Iran. This Governmental organization appears to reflect the Government’s view. 
However, the Government of Iran has never published any statement to express its direct and/or indirect 
opposition to ratification of the CISG.  
 
 The prohibition of interest by the Qur’an, which seems to be an impediment to accession to the CISG 
for Islamic countries, has to a certain extent been avoided by interpretation. Taking Egypt as an example, 
Article 226 of the Egyptian Civil Code awards interest.12 Iraq also took a similar approach and applied 
award of interest to its law.13 More importantly, as noted above, Articles 515(2) and 522 of the Iranian Civil 
Procedure Code 1379 (2000) introduce compensation for late payment, which is similar to the notion of 
interest.  
 
 Such interpretations perhaps explain why those Islamic countries that are party to the CISG14 have not 
made reservations on Article 78, which deals with interest. One could however argue that the reason these 
countries can apply interest is that the Western legal structure has had a great impact on their legal systems, 
and the same approach may not apply to other Islamic countries. Although this is true, there is still Article 
6 of the CISG, which formulates safety for Islamic countries, should they decide to avoid application of 
Article 78 of the CISG. Article 6 of the CISG, which provides that ‘the parties may exclude the application 
of this Convention or ... derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions,’ exemplifies the 
fundamental principle of freedom of contracts given to the parties.  
 
 
III. The Community That Would Probably Overcome (I) and (II)  
 
 It is the duty of this group — the community that is aware and in support of accession — to further 
facilitate accession to the CISG. It could be achieved by raising greater awareness and knowledge of the 
CISG through the use of the CISG database. ‘The database is a collaborative effort between the Institute of 
International Commercial Law and the Pace Law Library.’15 It accommodates over 2,900 cases and 1,600 
full texts of commentaries. Besides, one of the main functions of the CISG Advisory Council, where a 
jurisdiction has not ratified it, is to encourage and help them to adopt and implement it.16 More in-depth 
analysis and comparative study of the two legal systems (the CISG and Iranian law) would also enable Iran 
to overcome any apprehension over the anti-Islamic element of the CISG. An investigation into the 
compatibility of the CISG with Iranian law has shown that the two legal systems are by and large similar, 
and, where there are differences, sufficient principles can be found within Iranian law to bridge the gap.  
 
__________________ 
12  Article 226 of Egyptian Civil Code reads: ’When the object of an obligation is the payment of a sum of money 
of which the amount is known at the time when the claim is made, the debtor shall be bound, in case of delay in 
payment, to pay the claimant, as damages for the delay, interest ... ‘  
13  Fatima Akaddaf, ‘Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles? ’ (2001) 13 Pace 
International Law Review 1.  
14  Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Mauritania are parties to the CISG. . 
15  See ‘CISG Database.’ <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/> accessed 7 March 2017.  
16  Interview with Dr Loukas Mistelis, former Secretary of the CISG-AC between 2001 and 2007, (June 2004) in 
Joshua D H Karton and Lorraine de Germiny, ‘Has the CISG Advisory Council Come of Age?’ (2009) 27 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 448, 451. < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509761> accessed 7 March 2017.  
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In Favour of Appropriate Dynamic Interpretation for the CISG’s Legal Uniformity 
 
Zuoli Jiang, Shandong University Law School, People’s Republic of China  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) aims at 
removing the trade barriers for the promotion of international trade by virtue of setting standard for the 
unification of commercial law in the post-war era. However, in order to create legal uniformity it is 
insufficient to merely create and enact uniform instruments,1 because uniform application of the agreed 
rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost inevitably come to put different 
interpretations upon the same enacted words.2 Thus, an appropriate uniform interpretation of the CISG is 
essentially important to its legal uniformity. 
 
 Article 7 of the CISG indicates that courts of countries should not read and interpret the CISG through 
the lenses of domestic law, but rather in an “autonomous” manner. In other words, in interpreting the CISG 
one should not resort to the meaning generally attached to certain expressions within the ambit of a 
particular legal system.3 However, due to the lack of a world international trade court with an exclusive 
authority in interpreting the CISG, domestic courts as the sole interpreter and the existence of numerous 
vague and ambiguous terms and gaps in the CISG as a result of complex international compromises 
negotiated by countries with extremely diverse economies and legal cultures and systems, the courts of 
different countries will inevitably interpret the CISG based upon their own economic, political, and legal 
orientations.4 Some commentators believe that these diverging interpretations are greater obstacles to 
uniformity than once thought and suggest that pessimistically the CISG might not be a success.5 
 
 The purpose of this paper is not to give a brief account of the discussions about Article 7, but rather, 
this paper examines the current difficulties and problems of the uniform interpretation of the CISG by 
domestic courts, analyses the justification of the dynamic interpretation as the best approach of and solution 
to the problems for legal uniformity, and offer some suggestions to UNCITRAL’s work to promote 
unification of international trade law.  
 
2. The main difficulties of the uniform interpretation of the CISG for its legal uniformity 
 
 The chief reason of the divergent interpretations by the courts of different countries is that there are 
numerous difficulties and the courts try to overcome them by reading and interpreting the CISG by virtue 
of their domestic laws and techniques.  
__________________ 
1  L. M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 Tulane 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 99 (1995).  
2  Franco Ferrari, The CISG’s Uniform Interpretation by Courts — An Update, 9 Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law & Arbitration, 235 (2005). 
3  J. O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the United Nations Convention (Deventer, 3rd ed., 
1999) at 89. 
4  See, e.g., Arther Rosset, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Internat ional 
Sales of Goods, 45 Ohio St. L. J. 266 (1984); V. Susanne Cook, Note, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of 
the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 197 
(1988); See Ryan, supra note 1, at 101; Shani Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 
7 of the CISG, an Inter-American Application, 38 Inter-American Law Review(U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev), 227 
(2006); Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: 
Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 Pace International Law Review (Pace Int ’L. Rev.), 304 (1996); Edita 
Ubartaite, Application of the CISG in the United States, 7 European Journal of Law Reform (Eur. J.L. Reform), 
281 (2005). 
5  Philip Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving Uniformity?, 61 
La. L. Rev. 476 (2001); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International 
Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. In’l L. 760 (1999); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 Va. 
J. In’l L. 672 (1999); Aneta Spaic, Approaching Uniformity in International Sales Law through Autonomous 
Interpretation, 11 Vindobona J. Int’l Com. & Arb. 38 (2007).  
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2.1. There are so many vague and ambiguous terms and gaps in the CISG 
 
 The CISG as the most successful attempt to unify international trade law is filled with countless vague 
and ambiguous standards and rules as result of compromises of so many countries.6 First, there are so many 
legal concepts difficult to define. For example, “reasonable”, “place of business”, “good faith”, 
“substantial”, etc. Secondly, some rules are vague, for example, Article 78 provides that if one party fails 
to pay the price or any other sum, the other party is entitled to interest on it, but it fails to give specific 
explanations. What is more important, there are certain aspects involving international sales that the CISG 
does not even address. For example, Article 2 excludes from application those transactions involving 
consumer goods, as well as those transactions involving money or investment securities, and the same 
article also excludes from coverage issues relating to property ownership in the goods though these issues 
are essential in determining the substantial rights of the parties.7  
 
2.2. The criteria of uniform interpretation under the CISG are vague 
 
 It is common knowledge that in order to uniform interpretation the CISG must specify criteria of 
interpretation as guideline of judicial interpretations by different courts. However, the international 
character, uniform application and good faith as the criteria of interpretation of the CISG are also too vague 
and lack important provisions, for example, the CISG fails to define the concepts of international character, 
good faith and its scope of application and fails to spell out the role of general principles, etc. In addition, 
Article 7 fails to specify interpretation methodology.  
 
 These failures make Article 7 the most problematic one in the CISG and lead to endless arguments 
between scholars and judges which result in inevitable divergent interpretations, and will not be helpful to 
the uniform interpretation of the CISG, and even become barriers to the unification of international trade 
law.8 
 
2.3. The CISG fails to expressly provide the sources for consideration 
 
 Both jurisprudence and judicial practices demonstrate the importance of sources in the legal 
interpretation. Actually, the specific provisions of sources in the interpretation of international conventions 
are even more important than the national law because it is extremely difficult to unify the jurisprudence 
and judicial practices of different countries. However, the CISG does not provide specific guidance on the 
sources to be considered in interpretation. For example, foreign decisions interpreting the CISG are so 
important to national courts but the CISG fails to give any specific guidance.9  
 
2.4. The role of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is limited 
 
 In light of the fact that Article 7(1) of the CISG does not prescribe the theoretical methods of 
interpretation to be utilized, guidance on this matter would have to be obtained elsewhere. As uniform 
interpretation of the CISG is of utmost importance for its uniform application, regard must be had to 
universally accepted framework of interpretational guidelines. These guidelines are to be found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention).10 
__________________ 
6  Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25 Int ’l Rev Of L. & 
Econ. 474 (2005). 
7  James P. Quinn, The Interpretation and Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 9 Int’l T, Bus L. Rev. 4 (2004); Rod Andreason, MCC-Marble Ceramic: The Parol 
Evidence Rule and Other Law under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1 Byu L. 
Rev. 352 (1999). 
8  Christopher Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods and A Proposal for a New Uniform Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 Cardozo J. Int ’l & Comp. 
L. 472 (2007; James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 Cornell. Int ’l L. J. 293 (1999). 
9  See Cook, supra note 4, at 211. 
10  Marlene Wethmar-Lemmer, Regional Harmonization of International Sale Law via Accession to the CISG and 
the Importance of Uniform Interpretation of the CISG, 47 De Jure 305 (2014).  
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 There are long-time arguments between scholars on the application of the Vienna Convention to the 
interpretation of the CISG. Several scholars represented by Honnold hold that the CISG is an international 
convention only for sale of goods and the Vienna Convention applies to regulate only the relationships of 
its member countries, therefore, they contest the application of the Vienna Convention. The autonomous 
interpretation provided in the CISG excludes the application of both national laws and public international 
laws.11 Other commentators support reference to the Vienna Convention to provide guidelines for the 
interpretation of the CISG because Article 1 of the Vienna Convention provides that it is applicable to 
treaties between states and that the CISG therefore falls under its scope of application. Also, the Vienna 
Convention is universally accepted as customary international law and should be applied to the 
interpretation of the CISG and there will be no conflicts in the process of interpretation.12 There are also 
some scholars who neutrally advocate that both Article 7 of the CISG and the Vienna Convention are 
applicable but they must be divided into two parts: Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention should apply 
to interpret Articles 89-101 of the CISG, and Article 7 of the Convention should apply to interpret the other 
articles of the Convention. One argument in this regard is that Article 7 is the special law and Articles 31-
33 of the Vienna Convention are common law, thus the former applies in priority, while the latter applies 
only Article 7.13 
 
 Clearly, the Vienna Convention can be guidelines for the interpretation of the CISG, but its role is 
rather limited. 
 
3. The recourse to the interpretation sources as the main practical problems in the interpretation of the 
CISG by courts of most countries 
 
 The modern theories of interpretation and methods are mainly originated in the legal interpretation of 
ancient Roman law, and up to now, varied methods of interpretation already form such as literal 
interpretation, historical interpretation, purpose interpretation and dynamic (evolutional) interpretation. 
Broadly, these methods can be classified into static interpretation and dynamic interpretation. The historical 
development of legal interpretation demonstrate that several methods are usually comprehensively utilized 
in practical interpretations. The most important argument between scholars and judges in interpretation is 
the role of dynamic interpretation represented by the role and ranking of different sources of interpretation. 
The static interpretation emphasizes the text, preparatory materials, intent of drafters, legislative purpose, 
while the dynamic interpretation pays more attention to legal principles, foreign case law, academic writing, 
principles of public international law, national law, etc. 
 
3.1. The general principles on which the CISG is based 
 
 Article 7(2) provides that if questions are not expressly settled in the CISG, they shall be settled in 
conformity with the general principles on which the CISG is based. The ambiguous methodical 
interpretation of Article 7 results in the variant judicial interpretations.14  
 
 The static interpretation supporters insist that the CISG does not list specific general principles, that it 
is difficult, even impossible to find them, and are opposed to any dynamic interpretations. The dynamic 
interpretation supporters contend that general principles can be found through induction from two sources: 
the articles of the CISG and the process of legal development. In this way, the guidelines can be found for 
interpreting the CISG not to leave uncertainty which leads to national laws for interpretation by judges.15  
__________________ 
11  See Honnold, supra note 3, at 103. 
12  See Wethmar-Lemmer, supra note 10, at 305; Tom Allen, General Principles of International Law and the 
Autonomous Interpretation of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 8 J. Islamic St. 
Prac. Int’l L. 94 (2012). 
13  LiuYing, Study of Interpreting Problems of the United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale 
of Goods, 1th ed., Law Press China, 11(2009). See Wethmar-Lemmer, supra note 10, at 305. 
14  See Sheaffer, supra note 8, at 462.  
15  John O. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales: the Studies, Deliberations, 
and Decisions that Led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with Introductions and Explanations, 198 Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers (1989), at 20. 
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 Comparatively, more scholars and judges agree to identify general principles more flexibly. Some 
argue that an international convention is a living maturing body of law, founded on certain fundamental 
values but capable of adapting new interpretations for changed environments.16 Therefore, a dynamic 
understanding of Article 7(2) is conducive to settle questions that the CISG failed to provide for definitely.17 
Only an active judicial interpretation of a convention can “keep the ship afloat,” because there is little hope 
“that [legislative] rescue will arrive.”18 
 
 From the perspective of dynamic interpretation, several general principles can be deduced: the 
principle of protecting the injured party’s expectation interest from Articles 45(2), 47(2) and 48(1), the 
principle of protecting restitution property from Article 81(2), and the principle of reliance interest from 
Articles 85, 86(1) and 88(3), etc. One national court induced the principle of burden of evidence by the 
buyer who claims that the goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract.19  
 
 Certainly, the identifying and extracting many of the general principles through deduction is not 
unlimited, and it should be kept in mind that the CISG’s overall objective is to promote international trade 
by removing legal barriers that arise from different social, economic, and legal systems of the world. 
Namely, the present purpose of finding general principles from the text of the CISG and from its legislative 
history is to help produce at least the narrow effect of preventing interpretations of the CISG based on 
domestic law.20 
 
3.2. Foreign case law 
 
 Due to the failure of specific provisions of the CISG, the resort to foreign case law has been also highly 
controversial. Some contend the regard on the foreign case law, while others are in favour of the reference 
of foreign case law. Most scholars infer that the “international character” of the CISG requests the 
interpreters to break away from domestic legal concepts and interpreting techniques and consider 
international legal texts,21 “the promotion of uniform application” requires taking into account relevant 
foreign case law. Uniformity can only be achieved if one also considers foreign case law. One further points 
out that the interpreter must consider decisions rendered by judicial bodies of foreign jurisdictions, because 
it is possible that the same or similar questions have already been examined by other States’ courts.22  
 
 Another feature of dynamic interpretation in this regard lies in the finding of general principles on 
which the CISG is based from foreign case law. For example, one German court stated that autonomy is 
one principle of the CISG,23 and many courts indicated that “estoppel” is also the CISG’s principle.24 It 
should be stressed that in the case where questions that cannot be settled according to the expressed rules 
__________________ 
16  Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 783 (1998).  
17  See Salama, supra note 4, at 242. 
18  See Alstine, supra note 16, at 777. 
19  See Case HG930138, (Italy v. Switz.), Handelsgericht Zürich (Sep. 9, 1993), available in UNILEX, A 
Comprehensive and “Intelligent” Data Base on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG), Transnational Juris Publications, Inc. Irvington. N.Y.） 
20  Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale  
of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 Minn. J. Global Trade, 117 (1997).  
21  See Wethmar-Lemmer, supra note 10, at 301. 
22  Elizabeth H. Paterson, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Unification 
and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22 Stan. J. Int’L L. 263, 283(1986); Franco Ferrari, 
CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters? 17 J. L. & Com. 254 (1998); C. B. Andersen, Uniform 
International Sales Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, J. L. & Com. 159 (2005); Joseph Lookofsky, 
Understanding the CISG: A Compact Guide to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 3rd Edition, Kluwer Law International, 30 (2008).  
23  A. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, /Deventer, 1989, 114. 
24  Rechtbank Amsterdam, October 5, 1994, Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 1995, No. 231; Franco Ferrari, 
Article 7, in P. Schlechtriem (ed.), Kommentar Zum UN-Kaufrecht-CISG, Munich, 3rd ed., 2000, 134. 
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of the CISG and the general principles cannot be deduced in order to fill gaps, the courts must settled them 
by resort to foreign case law.25 
 
3.3. Domestic laws 
 
 Article 7(2) provides that if questions concerning matters governed by the CISG are not expressly 
settled in it, they shall be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law. This indicates clearly that domestic law can be utilized to fill gaps in the CISG. However, 
there has been heated debate on whether regard shall be had on domestic law as interpretation source. 
Supporters believe interpreters are not only allowed to consider domestic law but also are obligated to do 
so.26 Bonell further argues that the use of domestic law “represents under the …uniform law a last resort to 
be used only if and to the extent a solution cannot be found either by analogical application of specific 
provisions or by the application of general principles underlying the uniform law as such.”27 The last resort 
status of domestic sales law is meant to deter the threat of homeward trend. This is especially crucial in the 
case of the CISG due to the fact that its provisions were the product of intense debate and compromise.28 
One against the use of domestic law contends that the recourse to rules of private international law 
represents regression into doctrinal fragmentation and practical uncertainty. The relevant reference to such 
a method in Article 7(2) is unfortunate, as it does not assist the goal of uniformity. Recourse to the rules of 
private international law impedes and frustrates the unification movement and can reverse the progress 
achieved by the world-wide adoption of the CISG.29 
 
 With respect to the use of domestic law by national courts, Honnold helplessly calls it “homeward 
trend” and points out that this is an inevitable phenomenon.30 One scholar has examined some cases by 
some German courts and holds that an interpretation that is informed by national approaches may enhance 
the long-term legitimacy of the CISG.31  
 
3.4. Academic writings 
 
 The important role of academic writings in judicial interpretation is originated from the ancient Roman 
law and is an important part of dynamic interpretation. In the years of the third century B. C., the ancient 
Roman law was not sufficient to regulate the prosperous contacts between Rome, Greece, Egypt etc., courts 
had to resort to academic writings to fill gaps of old laws. In the years of the first century A. D., academic 
writings became the first source and authority in the legal interpretation by courts: the agreed interpretation 
by jurists is binding to judges.32 The famous Law of Citations promulgated by the Roman Emperors required 
the courts of the Roman Empire to follow the opinions of five jurisconsults and determine which one of 
them was to be given priority in case they disagreed among themselves. It must be emphasized that the 
__________________ 
25  Many courts in their judicial practices have found out general principles from foreign case law to settle questions 
not explicitly settled in the CISG. (See Franco Ferrari, Gap-Filling and Interpretation of the CISG: Overview of 
International Case Law, 2003 Int’l. Bus. L. J. 228, (2003).) 
26  M. J. Bonell, Article 7, in Convezione di Vienna sui Contractti di Vendita Internationale di Beni Mobili 25 (Cesare 
Massimo Bianca ed., 1991); John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International 
Sale of Goods, Kluwer Law International, 163 (2000-2001). 
27  M. J. Bonell, Introduction to the Convention, in Commentary on the International Sales Law 79 (Cesare M. 
Bianca & Michael. J. Bonell, eds. 1987); See Koneru, supra 20, at 105. 
28  Larry A. DiMatteo, The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG 
Jurisprudence, 24 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business (Nw. J. Int ’l & Bus), 314 (2004). 
29  John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods, Kluwer Law 
International, 165 (2000-2001); See Koneru, supra 20, at 123. 
30  John O. Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales: the Studies, Deliberations, 
and Decisions that Led to the 1980 United Nations Convention with Introductions and Explanations, 198 Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers (1989), at 26. 
31  See Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend” Reconsidered, 68 Ohio St. 
L. J. 158 (2007). 
32  Chaobi Chen, Fundamentals of Roman Law, Law Press China, 2006, p. 19; Edgar Bodenheimer, Doctrine as a 
Source of the International Unification of Law, 34 American Journal of Comparative Law, 71, 72 (1986). 
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Roman glossators construed only the meaning of the legal texts in the early years, but later they began to 
make comments to adapt to the changed circumstances. The commentaries by jurists of the Justinian Code 
as the main body of the famous Digest is highly creative and binding, and also a good example of dynamic 
interpretation in Roman Law to adapt to new social changes.33 Obviously, dynamic interpretation developed 
in line with and acted as important impetus to the Roman Law  
 
 Generally, the Roman Law exerts an influence both on the civil law and common law, but more on 
civil law and less on common law. As a result, courts in both common law and civil law nations do give 
consideration to scholarly writings, albeit in different degrees. Specifically, differences exist between the 
national courts involving the issue of what constitutes primary and secondary sources of legal authority.34 
While a US judge would likely refer to prior CISG case law in his efforts to render a uniform interpretation 
of the CISG, a French judge would likely refer to scholarly commentary in place of the judicial decisions 
themselves.35  
 
 One scholar concludes that among civil law jurisdictions, reliance on scholarly articles has long been 
utilized in interpretation of the law. Although courts of common law jurisdictions, by contrast, have been 
reluctant to confer the same weight to academic opinion when resolving disputes, there is evidence that 
common law courts are beginning to shift their approach, especially when faced with legal complexities 
involving international disputes.36 
 
4. The justification of the dynamic interpretation in the CISG’s uniform interpretation 
 
 Conventional interpretation can be broadly classified into static interpretation and dynamic 
interpretation. The former is basically based on the original intent of the legislature and asks how the 
legislature originally intended the interpretive question to be answered, or would have intended the question 
to be answered had it thought about the issue when it passed the statute.37 Comparatively, dynamic 
interpretation pays more attention to the dynamic nature of statutes, stating that statutes have different 
meanings to different people, at different times, and in different legal and societal contexts and that courts 
should interpret statutes in light of their current as well as historical context. That is, this view rejects the 
notion that “the meaning of a statute is set in stone on the date of its enactment.” Rather, it is argued, in the 
event of an evolution in the relevant public values, federal courts have the authority to develop new legal 
standards and even to adapt otherwise clear statutory text to accommodate a changed societal and legal 
environment.38 Dynamic interpretation is most appropriate when the statute is old yet still the source of 
litigation, is generally phrased, and faces significantly changed societal problems or legal contexts.39 
 
 Dynamic interpretation as a new method of conventional interpretation is undoubtedly the product of 
exploration by scholars and judges to settle new problems, due to the fact the traditional methods of literary 
interpretation, purpose interpretation provided for by the Vienna Convention failed to meet the requirements 
of the current economic globalization. Although this new method of interpretation may still lead to criticism, 
relevant legal theories in favour of it are to mature and so many courts and tribunals have already resorted 
to it in their judicial interpretation. Therefore, it is now an independent method of conventional 
interpretation.40  
 
__________________ 
33  See Chen, supra note 32, at 20. 
34  See Honnold, supra note 3, at 47. 
35  See Quinn, supra note 7, at 15. 
36  See Sheaffer, supra note 8, at 493. 
37  Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 817-
22 (1983). 
38  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 
1483 (1990). 
39  Id at1555; Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 774 (1998). 
40  Shipo Jiang, the Dynamic Interpretation of International Conventions, 14 Legal Methodology, 314, (2013).  
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4.1. The economic globalization is the utmost impetus to the dynamic interpretation 
 
 Along with the end of the Cold War, more and more countries have started to get involved in economic 
development, resulting in the unprecedented economic globalization that has naturally hastened the legal 
globalization under which the different interests of different countries are allocated. Recent years have 
witnessed the emergence of a whole new generation of international conventions designed to unify the law 
governing international commercial transactions. As national economies continue toward global 
integration, so too is the law progressing toward unification on an international level. New and broader 
perspectives on interpretation are required to accommodate the dynamics of this process.41  
 
4.2. The dynamic nature of Article 7 of the CISG requires dynamic interpretation 
 
 In accordance with Article 7, international character is free from the influence of national legal 
concepts and terminology and even from the domestic interpretive techniques themselves, to promote 
uniform application requires cooperation among the formally independent national courts, questions left 
unresolved in a convention’s express provisions must be settled in conformity with the general principles 
on which it is based. Each of these three elements of Article 7 carries an animating spirit of the interpretative 
paradigm. These norms have operated to give the codes the flexibility necessary to adapt to circumstances 
unforeseen at the time of their adoption. Dynamic interpretation is also compelled by the needs of 
international uniformity. Without a means for adaptation, the inevitable social and technological changes in 
the relevant field of commerce will make any formal unification of legal standards fleeting.42 
 
4.3. Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention demonstrate obvious dynamism  
  
 As is mentioned above, the Vienna Convention can be utilized partly to interpret the CISG, and its 
Articles 31-33 have obvious dynamism. Firstly, the words’ ordinary meaning can change with time because 
the Vienna Convention fails to define the “ordinary meaning”. Secondly, the words such as “good faith”, 
“object and purpose” should be interpreted dynamically. Thirdly, all the phrases of “subsequent 
agreements”, “subsequent practice” and “relevant rules of international law” permit to be interpreted in 
accordance with changed circumstances. Finally, the phrases of “preparatory works” and “circumstances of 
a treaty’s conclusion” manifest dynamism.43 Haopei Li concluded that general international convention 
should be interpreted according to their social purposes and developments and the relevant interpretation 
can exceed the original intents of drafters.44  
 
4.4. So many legal theories are in support of dynamic interpretation  
 
 In ancient times, the Roman glossators began to observe the relationship between literary interpretation 
and the changed circumstances and resort to dynamic interpretation to fill legal gaps. Grothius argued that 
due attention has to be paid to the true meaning of the drafters in conventional interpretation, however, if 
such interpretation leads to absurd or illegal outcome, true meaning can be speculated.45 The mechanical 
jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century posits that law consists of rules promulgated by the sovereign 
legislature and mechanically applied by judges. In 1908, Pound questioned the mechanical jurisprudence 
and argued that judges should not only resort to precedents, rather should concern the social development 
so as to promote rather than impede the social development.46 Another advocates that interpretation is not 
static, but dynamic. Interpretation is not an archaeological discovery, but a dialectical creation. 
Interpretation is not mere exegesis to pinpoint historical meaning, but hermeneutics to apply that meaning 
__________________ 
41  See Alstine, supra note 39, at 694. 
42  Id at 733. 
43  Sondre Torp Helmersen, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions, 6 EJLS, 131 
(2013). 
44  Haopei Li, Introduction to Law of Conventions, Law Press China, 2003, p. 361.  
45  Dongli Huang, Interpretation of international Convention needs certain flexibility, 3 International Trade, 34, 
(2005). 
46  Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Columbia Law Review 605, (1908).  
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to current problems and circumstances.47 In 1920, Judge Cardozo confessed that the nature of the judicial 
process is “uncertainty”, rather than objective answers, and that “the process in its highest reaches is not 
discovery, but creation.”48 Dworkin’s theory of statutory interpretation is part of his general theory of “law 
as integrity”, in which he argues that all law, including common law, statutes, and the Constitution, is a 
continuous process of interpretation. Dworkin has in an important way challenged scholars and judges to 
think about statutory interpretation as an ongoing process focusing on the present, and has linked his theory 
of statutory interpretation with a comprehensive theory of law.49 Judge Posner also as a leading scholar of 
economics of law has suggested reasons for reading generally worded statutes dynamically, stating that 
when Congress has basically dropped a problem into the collective judicial lap, with imprecise and only 
general directions, then it makes sense for courts to develop that statute in accordance with contemporary, 
rather than purely historical policy.50 
 
 Clearly, dynamic interpretation is justified by current jurisprudence though may still lead to criticism. 
 
5. Some suggestions to UNCITRAL’s practical work to encourage the reasonable dynamic interpretation  
 
 There are at least three main reasons for the divergent interpretations by different national courts of 
the CISG. First, the CISG is too old to settle the questions arising from the unprecedented unification of 
international trade law pushed forward by the economic globalization. Second, the CISG is filled with 
numerous vagueness, ambiguities, and gaps from which national judges cannot find relevant rules to settle 
problems and have to resort to their own national laws and interpretative techniques. Third, historically and 
jurisprudentially, dynamic interpretation is the most usual and effective method of interpretation to fill gaps 
in old laws to settle new questions in changed environment. Accordingly, there are at least three approaches 
for UNCITRAL to encourage dynamic interpretation by national courts. First, substantive revision should 
be made to the CISG to improve its rules and fill gaps. Second, a guide to or a standard for the CISG must 
be enacted to make detailed rules of dynamic interpretation. Third, recommendations should be made to 
dynamic interpretation to national legislatures, courts and law practitioners.  
 
 Comparatively, the first approach can solve the problem more thoroughly but difficult to put into 
practice currently because the revision of international convention is a lot difficult than national laws. The 
third approach sounds reasonable but it may not be persuasive enough to settle substantive questions. The 
second approach is, by contrast, the most effective and practical way to improve substantively the CISG as 
an old law to settle new problems of the economic globalization.  
 
 It is true that UNCITRAL has established both the CLOUT system and the Digest as important 
strategic tools to assist in uniform interpretation, however, the lack of substantive progress can only be an 
indication that additional efforts are required.51 Accordingly, I suggest that UNCITRAL enact the guide to 
the CISG that should contain the following points: 
 
5.1. The guide should have an emphasis of the standards for the dynamic interpretation of the CISG 
 
 It must be kept in mind that the dynamic interpretation concerns the misuse of judges’ judicial initiative 
if it is resorted to without any reasonable limitations. As a result, the guide should lay emphasis on the three 
interpretative standards provided for in Article 7: international character, uniform application and good 
faith. In other words, the dynamic interpretation of the CISG must be done under the guidelines of the three 
standards. Also the guide should provide for specific interpretative methods to refrain from unreasonable 
divergent interpretations. 
 
__________________ 
47  William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1482 (1987).  
48  Id 1507. 
49  Id 1550. 
50  Id 1517. 
51  Renaud Sorieul, Emma Hatcher, & Cyril Emery, Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Field of Contract 
Law: Preliminary Thoughts from the Secretariat, 58 Vill. L. Rev. 503 (2013).  
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5.2. The guide should specify relevant rules and fill the gaps of Article 7 
 
 As is mentioned above, the numerous vagueness, ambiguities and gaps of Article 7 are the chief hidden 
danger of divergent interpretations and the guide should define specifically the words such as “regard”, “the 
need”, “good faith”, “general principles” and “by virtue of”, and add up to new rules such as the specific 
sources of law that judges must resort to, and the way to find out general principles.  
 
5.3. Due attention should be paid to academic writings and the CISG cases by different courts and tribunals 
 
 In order to provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of the texts and identify and fill any gaps 
to contribute more to the uniform interpretation of the CISG, UNCITRAL should examine and analyse 
carefully the academic writings and the CISG cases of different courts and tribunals. In this way, the guide 
can achieve bigger powers of persuasion and application.  
 
5.4. The guide has to be more persuasive but not be necessarily binding 
 
 In order to lead to less criticism arising from sovereignty and other possible issues, the guide should 
at best be persuasive, but not binding, on courts.52 
 
 This approach could inadvertently bring about criticism of scholars and judges, however, as the 
economic globalization is developing more and more rapidly, the CISG has been accepted by more and 
more states and parties who recognize the importance of uniform application of the CISG and the significant 
achievements of UNCITRAL. What is more, UNCITRAL has gathered so much experience by having 
enacted so many model laws, guides and established the Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) and the 
UNCITRAL Digest of case law as great contribution to the unification of international trade law.53 In this 
connection, this approach is of bright future and worth trying.  
 
 
  
__________________ 
52  UNCITRAL has considered several proposals such as establishing a permanent editorial board and the Digest 
that should provide more detailed guidance as to the interpretation of the CISG. Neither of these proposals was 
adopted. (See Sorieul, supra note 51, at 504. 
53  Spiros V. Bazinas, Uniformity in the Interpretation and the Application of the CISG: The Role of CLOUT and 
the Digest, presented in “Celebrating Success: 25 Years United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods” (Collation of Papers at UNCITRAL-SIAC Conference 22-23 September 2005, 
Singapore)(available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bazinas.html).  
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  لأممانحو إعمال قواعد القانون المدني والتجاري الدولي: دعوة لانضمام دولة قطر الى اتفاقية 
  ( اتفاقية فيينا) 0891المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع 
 
 rataQ ,waL fo egelloC ytisrevinU rataQ ,halludbA halludbA
 د.عبدالله عبدالكريم عبدالله
  جامعة قطر -المشارك بكلية القانوناستاذ القانون 
 
 الدراسة مقدمة 
لطالما كانت عقود التجارة الدولية ترتكز أساسا ً على الأموال المادية، ولكن مع نمو التجارة الدولية  .1
 1وتطورها بدأت المفاهيم تتغير، و الحياة تتبدل، والتجارة تتطور، والعولمة تلقي بظلالها على معاملاتنا.
وفي هذا الخضم الهائل من تعقد المعاملات التجارية برزت الى السطح علاقات تعاقدية جديدة تتلاءم مع 
، واصبحت تجارة السلع والبضائع في تزايد مضطر، مع ترابط هذه البضائع 2النمو الإقتصادي والتقني
والخصائص المميزة،  وارتباطها بقيم معنوية مستمدة من تميز هذه البضائع عن غيرها من حيث الجودة
ضحت تجارة البضائع مرتبطة بحقوق الملكية الفكرية خاصة التجارية والصناعية منها كالعلامات أف
 التجارية لتلك البضائع وغيرها.
المتبادلة بين  ولا شك أن البيع الدولي للبضائع كأحد أبرز اوجه التجارة الحديثة، يقوم على أساس الحاجة  .2
لإشباع  الدولي لتصريف بضائعه وتحقيق الأرباح، تقابلها حاجة المشتري الدوليطرفيها، حاجة البائع 
 حاجات مستهلكي البضائع وطالبيها.
ية، التي تتصف بصفة الدول وقد وضع المشرع الدولي اطار شاملا ومتكاملا يرعى عقود بيع البضائع .3
لمنضمة او تطبيقه بين كافة الدول ارؤية منه انه هذه العقود بحاجة الى وضع اطار قانوني موحد يراعى 
ا الاطار عند اختيار الأطراف له كنظام قانوني حاكم حتى لو انتمى اطرافه الى دول غير منضمة الى هذ
تها الأمم المتحدة القانوني. وقد تمثل هذا الاطار القانوني المدني الدولي باتفاقية البيع الدولي التي أصدر
المدنية  محور دراستنا في هذا البحث ، محاولين مواءمة احد القوانين بشان بيع البضائع والتي ستكون
تائج من نالعربية مع هذه الاتفاقية فيما تضمنته من قواعد مخصصة لعقد البيع، ومتلمسين الوصول الى 
لاستثمار اشانها الحث على تبني هذه الاتفاقية نظرا لما تحققه من نتائج إيجابية من شانها حفز وجذب 
البيع الدولي  نبي علاوة على توفير ضمانة لهذا الاستثمار مرتبطة بثبات تشريعي مؤداه تطبيق اتفاقيةالأج
 صفة الدولية.بعلى العلاقة التعاقدية التي يبرمها المستثمر الأجنبي ان تعلق استثماره ببيع بضائع اتصف 
واءمة قواعد البيع في القانون من هنا فإن الدراسة سوف تنصب على التعريف باتفاقية البيع الدولي وم .4
المدني القطري لها مع شرح ومناقشة نطاق إعمال هذه الاتفاقية بشأن البيع الدولي للبضائع واثر ذلك على 
التزامات وحقوق طرفي عقد البيع الدولي سواء البائع او المشتري، وكذلك على مسؤوليتهما في حال 
 __________________
1
   انظر مؤلفنا: ضمانات الاستثمار في الدول العربية، الطبعة الثانية، دار الثقافة للنشر، عمان- الاردن، 0102، ص2. 
2
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وذلك على لقطري ومدى تطلب انضمام قطر الى هذه الاتفاقية، انعقادها، وانعكاس ذلك في القانون المدني ا
 النحو التالي:
 المطلب الأول: مدخل الى القانون المدني الدولي والتعريف باتفاقية البيع الدولي كجزء منه
  ني القطريالمطلب الثاني: آثار تطبيق الاتفاقية ومقارنتها مع بعض قواعد عقد البيع في القانون المد
 
 
  الأول المطلب
 مدخل الى القانون المدني الدولي والتعريف باتفاقية البيع الدولي كجزء منه
دولي ، والتعريف نعرض في هذا الاطار للتعريف بالقانون المدني الدولي وذاتيته وتكامله مع القانون التجاري ال
 باتفاقية فيينا للبيع الدولي باعتبارها جزءا مهما من القانون المدني الدولي.
 أولا: القانون المدني الدولي : متميز بذاتيته متمايز بدوليته متكامل مع القانون التجاري الدولي
يوصف القانون المدني عموما بأنه "دعامة" القانون الخاص ، .5
3
ويعرف بأنه القانون  والفرع الرئيسي فيه، 
م ينظمه أي قانون اخر من الذي ينظم علاقات التعامل بين الافراد سواء كانت شخصية او مالية، فيما ل
فروع القانون الخاص كالتجاري او العمل.. الخ.
4
 
 نوعين من القواعد: -كما هو معروف  –ويضم القانون المدني  .6
القواعد المنظمة للعلاقات الشخصية بين الافراد: وهي المنظمة للأحوال الشخصية التي تشمل  )أ(
لاهلية والنسب والزواج والطلاق والميراث والوصية المسائل المتعلقة بالفرد وعلاقته بأفراد عائلته كا
والوقف والهبة والنفقة وغيرها من المسائل ذات الصلة.
5
  
القواعد المنظمة للعلاقات المالية بين الافراد: وهي التي تنصرف الى الحقوق المالية ، سواء  )ب(
تبر العقد من ابرز كانت هذه الحقوق من قبيل الحقوق الشخصية فتسمى حينها الالتزامات التي يع
مصادرها، او كانت من قبيل الحقوق العينية اصلية كحق الملكية او تبعية كحق الرهن.
6
 
ولعل جل القوانين المدنية العربية تعرف هذه التقسيمات لقواعد القانون المدني وما تتضمنه من موضوعات  .7
اته او ضمن قوانين متصلة. سواء كانت هذه الموضوعات مدنية الطابع ضمن قواعد القانون المدني ذ
7
 
 __________________
  .27،ص9691د.حسن كيرة، المدخل الى القانون ، منشأة المعارف للنشر، الإسكندرية، ،    3
  .17، ص 3002د.محمد منصور، المدخل الى القانون، منشورات الحلبي الحقوقية، بيروت،  –د.رمضان أبو السعود    4
، دون ناشر، القاهرة، 5نظرية القانون، ط –د.محمد حسام لطفي، المدخل لدراسة القانون في ضوء اراء الفقه وأحكام القضاء   5
  .56، ص 3002
  .875،ص5891د.سمير تناغو، النظرية العامة للقانون، منشأة المعارف للنشر، الاسكندرية،   6
  صدرت اغلبية القوانين المدنية العربية كالتالي:  7
 ) وتعديلاته6791) لسنة ( 34قانون رقم (  -: القانون المدني  الأردن  
 7891المعدل  5891لسنة   5القانون الاتحادي رقم  –: قانون المعاملات المدنية  الإمارات  
 1002) لسنة 91: القانون المدني الصادر بالمرسوم بقانون رقم ( البحرين  
 وتعديلاتها 6091: مجلة الالتزامات والعقود لسنة  تونس  
 متضمن القانون المدني المعدل والمتممال 5791سبتمبر  62المؤرخ  57-85: الامر رقم  الجزائر  
 4891: قانون المعاملات المدنية لسنة  السودان 
 القانون المدني –وتعديلاته  9491للعام  /48: مرسوم تشريعي رقم / سوريا  
  
 453
لتجارية او واذا ما اتصفت القواعد المنظمة للعلاقات الشخصية او المالية للافراد بصفة الدولية دون ا .8
واعد تسمية غيرها من الصفات التي ترتبط بطبيعة المعاملة، فإنه يحق لنا ولا ريب ان نطلق على هذه الق
د القانون المدني المدني الذي سقناه خير دليل وهو الذي يقسم قواع"، ولنا في الفقه "القانون المدني الدولي
 الى قواعد منظمة للأحوال العينية وقواعد أخرى مخصصة للأحوال الشخصية.
املة تجارية ولعل ما يعزز توجهنا في إطلاق تسمية القانون المدني الدولي ان صفة الدولية ان اتصلت بمع .9
جرائية بصفة لة هو القانون التجاري الدولي ، واذا ما اتصلت معاملة إاصبح القانون المنظم لتلك المعام
للتحكيم كوسيلة  دولية اصبح القانون المنظم لها هو قانون الإجراءات المدنية الدولية، وكذا الحال بالنسبة
حكيما اصبح ت لتسوية المنازعات فإذا تعلق بنزاع تجاري اصبح تحكيما تجاريا، واذا ما اتسم بصفة الدولية
بة للجرائم تجاريا دوليا، اما ان اتقصر على صفة المحلية فإنه يكون تحكيما محليا، وكذلك الحال بالنس
ها "القانون الدولية التي يطبق عليها ما يعرف بالقانون الجنائي الدولي، افلا يحق لأبي القوانين واصل
، كي نطلق  ان ارتبطت بإحدى معاملاته المدني" ان يحتفظ بذاتيته مع الاخذ بعين الاعتبار صفة الدولية
 على ما ينظمها تسمية القانون المدني الدولي؟!
 ؛اولنا في تسميتنا هذه "القانون المدني الدولي " دليل آخر مستقى من المعايير الدولية ذاته .01
 LARTICNUفالمعايير الدولية التي تضعها لجنة الأمم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي الاونسترال  
تعالج العديد من الموضوعات والمبادئ القانونية التي تعد من صلب القانون المدني وان اضفيت عليها 
عقد البيع، والاعسار، والقواعد التي ترعى مسألة التقادم في عقد صفة الدولية، ومنها القواعد الحاكمة ل
ن نية، وفكرة التعويض عند الاخلال البيع، ، وكذلك المبادئ التي ترعى التفاوض وتنفيذ العقود بحس
بالعقود، إضافة الى مستجدات موضوع التأمينات او منح الائتمان واعتبار حقوق الملكية الفكرية ومنها 
حقوق المؤلف محلا لاحد اهم التامينات وهو الرهن وهو ما اصطلح على تسميته دوليا "المعاملات 
المضمونة".
8
 
ضعها مؤتمر لاهاي للقانون الدولي الخاص والذي يسعى لتوحيد الحلول كما ان المعايير الدولية التي و 
القانونية ركز على كثير من الموضوعات والمبادئ القانونية التي تعد من صميم القانون المدني خاصة 
فيما يتعلق بالقواعد الحاكمة للعلاقات الشخصية كالنفقة وحقوق الاسرة، وكذا القواعد الحاكمة للعلاقات 
لية كعقد البيع والوكالة والاثبات في المواد المدنية والتجارية وغيرها من المسائل.الما
9
 
 __________________
 وتعديلاته   1591) لسنة 04: القانون المدني العراقي رقم ( العراق 
 نون المعاملات المدنيةبإصدار قا 3102/  92: مرسوم سلطاني رقم  عُمان 
 4002/  22بإصدار القانون المدني  4002) لسنة 22: قانون رقم ( قطر  
 بإصدار القانون المدني ، وتعديلاته  0891لسنة  76: مرسوم بالقانون رقم  الكويت  
 2391: قانون الموجبات والعقود  لبنان  
 م 6102) لسنة 6معدل بقانون رقم ( م. ال3591من نوفمبر  82: القانون المدني الصادر في  ليبيا  
 بإصدار القانون المدني وتعديلاته 8491لسنة  131: القانون رقم  مصر  
 5102وتعديلاته  3191: قانون الالتزامات والعقود لسنة  المغرب 
  9891لسنة  621: قانون الإلتزامات و العقود رقم  موريتانيا  
 بشأن القانون المدني 2002لسنة  41: قرار جمهوري بالقانون رقم  اليمن 
8
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9
 وضع مؤتمر لاهاي للقانون الدولي الخاص 04  اتفاقية انضم الى بعضها بعض الدول العربية وادمجتها في نظامها القانوني، 
 وهذه الاتفاقيات هي:
 1691-4-42( والدول العربية المنضمة هي مصر 5591-7- 51  . النظام الأساسي لمؤتمر لاهاي للقانون الدولي الخاص.1
  )6102 -01-91السعودية 4102 -11-4تونس  1002-6-31دن الار 3991-9-6المغرب 
  
 553
 __________________
-9-41( والدول العربية المنضمة  هي: المغرب   7591-4-21الخاصة بالإجراءات المدنية. 4591مارس  1. اتفاقية 2
  )1891-11-61(ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي) مصر  5791-1-7لبنان  2791
  ا أي دولة عربيةولم تنضم اليه4691-9-1لواجب تطبيقه على البيع الدولي للبضائع. الخاصة بالقانون ا 5591يونيو  51. اتفاقية 3
  ل حيز النفاذالخاصة بالقانون الُمنظم لنقل الحقوق القانونية في البيع الدولي للبضائع. لم تدخ 8591أبريل  51. اتفاقية 4
   نفاذالبيع الدولي للبضائع. لم تدخل حيز ال الخاصة باختصاص المحكمة الُمختارة في حالة 8591أبريل  51. اتفاقية 5
  المتعلقة بحل التنازع بين قانون الجنسية وقانون مكان الموطن. لم تدخل حيز النفاذ 5591يونيو  51. اتفاقية 6
  النفاذل حيز بخصوص الاعتراف بالشخصية القانونية للشركات والجمعيات والمؤسسات الأجنبية. لم تدخ 6591يونيو  1. اتفاقية 7
لم تنضم اليها أي  2691-1-1الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على الالتزامات المتعلقة بنفقة الأطفال.  6591أكتوبر  42. اتفاقية 8
 دولة عربية.
 2691-1-1  ا.بخصوص الاعتراف بالقرارات ذات الصلة بالالتزامات المتعلقة بنفقة الأطفال وإنفاذه 8591أبريل  51. اتفاقية 9
  تنضم اليها أي دولة عربية لم
لم تنضم  9691-2-4  بخصوص الاختصاص والقانون الواجب تطبيقه فيما يتعلق بحماية القُصَّ ر. 1691أكتوبر  5. اتفاقية 01
 اليها أي دولة عربية
ضم اليها أي تنلم  4691-1-5الخاصة بتنازع القوانين بخصوص شكل الترتيبات المتعلقة بالَوصايا.  1691أكتوبر  5. اتفاقية 11
 دولة عربية
وقد انضمت اليها  5691-1-42  القاضية بإلغاء شرط التصديق بالنسبة للوثائق العامة الأجنبية. 1691أكتوبر  5.  اتفاقية 21
  6102-8-13(انضمت على الرغم من انها ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي) وكذلك المغرب  2102-1-03سلطنة عمان 
لم   ي.الخاصة بالاختصاص والقانون الواجب تطبيقه والاعتراف بالقرارات المتعلقة بالتبن 1569نوفمبر  51. اتفاقية 31
 تدخل حيز النفاذ
ة بالمسائل المدنية الخاصة بالخدمات في الخارج المتعلقة بالوثائق القضائية وغير القضائية ذات الصل 5691نوفمبر  51. اتفاقية 41
) (ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي 2002-21-1وكذلك الكويت  9691-2-01يها مصر وقد انضمت ال9691 -2-01أو التجارية.
  1102-11-1و المغرب 
 لم تدخل حيز النفاذ.  الخاصة باختيار المحكمة. 5691نوفمبر  52.  اتفاقية 51
 9791-8-02  ا.الخاصة بالاعتراف بالأحكام الأجنبية في المسائل المدنية والتجارية وإنفاذه 1791فبراير  1. اتفاقية 61
  (ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي). 2002-21-1وانضمت اليها الكويت 
لتجارية وإنفاذها.التكميلي للاتفاقية الخاصة بالاعتراف بالأحكام الأجنبية في المسائل المدنية وا 1791فبراير  1. بروتوكول 71
  )(ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي 2002-21-1وانضمت اليها الكويت  9791-8-02 
-6-02وقد انضمت اليها مصر   5791-8-42الخاصة بالاعتراف بالطلاق والانفصال القانوني.  0791يونيو  1. اتفاقية 81
 0891
-52لمغرب وقد انضمت اليها ا 5791-6-3الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على الحوادث المرورية.  1791مايو  4. اتفاقية 91
  0102-6
وقد  2791-10-7لخاصة بالحصول في الخارج على الأدلة المتعلقة بالمسائل المدنية أو التجارية. ا 0791مارس  81. اتفاقية 02
  (ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي).  2002-7-7و الكويت  1102-5-32انضمت اليها المغرب 
  أي دولة عربية. تنضم اليها ولم 3991-7-1المتعلقة بالإدارة الدولية لممتلكات الأشخاص المتوفيين.  3791أكتوبر  2. اتفاقية 12
لم تنضم اليها و 7791-01-1الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على المسئولية القانونية عن المنتجات.  3791أكتوبر  2. اتفاقية 22
 أي دولة عربية.
تنضم اليها أي  ولم 1679-8-1الخاصة بالاعتراف بالقرارات المتعلقة بالاتزامات بالنفقة وإنفاذها.  3791أكتوبر  2. اتفاقية 32
 دولة عربية
  ها أي دولة عربية.ولم تنضم الي 7791-01-1الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على الالتزامات بالنفقة.  3791أكتوبر  2. اتفاقية 42
ها أي ولم تنضم الي 2991-9-1  الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على النظام المالي للزوجين. 8791مارس  41. اتفاقية 52
 دولة عربية.
-41اريخوقامت مصر بالتوقيع عليها بت 1991-5-1الخاصة بالإشهار والاعتراف بشرعية الزواج.  8791مارس  41. اتفاقية 62
  8791-3
  بية.ولم تنضم اليها أي دولة عر 2991-5-1الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على الوكالة.  8791مارس  41. اتفاقية 72
-1وانضمت اليها المغرب   3891-21-1  الخاصة بالجوانب المدنية للاختطاف الدولي للطفل. 0891أكتوبر  52. اتفاقية 82
  (ليست عضوا في مؤتمر لاهاي) 4102 -6-1و العراق  0102-6
  1891-9-61وقامت المغرب بالتوقيع  فقط في   8891-5-1الخاصة بالوصول الدولي للعدالة.  0891أكتوبر  52. اتفاقية 92
م اليها أي ولم تنض 2991-1-1الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على "الترست" وعلى الاعتراف بها.  5891يوليو  1اتفاقية  .03
 دولة عربية.
  نفاذ.الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع. لم تدخل حيز ال 6891ديسمبر  22. اتفاقية 13
 لم تدخل حيز النفاذ.  الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على إرث ممتلكات الأشخاص المتوفيين. 9891أغسطس  1. اتفاقية 23
ولم تنضم اليها أي  5991-5-1  الخاصة بحماية الأطفال والتعاون فيما يتعلق بالتبني عبر الدول. 3991مايو  92. اتفاقية 33
 دولة عربية.
والقانون الواجب تطبيقه، والاعتراف، والإنفاذ والتعاون فيما يتعلق بالمسئولية الخاصة بالاختصاص،  6991أكتوبر  91. اتفاقية 43
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 يضاف الى ذلك ان المعايير الدولية التي اتى بها المعهد الدولي لتوحيد القانون الخاص (اليونيدروا) 
دنية تركز على موضوعات مقواعد موحدة للقانون الخاص،  والتي تهدف الى توحيد القانون واعداد
الطابع أساسها القانون المدني، كحقوق الامتياز على الأموال المنقولة، والمصالح الضمانية، وعقود 
الليزينغ، وعقود الفاكتورنغ، وحقوق الدائنين، وغيرها من المسائل المدنية الخالصة المتصلة.
01
 
ى كالقانون اصة دولية أخركل ما سبق يؤكد ان هنالك قانونا مدنيا دوليا يقف جنبا الى جنب مع قوانين خ .11
مر الذي يعد التجاري الدولي بموضوعاته المتعلقة باعسار الشركات والتحكيم التجاري الدولي وخلافه، الا
ين بضمن اطار هذا التكامل ، وتكاملا بين هذه القوانين ، مع مراعاة خصوصية موضوعاتها الفرعية
لنظام عالمي  تشكلاً  يفقد شهد العالم فى القرن الماضالقانون المدني الدولي والقانون التجاري الدولي ، 
صاد يلعب دورا جديد يقوم على اساس أن من يمتلك مفاتيح الإقتصاد، فانه يمتلك أسباب القوة، ذلك أن الإقت
أعمال التجارة  أساسيا ًفي حّل أو خلق المشكلات التي تعاني منها الدول نامية كانت أو متقدمة. ومع تزايد
نونية تحكم برزت حاجة ملحة إلى أن تكون هنالك ثمة نظم قا دورها في تعزيز اقتصاديات الدول،الدولية و
من اطار ضتكّون العلاقات التجارية، وتفض النزاعات الناشئة عنها فيما لو تعثرت مثل هذه العلاقات، 
 حلول القانونية. توحيد القانوني محكم حاولت المنظمات الدولية المعنية كاليونسترال ان تجعله نظاما موحدا ل
 ثانيا: اتفاقية البيع الدولي كجزء من القانون المدني الدولي 
في  تأتي اتفاقية فيينا للبيع الدولي وهي اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع التي اعتمدت .21
بهدف توفير نظام موّحد بشأن إبرام عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع، باعتبار عقد  11،0891نيسان/أبريل  11
البيع من اهم ركائز التجارة الدولية في جميع الدول. كما تحاول هذه الاتفاقية تحقيق التوازن بين مصالح 
 المشتري والبائع. 
 __________________
  2002-21-1وانضمت المغرب  2002-1- 1الأبوية وإجراءات حماية الأطفال. 
  ولم تنضم اليها أي دولة عربية. 9002-1-1الخاصة بالحماية الدولية للبالغين.  0002يناير  31. اتفاقية 53
فظ بها لدى وسيط.الخاصة بالقانون الواجب تطبيقه على بعض الحقوق المتعلقة بالأوراق المالية الُمحت 6002ليو يو 5. اتفاقية 63
 لم تدخل حيز النفاذ 
ولم  5102-01-1  )5691نوفمبر  52الخاصة باتفاقات اختيار المحكمة.  ( حلت محل اتفاقية  5002يونيو  03. اتفاقية 73
 تنضم اليها أي دولة عربية.
ولم  3102-01-1  بشأن الوفاء الدولي بالنفقة الخاصة بالأطفال وأعضاء اخرين في الاسرة. 7002نوفمبر  32. اتفاقية 38
 تنضم اليها أي دولة عربية.
  ي دولة عربية.ولم تنضم اليها أ 3102-8-1بشأن القانون الواجب التطبيق على الالتزام بالنفقة.  7002نوفمبر 32. بروتوكول 93
  .5102-3-91دئ اختيار القانون المنطبق على العقود التجارية الدولية . مبا04
انظر في ذلك أ.د.حفيظة الحداد، د.عبدالله عبدالكريم عبدالله، د.فاتن حوى، بيان بموقف الدول العربية والاسلامية من مؤتمر لاهاي، 
اليونسترال"والذي نظمته كلية الحقوق  –ليونيدروا ا –وثيقة مقدمة الى المؤتمر الاقليمي حول "توحيد القانون: مؤتمر لاهاي 
والعلوم السياسية بجامعة بيروت العربية بالتعاون مع جامعة جونز هوبكنز بالولايات المتحدة الامريكية و مؤتمر لاهاي، معهد 
أيلول/سبتمبر  11-01اريخ توحيد القانون الخاص، ولجنة الأمم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي في مقر جامعة بيروت العربية بت
. كما يراجع بشأن هذه الاتفاقيات والدول المنضمة اليها المعلومات محدثة على الموقع الالكتروني لمؤتمر لاهاي  2102
  . 7102يناير  8يارة تاريخ اخر ز  snoitnevnoc/stnemurtsni/ne/ten.hcch.www//:sptth
01
-241/gro.tiordinu.www//:ptth  انظر لائحة بالاتفاقيات التي أصدرتها اليونيدروا ونصوصها على الموقع الالكتروني 
-tnempiuqe-elibom-noitnevnoc-nwot-epac/stseretni-ytiruces/stnemurtsni
-fo-modgnik-eht-yb-degdol-noitaralced-784/etats-gnitcartnoc-yb-snoitaralced/yratisoped/1002
-fo-tnemurtsni-sti-fo-tisoped-eht-fo-emit-eht-ta-noitnevnoc-nwot-epac-eht-rednu-aibara-iduas
  .7102يناير  8تاريخ اخر زيارة     noitacifitar
11
  انظر نص الاتفاقية على الموقع الالكتروني  الخاص بلجنة الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي (اليونسترال) 
   fdp.a-GSIC-9996501V/gsic/selas/stxet/cibara/fdp/gro.larticnu.www//:ptth   
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ويبلغ عدد الدول الاطراف في هذه الاتفاقية 58 دولة،21 من بينها (6 ) دول عربية هي البحرين والتي بدء 
، و 8891 1-1، سوريا والتي بدء نفاذ الاتفاقية بشأنها بتاريخ  4102 -01-1نفاذ الاتفاقية بشأنها بتاريخ 
، وموريتانيا بتاريخ 8891-1-1، ومصر بتاريخ  9002 21-1، ولبنان بتاريخ  1991-4-1بتاريخ العراق
  .0002-9-1
بعيدا ًعن  31هو توفير حلول موحدة بشأن النزاعات المرتبطة بهذه العقود، ولعل الابرز في هذه الاتفاقية .31
اللجوء إلى قواعد القانون الدولي الخاص لتحديد القانون الواجب التطبيق على العقد، فهي تأخذ بالاعتبار 
عليه  تنمية وتطوير حركة التجارة الدولية على أساس من المساواة والمنفعة المتبادلة علاوة على ما تنص
 41مختلف النظم القانونية.
بيد ان نطاق إعمال هذه الاتفاقية على عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع يثير جملة من المسائل المرتبطة بحالات  .41
من الاتفاقية والتي تنص على  6تطبيق او عدم تطبيق هذه الاتفاقية، خاصة في ظل ما اشارت اليه المادة 
 في المنصوص عليها الأحكام عدا فيما لهما، يجوز الاتفاقية، كما ذهه تطبيق استبعادُ  ان "يجوز للطرفين
 آثاره".  تعديل أو نّصٍّ من نصوصها مخالفةُ  ،5121المادة 
ما ركزنا دائرة الضوء على القانون المدني القطري،  من جهة أخرى ، اذا .51
61
نجد ان قواعده تنظم فقط  
الخاصة  –دون الشخصية  –التي تعبر عن الأحوال العينية  العلاقات المالية او بتعبير ادق الحقوق المالية
بالعلاقات التي تنشأ بين الأشخاص ذات الطابع المالي ، وترتب اثارا في الذمة المالية تتمثل اما في ترتيب 
الالتزامات على الأشخاص او ترتيب حقوق لهم.
71
بينما اوكل القانون المدني القطري مهمة تنظيم  
لقانون الاسرة القطري المستمد من أحكام الشريعة  –او تنظيم الأحوال الشخصية  –العلاقات الشخصية 
الإسلامية.
81
  
مادة ، وقد اتى ضمن  8811ويتألف من  4002وقد صدر القانون المدني القطري المعمول به حاليا في  .61
ه من حيث عرض فيه في الفصل الأول لتطبيق القانون وسريان باب تمهيدي وقسمين، فالباب التمهيدي
، 55الى  في المواد من ، والفصل الثاني تناول فيه المشرع الأشخاص83الى 1الزمان والمكان من المواد 
، بينما خصص الفصل 16الى 65اما الفصل الثالث فخصصه المشرع للأشياء والأموال في المواد من 
ول من القانون المدني . وخصص المشرع القطري القسم الأ36و 26ضمن المواد  الرابع لاستعمال الحق
، حيث عرض في الكتاب الأول منه 638-الى  46في المواد من  أو الالتزامات -الحقوق الشخصية لتناول
لموضوع الالتزامات بوجه عام ، وخصص الكتاب الثاني للعقـود المسماة . اما القسم الثاني فقد تناول فيه 
 __________________
21
  عدد الدول الاطراف لغاية تاريخ 7 يناير 7102  
   lmth.sutats_GSIC0891/sdoog_elas/stxet_larticnu/ra/larticnu/gro.larticnu.www//:ptth
31
 انظر في فكرة التوحيد فى ت طبيق الاتفاقية: د. حسام الدين عبد الغنى الصغير، تفسير اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع 
  ، الكتاب متاح الكترونيا على الرابط الالكتروني18، البند 1002الدولى للبضائع، دار النهضة العربية، القاهرة، 
   mth.noitaterpretni/tsaelddim/cibaragsic/ude.ecap.wal.3wgsic//:ptth    
41
   انظر ديباجة اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع 0891 ( اتفاقية فيينا).
51
 شكل باتخاذ أّي   تَسَمح التي الاتفاقية هذه من الثاني الجزء أو 92 والمادة 11 المادة أَحكام  تنص المادة 21 من الاتفاقية على ما يلي" جميع ُ
 تُطبَّق لا الطرفين أحد قصد عن الإعلان أو أو القبول الإيجاب لوقوع أو رضائيا فسخه أو تعديله أو البيع عقد انعقاد لأجل الكتابة غير
هذه  من 69 المادة بموجب تحفّظها أعلنت التي الاتفاقية هذه إلى المنضمَّ ة المتعاقدة الدول في إحدى الطرفين أحد عمل مكان ُ يكون عندما
 .آثارها" تعديل ُ أو المادة هذه مخالفةُ  للطرفين يجوز ولا .الاتفاقية
  . 4002) لسنة 22القانون المدني القطري رقم (   61
مصادر الالتزام في القانون القطري، منشورات كلية القانون بجامعة  1ج –د. جابر محجوب علي، النظرية العامة للالتزام    71
  .3، ص6102قطر، الدوحة، 
  .6002لسنة  22قانون الاسرة القطري رقم   81
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، حيث خصص الكتاب الأول 6811الى  738ن في المواد م المشرع القطري موضوع الحقوق العينية
للحقوق العينية الأصلية والكتاب الثاني للحقوق العينية التبعية "التأمينات العينية". علاوة على موضوعات 
ذات صبغة مدنية تناولتها قوانين خاصة بها كقانون الاسرة وقانون حق المؤلف والحقوق المجاورة 
 وغيرها.
ي، من القانون المدني القطر 784الى  914عقد البيع بالمواد من  وقد خص المشرع القطري .71
اليها باعتبارها  وهو العقد الذي نحاول اجراء مواءمة الاحكام المنظمة له مع ما جاء في الاتفاقية المشار
 جزءا من القانون المدني الدولي حسب ما اوردناه.
  ثالثا:ً البيوع الخاضعة لنطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية
والتي تتعلق بالبضائع وهي اتت كاطار قانوني  91لاتفاقية بشكل اساس على البيوع دولية الطابع،تطبق ا .81
دولي موحد للحلول التشريعية الخاصة بعقود البيع الدولي للبضائع التي تنطبق عليها، في محاولة للتفلت 
 02من اللجوء إلى قواعد القانون الدولي الخاص بشأن هذه العقود.
ية من اربعة اجزاء خصص الاول لنطاق تطبيقها وبعض الاحكام العامة، حيث تشير الاتفاقية وتتكون الاتفاق .91
ضمنا ًالى عقود بيع البضائع الخاضعة لنطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية، وتلك التي تستثنى  6لغاية  1في المواد من 
لى تكوين العقد من تطبيق الاتفاقية عليها، علاوة على ما تتعرض له الاتفاقية من موضوعات تقتصر ع
وسنعرض في هذا الاطار للبيوع الخاضعة لنطاق  12واثاره الخاصة بحقوق وواجبات طرفي هذا العقد.
 تطبيق الاتفاقية، ثم نخصص حيزا للمسائل الموضوعية الخاضعة لنطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية.
ان يتم بين طرفين يوجد اي  ،تشترط الاتفاقية لتطبيق احكامها ان يكون هنالك ثمة بيع يتصف بصفة الدولية .02
أو عندما تقضي قواعد القانون  32اي الاتفاقية نافذة بحقهما، 22مقر عملهما في دولتين متعاقدتين مختلفتين،
 __________________
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02
  انظر معلومات تفصيلية حول الاتفاقية على الموقع الالكتروني للجنة الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي "اليونسترال"  
  . lmth.GSIC0891/sdoog_elas/stxet_larticnu/ra/larticnu/gro.larticnu.www//:ptth
12
  الامم المتحدة، لجنة الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي "اليونسترال"، مذكرة تفسيرية ملحقة بنصوص الاتفاقية، معدة من  
، 1102الدولي للبضائع، منشورات الامم المتحدة، نيويورك، امانة اليونسترال حول اتفاقية الامم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع 
  .53ص
22
  هيئة التحكيم التجاري الدولي التابعة لغرفة التجارة الأوكرانية ، قرار صادربتاريخ  12 حزيران/يونيه 2002 ، منشور في  
الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري مجموعة السوابق القضائية المستندة إلى نصوص الأونسيترال (كلاوت) ، التي تصدر عن لجنة 
  ude.ecap.wal.3wgsic//:ptth . نُشر النص على الموقع الالكتروني  11، ص 1102الدولي، منشورات الامم المتحدة، فيينا، 
روبل روسي.  2 005 000المشتري معدّات ثمنها  والخلاصة من إعداد أربان كومار غوبتا حيث ورد فيها " وافق البائع على تسليم
خلال خمسة  في المائة 52في المائة مقدّما في غضون شهرين من تاريخ توقيع العقد؛ و 05وكان مطلوبا من المشتري أن يدفع 
روبل  1 000 000في المائة في غضون خمسة أيام من توقيع شهادة القبول. وَسدّد المشتري  52أيام من تاريخ صنع المعدّات؛ و
يبة وأُبلغ البائع روبل روسي. وتبيّن أنَّ البضاعة مع 1 053 000روسي ُمقدّما وشحن البائع إلى المشتري معدّات تساوي قيمتها 
تأّخره في الدفع.  وطالب البائع بتغريم المشتري على  .بذلك. وأُصلحت البضاعة جزئيا لاحقا. ولم يدفع المشتري أيَّ مبالغ أخرى
دين قد صدّق عليها. من اتفاقية البيع وطبقت الهيئة هذه الاتفاقية لأن كلا البل 08ة التحكيم المطالبة بموجب المادة ورفضت هيئ
ي ُحدود ما يكوُن عدُم فمن الاتفاقية "لا يجوُز لأَحد الطرفين أن يتمسَّك بعدم تنفيذ الطرف الآخر لالتزاماته  08وبمقتضى المادة 
نة دليل على مال من جانب الطرف الأول". واعتبرت الهيئة أنَّ النقص والقصور في البضاعة المشحوالتنفيذ بسبب ف عل أو إه
 مثل هذا الإهمال من جانب البائع ولذا لم يغّرم المشتري على التأخر في السداد".
32
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عند  وذلك 42،الدولي الخاص إلى تطبيق قانون دولة متعاقدة. وقد تنطبق الاتفاقية أيضا باختيار الطرفين
ما على ان القانون واجب التطبيق هو قواعد اتفاقية فيينا بحيث ينصان في عقده 52ابرام عقد بيع بينهما،
وهذا يعني ان البائع في هذا العقد قد يكون شركة تابعة للقطاع الخاص وكذلك  62للبيع الدولي للبضائع.
 72المشتري او ان يكون احدهما او كليهما شخصا ًطبيعيا.ً
البائع او المشتري من جنسية تختلف عن الاخر، ولاتشترط الاتفاقية ان يكون احد اطراف عقد البيع سواء  .12
او ان يكون تاجرا، فالاتفاقية لاتأخذ بعين الاعتبار في هذا الشأن جنسية الأطراف علاوة على عدم ايلاء 
الاعتبار لمدى تمتع احد اطراف عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع بالصفة التجارية للأطراف او حتى العقد من 
 82فاقية.عدمه كشرط لانطباق الات
 يلي للشروط الواجب توفرها في عقود البيوع كي تخضع لنطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية. فيماوسنعرض  .22
البيع في هذا المجال ذلك العقد الذي يلتزم فيه البائع يعني و الشرط الأول ان يكون العقد عقد بيع لبضاعة:
بان ينقل للمشتري ملكية شيء او حق مالي اخر في مقابل ثمن نقدي.92 بيد ان ما يعنينا هو فقط نقل ملكية 
الشئ دون ملكية الحق الذي يخرج عن نطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية. ونقل ملكية شيء معين يقصد فيه بمفهوم 
الاتفاقية البضاعة محل التعاقد، وهي قد تتمثل في منقول معين بالذات او منقول معين بالنوع، فإذا ما كانت 
الذات فإن التزام البائع ينشأ وينفذ فورا ًبمجرد ابرام العقد، بينما اذا البضاعة منما يعتبر منقولات معينة ب
كانت البضاعة من نوع المنقولات المعينة بالنوع فلا تنتقل الملكية الا من وقت افراز هذا الشيء المبيع،03 
فعقد البيع ناقل للملكية حيث انه يرتب التزاما ًفي ذمة البائع بنقل ملكيىة المبيع الى المشتري،13 كما يجب 
ان يتم هذا العقد مقابل ثمن نقدي، لأن انعدام المقابل يجعل من العقد هبة لابيعا، علاوة على كون العقد 
 ملزما للجانبين مولدا لالتزامات بحق كل من طرفيه البائع والمشتري.23
 __________________
42
  انظر: محكمة تحكيم غرفة التجارة الدولية، حكم تحكيم نهائي صادر في القضية رقم 33131، منشور في مجلة التحكيم العالمية  
يتعلق هذا الحكم .  حيث 996، ص2102، بيروت، 2102سنة  51، التي يشرف على نشرها المحامي عبدالحميد الاحدب، العدد
التحكيمي بمنازعة حول عقد توريد منتج، وقد نص في هذا العقد على تطبيق اتفاقية الامم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي 
من العقد "ان العقد خاضع للقانون الموضوعي النافذ في فرنسا  42للبضائع "اتفاقية فيينا" حيث ورد في الفقرة الاولى من المادة 
فإن المقصود  0891جبه "، وبما ان فرنسا دولة عضو في اتفاقية الامم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع لسنة ويفسر بمو
بالقانون الموضوعي النافذ في فرنسا هو احكام الاتفاقية باعتبار ذلك تطبيقا ً لاختيار الطرفين للقانون الواجب التطبيق. (انظر 
  .من المرجع السابق 107ص 
52
 انظر في تكريس اتفاقية الامم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع لسنة 0891 كقانون للارادة وتطبيقها كجزء من القانون  
الوطني الذي وقع اختيار الاطراف عليه: د.لطفي الشاذلي، تعليق على الحكم التحكيمي النهائي الصادر عن محكمة تحكيم غرفة 
، منشور في مجلة التحكيم العالمية ، التي يشرف على نشرها المحامي عبدالحميد 33131قم التجارة الدولية، في القضية ر
  .037، ص2102، بيروت، 2102سنة  51الاحدب، العدد
62
  انظر في خضوع عقود التجارة الدولية لقانون الارادة: د.هشام صادق، القانون الواجب التطبيق على عقود التجارة الدولية،  
  وما بعدها والمراجع المشار اليها لديه. 61، ص5991لمعارف، الاسكندرية، منشورات منشأة ا
72
  د.أحمد صالح مخلوف، انتقال المخاطر في عقود البيع الدولية، دراسة منشورة في مجلة الحقوق الكويتية الصادرة عن مجلس  
  .573ص2102يت، ، منشورات جامعة الكويت، الكو2102مارس   – 1النشر العلمي بجامعة الكويت، العدد
82
  هنالك عقود تبرم بين الدولة من جهة والاشخاص الاجنبية التابعة لدولة اخرى، قد تدخل في ضمن موضوعاتها البيوع الدولية  
للبضائع. انظر في عقود الدولة د. حفيظة الحداد، العقود المبرمة بين الدول والاشخاص الاجنبية، دار النهضة العربية، القاهرة، 
  .11، ص 6991
92
  انظ رالمادة 814 من القانون المدني المصري، والمادة 273 من قانون الموجبات والعقود اللبناني 
03
 د.محمد حسن قاسم، القانون المدني "العقود المسماة:البيع – التأمين-الايجار"، دراسة مقارنة، منشورات الحلبي الحقوقية،  
  .52، ص8002بيروت،
13
 د.عبدالرزاق السنهوري، الوسيط في شرح القانون المدني الجديد، المجلد 4، العقود التي تقع على الملكية " البيع والمقايضة"،  
  .12، ص9002، منشورات الحلبي الحقوقية، بيروت، 3ط
23
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 والمقصود بدولية هذا العقد بحسب مفهوم الاتفاقية 
33
اما الشرط الثاني فمؤداه ان يكون عقد البيع دوليا:
ان يتم عقد البيع للبضائع بين طرفين يوجد مقر عملهما في دولتين متعاقدتين مختلفتين اي الاتفاقية نافذة 
بحقهما،43 أو عندما تقضي قواعد القانون الدولي الخاص إلى تطبيق قانون دولة متعاقدة،53 دون اشتراط 
تري من جنسية تختلف عن الاخر، اي ان ضابط ان يكون احد اطراف عقد البيع سواء البائع او المش
اختلاف الجنسية بالنسبة للمتعاقدين لايعد صالحا ًكمعيار لتحديد دولية العقد،63 والعقد بهذا المفهوم ينصرف 
 الى المفهوم الدولي لاتصال عناصره بأكثر من نظام قانوني واحد.73
نت الاتفاقية استثويتمثل الشرط الثالث في الا يكون البيع من البيوع المستثناة من تطبيق احكام الاتفاقية:    
  عقود وهي:بعضا من انواع البيوع وذلك كونها محكومة بقواعد وطنية خاصة نظرا للطبيعة الخاصة لهذه ال
التي يكون شراؤها بغرض  وهي عقود بيع البضائعمنها:  الغرضعقود البيع المستبعدة بسبب  -أ
الاستعمال الشخصي او العائلي او المنزلي،83 وتعتبر عقود البيع الاستهلاكية مثالا على هذه العقود 
المستبعدة من نطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية، وذلك لان غرضها تلبية احتياجات استهلاكية ولأغراض شخصية 
وعائلية او منزلية، ولا يُقصد من اجرائها تحقيق الربح او تنمية حركة التجارة الدولية بشكل مباشر.93 
مبررات حماية المستهلك ولو كان العقد دوليا تجعل من العقد محكوما بقواعد حمائية وطنية لان ف
المستهلك يُعتبر الطرف الاضعف في علاقته بالمهني (المحترف) وهو هنا البائع الذي يقدم له السلعة 
ب ضعفه الى كونه يجهل المعلومات الكافية والضرورية حول هذه التي يريد التعاقد عليها، ويرجع سب
السلعة والتي تجعله يستخدمها افضل استخدام بما يحقق له الغرض الذي من اجله قام بإبرام العقد.04 
الاستعمال ولايُفترض في هذا الاطار علم البائع بالغرض الذي يهدف المشتري الى تحقيقه والمتمثل ب
، وانما يقع على المشتري عبء هذا اثبات علم البائع بذلك قبل انعقاد  او المنزلي الشخصي او العائلي
 العقد او وقته.14
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33
  اعتبرت الاتفاقية من قبيل البيوع الداخلة ضمن نطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية عقود التوريد التي يكون موضوعها الاساس صنع بضائع او انتاجها 
  شرط الا  يكون مشتري هذه البضائع هو من قام بتوريد العناصر المادية الداخلة في عملية الانتاج
43
 وفي هذا الاطار تنص المادة 01 على انه (في ُحكم هذه الاتفاقية: أ- إذا كان لأحد الطرفين أكثُر من مكان عمل واحد، فيُقَصد  
بمكان العمل المكاُن الذي له صلةٌ وثيقة بالعقد وبتنفيذه، مع مراعاة الظروف التي يعلُمها الطرفان أو التي كانا يتوقَّعانها قبل 
  ن مكاُن عمل، َوَجَب الأخذُ بمكان إقامته المعتاد.إذا لم يكن لأحد الطرفي -انعقاد العقد أو وقت انعقاده؛ ب
 53
 انظر في ضابط الدولية بالنسبة للعقد فى اتفاقية فيينا:د. خالد عبد الحميد، فسخ عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع وفقـــا ًلاتفاقيـــة فيينا 
. 01مود سمير الشرقاوي، البند ، اشراف د.مح0002/21/02، اطروحة دكتوراه نوقشت بجامعة القاهرة بتاريخ 0891لعام 
متاحة الكترونيا على الرابط الالكتروني  
    mth.dimaH_lE_dba/tsaelddim/cibaragsic/ude.ecap.wal.3wgsic//:ptth
 63
 د. محمود سمير الشرقاوى، العقود التجارية الدولية: دراسة خاصة لعقد البيع الدولى للبضائع، دار النهضة العربية، القاهرة، 
  .16،  ص2991
 73
   د.هشام صادق، القانون الواجب التطبيق على عقود التجارة الدولية، منشأة المعارف، الاسكندرية، 5991، ص95.
83
  الامم المتحدة، لجنة الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي "ا ليونسترال"، مذكرة تفسيرية ، المرجع السابق، ص73. 
  .انظر ديباجة الاتفاقية  93
04
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يادية للبيع، وهي عقود بيع البضائع التي لاتتم بالطرق الاعت: طبيعتهاعقود البيع المستبعدة بسبب  -ب
  .بل تتم بالمزاد او عبر تنفيذ الحجز او البيوع التي تتم بأمر قضائي
كبيع الاوراق المالية والاسهم وسندات الاستثمار  :طبيعة محلهاالبيع المستبعدة بسبب عقود  -ج
علاوة على  24والصكوك القابلة للتداول والنقود، والسفن والمراكب والحوامات والطائرات، والكهرباء.
مواد  اذا تعهد الطرف طالب البضاعة بتوريد جزء كبير من عقود توريد البضائع التي ستصنع او تنتج
التصنيع او الانتاج، كما تستبعد عقود توريد البضائع والتي يكون الالتزام الاكبر فيها والواقع على 
 34مورد البضائع يتمثل في تقديم الايدي العاملة او غير ذلك من الخدمات.
 رابعا:ً المسائل الموضوعية الخاضعة لنطاق الاتفاقية
ضمن مسائل لخاضع لنطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية، فإن هذا العقد يتبالاشارة الى عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع ا .32
مفاعيله القانونية، بتكوين العقد ومنها ما يتعلق باثاره و موضوعية عديدة تتعلق بهذا العقد منها ما له علاقة
 ومنها ما يستبعد اساسا من نطاق تطبيق احكام الاتفاقية.
 من لكّلٍّ  لعقداهذا  يُنشئها التي والالتزامات والحقوق يعالب عقد تكوين على الاتفاقية هذه تطبيق ُ ويقتصر .42
ية الأمم وهو الامر الذي سيكون محل عرضنا لاحقا عند الحديث عن آثار تطبيق اتفاق .البائع والمشتري
 ( اتفاقية فيينا) 0891المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع 
 __________________
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24
  انظر: محكمة النقض  الفرنسية: الدائرة المدنية الاولى ، قرار صادر بتاريخ1 ديسمبر 0102 في دعوى الاستئناف رقم  
. ، منشور في مجموعة A.S tojaP eniatnuoF ، قضية السيد بيتر س  والسيدة جولي زوجته ضد شركة  90-303331
ندة إلى نصوص الأونسيترال (كلاوت) ، التي تصدر عن لجنة الامم المتحدة للقانون التجاري الدولي، السوابق القضائية المست
 cod.3344811V 011/STCARTSBA/C.RES/9.NC/A  . متاح على7، ص 1102منشورات الامم المتحدة، فيينا، 
(خلاصة الحكم اعدها كلود ويتس و كورين شاتلان)، الأصل بالفرنسية، وقد نُشر النص    gro.vonu.smc و  )cibarA(
اعدة بيانات اتفاقية البيع ؛ وفي ق rf.vuog.ecnarfigel.wwwبالفرنسية على الموقع التشريعي الحكومي الفرنسي الشبكي: 
حيث ورد في   rf.noitassacedruoc.www//:ptth؛ وقاعدة بيانات محكمة النقض gro.ecnarf-gsic.wwwبفرنسا: 
، من الشركة 9991يوليه /الخلاصة " طلب الزوجان، السيد "سين" والسيدة "ياء"، وهما يحملان الجنسية الأمريكية، في تموز
الفرنسية "فونتين باجو" صنع طَ ْوفٍّ لاستعمالهما الخاص. غير أنَّ هذا المركب، المشيّد في لاروشيل، أتلفته عاصفة قبل تسليمه 
بعدّة شهور. وأجرت الشركة "فونتين باجو" تصليحات عليه كاتمةً تلك الواقعة على المشتريين. وإذ تبيّن للزوجين المذكورين 
وطلب السيد "سين" والسيدة "ياء"   . جود عيوب فيه بُعيد التسليم، رفعا دعوى ضد الشركة البائعة أمام محكمة كاليفورنيا العلياو
والذي يحكم على الشركة  "فونتين باجو"    3002شباط / فبراير  62أن ينفَّذ في فرنسا قرار المحكمة الكاليفورنية الصادر يوم   
  دولارا كتعويضات عن عدم التنفيذ   1 193 056بدفع مبلغ 
ييه، في قرارها وأكّدت محكمة استئناف بوات  . دولارا لسداد التكاليف القانونية 204 480دولار كتعويضات تأديبية و 1 064 000و 
رني. كاليفو، حكم محكمة روشفور العليا التي رفضت طلب الأمر بإنفاذ قرار القضاء ال9002شباط/فبراير  62الصادر بتاريخ 
بلغ التعويضات موحسب محكمة استئناف بواتييه، فإنَّ الحكم الكاليفورني مخالٌف للسياسة العامة الدولية لأنَّ من الجلي أن 
رت محكمة التأديبية غير متناسب مع سعر البيع وكذا مقدار التعويضات عن الأضرار المخّولة لجبر الضرر الملحق. واستظه
كبّدة وللكسب الضائع، من اتفاقية البيع، التي تقضي بأن تكون التعويضات مساوية للخسارة المت 47ادة الاستئناف، في آنٍّ معا، بالم
كان إحداث التوازن وبالقانون الفرنسي الداخلي الذي ينص على أنَّ المسؤولية المدنية الهدف منها هو أن يعاد بالتمام قدر الإم
المبدأ العام بلذي كانت ستكون عليه لولا وقوع الفعل الضاّر، وكذا الوفاء الذي أخّل به الضرر وإعادة الضحية إلى الوضع ا
اقية البيع، ذلك أنَّ هذه ووّجه مقدّم الطعن الانتباه، في طلبه، إلى كون محكمة بواتييه قد خرقت اتف  .القائل بمنع الإثراء بلا سبب
م تستجب محكمة ول  . المشتراة للاستعمال الشخصي أو العائليالاتفاقية لا تنطبق على مبيعات المراكب ولا على مبيعات البضائع 
قية البيع. كما أنَّ النقض لهذا الجزء من البرهان، ممتنعةً بذلك عن تدارك الخطأ الذي ارتكبته محكمة بواتييه بشأن انطباق اتفا
ع تعويضات نبية التي تحكم بدفالمحكمة أصدرت حكما عاما بشأن المدى الذي تتطابق فيه مع السياسة العامة القرارات الأج
اسة العامة، فإنه تأديبية. هكذا وحسب محكمة النقض، "إذا كان مبدأ الإدانة بتعويضات تأديبية ليس منافيا، في حدّ ذاته، للسي
ضت اقدية". ورفيكون كذلك متى كان المبلغ المخّول غير متناسب من حيث الضرر الملحق وعدم وفاء الُمتعّه  د بالتزاماته التع
ير متناسبة غمحكمة النقض الطلب على أساس أنَّ محكمة بواتييه محقّة في "الاستنتاج بأنَّ التعويضات كان من الجلي أنها 
لا يمكن    جنبيةبالقياس إلى الضرر الملحق وإلى عدم الوفاء بالالتزامات التعاقدية، بحيث أنَّ الحكم الصادر عن المحكمة الأ
 الاعتراف به في فرنسا". 
34
   انظر المذكرة التفسيرية الخاصة باتفاقية فيينا للبيع الدولي للبضائع. 
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يع الدولي للبضائع بعض المسائل المتعلقة بهذا البيع، بينما استبعدت الاتفاقية من نطاق تطبيقها على الب .52
 أو شروطه أو العقد بصحَّ ةوتتمثل حالات الاستبعاد هذه في عدم انطباق الاتفاقية على المسائل المتعلقة 
المبيعة  البضائع ملكية شأن في العقد يحدثها قد التي شأنه؛ اضافة الى استبعاد الآثار في المّتبعة الأعراف
 أو الوفاة عن الناتجة البائع مسؤولية على الاتفاقية هذه أحكامُ  تسري تطبيق الاتفاقية، كما لا من نطاق
البضائع بسبب شخص لأّي   تحدث التي الإصابات الجسمية
 .44
بيد ان هذه المسائل المستبعدة يشوب النص عليها الكثير من الغموض وعدم الوضوح والتناقض، فالنص  .62
العقد التي تُستبعد من نطاق تطبيق الاتفاقية، وكذلك الاعراف المتبعة بشان هذا لايحدد المقصود بشروط 
العقد، هل هي الاعراف التجارية ام المدنية، كما ان الغموض يشوب ما قصده المشرع الدولي بعدم انطباق 
حة والتكوين الاتفاقية على صحة العقد، وانطباق الاتفاقية على تكوين العقد مع ما يمثله الترابط بين الص
 54.من اهمية في ابرام عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع
 المطلب الثاني
 آثار تطبيق الاتفاقية ومقارنتها مع بعض قواعد عقد البيع في القانون المدني القطري
تعلق بعضها رتبت اتفاقية فيينا في حال انطباقها على عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع مجموعة من الاثار، ي .72
ور حديثنا العقد وبعضها الاخر بترتيب اثاره القانونية (مفاعيله)، وسيكون هذان الموضوعان محبتكوين 
 في الفرعين التاليين.
 أولا: الاثار المتعلقة بتكوين العقد
يجب توفر ثلاثة اركان فيها هي التراضي  -كأي عقد  –كي يتكون عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع وينعقد  .82
الصادرين عن  64،في هذا الاطار يعني التقاء الايجاب والقبول المتطابقين والمحل والسبب. والتراضي
شخص كامل الاهلية لم يشب ارادته اي عيب من عيوب الارادة كي يكون العقد صحيحا.ً اما المحل فيتمثل 
مبيع في الاداء الذي يجب على المدين القيام به لصالح دائنه وهنا في هذا العقد البائع مدين بنقل ملكية ال
اما السبب في العقد فيجب توفره بمفهوم الغرض المباشر الذي يسعى اليه  74والمشتري مدين بدفع الثمن.
الباعث الى التعاقد وضرورة عدم مخالفتهما للنظام العام مالاداب وهذا ما نحيل  المتعاقدان اضافة الى
 84بشانه الى القواعد العامة في القانون المدني.
تكون الاطار للتراضي والمحل في عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع والذي بدونهما لايوسوف نعرض في هذا  .92
 هذا العقد.
  التراضي : -1
يُعتبر عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع من العقود الرضائية التي تنعقد بمجرد تبادل البائع والمشتري التعبير عن  .03
كل خاص، ولعل ذلك الامر يعتبر من ارادتيهما بقصد انشائه دونما حاجة الى افراغ هذا التراضي في ش
 __________________
44
  انظر نص المادة 4 و 5 من الاتفاقية. 
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   د.محمد شكري سرور، موجز احكام عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع وفقا لاتفاقية فيينا 0891، المرجع السابق، ص221. 
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  د.محمد حسن قاسم، القانون المدني "العقود المسماة:البيع – التأمين-الايجار"،المرجع السابق، ص76.
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تمام  حيث تنص الاتفاقية على عدم اشتراط 94ادوات تحقيق التوازن العقدي بين طرفي عقد البيع الدولي،
 وسيلة بأّي   إثباته شكلية، علاوة على جواز شروط لأّي   وعدم خضوعه كتابة،ً إثباته أو البيع عقد انعقاد
بالبيّ نة الإثبات ذلك في بما
 وسوف نعرض فيما يلي لعنصري التراضي المتمثلين بالايجاب والقبول. .05
 أ- الايجاب:
افرها المقصود بالايجاب كعنصر من عناصر التراضي لتكوين العقد والشروط الواب تو 41حددت المادة  .13
ن ين، وكافيه، فاعتبرت الايجاب أّي عرض لإبرام عقد إذا كان موّجها ًإلى شخص أو عدّة أشخاص معيَّن
ن، وتَبيَّن منه اتجاه ُهذا الايجاب محدَّدا ًبشكل كاف اي متضمنا ًكافة البيانات المتعلقة بالكمية والنوع والثم
واجب توفره في كما حددت الاتفاقية معنى التحديد الكافي ال قصد الموجب إلى الالتزام به في حالة القبول.
ل مواصفاتها بما كاف إذا َعيََّن البضائَع ( بما يشم العرض المعتبر ايجابا واعتبرت العرُض محدَّدا ًبشكل
 ها تحديدهما. تميزها عن غيرها) وتضمَّ َن صراحة ًأو ضمنا ًتحديدا ًللكمية والثمن أو بيانات يمكن بموجب
لصين الدولية من اتفاقية البيع الدولي للبضائع فقد قضت لجنة ا 41وتطبيقا لمفهوم الايجاب بحسب المادة  .23
ين بائع بوبمناسبة نزاع حول عقد بيع مبرم  -قتصادي والتجاري في حكم تحكيمي صادر عنها للتحكيم الا
ساري في بوجود العقد وصحته وفقا للنظام القانوني ال -صيني ومشتر استرالي لبيع اقراص فيديو رقمية
 الصين بما يشمل قانون العقود الصيني وذلك اتفاقية البيع الدولي للبضائع.
تبدو وكأنها خرجت عن القواعد العامة في  41فاقية في الفقرة الثانية من المادة بيد ان الات .33
القانون المدني التي تعتبر العرض بالمواصفات السابقة ايجابا،ً واعتبرته اي الاتفاقية مجرد دعوة للتعاقد 
ابق لايعد ايجابا الا اذا تبين من الظروف انه يعد ايجابا، فالاصل حسب الاتفاقية ان العرض بالتحديد الس
الا اذا تبين من ظروف واقع الحال انه ايجاب بحيث ان صادفه قبول لايعد العقد منعقدا ما لم تشر الى 
ذلك الظروف المحيطة بالعقد، والعكس هو المعمول به في القواعد العامة للقانون المدني والتي تعتبر 
بمثابة الايجاب الذي ان صادفه قبول مطابق العرض المحدد المتضمن كافة عناصر العقد المراد ابرامه 
يعتبر من قبيل الايجاب حيث ولعل هذا المنحى العام نجده في القانون المدني القطري  15انعقد العقد.
"عرض البضائع مع بيان أثمانها، دون إخلال بما تقتضيه قواعد التجارة" اما بشأن "النشر والإعلان 
اري التعامل بها، وكل بيان آخر متعلق بعروض أو طلبات موجه وإرسال أو توزيع قوائم الأسعار الج
للجمهور أو لأفراد معينين" فلاتعتبره ذات المادة إيجابا بالمعنى القانوني المرتب لآثار قانونية، الا في 
حالة كان هنالك من الدلائل القوية المرتبطة بظروف الحال ما يؤكد على اعتبار هذه الأفعال من قبيل 
.الايجاب
25
وفي هذا الاطار فإن عقد البيع ينعقد كما في بقية العقود بمجرد التقاء الايجاب بالقبول  
من القانون المدني القطري حيث اشارت الى ان انعقاد العقد "بمجرد  46بحسب ما نصت عليه المادة 
ذي يصدر عن ، على اعتبار ان الايجاب هوالتعبير الأول والجازم والبات ال ارتباط الإيجاب بالقبول"
احد المتعاقدين متضمنا رغبة محددة في التعاقد متضمنة كافة عناصر هذا التعاقد( وليكن هنا الشخص 
الذي يود بيع بضاعة معينة)، بحيث ان صادف هذا الايجاب قبول مطابق ممن وجه اليه الايجاب 
عديل من قبل من وجهت ( الشخص الذي ربما سيشتري البضاعة) انعقد العقد ، اما ان كان هنالك ثمة ت
 __________________
94
 د. وفاء مصطفى عثمان، توازن المصالح فى عقد البيع الدولى للبضائع وفقا  ًلاتفاقية فينا 0891، اطروحة  دكتوراه، جامعة  
  .631، ص5002القاهرة، 
05
  المادة 11 من الاتفاقية. 
15
 نص المادة 41 فقرة 2 من اتفاقية فيينا (ولا يُعتبر العرُض الذي يُوجَّ ه إلى شخص أو أشخاص غير معيَّ نين إلا ّدعوة ًإلى الإيجاب 
 ما لم يكن الشخُص الذي َصدََر عنه العرُض قد أبان بوضوح عن اتجاه قصده إلى خلاف ذلك).
25
  المادة 96 من لاقانون المدني القطري
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الدعوة اليه بالتعاقد فلايكون التعبير الصادر عن الشخص الأول إيجابا وانما هذا التعديل الأخير هو 
الايجاب الجديد الذي ينتظر قبولا من الشخص الموجه اليه وهو الشخص الأول.
35
 
الموجودة في القواعد العامة ولمحاولة ايجاد مواءمة بين الحلول التي وضعتها اتفاقية فيينا وتلك الحلول  .43
للقانون المدني، ولاعتبارات التجارة الدولية المرتبطة بعقد البيع الدولي للبضائع فإننا نرى ان التباين 
الحاصل بين هذين المنحيين هو ظاهري، ويجب تفسيره على ان الاتفاقية تشترط في العرض المقدم من 
مثل في تحديد موضوع العرض بدقة وخلوه من الالتباس شروطا ًتت قبل الشخص العارض كي يكون ايجابا
حول الموضوع علاوة على ثبات معالم موضوع العرض وتحديد بياناته بدقة اضافة الى ان يكون العرض 
معبرا عن ارادة التعاقد الملزمة لمن صدرت عنه والتي عبرت عنها الاتفاقية بعبارة ان يكون الشخُص 
بان بوضوح عن اتجاه قصده ، فإن توفرت هذه الشروط اعتبر العرض ايجابا الذي َصدََر عنه العرُض قد أ
 45بمفهوم الاتفاقية وحتى بمفهوم القواعد العامة في القانون المدني.
وتبين الاتفاقية الاحكام الخاصة بالايجاب خاصة لجهة مفاعيله القانونية وتوقيت ترتيب هذه المفاعيل،  .53
المخاطب، اي ان الايجاب وقبل  إلى وصوله عند أثََرهُ  يحد  ث ُ الايجابالى ان 51 حيث اشارت المادة
وصوله الى من وجه اليه لا اثر له حيث يستطيع من اصدره سحبه، او الرجوع عنه او تغييره بايجاب 
بيد ان ُمصدر الايجاب او  55اخر طالما لم يصل الايجاب الى المخاطب به وحتى صدور القبول عنه.
الرجوع عن ايجابه في حال كان الايجاب ُملزما،ً وتتحقق حالة الايجاب الملزم اذا قيد  الموجب لايستطيع
الموجب نفسه بمدة لايحق له خلالها الرجوع عن ايجابه او اذا تبين من العقد ان الموجب قد انصرفت 
قبول العرض ارادته الى تقييد نفسه بعدم الرجوع عن ايجابه الا اذا اصدر من وجه اليه الايجاب جوابه ب
او رفض الايجاب وحينها ينقضي التزام الموجب بالابقاء على  65المقدم من الموجب وحينها ينعقد العقد،
 75ايجابه. 
 ب- القبول:
الدولي  من الاتفاقية لمفهوم القبول الذي بوصوله الى علم الموجب ينعقد عقد البيع 81المادة عرضت  .63
قة َعلى الإيجاب أّي تصّرف آخر صادر من المخاَطب يُفيد ُالمواف للبضائع، وفي هذا الاطار فإن أّي بيان أو
بة او الاشارة يعتبر بهذا التحديد قبولا، والمقصود بذلك ان القبول يمكن ان يصدر صراحة باللفظ او الكتا
صدر ياو اتخاذ موقف لاتدع ظروف الحال مجالا للشك في دلالته الصريحة على القبول، كما يمكن ان 
يث يعتبر منا ًكما لو بادر الطرف المخاطب بالايجاب بارسال البضاعة التي طلبها الموجب، بحالقبول ض
 تنفيذ العقد دلالة ضمنية على قبوله وبالتالي انعقاده.
بيد ان الاتفاقية تقرر أن السكوت لا يصلح بأن يكون قبولا للايجاب ي مجال عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع  .73
جردا من اي دلالة للتعبير عن ارادة من وجه اليه الايجاب بقبول هذا الايجاب، باعتباره موقفا ً سلبيا مت
اضافة الى ان عدم القيام بأّي  تصرُّ ف لايٌعتبر في ذاته قبولا ًيعتد به لانعقاد العقد. ولعل عبارة ( في ذاته) 
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65
 تنص المادة 561  من قانون الموجبات والعقود اللبناني على ان الاتفاق هو كل التئام بين مشيئة وأخرى لانتاج مفاعيل قانونية،  
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75
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سيرها الى ان هنالك الواردة في ختام الفقرة الاولى من المادة الثامنة عشرة من الاتفاقية تنصرف في تف
نوعا من انواع السكوت قد يعتبر قبولا للايجاب وهو السكوت الذي ترتبط به ظروف تجعل منه قبولا 
للايجاب، وهو ما يُعرف بالسكوت الُملابس، اي السكوت الذي يرتبط مثلا بطبيعة المعاملة او العرف 
يجاب وبين من يفترض فيه ان يقبل التجاري، او السكوت المرتبط بوجود تعامل سابق بين من وجه الا
 85بسكوته، علاوة على السكوت المرتبط بمنفعة الشخص الساكت الذي وجه اليه الايجاب.
ر القانوني المعني وكي يُحدث القبول اثره القانوني فلا بد من وصوله الى الموجب بما يُفيد الموافقة،َ والاث .83
إذا لم يصل إلى  هلائع، وتقرر الاتفاقية بأن القبول لا أثر في هذا السياق هو انعقاد عقد البيع الدولي للبض
ذا الشرط، الموجب خلال المدة التي اشترطها هذا الاخير، أو خلال مدة معقولة في حالة عدم وجود مثل ه
ل على أن يؤخذ في الاعتبار ظروف الصفقة وسرعة وسائل الاتصال التي استخدمها الموجب. وفي حا
م يَتَبيَّن من لول شفاهة فإن اثره يكون لازما ً في الحال بما يؤدي لانعقاد العقد ما كان التعبير عن القب
 .الظروف خلاف ذلك
اعطت للاعراف التجارية والتعاملات السابقة بين الطرفين  81ولعل الاتفاقية في الفقرة الثالثة من المادة  .93
الاحوال أن يُعلن المخاَطب الذي ُعرض عليه اهمية في مجال البيع الدولي للبضائع، فقد اجازت في هذه 
الإيجاُب عن قبوله بالقيام بأي تصرف كإرسال البضائع أو تسديد الثمن، دون إخطار الموجب، عندئذ يكون 
القبوُل نافذا ًفي اللحظة التي تم ّفيها التصّرف المذكور بشرط أن يجرى ذلك خلال المدة المحددة او المعقولة 
  95من صدر عنه الايجاب .لوصول القبول الى 
والمطابقة تكون في كل ما ورد به وبما لا يتضمن رفضا ً 06ويُشترط في القبول مطابقته التامة للايجاب، .04
 16للإيجاب ويُشّك  ل إيجابا ًمقابلا ًيحتاج بدوره لقبول مطابق كي ينعقد العقد.
لعقد أن امن القانون المدني القطري ضوابط القبول المشار اليها حيث يشترط لانعقاد  27وتضع المادة  .14
ادة عليه اونقصان يكون القبول مطابقا ًللإيجاب، بحيث انه لو أتى جاء الرد على الإيجاب بما يغير فيه من زي
رض ان يلاقيه قبول ها "إيجابا" جديداً يفتاو تعديل ، فإنه لايعد "قبولا" يعتد به لانعقاد العقد بل يعد حين
 كي ينعقد العقد . 
وقد اشارت الاتفاقية الى ما يمكن اعتباره تعديلا جوهريا في متضمنات الايجاب من قبل من وجه اليه هذا  .24
الايجاب، وبحيث لايعتبر ما يصدر عنه قبولا بل ايجابا جديدا بحاجة لقبول، ويتمثل ذلك في الشروطُ 
 26و المختلفة المتعلقة بالثمن أو التسديد أو النوعية أو الكمية أو مكان وموعد التسليم للبضائع،الإضافية أ
أو ما يتعلَّق بمدى مسؤولية أحد الطرفين تجاه الطرف الآخر أو تسوية المنازعات، بحيث اشارت الاتفاقية 
يجاب وبالتالي تنتفي عنها صفة الى اعتبار هذه الأمور تَُؤدّ  ي إلى تغيير أساسي بما جاءت به صيغةُ الإ
 القبول.
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على انه يحق للشخص ُمصدر القبول ان يقوم بسحب قبوله كالما لم يصل الى علم الموجب، اي طالما لم  .34
 36ينعقد العقد.
فاقية فيينا وفي هذا الاطار لانجد أي مانع من ان يشير القانون المدني القطري الى ما يتضمن الاخذ بات .44
لبيع، لا بل لي على اعتبار انه لاتتضمن أي تعارض مع فلسفة القواعد المنظمة لعقد االخاصة بالبيع الدو
من المعاملات،  ان من شان الانضمام الى اتفاقية البيع الدولي توحيد الحلول القانونية الخاصة بهذا النوع
جنبي الذي نون الأوبما يحقق حافزا للمستثمرين الأجانب بأن البيع الدولي ستطبق أحكامه كما لو ان القا
 يأخذ فيه عد منطبقا، ودون اللجوء الى منهج تنازع القوانين في العلاقات الخاصة الدولية.
  المحل: المبيع والثمن -2
يُعتبر المبيع محل التزام البائع ويجب ان يتوفر في هذا المحل الشروط المتطلبة في القواعد العامة لجهة  .54
كما لو كانت البضاعة محل عقد البيع لازالت في طور التصنيع ،  وجود هذا المبيع او قابليته للوجود
عبر تعيين هذا المحل تعيينا كافيا فغن كان من الاشياء القيمية يجب  وتعيين هذا المحل او قابليته للتعيين
نسها بيان صفاته بشكل ناف للجهالة اما اذ كان من الاشياء المثلية فإن التعيين الكافي بشانها يكون بتحديد ج
ونوعها ومقدارها، كما يشترط في محال العقد جواز التعامل فيه وملكية البائع للمبيع محل عقد البيع الدولي 
 46للبضائع.
ا في عقد البيع اما لجهة الثمن فهو محل التزام المشتري والذي يجب عليه تنفيذه وفقا للطريقة المتفق عليه .64
اودفعة واحدة  ا او بموجب شيك او قد يكون على دفعات متعددةالدولي للبضائع، فقد يكون الوفاء بالثمن نقد
 او مرتبا مدى الحياة.
لمبيع وكذا االى ضوابط تعيين  724الى  124وفي هذا الاطار فإن القانون المدني القطري أشار في المواد  .74
، كما وضع يعالثمن، حيث اشترط العلم الكافي للمشتري بالمبيع مع احتفاظه بالحق في طلب ابطال عقد الب
المبيع وهي المشرع القطري في هذا الاطار الضوابط التي من خلالها يمكن القول بتوافر "العلم الكافي ب
ية للجهالة ضوروة ان يتضمن العقد بيانا بالمبيع من شأنه ان يجعل المشتري يعرف هذا المبيع معرفة ناف
لقة بالبيع مشرع القطري احكاما تفصيلية متعوان يكون على علم بكافة الاوصاف الأساسية له. كما وضع ال
يع بشرط التجربة بالعينة التي اشترط وجوب مطابقة المبيع للعينة التي تم الاتفاق عليها، وكذلك احكاما للب
جربة المبيع تالذي يمنح فيه المشتري مكنة قبول المبيع او رفضه بعد ان يمكنه البائع من ممارسة حقه في 
ة للتجربة في ل المدة المتفق عليها في حال وجود اتفاق على المدة او خلال مدة معقولعلى ان يتم ذلك خلا
 حالة غياب الاتفاق على المدة.
تقدير ولجهة الاتفاق على الثمن فقد أجاز المشرع القطري اقتصار تحديده على وضع الأسس الصالحة ل
لبيع بطلان على عدم ذكر الثمن في عقد االثمن دون تطلب تحديده بشكل بات عند انعقاد العقد، ولم يرتب 
تضيه هذا العقد على اعتبار وجود أسس موضوعية لتقديره او ان تحديده خاضع لسعر السوق او لما يق
دل محاولة عرف التعامل في هذه الحالات . ولعل هذا التوجه مرده الحفاظ على البعد الاقتصادي للعقد ب
  د البيع.انهاء الروابط العقدية المتضمنة في عق
  . 
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 ثانيا: الاثار المتعلقة بترتيب مفاعيل العقد
يتناول الجزء الثالث من الاتفاقية ترتيب بعض مفاعيل عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع المتمثلة بالتزامات  .84
وتشمل التزامات البائع تسليم البضائع بالكمية والنوعية المنصوص عليهما في العقد، . الطرفين في العقد
أما التزامات المشتري فتشمل دفع ثمن . تصل بذلك من مستندات، ونقل الملكية في البضائعفضلا عّما ي
وإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن هذا الجزء من الاتفاقية يورد قواعد مشتركة بشأن سبل . البضائع واستلامها
نتيجة  القواعد المتعلقة بحل المنازعات في حال ثارت الانتصاف المتعلقة بالإخلال بالعقد ويعني ذلك
واجازت الاتفاقية للطرف المتضرر أن يشترط الوفاء بالعقد أو . الاخلال بتنفيذ العقد من قبل احد طرفيه
كما عرضت الاتفاقية . يطالب بتعويضات أو يفسخ العقد في حال الإخلال بالتزامات جوهرية او اساسية فيه
  56.بالعقد، والتعويضات، والإعفاء من تنفيذ العقدفي هذا الجزء منها لأحكام انتقال التبعة، والإخلال المتوقع 
ى لتناول الأثر المترتبة عل 564الى  234وفي القانون المدني القطري خصصت المواد من  .94
لتزامات يجب ان عقد البيع فيما يتعلق بالبائع محددة التزامات البائع، مع التركيز على ان تنفيذ هذه الا
 وبما يضمن تحقيق الغاية النهائية من عقد البيع. يكون كما هو متفق عليه وبحسن نية 
هذا وحسب  حيث يجب على البائع القيام بالإجراءات الضرورية اللازمة لنقل الملكية الى المشتري، وليس .05
ة هذه الامر . بل يجب عليه أيضا الامتناع عن أي اجراء او عمل من يؤدي الى استحالة نقل الملكية او عرقل
التي كان عليها  ام البائع تسليم المبيع للمشتري طبقا للمواصفات المتفق عليها وبالحالةيضاف الى ذلك التز
بيع الوثائق وقت ابرام عقد البيع، إضافة الى تسليمه ملحقات المبيع وما يعد من اجزائه، حيث يلحق بالم
 تزام من عدمه.هذا الالوالمستندات المتعلقة به، كما حدد المشتري ضوابط التسليم المعتد به للقول بتنفيذ 
يحقق قيام  كما اوجب المشرع على البائع تزويد المشتري بكافة البيانات الضرورية الخاصة بالمبيع وبما .15
الما بهذه البينات عالبائع بتنفيذ التزامه بالادلاء بالبيانات الضرورية الخاصة بالمبيع بما يجع من المشتري 
رتبط هو الالتزام ى ما تقتضيه بعض عقود البيع من تنفيذ التزام اخر م" تنفيذ الالتزام بالاعلام"، علاوة عل
لمشتري بالتبصير والتحذير لو تطلب المبيع عناية خاصة في استعماله تجنبا لحصول اضرار قد تلحق با
 جراء عدم إيلاء العناية المطلوبة الاهتمام الواجب عند استعمال بعض المنتجات.
لعقد أو مشرع المدة التي من خلالها يحق رفع الدعوى الخاصة بطلب فسخ اواستقرارا للتعاملات حدد ال .25
نقضت سنة اإنقاص الثمن أو تكملته أو رد الزيادة إ بحيث جعل الحق في رفع هذه الدعوى يتقادم في حال 
 من وقت تسليم المبيع تسليما ًفعليا،ً محددا تبعة الهلاك قبل التسليم وبعده. 
ضت لها اتفاقية المشار اليها سالفا كافة الالتزامات الملقاة على عاتق البائع والتي عركما تضمنت المواد  .35
 البيع الدولي كالالتزام بضمان الاستحقاق والتعرض والعيوب الخفية.
ضمنا حيث  374الى  664في المواد  وفي هذا الاطار فقد عرض المشرع القطري لالتزامات المشتري .45
 بدفع الثمن وضوابط تنفيذ هذا الالتزام لجهة توقيته وكيفيته ومكان الوفاء به.عرض أولا لالتزام المشتري 
فالثمن يكون مستحق الوفاء بمجرد تمام البيع فورا، غير ان هذه القاعدة لاتعد من قبيل القواعد الامرة، 
ر حيث أجاز المشرع الخروج عليها في حال وجود اتفاق مخالف ، او ان عرف التعامل كان يقضي بغي
هذا الحكم ، مع الاحتفاظ بحق المشتري بحبس الثمن في حالات تعرض احد للمشتري او في حالات وجود 
 __________________
56
  انظر المذكرة التفسيرية الملحقة بالاتفاقية. 
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أسباب جدية يخشى ان تؤدي لاستحقاق المبيع.، او في حالة ظهور عيب في المبيع، غير ان هذا الحق 
 مشروط بعدم وجود اتفاق في العقد مانع من هذه المكنة. 
والتسلم  –مبيع وهو التزام مقابل لاتلزم البائع بتسليم ال –لقيام بتسلم المبيع كما يتوجب على المشتري ا
ر هذا يكون في مكان وجود المبيع وقت البيع، الا في حال وجود اتفاق على غير ذلك او عرف قضى بغي
رسوم والامر حينها يقدم الاتفاق والعرف على الترتيب ، على ان يتحمل المشتري "نفقات عقد البيع 
رف يقضي التسجيل ونفقات الوفاء بالثمن وتسلم المبيع وغير ذلك من مصروفات، ما لم يوجد اتفاق أو ع
 بغير ذلك".
وهنالك ثمة اثار تتعلق بكل من البائع والمشتري معا ، فالاتفاقية تفرض بموجب عقد البيع الدولي للبضائع  .55
عهدته وللطرف الاخر حقوق متعلقة بها.  على اطراف هذا العقد الالتزام بحفظ البضائع طالما كانت في
لتجعل الهلاك أو التلف الذي يحدث للبضائع بعد انتقال التبعة إلى  66كما ان الاتفاقية تعرض لتبعة الهلاك،
المشتري على عاتق هذا المشتري ولا يعفيه ذلك من التزامه بدفع الثمن ما لم يكن الهلاك أو التلف ناتجا 
 76.عن فعل البائع أو تقصيره
من الاتفاقية اسس التعويض في حال الاخلال بالالتزامات العقدية الناشئة عن عقد البيع  47وتحدد المادة  .65
يَتألَّف التعويض من َمبلغ يُعاد  ل الخسارة َالتي لحقت بالطرف المتضرر، علاوة  ثحي 86الدولي للبضائع،
للتعويض بألا يتجاوَز  ضعت حدوداً بيد ان هذه المادة و 96على الكسب الذي فاته نتيجة لهذا الاخلال.
التعويض قيمةَ الخسارة والربح الضائع التي توقَّعها الطرُف المخالف أو التي كان ينبغي له أن يتوقَّعها 
وقَت انعقاد  العقد في ضوء الوقائع التي كان يَعلم بها أو التي كان من واجبه أن يعلَم بها كنتائج متوقَّعة 
 07بالاخلال بالتزامه العقدي. لمخالفة العقد المتمثلة
ية، حيث بالاعفاء من المسؤولية عن الاخلال بالالتزامات العقد ةوتضع الاتفاقية بعض الاحكام الخاص .75
بت أنَّ عدَم التنفيذ الى عدم مسؤولية اي من الطَّرفين عن عدم تنفيذ أّيٍّ من التزاماته إذا أث 97تشير المادة 
يَأُخذ  جة عن إرادته وأنه لم يكن من المتوقَّع بصورة معقولة أنكان بسبب عائق يعود إلى ظروف خار
لتغلُّب عليه أو على االعائَق في الاعتبار وقت انعقاد العقد أو أن يكون بإمكانه تجنُّبه أو تجنُّب عواقبه أو 
ببا اجنبيا يعد سعواقبه، وهذا يعني القوة القاهرة اوالحادث المفاجئ الذي لايمكن توقعه او توقيه، والذي لا
 لايد لاي من الاطراف المتعاقدة فيه.
 __________________
 taht sdooG fo elaS lanoitanretnI eht rof gnitcartnoC :reitnorF laniF eht dna GSIC ,orieniM .C leahciM .rD 66
 fo etu titsnI ,ssoL fo ksiR fo egassaP eht dna ecapS retuO hguorht tisnarT ro ,ni derevileD era ,morf etanigirO
 elbaliava ypoc cinortcelE .4.P ,8002 ,3 rebotcO ,adanaC ,laertnoM -ytisrevinU lliGcM ,waL ecapS dna riA
  .8065821=tcartsba/moc.nrss//:ptth:ta
76
  المادة 66 من الاتفاقية 
 eht rof stcartnoC no noitnevnoC NU eht rednu tcartnoC fo hcaerB rof elbaliavA seidemeR ,usH einkcoL 86
 no dehsilbuP ,eropagniS ,6991 ,511 .p ,8 .loV ,lanruoJ waL fo ymedacA eropagniS ,sdooG fo elaS lanoitanretnI
 .125696=di_tcartsba?mfc.srepap/3los/moc.nrss.srepap//:ptth
 loohcS ytisrevinU avonalliV ,tcartnoC fo hcaerB fo esuaceB ecnamrofreP fo ueiL ni segamaD ,adnatoG .Y nhoJ 96
 ,avonalliV ,waL fo loohcS ytisrevinU avonalliV ,seireS repaP gnikroW yroehT lageL dna waL cilbuP ,waL fo
 ecneicS laicoS eht morf dedaolnwod eb nac repap sihT .35P ,6002 yluJ ,8-6002 .oN repaP gnikroW ,setatS detinU
 ro 424719=tcartsba/moc.nrss//:ptth ta noitcelloC repaP cinortcelE krowteN hcraeseR
 .1=sop&1=gla&125696=sbacrs&1=cer&424719=di_tcartsba?mfc.srepap/3los/moc.nrss.srepap//:ptth   
 no noitnevnoC snoitaN detinU eht fo 47 elcitrA - GSIC eht rednU segamaD gnirusaeM ,redienhcS .C cirE 07
 remmuS ,722 .p ,1 .oN ,9 .loV ,weiveR waL lanoitanretnI ecaP ,sdooG fo elaS lanoitanretnI eht rof stcartnoC
 :ta elbaliavA ,7991 ,setatS detinU ,eromitlaB ,waL fo loohcS - eromitlaB fo ytisrevinU ,7991
 .7/1ssi/9lov/rlip/ude.ecap.snommoclatigid//:ptth
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على كل من طرفي عقد البيع الدولي عدم ارتكاب اي مخالفة  52كما تفرض الاتفاقية بموجب المادة  .85
ويُقصد بالمخالفة الجوهرية لمقتضيات العقد اي مخالفة يرتكبها اي طرف في العقد  17جوهرية للعقد،
ويكون من شأنها الحاق الضرر بالطرف الاخر شريطة ان يتمثل هذا الضرر في حرمان الطرف المضرور 
قد مما كان يحقُّ له أن يتوقََّع الحصوَل عليه بموجب العقد، بمعيار الرجل العادي في ذات الظروف . و
اعتبر القضاء الفرنسي عدم احترام احد اطراف العقد لمقاصد الطرف الاخر من وراء ابرام العقد بمثابة 
 27 من الاتفاقية اي من قبيل المخالفة الجوهرية. 52الخرق الاساسي للعقد طبقا للمادة 
لموجب أساس ملقى على  271وفي هذا الاطار فقد عرض القانون المدني القطري في المادة  .95
عاتق اطراف العقد سواء كان البائع او المشتري وهو التزام أساسي في كل العقود يبدأ من مرحلة 
التفاوض وحتى الانتهاء من تنفيذ العقد وهو " الالتزام بحسن النية" ان في التفاوض او في الابرام او 
في التنفيذ او حتى اثناء النزاع حول تنفيذ العقد.
37
  
  البحثلخاتمة: خلاصات ونتائج ا
كما  – 0891ي) لسنة تأتي اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة بشأن عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع (اتفاقية فيينا للبيع الدول .06
لمنشود الوضع اطار قانوني موحد بشأن إبرام عقود البيع الدولي للبضائع، ولتحقيق التوازن  -عرضنا 
ع اطار استنا هذه التعرف على اهمية وضوقد حاولنا من خلال در .بين مصالح اطرافه المشتري والبائع
نونية، واهمية قانوني محكم الامم المتحدة من خلال اليونسترال ان تجعله نظاما موحدا لتوحيد الحلول القا
ي مجال بيع انضمام الدول الى هذه الاتفاقية باعتبارها اطار تشريعيا يوفر الثبات التشريعي المنشود ف
  البضائع دوليا.
نظرة فاحصة لهذه الاتفاقية تجعل من الاهمية بمكان القول بضرورة انضمام الدول اليها لتوحيد من هنا فإن  .16
من هنا نوجه الدعوة الى المشرع القطري و  47 الحلول في مجال هو الابرز في ميدان التجارة الدولية.
بضرورة سرعة الانضمام الى اتفاقية البيع الدولي وادماج احكامها في القانون المدني القطري بحيث ينص 
تحت عنوان ( البيع  784يضاف بند (سابعا) بعد المادة  -في هذا القانون بشأن عقود البيع على مايلي: 
 الدولي ) تحدد فيه : 
 البيع الدولي  تعريف عقد -
 __________________
 :)GSIC( sdooG fo elaS lanoitanretnI eht rof stcartnoC no noitnevnoC snoitaN detinU ehT ,REGNILAS ahsylA 17
 eht fo tnemlifluf ni dettimbuS ,sisehT hcraeseR ,?52 elcitrA ni ytiliba eeseroF fo emiT tnaveleR eht si tahW
 ,ygolonhceT fo ytisrevinU eht ta waL fo ytlucaF ,1102 retsemeS nmutuA ,sisehT hcraeseR 04067 rof stnemeriuqer
 .92.P ,1102,yendyS ,yendyS ygolonhceT fo ytisrevinU ta waL fo ytlucaF ,sagemeleF nhoJ rD :rosivrepuS ,yendyS
  .fdp.regnilas/oilbib/gsic/ude.ecap.wal.gsic.www//:ptth  no dehsilbuP
27
  انظر: محكمة استئناف غرونوبل  الفرنسية: الدائرة التجارية، قرار صادر بتاريخ 22فبراير 5991 في قضية شركة سارل  
بري برودكشن ضد شركة بان افريكا اكسبورت، منشور في مجموعة السوابق القضائية المستندة إلى نصوص الأونسيترال 
. متاح 7، ص 6991نون التجاري الدولي، منشورات الامم المتحدة، فيينا، (كلاوت) ، التي تصدر عن لجنة الامم المتحدة للقا
  .lmth.wal_esac/ra/larticnu/gro.larticnu.www//:ptthالكترونيا على الرابط الالكتروني      
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 محمود دودين، الاخلال المبتسر للع قد: تحليل مقارن بين الوثائق الدولية الموحدة للبيوع والقانونين المدني والتجاري القطريين، 
، متاحة الكترونيا على 5102 –دراسة منشورة في المجلة الدولية للقانون الصادرة عن كلية القانون بجامعة قطر، العدد الأول 
  . 7102يناير  8. تاريخ اخر زياة 7ص   6.5102.lri/9335.01/fdp/iod/moc.ecneicsq.www//:ptthالرابط  
47
  وعلى غرار هذه الاتفاقية اتت نصوص مبادئ اليونيدروا كمحاولة لتوحيد المبادئ القانونية المتصلة بعقود التجارة الدولية،  
على عقود التجارة الدولية، بحث منشور في مجلة الحقوق  4002بادئ اليونيدروا لعام انظر: د.أمين دواس، نطاق تطبيق م
، 8002، منشورات جامعة الكويت، الكويت، 8002يونيو  -2الكويتية، الصادرة عن مجلس النشر العلمي بجامعة الكويت، العدد
  والمراجع المشار اليها لديه. 293ص
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 نطاق هذا العقد   -
 اطرافه  -
 القيمة القانونية لتبادل العرض وقبوله   -
 التزامات الطرفين في العقد  -
 الاثار المترتبة عن الإخلال بالعقد -
  تبعة الهلاك وانتقالها  -
 اثر الإخلال المتوقع بالعقد -
 التعويضات -
 الإعفاء من تنفيذ العقد -
 مدى تطلب الشكلية في هذا العقد . -
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Session 12 — Approaches to keeping UNCITRAL texts up to date 
 
 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and public procurement regulation: the division of public 
contracts into lots 
 
Martin Trybus, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom 
 
 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) are at the heart of the economy of any country. 
Moreover, they create significantly more employment than larger companies, train more people, and 
provide economic stability even during an economic crisis. SMEs are therefore also essential for a 
sustainable economy. However, their share of public contracts is often deemed insufficient.  
 
 Legislative techniques directed at increasing the participation of SMEs in public procurement 
include: the division of larger contracts into smaller lots, the reduction of ‘red tape’ bureaucratic hurdles, 
the limitation of participation requirements, requirements regarding the supply chain — such as direct 
payments to subcontractors, and reserving contracts to SMEs. This paper discusses one of these techniques: 
the division of contracts into lots.  
 
 Neither the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement nor the techniques to favour SMEs 
covered in the Guide to Enactment (at 5-6) provide for the division into lots. In many countries, it is not 
practiced. This is also because the division into lots may have disadvantages. It might undermine the 
effectiveness of procurement when it is not technically or economically feasible, when the number or size 
of the lots is not geared towards the market in which they are to generate competition, or when the different 
components of a contract are highly dependent on each other and there is a need to coordinate them. 
Awarding a larger contract lowers administrative costs and increases buying power and economies of scale. 
 
 However, it is argued that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement (with a basic provision) and 
Guide to Enactment (setting out details) should provide for the division into lots to increase SME 
participation in public procurement, based on the EU model. While the previous Directive 2014/18/EC 
merely tolerated the technique, Article 46(1) of the new EU Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU now 
expressly and specifically provides that contracting authorities may award contracts divided into separate 
lots while they are free to determine the size and subject-matter of such lots. According to Article 46(4) 
Directive 2014/24/EU, EU Member States may also require rather than just allow the division into separate 
lots in their national laws transposing the Directive. Therefore, France and Germany could continue their 
already long-standing regimes of compulsory division into lots. However, in cases in which this has not 
been made obligatory by the transposing national law, such as in the UK or Austria, contracting authorities 
shall indicate the main reasons for their decision not to divide into lots. This means that, while the default 
approach suggested by the Directive is the division into lots and Member States have the option to make 
this obligatory for all or parts of the contracts subject to the Directive and their transposing national laws, 
the new Directive does not require the division into lots, as the decision not to divide a contract into lots 
merely requires a communication of the reasons, the “divide or explain principle”. If the contract is divided, 
bids for multiple lots are allowed to keep large companies interested while encouraging SME participation.  
 
 First, economic theory supports the division into lots. Public contracts can be complex and of 
substantial size and value, requiring considerable financial resources and technical expertise. SMEs will 
often be excluded from these contracts simply because they lack the capacity to manage such a large 
contract in its entirety. Therefore, there is some indication that a division of large public contracts into 
smaller lots — geographical lots, and/or technical lots — would extend the supplier and provider base 
beyond large companies to SMEs. This could increase competition and value for money, provided the 
division has no parallel negative effects on competition, especially due to collusion. However, there is yet 
no conclusive empirical evidence that division into lots increases SME participation.  
 
 Second, the division into lots is preferable compared to most other techniques to increase SME 
participation. Techniques that aim to promote SMEs as subcontractors by intervening in the supply chain 
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are too intrusive. This could undermine competition by discouraging the large companies acting as prime 
contractors from bidding for public contracts, and might even be the case for the requirement of direct 
payments to subcontractors. Cutting red tape, for example through the new European Single Procurement 
Document, may help SMEs, as it also helps large companies, but will not be sufficient on its own to increase 
SME participation. The reduction of participation requirements, such as minimum turnover — for example 
twice the turnover of the contract value — may increase SME participation but may compromise the 
interests of contracting entities in capable economic operators. Margins of preference for SMEs, for 
example allowing the most competitive SME to be x% more expensive than the most competitive large 
company, compromise competition and violate international trade principles. This is even more so when 
certain categories of contracts are completely reserved to SMEs. Finally, not including any technique to 
promote SME participation might permanently compromise competition and efficiency as SMEs continue 
not to bid for public contracts.  
 
 Finally, the division of larger contracts into smaller lots is politically attractive. While not violating 
obligations under international trade agreements, politicians and lawmakers of any political persuasion can 
do something for SMEs. This is important because these SMEs are or employ their voters. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Procurement should introduce the outlined flexible EU approach to the division into lots. 
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Dutch PPP tendering infrastructure into the equation 
 
Marcelle van Valkenburg and Marijke Nagelkerke, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, The 
Netherlands  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The member states of the EU countries have incorporated the EU Directive on public procurement 
2014/24/EU 1 (hereinafter: EU Procurement Directive) in their national tender laws. In the Netherlands, 
tendering PPP infrastructure projects is currently based on tendering DBFM-contracts with the use of the 
competitive dialogue2. The aim of PPP contracts is to achieve value for money, which so far seems to be 
mostly accomplished in the Netherlands3. Other EU countries use the competitive dialogue4 for tendering 
PPP contracts as well, while some EU countries5 also use the ‘competitive procedure with negotiation’6. 
Although there are some differences, these two procedures are largely the same7. For the sake of limiting 
this paper however, the scope of this paper will be restricted to the competitive dialogue. 
 
 Companies participating in PPP tenders throughout Europe, are familiar with the EU Procurement 
Directive and the competitive dialogue. Next to the EU Procurement Directives other international tender 
regulations exist. One being the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, with the purpose of 
progressive harmonization and modernization of international trade, which Model Law is an important 
international benchmark in procurement law reform8. As PPP is used worldwide it would obviously enhance 
inclusive competitiveness if applicable procurement regulations could be uniform worldwide. It is therefore 
interesting to compare the differences between these regulations to see if they may be further harmonised 
and modernised by profiting from each other’s drafts. The ‘request to proposals with dialogue’ procedure, 
as regulated in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, is largely comparable to the (EU) 
competitive dialogue.  
 
 The defining question of this paper therefore is “how does the procedure ‘request for proposals 
with dialogue’ compare with the competitive dialogue and what can be learned from this comparison 
towards inclusive competitiveness by harmonising and modernising tender law applicable for PPP?” 
 
 The findings in this paper have been based on literature research, evaluations on the application of the 
competitive dialogue and long-term experience in tendering PPP projects and PPP policy of both authors. 
 
 Firstly in this paper the current Dutch tendering practice of PPP infrastructure projects are explained. 
Secondly the applicable provisions regarding the ‘request to proposals with dialogue’ in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Public Procurement are compared to the competitive dialogue on the subjects of grounds for 
use, award criteria, the procedure requirements and confidentiality. These subjects have been chosen 
because they comprise the core elements of the tender procedures to be compared. Finally conclusions will 
be drawn, including some advice for adaption of both regulations. 
 
__________________ 
1
  Next to EU Directive 2014/24/EU (Public Procurement) also EU Directive 2014/23/EU (Concession Contracts) 
and 2014/25/EU (Special Sectors). 
2
  Incorporated in the Dutch Procurement Act 2012 (in Dutch: Aanbestedingswet 2012)  
3
  Paragraph 1.3 Progress Report DBFM(O) 2016-2017 (in Dutch: Voortgangsrapportage DBFM(O) 2016-2017) 
reports a financial value for money of 10-15%, which is up to 2016 € 1,5 billion of approximately € 13 billion.  
4
  For example the UK, France, Belgium, Denmark and Sweden.  
5
  For example Germany. 
6
  Article 29 EU Procurement Directive. 
7
  An essential difference is that in the ‘competitive procedure with negotiation’ candidates have to submit an initial 
tender which shall be the basis for the subsequent negotiations, article 29, paragraph 2 and 3 EU Procurement 
Directive.  
8
  UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, United 
Nations, New York, January 2014, page 1. 
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2. Current tendering practice in Dutch PPP projects 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is, i.a. responsible for the 
national highway and waterway network. The Department of Public Works and Water Management (in 
Dutch: Rijkswaterstaat), is this Ministry’s procurement agency and is i.a. responsible for the development 
and maintenance of the national road infrastructure network.  
 
 Since approximately 10 years PPP is one of the approaches of the Dutch government for public 
procurement of large infrastructure and housing projects. For these PPP projects DBFM(O) contracts are 
often used. The government has implemented PPP-contracts with the presupposition that it would be able 
to complete large infrastructure projects faster and more efficiently — i.a. through life cycle costing — with 
the use of PPP9. For a proper use of the private sector’s contribution and to achieve the desired results the 
following principles were formulated:  
 
(1) formulating output based (functional) description of the contracting authority’s requirements; 
(2) using an integral life cycle approach to procurement and project realisation, thus combining the 
consecutive stages (design, build and maintenance), corresponding disciplines (like obtaining 
permits, coordinating relocation of cables and pipelines, stakeholder management, IT etc.) and 
an integral project scope (e.g. an integral scope like a road corridor and total housing concept); 
(3) optimising or broadening the project scope and contract duration in order to obtain value for 
money; 
(4) transferring risks to the party best able to control them; 
(5) payment based on performance instead of products delivered; 
(6) integrating finance into the contract resulting in an actual transfer of risks for an optimal incentive 
for the private sector to control and reduce risks; 
(7) realising mutual cooperation;  
(8) tendering based on price/quality ratio.  
 
2.2 Why the competitive dialogue 
 
 Rijkswaterstaat procures PPP infrastructure projects through the use of the competitive dialogue10. In 
the competitive dialogue any economic operator may submit a request to participate in response to a 
notification of tender. After pre-selection, the procuring authority will establish a dialogue with the 
candidates selected, with the aim to identify and define the means best suited to satisfy its needs. The 
procuring authority may limit the number of suitable candidates. The candidates selected are invited to the 
dialogue. After the dialogue stage candidates will be invited to submit their best and final offer11. 
 
 Since before 2004 the procurement strategy of Rijkswaterstaat has been subject to substantial changes. 
Where it used to be a large somewhat unwieldy and bureaucratic organization, aimed at tendering bills of 
quantity or contracts with detailed specifications and making its own designs, Rijkswaterstaat was required 
to make a substantial change in its performance, size and structure. The government required 
Rijkswaterstaat to become cheaper, smaller and more agile and to transfer more work to the private sector. 
In order to change its structure and performance the policy of Rijkswaterstaat focussed on involving the 
market in an early stage of the project development, based on contracts with functional specifications. It 
was expected that through the use of functional specifications in PPP- and D&C-contracts and an early 
involvement of the private sector the innovative capacity and expert knowledge on e.g. contract realisation 
and -exploitation could be utilised. The principle of approaching the private sector without a clear-cut 
__________________ 
9
  “Final report of the project More Value through Mutual Cooperation (Meer Waarde door Samen Werken)”. (1998) 
Dutch government report. 
10
  Dutch Procurement Act 2012 (in Dutch: Aanbestedingswet 2012).  
11
  Article 1.1 Aanbestedingswet 2012, definition ‘competitive dialogue’. 
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solution incorporated in the contract however necessitates a more tailored tender approach, for which the 
competitive dialogue in particular was seen as the most suitable method. 
 
 The fact that the market is approached without a clear-cut solution in mind in order to invite the private 
sector to devise new and smarter solutions fits the grounds for use of the competitive dialogue12. Use of the 
competitive dialogue by Rijkswaterstaat is based more specifically on the following criteria:  
 
(1) the requirements of the contracting authority cannot be met without adaptation of readily 
available solutions;  
(2) they include design or innovative solutions;  
(3) the contract cannot be awarded without prior negotiations; and 
(4) the technical specifications cannot be established with sufficient precision. 
 
2.3 Overview tender process  
 
 At Rijkswaterstaat the competitive dialogue has been elaborated and optimised over the last 10 years 
in a ‘standardised’ framework procedure the size of which has been limited by stating applicability of the 
Dutch legislation on procurement and its guidelines, more specifically the guideline on the General 
Procurement Regulations for Works 2016 (Dutch abbreviation: ARW 2016). This framework has been laid 
down in its procurement policy for DBFM infrastructure projects, while the use of the ARW 2016 is 
obligatory for all government procurement authorities through the Dutch Procurement Act. The added 
bonus of this regular use of the ARW 2016 is that parties involved in government tenders are fully conversed 
on its contents, which saves time and money as the need for (legal) scrutiny of these rules is reduced. 
 
 The competitive dialogue takes place in successive stages in order to reduce the number of solutions 
to be discussed during the dialogue stage, as the candidates are requested to specify their proposals in the 
form of progressively refined proposals, as explained in the picture below. 
 
 
__________________ 
12
  Article 26 EU Procurement Directive. 
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Industry Day 
 
 Before notification of tender the procuring authority organizes a so called Industry Day to generate 
interest for the tender and to inform possibly interested parties of the PPP project’s scope, targets, 
procurement aims, etc. 
 
Selection stage 
 
 After its notification the tender commences with the selection stage during which candidates can 
qualify for participation in the first stage of the dialogue. Tendering Instructions are digitally provided to 
interested parties. These Tendering Instructions regulate the selection and the following stages of the tender 
procedure. Admission to the first stage of the dialogue is based on an assessment of the grounds of exclusion 
and suitability requirements. These suitability requirements, aimed at ensuring sufficient competition, 
mostly concern: 
 
- economic and financial standing; 
- project management experience; 
- project financing experience. 
 
 The procuring authority invites the candidates in respect of whom no grounds of exclusion apply and 
who meet the suitability requirements to participate in the dialogue. These candidates receive in addition to 
the digital Tendering Instructions the concept contract documents and are given access to a virtual “Data 
Room” on an extranet site with information about the project.  
 
Dialogue stage 
 
 The dialogue is organized in two successive stages: the first and second dialogue stage.  
 
 In the event that more than three candidates satisfy the minimum conditions in the selection stage, the 
number of candidates are reduced to three by way of assessing their shortlisting products in the first dialogue 
stage. During the first dialogues with the procuring authority, the candidates are informed about the tender 
documents in general. The focus of the first dialogue stage is the project as such and the candidates’ 
shortlisting products which must be submitted at the end of this stage. The shortlisting products usually 
exist of a risk management plan in which candidates formulate measures to mitigate the risks as specified 
by the procuring authority and elaborate upon what in their opinion could be good (innovative) 
opportunities for the project. The procuring authority invites the three candidates with the highest 
assessment scores for their shortlisting products to participate in the second dialogue stage. 
 
 During the second stage of the dialogue, the procuring authority completes the content of the DBFM 
contract in more detail in consultation with the candidates. During the dialogue the candidates can discuss 
the admissibility of certain proposals, as well as possible modifications of the DBFM contract13. The 
candidates may submit parts of their offer as a draft for discussion purposes. The objective of the second 
stage of the dialogue is to: 
 
- discuss the principles of the DBFM contract and the final invitation to tender; 
- give the candidates the opportunity to discuss parts of their draft offer; 
- complete the DBFM contract; 
- discuss the process to obtain project finance. 
 
 During this stage, no further shortlisting takes place. On the basis of the results of the dialogue, the 
procuring authority may revise the tender documents identically for all candidates. The procuring authority 
sets out the result of the dialogue in writing in a dialogue report. 
 
__________________ 
13
  Possible modifications are limited as substantial modifications are not allowed after the start of the tender.  
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Tender submission stage 
 
 After conclusion of the second dialogue stage, the procuring authority invites the candidates to submit 
their best and final offers. The objective of this stage is to identify the preferred bidder. The award of the 
project takes place based on the criterion of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT). The 
award criteria are tailor-made for each PPP infrastructure project. In general the criteria concern 
sustainability, stakeholder management, limiting construction/traffic nuisance and risk management. 
 
3. UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement versus EU Procurement Directive 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 Both the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and the EU Procurement Directive provide 
(model) tender law for countries to include in their national legislation. Although the procedure ‘request for 
proposals with dialogue’ corresponds with the competitive dialogue and both tender procedures aim at 
achieving similar objectives, the actual texts and content of specific provisions differ. The UNCITRAL 
procedures ‘Request for proposals with consecutive negotiations’ and ‘Competitive negotiations’14 also 
show similarities with the competitive dialogue. The comparison in this paper is however limited to the 
procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ based on the fact that the ‘request for proposals with 
consecutive negotiations’ is limited to negotiations on price only, while the procedure on ‘competitive 
negotiations’ can only be used in cases of urgent need by the procurement authority15. As a result authors 
consider that there is a higher degree of compatibility of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ 
with the competitive dialogue compared to the other two. 
 
 In this chapter the following subjects — which comprise the core elements of these tender procedures 
— are compared with regard to PPP: 
 
1. the grounds for use of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ versus the competitive 
dialogue; 
2. requirements for the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ versus the competitive 
dialogue; 
3. award criteria; 
4. confidentiality. 
 
 Based on this comparison, some advice is formulated for adaption of both regulations to increase 
inclusive competitiveness by harmonising and modernising tender law. 
 
3.2 Grounds for use of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ versus the competitive dialogue  
 
 The grounds for use of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ are provided in article 30, 
paragraph 2 (Conditions for the use of methods of procurement […] requests for proposals with dialogue 
[…]) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and the grounds for use of the competitive 
dialogue are stipulated in article 26 (Choice of procedures) of the EU Procurement Directive.  
 
 The provision regarding the grounds for use of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ is 
to some extent similar to the grounds for use of the competitive dialogue as it stipulates the following 
conditions for use: 
 
(1) where it is not feasible for the procuring entity to formulate a detailed description of the subject 
matter of the procurement and the procuring entity assesses that dialogue with suppliers or 
contractors is needed to obtain the most satisfactory solution to its procurement needs;  
__________________ 
14
  Articles 50 and 51 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
15
  Article 30, paragraph 4 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
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(2) where the procuring entity seeks to enter into a contract for the purpose of research, experiment, 
study or development, except where the contract includes the production of items in quantities 
sufficient to establish their commercial viability or to recover research and development costs; 
and 
(3) where the procuring entity determines that the selected method is the most appropriate method of 
procurement for the protection of essential security interests of the State; or  
(4) open tendering was engaged in but no tenders were presented or the procurement was cancelled 
and engaging in new open-tendering proceedings would probably not result in a procurement 
contract. 
 
 The grounds for use of both tender procedures allow the procuring authorities to use these procedures 
for PPP projects, for which the market is approached without a clear-cut solution in mind in order to invite 
the private sector to devise new and innovative solutions.  
 
 With regard to the grounds for use the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement offers the 
possibility to apply the procedure ‘request for the proposals with dialogue’ for research objectives, be it 
with substantial restrictions on the scope of these research contracts16. The EU Procurement Directive has 
introduced the so called Innovation Partnership for research objectives17. On the one hand the possible 
scope for research contracts can be substantially extended in comparison to the stipulations in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, as the restrictions on establishing commercial viability 
and recovering research and development costs no longer apply in the EU setting18. On the other hand 
however the procedure applicable to Innovation Partnership is compared to the competitive dialogue less 
open to dialogue on possible solutions offered by the private sector as the basis of the tender for an 
Innovation Partnership is based on the ‘competitive procedure with negotiation’, which requires an initial 
tender which will be subject to negotiations19. In order to be able to submit a viable tender the information 
provided by the procuring authority to the participants needs to be sufficiently precise20, which precision in 
itself limits the possible solutions — some of which may not be known to the procuring authority— offered 
by the private sector.  
 
 In view of the developments within the EU Procurement Directive one could consider removing the 
current restrictions on the contract scope for research objectives for the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement. On the flip side, the EU Procurement Directive could leave more room for determining the 
possible innovative solutions available by incorporating more aspects of the competitive dialogue instead 
of the ‘competitive procedure with negotiation21‘. 
 
3.3 Requirements for the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ versus the competitive dialogue 
 
 The requirements regarding the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ are elaborated in 
article 49 (Request for proposals with dialogue) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and 
the requirements for the competitive dialogue are elaborated in article 30 (Competitive dialogue) of the EU 
Procurement Directive. 
 
 The first issue that comes to mind while comparing both articles is that the EU Procurement Directive 
provision is much more concise. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement contains some overly 
detailed provisions, together with the use of some obscure language, which makes it less easy to understand.  
 
__________________ 
16 
 Article 30, paragraph 2 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
17  
Article 31 EU Procurement Directive. 
18  
Article 31 EU Procurement Directive. 
19
  Article 31, paragraph 3 EU Procurement Directive. 
20
  Article 31, paragraph 1 EU Procurement Directive. 
21
  Article 29 EU Procurement Directive. 
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The EU Procurement Directive in comparison is more to the point. Whether or not the level of detail is 
necessary for provisions in law may be held to scrutiny. Some examples: 
 
- the detailed instructions to be included in the invitation (paragraph 2) compared to paragraph 2 of the 
EU Procurement Directive, which is more concise; 
- the pre-qualification proceedings (paragraph 3) compared to paragraph 1, third and fourth sentences, 
of the EU Procurement Directive, which is more concise; 
- the detailed instructions to be included in the requests for proposal (paragraph 5). 
 
 In the Netherlands the EU Procurement Directives are incorporated in Dutch Procurement Act while 
more detailed instructions — like e.g. the detailed instructions to be included in the tender documents, 
invitation and requests for proposal — are incorporated in general procurement regulations for tenders, 
such as the ARW 201622. It is therefore possible to remove these detailed instructions from article 49 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and incorporate these instructions into either separate 
general regulations or a legislative guide. 
 
 The EU Procurement Directive requires the procuring authority to set out its needs and requirements, 
award criteria and indicative timeframe, in either the contract notice or descriptive document23. Therefore, 
in the tender practice of Rijkswaterstaat, Tendering Instructions including the legal, organizational and 
procedural information necessary for the tenderers to participate in de tender, are issued to the candidates 
upon their request as from the notification of tender. Within EU procurement it is deemed more transparent 
to provide information about the tender procedure — e.g. the award criteria, whether or not the subject 
matter is divided in portions, the currency for the proposal price, the number of candidates to be selected 
— at the very start of the tender. Article 49 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement requires 
the procuring authorities to limit inclusion of this kind of information in the request for proposals, so after 
the pre-qualification24. For transparency purposes this article could be adapted in accordance with the 
transparency requirements from the EU Procurement Directive. 
 
 The procedure ‘request for proposal with dialogue’ is required to start with a request for proposals 
after pre-selection25. In lieu of the room for dialogue as stipulated in the EU Procurement Directive26 there 
seems to be no opportunity for a dialogue between the procuring authority and the pre-selected candidates 
before the (first) proposals have to be submitted.  
 
 Furthermore the procedure ‘request for proposal with dialogue’ is based on a more traditional approach 
of pre-selecting participants on the basis of their qualifications only (e.g. based on the level of past 
experience). This may have as a consequence that new companies and companies which would like to 
expand onto a new field of expertise do not really stand a chance to compete with large and or experienced 
companies, while these companies might have certain innovations to offer. By using the opportunity offered 
by the competitive dialogue to reduce the number of solutions in successive stages27 parties are selected 
because of submitting the best solutions irrespective of the length of their experience in a specific field. 
 
 Lack of dialogue before the initial proposal may also mean that there is no opportunity to explain and 
discuss the needs and requirements of the procuring authority. This may leave room for misunderstandings. 
The procuring authority must have a clear view of its needs and requirements from the start, resulting in 
less room for approaching the private sector without a clear-cut solution incorporated in the contract. Some 
__________________ 
22  
General Procurement Regulations for Works 2016 (in Dutch: Aanbestedingsreglement Werken 2016 (ARW 
2016)).
.
 
23 
 Article 30, paragraph 2 EU Procurement Directive.
.
 
24
  Article 49, paragraph 5 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. 
25 
 Article 49, paragraph 4 until 7 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.
. 
26  
Article 30, paragraph 4 EU Procurement Directive. 
27 
 Article 30, paragraph 4 EU Procurement Directive, states: competitive dialogues may take place in successive 
stages in order to reduce the number of solutions to be discussed during the dialogue stage by applying the award 
criteria laid down in the contract notice or in the descriptive document.  
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smart and/or innovative solutions may not completely fit within the initial requirements despite being 
attractive for the procuring authority. As there is no room for dialogue, the procuring authority will not 
know how to adapt unintentionally restrictive requirements. These limitations do not seem to be consistent 
with the following grounds for use of the procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’:  
 
(a) “it is not feasible for the procuring entity to formulate a detailed description of the subject matter 
of the procurement […], and the procuring entity assesses that dialogue with suppliers or contractors is 
needed to obtain the most satisfactory solution to its procurement needs; 
 
(b) the procuring entity seeks to enter into a contract for the purpose of research, experiment, study 
or development, except where the contract includes the production of items in quantities sufficient to 
establish their commercial viability or to recover research and development costs”28. 
 
 The requirement to start with a request for proposals after the pre-selection is comparable to the 
requirement regarding the ‘competitive procedure with negotiation’29, where it is stipulated that candidates 
have to submit an initial tender which shall be the basis for the subsequent negotiations30. However, the 
‘competitive procedure with negotiation’ is meant to be used for less innovative, more clear-cut projects in 
a mature market. 
 
 In order to solve the above mentioned inconsistencies it could be considered to adapt the provisions in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement to allow the dialogue stage to take place in successive 
stages in order to reduce the number of solutions and or candidates to be discussed during the dialogue 
stage by applying the award criteria in accordance with article 30 of the EU Procurement Directive. 
 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement requires that the “dialogue shall be conducted by 
the same representatives of the procuring entity on a concurrent basis”31. This seems to aim at maintaining 
a consistent make-up of the dialogue team of the procuring authority during the dialogue and by extension 
of the dialogue itself. This requirement however may also be unnecessarily restrictive. This kind of 
consistency is difficult to uphold as employees and consultants may change jobs, get ill or leave the dialogue 
team for other reasons. There are other measures to ensure consistency in the dialogue. In the Netherlands 
for example the procuring authority makes sure that the key players in the tender and dialogue team have 
deputies, which can step in if necessary. Consistency may also be upheld by allowing informal, specialist 
dialogue meetings - in which specific technical, legal, financial, or other subjects regarding the contract can 
informally be discussed between specialists of the candidates and the procuring authority - while only issues 
decided upon by the dialogue team can be legally binding. The details of these organizational measures are 
not provided for in the EU Procurement Directive. As long as the principles of the EU Procurement 
Directive are upheld procuring authorities have freedom to establish their own tender organizations. With 
this in mind, the UNCITRAL paragraph seems too restrictive and could in our opinion be removed. 
 
 The procedure ‘request for proposals with dialogue’ should include “any element of the description of 
the subject matter of the procurement or term or condition of the procurement contract that will not be the 
subject of dialogue during the procedure32“. Moreover it is not allowed to “modify the subject matter of the 
procurement” or “any element of the description of the subject matter of the procurement or any term or 
condition of the procurement contract that is not subject to the dialogue as specified in the request for 
proposals33“. These requirements seem to aim at restricting the dialogue, in order to make sure that no 
substantial modifications of the contract will take place. However these requirements may be unnecessarily 
restrictive. Despite a thorough preparation of the tender it may not be foreseeable that some elements need 
to be subject of dialogue after all, e.g. for clarification purposes. This is inherent to the principle of 
__________________ 
28
  Article 30, paragraph 2 sub (a) UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. 
29  
Article 29 EU Procurement Directive. 
30
  Article 29, paragraph 2 and 3 EU Procurement Directive.  
31
  Article 49, paragraph 8 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
32
  Article 49, paragraph 5 sub (f) UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement . 
33
  Article 49, paragraph 9 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
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approaching the private sector without a clear-cut solution incorporated in the contract to give room to 
innovative solutions of the market parties, of which the procuring authority is as yet unaware. In 
comparison, the EU “substantial modification” doctrine34, which is based on long term EU jurisprudence 
and allows modifications to a certain extent, is a sound framework for how this doctrine could be included 
in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. 
 
 Furthermore paragraph 12 of article 49 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement seems 
too restrictive for complex contracts, especially when the tender is based on involving the market in an 
early stage of determining the procurement authority’s needs and requirements, without the aforementioned 
clear-cut solution. Why should the procuring entity not be able to negotiate any changes, clarifications or 
refinements at all in the final offer? Of course the room for manoeuvre that procuring authorities have after 
the submission of a final offer is fairly limited. Fundamental changes cannot be made, but in (complex) 
procurement — like PPP — there should be room for some final adjustments to tenders (fine-tuning). The 
EU Procurement Directive allows adjustments to final tenders after the dialogue stage has been concluded, 
provided the essential aspects of the tender are not changed and that the adjustments are not likely to distort 
competition or have a discriminatory effect35. The argument that there already has been an entire dialogue 
stage prior to the tenders in which (preliminary) offers can be fully synchronized to the requirements fails 
to observe the economical facts. Considering the complexity of the tenders, the available time in the tender 
procedure and the need to limit transaction costs it is highly unlikely that tenders are fully elaborated and 
discussed during the dialogue. On top of that participants will want to further optimise their solutions. The 
procuring authority may also want to partly fine-tune its output specifications on the basis of progressive 
understanding. It could be considered to adapt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement in 
similar fashion to allow adjustments to final tenders after the dialogue stage has been concluded, provided 
that the essential aspects of the tender are not changed and that the adjustments are not likely to distort 
competition or have a discriminatory effect. 
 
3.4 Award Criteria 
 
 The award criteria for tenders are elaborated in article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement and article 67 of the EU Procurement Directive. 
 
 Both regulations give room for tailor made elaboration of award criteria relating to either just price or 
(life cycle) costs or the best price-quality ratio, which is called the most economically advantageous tender 
(MEAT) in the EU Procurement Directive. Both regulations give examples of possible award criteria and 
require that the criteria are linked to the subject matter of the contract. However, the examples given in the 
EU Procurement Directive are somewhat broader than the examples given in the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Public Procurement, for example those with regard to the “social aspects” and “quality”. 
 
 On the other hand however, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement leaves more room for 
listing all evaluation criteria in descending order of importance, instead of specifying the relative weights 
of the criteria. In comparison the EU Procurement Directive only allows this if weighting is not possible 
for objective reasons. For simplification’s sake it could seem attractive to adapt the EU Procurement 
Directive in order to suffice with listing the evaluation criteria in descending order of importance. Whether 
this would lead to improved tender results however is up for debate. Before deciding on such a 
simplification it would therefore be advisable to research the tender results from the use of both methods. 
 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement provides a practical guideline with “to the extent 
practicable, all non-price evaluation criteria shall be objective, quantifiable and expressed in monetary 
terms36“. This guideline could be a very useful tool for the EU Procurement Directive as well. 
 
__________________ 
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  Article 72, paragraph 4 sub (a) EU Procurement Directive.  
35
  Article 30, paragraph 6 EU Procurement Directive. 
36
  Article 11, paragraph 4 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
  
382 
 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement allows the procuring authority “a margin of 
preference for the benefit of domestic suppliers or contractors or for domestically produced goods, or any 
other preference, if authorized or required by the procurement regulations or other provisions of law of this 
State37“. This preferential treatment for domestic suppliers or contractors is not allowed according to the 
stipulations of the EU Procurement Directive, because it is deemed to conflict with the non-discriminatory 
principle. The non-discriminatory principle is firmly based on the EU Treaty, which has realising an open 
internal EU-market as one of its founding principles38. Furthermore it is unclear in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Public Procurement which procurement regulations are meant with the provision stating “the 
margin of preference shall be calculated in accordance with the procurement regulations”. As preferential 
treatment of domestic suppliers or contractors is an anathema to one of the founding principles of the Treaty 
on the EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, for harmonisation purposes it could be considered 
to remove said provision in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. 
 
3.5 Confidentiality 
 
 Confidentiality of information communicated by candidates who participate in a tender is elaborated 
in article 24 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and articles 21 and article 30, paragraph 3, 
of the EU Procurement Directive. 
 
 Both regulations provide which information supplied by the candidates participating in a tender, and 
more specifically, during the dialogues, has to be considered confidential. However, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Public Procurement seems unnecessary restrictive, as it states: “Any discussions, communications, 
negotiations or dialogue between the procuring entity and a supplier or contractor […] shall be 
confidential. Unless required by law or ordered by the [name of the court or courts] or the [name of the 
relevant organ designated by the enacting State], no party to any such discussions, communications, 
negotiations or dialogue shall disclose to any other person any technical, price or other information 
relating to these discussions, communications, negotiations or dialogue without the consent of the other 
party39“. While it makes sense to make an exception when disclosure of information is required by national 
law or court, it seems too restricting to order all communication during the dialogues as confidential. 
Namely, it is possible that subjects discussed during the dialogue are not confidential. Some information 
the procuring authority may even be obliged to share with the other candidates, to ensure equality of 
treatment among all candidates. An example may be that information provided by one of the candidates 
concerns an error in the contract or tender document of which the procuring authority must inform the other 
candidates. Of course confidential information about the solutions planned or proposed by the candidate or 
other commercially sensitive information has to be kept confidential, but a general clause that all 
communication during the dialogue is confidential can be too restrictive. In this case the wording of the EU 
Procurement Directive seems more balanced: “the contracting authority shall not disclose information 
forwarded to it by economic operators which they have designated as confidential, including, but not limited 
to, technical or trade secrets and the confidential aspects of tenders40“. There is the possibility within the 
EU Procurement Directive to agree upon disclosure of confidential information, however this agreement 
may not take the form of a general waiver41. This means that information that is not confidential, like 
information that does not concern solutions, technical or trade secrets, confidential aspects of tenders or 
other confidential information, does not have to be kept confidential. In this light it could be considered to 
adapt the UNCITRAL provision accordingly. 
 
__________________ 
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  Article 11, paragraph 3 sub (b) UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
38
  Article 3, paragraph 3 Treaty on the EU and article 18 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.  
39
  Article 24, paragraph 3 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement.  
40
  Article 21, paragraph 1 EU Procurement Directive. 
41
  Article 30, paragraph 3 EU Procurement Directive, states: contracting authorities shall not reveal to the other 
participants solutions proposed or other confidential information communicated by a candidate or tender er 
participating in the dialogue without its agreement. Such agreement shall not take the form of a general waiver 
but shall be given with reference to the intended communication of specific information.  
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4. Conclusions  
 
 In the Netherlands the national Procurement Act is based on the EU Procurement Directives42. The EU 
Procurement Directives correspond with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement on the other hand does 
not completely correspond with both the EU Procurement Directives or the GATT. Use of language, 
definitions, (names of) tender procedures, etc. are different. However, although the distinctive regulations 
have similar objectives aimed at achieving fair competition, transparency and equality, legislative 
harmonisation is not complete. We therefore advise to update the Model Law and align it with both the EU 
Procurement Directives and the GATT. Updating the Model Law could also be used to obtain a regulation 
more easily understood. In addition it could result in actual legislative harmonisation by a large part of the 
international community as the EU Procurement Directives are already in use and known to a large part of 
the private sector. Companies participating in PPP tenders throughout Europe, are familiar with the EU 
Procurement Directive and the competitive dialogue. As PPP is used worldwide it would obviously enhance 
inclusive competitiveness if procurement regulations could be uniform worldwide.  
 
 In the previous chapter several examples have been illustrated of specific provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and the EU Procurement Directive which could be 
harmonised and even modernised. In our view, these examples show that both regulations can profit from 
each other’s drafts. We therefore also advise to compare the remainder of the regulations of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Public Procurement with the EU Procurement Directives. The resulting harmonisation and 
modernisation could further enhance worldwide inclusive competitiveness in public procurement.  
 
 In order to obtain regulations more easily understood the more detailed instructions incorporated in 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement could be removed from the Model Law itself and 
included in general regulations and (legislative) guidelines for tenders, like this has been done in the 
Netherlands43. Uniform procurement regulations available for each tender procedure can also promote 
efficiency in preparing and conducting (individual) tenders as procurement agencies could suffice with 
simply declaring these regulations applicable to a specific tender procedure. Especially when these 
procurement regulations are drafted in a way so that they can be used irrespective of the applicable national 
laws, or with very little adjustments, it would make life a lot easier for many procurement authorities. 
 
 Finally, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement uses somewhat obscure language which 
makes it difficult for people — not being proficient in English — to quickly and easily grasp the essence 
and finesse of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement. This difficulty is somewhat less of a 
problem with the EU Procurement Directive. Should the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement 
be updated simplification of the language used should also be given attention. 
 
 
__________________ 
42
  EU Directive 2014/24/EU (Public Procurement) also EU Directive 2014/23/EU (Concession Contracts) and 
2014/25/EU (Special Sectors). 
43 
 General Procurement Regulations for Works 2016 (in Dutch: Aanbestedingsreglement Werken 2016 (ARW 
2016)). 
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